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Abstract 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the significance of the logical 
phenomenon of paradox for law and its relation to politics. I examine a selection of 
formal legal and political theories that in different ways understand law as a totality 
of norms, communications or behaviors, how paradox emerges in these theories, and 
what implications their understanding of paradox has for the relationship between 
law and politics. I argue that these legal and political theories can be meaningfully 
and in a novel way grouped according to their orientation to legal totality and 
paradox.  
To my knowledge, there is no research systematically mapping orientations to 
paradox in legal theory. It is the objective of this dissertation to fill this lack. Paradox 
presents challenges for formal thought, i.e. thought that analyzes the logic of 
totalities. Law, considered as a totality or form, gathers a plurality of entities under a 
common denominator and into a legal order. It is in reflecting on such formalization 
that we encounter paradoxes. This work aims to contribute to a growing literature on 
the implications of formalism for contemporary social and political thought by 
providing a legal theoretical perspective hitherto missing in these discussions. 
I use as a heuristic device a grouping of formal thought presented by the 
philosopher Paul M. Livingston. According to this grouping, there are three main 
orientations in contemporary formal thought to totality: the constructivist-
criteriological, the paradoxico-critical and the generic orientation. These orientations 
arise on grounds of the “metalogical choice”: they prefer to view totality (such as law 
as a system or order) either as complete but inconsistent (the paradoxico-criticism), 
or as consistent but incomplete (the constructivist-criteriological and the generic 
orientation). I will apply, and modify when necessary, this categorization in order to 
analyze the theories of Hans Kelsen, Niklas Luhmann, Giorgio Agamben, Alain 
Badiou and Hans Lindahl, and to provide a systematic mapping of how the nature of 
law as a totality is understood in contemporary formal legal-political thought. 
Accounts of modern law encounter a paradox, I argue, if they observe law as an 
autonomous, self-referential totality that claims for itself the right to draw a 
distinction between itself and non-law. The paradox of autonomous law is that it 
cannot consistently show that it is itself legal as a totality. The basic problem that this 
implies is that the legal system or collective is unable to legitimate its existence and 
identity in response to challenges in any other way than by drawing on its own 
resources – which precisely is what the challenge targets in the first place. If we think 
of law as offering a framework within which questions of justice and injustice can be 
answered, the paradox emerges when we question the justice of this framework itself. 
The dissertation defends the paradoxico-critical orientation. It argues that the 
legal system is a paradoxical totality, which implies that there is no neutral 
metalanguage, such as natural law, that could solve the problem of law’s self-
reference for good. This challenges legal theory to show how the problem of nihilistic 
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relativism, the mere perpetuation of the self-referential legal system, can be 
mitigated and law’s normative authority in society rethought.  
In Chapter 1, I define the notion of paradox, explicate its meaning and role in 
formal thought and motivate its application to legal theory. In Chapter 2, I show that 
in his theory of the basic norm, Kelsen can be understood as oscillating between the 
constructivist-criteriological position and the paradoxico-criticism, between an 
attempt at guaranteeing legal order’s consistency in a metalanguage, i.e. legal 
science, and an acknowledgement of law as an inconsistent totality. In Chapter 3, I 
interpret Luhmann as a paradoxico-evolutionary thinker: he observes the legal 
system as constitutively inconsistent but emphasizes the ways in which the system 
seeks to make this inconsistency unproblematic for functional reasons. In Chapter 4, 
I show that in systems theory, just like in Kelsen’s pure theory, the politics of the 
paradox remains unarticulated. I also show that, for Agamben, a paradoxico-critical 
thinker, the paradoxical articulation of law and politics is exposed in the state of 
exception, which, in his analysis, has become the new normal, requiring “messianic” 
politics to deactivate the whole nihilistic sovereign-legal apparatus. For Badiou, the 
representative of the generic orientation, which I discuss in Chapter 5, what can be 
said within a language, and by implication a legal system, is pre-determined by that 
language. Politics, the desire to say the unsayable, is thrown fully outside the 
language and the legal system to a position from which law’s incompleteness, its 
incapacity to offer space for justice and politics, can only be disclosed. Both Agamben 
and Badiou, thus, think about politics as “post-juridical.” In Chapter 6, I show that 
the very inconsistency and paradox at the heart of the legal order is, for Lindahl’s 
paradoxico-criticism, the site of the politics of its limits. This dissertation, then, 
concludes that the paradoxical limits of the legal totality can be understood as the 
site of politics in law. Taking law’s paradox into account allows for a non-nihilistic 
conception of politically contestable law and legal authority. 
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1. Introduction: Modern formalism, law and the logic of paradox
1.1 Introduction 
In this work, my aim is to analyze the significance of the logical phenomenon of 
paradox for law. I will study a selection of formal legal and political theories, how they 
understand paradox in law, what implications their understanding of paradox has for 
law and how their chosen orientation to law as a totality of norms, communications or 
behaviors affects their understanding of the relationship between law and politics. I 
will argue that legal and political theories can be meaningfully grouped according to 
their orientation to legal totality and paradox, and that paradox brings out interesting 
differences between them. This approach allows me, on the one hand, to group 
theories of law and politics that in different ways acknowledge modern law’s 
paradoxical nature and to think through the significance of this extraordinary logical 
phenomenon for legal operation. On the other hand, it allows me to distinguish these 
theories from those that regard law as a consistent, albeit incomplete, totality.  
It is my hypothesis that paradoxes are not merely of theoretical interest to 
logicians, mathematicians and philosophers, but that they have practical, social, legal 
and even political dimensions, and much of our practical lives can, in fact, be 
understood as being confronted with paradoxes and trying to navigate our ways 
around or “within” them. As we will see, there are different definitions and 
understandings of paradox. But if we look at the concrete effects that a paradox may 
have, we can understand it as an indifferent difference or an inoperative distinction 
that suspends how the distinction normally works, which is to bring out some features 
of interest and leave out others. Therefore, a paradox makes the distinction thematic 
as such, as a distinction with two sides of which one is normally preferred to the other. 
Distinctions are like tools that orient us, making it possible to, say, perceive a 
person as a woman rather than as a man and act accordingly (whatever that may mean 
for the observer in question). Much like tools that can break or go missing, impeding 
the continuation of what it is that we are doing with their help, our distinctions can 
lose their orienting force. Encountering a paradox is one such moment of 
disorientation and “inoperativity.” However, encountering a paradox is not necessarily 
simply an aporia, a dead end, but also an occasion for reconsidering the direction that 
the praxis ought to take. Legal paradoxes are ultimately moments of the political in 
law, or so I will argue, because their appearance arrests the operating distinctions, 
putting in question the very form that orients legal practice, thereby making possible 
new distinctions, re-orienting the legal practice in a situation where absolutely fixed 
points of reference for that praxis are lacking. Paradoxes reveal the contingency of the 
distinctions with which law works and that constitute its identity.  
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Paradox has been a rather marginal research topic in legal theory. There have 
been discussions in legal theory both of the “analytical” and “continental” bent around 
such paradoxes as rule-following, exception/sovereignty and constituent power, the 
first two of which I introduce in the next subsection. To my knowledge, there is, 
however, no research attempting more systematically to map orientations to paradox 
in legal theory1 and study the implications of the choice of orientation for the theory 
in question. It is the objective of this dissertation to fill this lack.  
I have chosen to study a selection of legal and political theorists — Hans Kelsen, 
Niklas Luhmann, Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou and Hans Lindahl — in whose work 
paradox is either central or its significance is marginalized with theoretical techniques 
and choices that have significant implications for how they perceive the relation 
between law and politics. Other thinkers could have been selected as well, in particular 
Jacques Derrida, but I believe that the chosen authors represent an interesting variety 
of theoretical orientations to legal totality and paradox and that grouping them 
together for analysis allows for a fresh mapping of contemporary legal and political 
thought.   
I have decided to label these thinkers “formalists,” not because they are all 
conventionally referred to as such (in fact, only Kelsen, and sometimes Luhmann and 
Badiou, are), but because I think they all in different ways address the nature of 
totality that groups a multiplicity of entities, whether norms, individuals, 
communications or behaviors, together under a common banner. As we will see, 
paradoxes arise at the limits of totalities. Paradox poses problems precisely for formal 
thought, the thought that analyzes the logic of totalities. Law, if considered as a totality 
or form, gathers a plurality of entities under a common denominator, and when we 
reflect on such formalization, we encounter paradoxes. This work thus aims to 
contribute to a growing literature on the implications of formalism for contemporary 
social and political thought by providing a legal theoretical perspective hitherto 
missing from these discussions (see in particular Livingston, 2012; Prozorov, 2013a 
and 2013b).      
In this introductory chapter, I will first discuss two famous paradoxes, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule-following and Carl Schmitt’s paradox of the 
exception/sovereign. After that, I shortly study paradox in modern formal logic and 
mathematics, present a definition of the paradox and discuss the notion of formalism 
in order to motivate the argument that there are, indeed, different possible 
orientations to totality and paradox with different implications for the relations 
between law and politics. Then, I introduce a mapping of the orientations to the nature 
of totality, based on the work of the logician and philosopher Paul M. Livingston, 
which I will use as a heuristic tool, and redefine some key concepts so that this 
mapping will be applicable to legal theory as well. I finish by presenting the structure 
of the dissertation.  
1 There are studies that analyze, for example, Niklas Luhmann’s and Jacques Derrida’s 
conceptions of paradox (Teubner, 2006; Teubner, 2001b; Kastner, 2006), as well as more general 
discussions of paradoxes in law (e.g. Perez & Teubner, 2006; Fletcher, 1985). Perhaps the most 
extensive treatment of paradox in law can be found in systems theoretical literature that we will 
investigate in Chapter 3. 
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1.2 How to follow a rule correctly and other paradoxes in legal theory 
1.2.1 Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule-following 
Like so many people in our contemporary world, I sometimes allow myself to 
procrastinate by scrolling through my Facebook newsfeed. Some time ago, there 
appeared a sort of homemade “IQ test” that asked its readers to continue a series of 
simple arithmetic equations and motivated people to complete the test by claiming 





The idea was, as always in these kinds of “tests,” to come up with the rule that 
the given set of equations supposedly implies and continue the series in accordance 
with this rule. Scrolling through the responses to this post showed, as expected, a 
variation in the proposed solution. Which of these was correct? I could easily identify 
two different rules implied by the calculations and hence two different responses to 
the last calculation, both at least seemingly equally well grounded but with different 
interpretations of the rule that the given equations imply: 34 and 45 (I leave it to the 
reader to figure out the content of the rule in each case). And there is no reason why 
yet other responses with different justifications could not be imagined. Yet, the whole 
idea of a test that “almost all would fail” certainly was that a determinate, 
unambiguous rule, although perhaps difficult to discover, was implied by the given 
calculations and that a single correct answer to the last calculation could be found on 
the basis of that rule. 
This Facebook witticism was, probably unintentionally, recycling what is 
known as Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule-following. In his Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein plays with the observation that simple sequences of 
numbers can be continued in different ways by variously interpreting the rule the 
sequences are supposed to express. He then famously concludes: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. The 
answer was: if every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, 
then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And so there would be neither 
accord nor conflict here. (Wittgenstein, 2009, § 201) 
The paradox is that “‘whatever I do can, on some interpretation [of the rule], be 
made compatible with the rule’” (Wittgenstein, 2009, § 198). The given sequence of 
simple equations (signs) that in my example — similar to what Wittgenstein himself 
discusses — were supposed to unambiguously express a determinate rule in order to 
solve the last equation correctly, turns out to be consistent with multiple 
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interpretations (meanings). It does not help to try to justify the choice of one 
interpretation over others with reference to yet another, higher rule, for the same 
problem of the undecidability of interpretation of the rule only re-emerges, ad 
infinitum. Grounds for a choice that excludes alternatives can always be questioned. 
If a set of signs itself is not able to control how it is continued, and if the attempt to go 
one level up only repeats the problem, the set allows for contradictory continuations. 
However, behavior as rule-following and rule-application is supposed to be about 
being guided by the rule in a specific way. A rule counts as nil if it does not 
discriminate among possibilities of conduct, if it cannot control how it is to be applied 
and followed in an open set of continuously new situations. Wittgenstein’s paradox 
exposes the inability of the rule to control only on the basis of its past applications how 
it is applied and followed in a new case.  
This paradox has been extensively discussed in the philosophy of language. It 
has been understood, for example, to challenge philosophers to clarify how “correct” 
language use is possible at all and how skepticism about meaningful language use can 
be avoided (e.g. Wright, 1980; Kripke, 1982; McDowell, 1984). Wittgenstein’s paradox 
is understood to challenge the “natural” intuition that  
to learn the meaning of a word is to acquire an understanding that obliges us 
subsequently [...] to judge and speak in certain determinate ways, on pain of 
failure to obey the dictates of the meaning we have grasped; that we are 
“committed to certain patterns of linguistic usage by the meanings we attach to 
expressions.” (McDowell, 1984, p. 325, referring to Wright, 1980.)  
The paradox de-stabilizes the familiar relation between signs, whether sounds 
or written marks, and the meaning of these signs by suggesting that a certain set of 
signs is logically consistent with infinitely many meanings. How is it, then, that 
linguistic (and other) rules succeed at all in determining meaning in everyday life?  
Saul Kripke has famously reformulated Wittgenstein’s paradox as what has 
become known as the Kripkenstein paradox (Kripke 1982). Imagine a student of 
elementary arithmetic who has never solved equations above the value 57. Imagine 
also a mathematical function called “quaddition” (or the “quus” function) that is 
exactly like the addition function (the plus function) but with the specification that 
after one of the arguments reaches 57, the function’s value is always 5. For example, 1 
quus 1 equals 2, 35 quus 7 equals 42, 52 quus 4 equals 56, but 57 quus 3 equals 5. Now, 
Kripkenstein’s skeptical challenge is to determine whether, in her past exercises, our 
student has been using the addition function rather than the quaddition function. 
There do not seem to be any facts about her past usage of the + sign that would be 
capable of distinguishing whether the meaning she gave to this sign was addition or 
quaddition. All past uses of the + below the value 57 can be made consistent with both 
addition and quaddition (and with an infinite number of other functions that stipulate 
that above 57 the value is 6 or 7 or 8...). This is not skepticism about mathematical 
truth, but about objectivity of meaning: how can we know what others’ utterances 
mean, if the same set of (uses of) signs can, logically speaking, be consistent with 
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multiple meanings? How are communication and shared meanings possible? How do 
rules manage to control an endless number of new situations in certain ways rather 
than others? The bizarre student puts doubt on the possibility of inferring from “a 
given sequence of steps [...] a sort of algorithm” that we could use in order to decide 
how the rule determines the next step (van Roermund, 2013b, p. 544). The rule 
paradox demands how we can know, as Aulis Aarnio succinctly puts it, “that the rules 
really have been followed, and that they have been followed correctly” (Aarnio, 2011, 
p. 33, original emphasis).  
 
 
1.2.2 The example 
 
The relevance of the Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein paradox to the problems of the 
interpretation of legal norms, indeterminacy of meaning of written rules and 
precedents, objectivity of legal judgments and the distinction between law-making and 
law-application is easy enough to see. How can we understand legal judgments as rule-
applications rather than arbitrary rule-makings each time around, given that, as the 
paradox suggests, a written or customary rule cannot itself determine how it is to be 
applied to a new case? Are not legal rules illusory, if contradictory outcomes, 
justifications for both an apology for state conduct and the utopia of world peace (to 
borrow Martti Koskenniemi’s terms), can be derived from the same rule (see 
Koskenniemi, 2005)?  
My intention here is not to enter these long-running, well-established debates. 
Let me reframe our exemplary paradox in a way relevant to our purposes. The paradox 
suggests, first, that no given set of signs, nor facts, carries its meaning within itself, 
but a set of signs can be, in principle, interpreted in an infinite number of ways. 
Meaning is not a natural, intrinsic property of signs or facts. At any moment, it is, 
logically speaking, possible to interpret and semantically organize a set of signs or facts 
in infinitely different, and thus also contradictory, ways. Nothing in the facts 
themselves decides whether an act constitutes, say, a treason or a liberation. This leads 
to the problem of representation that we will encounter many times in this work. 
Second, the Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein paradox points out that each choice of 
interpretation is contingent in the sense that it points to excluded alternatives. There 
is an undecidability at the heart of rules (the rule’s inability to decide the next step) 
that leads to the problem of the justification of a choice. The argument for each and 
every choice can in principle be questioned by reference to the excluded alternatives. 
Third, Kripke’s thought experiment of the bizarre student imagines a situation in 
which this undecidability leads to a standstill of successful social interaction and 
undermines the function of the rule, which is to exclude alternatives, by casting doubt 
on our ability to understand ourselves as sharing a common language. He paints a 
picture of the social significance of paradox: the ability of an inconsistency to 
undermine the continuity of social practices. However, the paradox — this is the fourth 
point — also indirectly sheds light on the drawing of contingent distinctions, holding 
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onto them across time, and iterating them in an open set of new situations as what 
enables such action and communication in the first place.  
One standard interpretation of Wittgenstein’s solution to the paradox of rule-
following is that, first, Wittgenstein shows the impossibility of “private language,” the 
impossibility of imagining meaningful language use without the social dimension. 
Second, it is the existence of “language games,” and ultimately the existence of a “form 
of life” within which language games are embedded, that explain why language is used 
in meaningful and regulated, non-arbitrary ways. This has direct relevance to law as 
well, insofar as law is understood as something to which meaning is given in joint 
practices. As Aarnio, a supporter of this conventionalist view, explains: 
 
There cannot be language without its use, so it is not possible to talk about 
meanings without a language community in which the language is used. Hence, 
it is perfectly impossible to think that every member of the legal community 
could have a personal and private secondary language. For these reasons, 
language cannot be separated from the form of life. On the contrary, language 
as an activity is only meaningful when connected to the form of life that 
supports it. Speaking language is the same as participating in a form of life. 
(Aarnio, 2011, p. 37) 
 
Here, speaking a language and correct, decidable rule-application and rule-
following are only possible within a form of life. However, to interpret, as Aarnio does, 
Wittgenstein’s “form of life” as “a shared cultural background” is, in fact, to beg the 
question. The conventionalist still needs to account for the conventions of the 
application of these contingent standards (Livingston, 2012, p. 140). Conventionalism 
is a typically “criteriological” (I come back to this term in a moment) response to 
inconsistency: it attempts to switch to a hierarchically higher, here “cultural,” level in 
order to guarantee the consistency of the first level rules. When singular rules cannot 
by themselves determine their own correct use, are threatened by deep inconsistency, 
and are in that sense “incomplete,” their consistency can be secured by referring the 
determining function to “a shared cultural background” or “the community” (see 
Aarnio, 2011, p. 38). The “cultural background” completes the incompleteness of the 
singular rule, thereby guaranteeing its consistent following and application. But if 
something like the “cultural background” determines the correct application and 
following of a rule in singular cases, how does this background itself come about? 
Given that it is quite plausible to think that contexts and “cultural backgrounds” 
themselves allow for a plurality of understandings, which interpretation of a cultural 
practice or a language game is the one that supports the correct rule-application and 
following in a particular case?  
That a social dimension of sharing is important to understanding, following and 
applying rules is certainly a correct observation, but this sharing is rather the problem 
than the solution. What the rule paradox suggests, I would argue, is not simply the 
necessity of the social dimension for correct and decidable rule-following, but also the 
need to consider the emergence of this dimension: how is it that a community or a 
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form of life, within which shared meanings and reliable rules are continuously 
possible, is formed in the first place?  
What the paradox suggests, then, is the problem of the origin of social order, 
and we come back to this problem in the following chapters from different 
perspectives. How is it that stable social structures emerge and stay in place over time, 
such that singular cases of intelligible language use and decidable rule-application and 
-following are possible? Let me answer this question here in a preliminary way. A
stable social order makes it possible to repeat the same meaning and interpret a rule
in the same way in continuously new situations. However, the relation between the
singular case and the common, shared structure or form of life is not simply that of a
one-way determination (see also Livingston, 2012, pp. 16-17). On the one hand,
iterating the same meaning and interpreting a rule in the same way as in the past is
only made possible by stable linguistic and legal structures. On the other hand, no such
structure, form of life, community or order emerges and remains in place over time
without the singular acts that repeatedly exemplify or are taken to represent it. The
singular case of correct language usage or rule-application is dependent on the existing
structure that determines it, but, inversely, the structure is also dependent on the
singular case that exemplifies it.
Each singular case of correct rule-application and rule-following must then 
claim to iterate a distinction that has already been made between alternative 
interpretations of the rule. It must present itself as an example of how one correctly 
applies and follows a rule in general, in exclusion to alternative, incorrect possibilities 
of its application and following. What the bizarre student in the Kripkenstein paradox 
precisely challenges us to do is describe the normal student of mathematics as 
paradigmatic or exemplary one: as someone whose behavior manifests how the whole 
practice of counting ought to unfold.  
By challenging us to explain how one ought to use the addition sign, deviant 
behavior points to the particular logical place that the example occupies. As Giorgio 
Agamben notes, an example or a paradigmatic case of rule-application or -following is 
a singular entity that is, first of all, “deactivated from its normal use” (Agamben, 2009, 
p. 18). As Kripkenstein illustrates, encountering a threatening inconsistency in a social
practice puts on hold how that practice usually unfolds, deactivates it and makes
thematic, or at least presents a challenge to thematize, the characteristics of exemplary
behavior. The exemplary case thus, in Agamben’s words, “present[s] the canon — the
rule — of that use” (Agamben, 2009, p. 18). It represents the set of correct uses of a
rule as a whole. Furthermore, that a singular case claims exemplarity in how one
applies or follows the rule correctly in general means that it must present itself as
repeatable in future cases. An example that could not be repeated — shared by many
who orient themselves according to the example — would not be an example.
However, it remains a possibility that a distinction among alternatives that the 
example represents is, simply, dropped and not iterated. So, the meaning of a singular 
case as exemplary of the set of cases of correct rule-application or -following depends, 
in fact, on its becoming confirmed by other singularities that repeat its choice of 
distinction. Each singular case that claims exemplarity remains just that, a claim to 
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exemplarity requiring confirmation by other singular cases that repeat its choice. 
Thus, legal structure or “legal form of life” as the set of all correct uses of a rule is not 
simply a static background determining the singular cases. If the singular case owes 
its meaning as a correct application or following of a rule to the form of life, it is also 
the case that this form of life owes its appearance to the singular case that claims to 
exemplify it, opening the possibility for other singular cases to do the same (or not). 
Rules of rule usage, Agamben argues, “cannot be shown in any other way” (Agamben, 
2009, p. 18) than through the singular exemplar that itself depends on other singular 
cases for its (continued) exemplarity. We return later to this paradoxical temporality 
of the example/representation on several occasions. 
Bert van Roermund has argued in response to Wittgenstein’s paradox that rule-
following can be understood as the subject’s relating to rules as icons:  
 
To follow, indeed to interpret, a rule is not to apply a syllogism or an algorithm 
to the situation, but to step through the looking glass, i.e., to project oneself as 
a would-be agent in front of the rule, to a form of behaviour from the 
perspective which the rule is prompting. In order to “interpret” the rule, there 
is a need to relate your standpoint to the point where the rule situates you, and 
this again is conveyed by a function that involves taking that step in order to 
yield a picture that strikes you as “coherent.” In navigation we do this all the 
time: Your GPS device tells you where you should go, but only on condition (a) 
that your map is oriented, and (b) that you are prepared to project yourself on 
to that tiny triangle on the display. (van Roermund, 2013b, pp. 549-550, my 
emphasis.) 
 
A rule “prompts a perspective” for orienting oneself in the world and toward 
others, and following a rule is about situating oneself to that perspective for 
orientation offered by the rule. I would add to this that such situating-oneself-to-the-
perspective-prompted-by-a-rule is precisely about iterating a rule, confirming that 
this situating exemplifies, in its singularity, the totality of cases of correct rule-
following as situating-oneself-to-the-rule’s-perspective. If a rule is to function as an 
icon that proposes (demands) the taking-of-a-perspective, some singular case of its 
application or following must exemplify that perspective. Mere naming the rule on 
paper cannot achieve this. A singular case of rule-following (like the behavior of some 
student that appears as normal, or indeed my own) must claim to exemplify “a form 
of behavior” and a perspective that ought to be shared by all those that the rule 
addresses. A singular case, and the particular perspective of orienting oneself in the 
world and toward others it proposes, may be a “true” example of that shared 
orientation, but this depends crucially on whether others recognize it as “their own” 
perspective or not. Thus, a “form of life” is, in fact, about a “formalization of life”: not 
a static order but rather a temporally unfolding process of ordering as the iteration of 
a perspective of the world and toward others that a rule is interpreted to demand.  
Note that understanding the rule-following inconsistency in this way does not, 
in fact, efface the paradox, but rather turns it into another one. For examples are, 
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logically speaking, exceptions to the law of the excluded middle (either P or not-P, but 
not both) (Livingston, 2012, p. 140). This is because on the one hand, a singular case 
that functions as an example is just one case among other similar ones. On the other, 
it is not just any case, but the case that manifests what all these cases share, what joins 
them together. It “occup[ies] the elevated and exceptional position of the general” 
(Livingston, 2012, p. 140). The Finnish word laki means “law” in its normal use, but it 
can also exemplify the declination of substantives in Finnish (laki, lain, laissa, laista, 
lakiin etc.), in which case the word’s usual signifying function is momentarily 
suspended, so that the word is able to represent the general law of declination (see 
Agamben, 2009, p. 24). An example, thus, is neither mere singularity nor mere 
generality, but a point of their crossing. It is a singular point at which the internal 
logic of a totality is shown. An individual case that is considered to be an example of 
something therefore paradoxically both belongs to and is excluded from the set of 
cases it exemplifies. An exemplary student is not simply one student among others but 
the normal or paradigmatic student: she is a student whose behavior “shows the law 
of behavior” for other students as well and shows where the bizarre student goes 
wrong. For this reason, because she makes visible the norm for being a good student, 
she is unlike all other students.  
So, while our original paradox of the inability of a rule to determine its own 
application and following leads to what logicians call “explosion” — every behavior 
could equally well count as applying or following a rule — the paradoxical logic of an 
example, by contrast, shows how rule-application and -following is possible in the first 
place. Below we encounter a position in contemporary logic that accepts some 
inconsistencies as true paradoxes, that is, as inconsistencies that reveal something 
important about the nature and logic of totalities themselves. We will also come back 
to study the significance of exemplarity for law; for now, suffice it to note that the 
above interpretation of Wittgenstein’s form of life itself exemplifies a position that I 
will call (following Livingston) the “paradoxico-critical” orientation to paradox. A 
reformulated paradox of rule-following may well be a version of true paradox. 
 
 
1.2.3 The exception 
 
That the rules of rule usage can be shown only through the singular exemplars 
(or this is at least what a paradoxico-critical position holds) has a formal structure that 
is very close to another paradox well known in political and legal theory, that of 
exception. In an exception, the law applies to the case at hand in no longer applying, 
that is, the effectivity of the law to regulate the case at hand is suspended, although the 
legal order as a whole stays in place. Both the exemplary case and the exceptional case 
stand both inside and outside the legal order. The example that shows the rule of the 
rule usage is, in fact, itself an exception, to the extent that in order to be able to show 
or make manifest what the correct use of the rule is, it must be “deactivated from its 
normal use,” as Agamben puts it (Agamben, 2009, p. 18). As mentioned, a singular 
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case of rule application exemplifies how that rule ought to be applied only if that 
application is not just blind, unreflective of itself, but somehow points to itself, makes 
its own operation thematic. While the example precisely seeks to guide behavior 
according to the rule and show how to make the correct decision among its possible 
interpretations, the legal exception suspends the exemplar force of the normal and 
gives space to another behavior, incongruent to the normal rule. At least since Carl 
Schmitt’s writings on the nature of sovereignty, that “another behavior” has been 
understood as the purely political, legally ungrounded decision.2 
Making essentially the same point as Wittgenstein with his paradox, Schmitt 
notes that “no norm, neither a higher nor a lower one, interprets and applies, protects 
or guards itself” (Schmitt, 2004, p. 54): it is the very relation between life and the legal 
form of that life that the norm itself is unable to establish. “For a legal order to make 
sense,” Schmitt (in)famously writes, “a normal situation must exist, and he is 
sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists” 
(Schmitt, 2005, p. 13). Liberal political and legal theory presupposes that normal 
situation, thereby obscuring the very non-legal foundations of the legal order: the 
decision that a normal situation actually exists (Schmitt, 2005, p. 13; Whyte, 2013, p. 
56). For liberalism, “the decision has already been made, and that decision dictates 
that there will be no more decisions,” only norms (Rasch, 2007, pp. 95-96). For 
Schmitt, it is the legally unbound sovereign that determines the relation between norm 
and life: “authority proves that to produce law it need not be based on law” (Schmitt, 
2005, p. 13). As a mirror image to the inability of a norm to guarantee its own 
application, the state of emergency is a factual situation that the norm cannot 
anticipate (Schmitt, 2005, pp. 6-7). Whether there is a state of emergency requiring 
the suspension of the law to the benefit of the maintenance of the state and public 
order, and what needs to be done in such a situation, are normatively 
underdetermined. Only an extra-legal, and in this sense unlimited and absolute, 
decision on the exception/the normal is capable of making law an order, a concrete 
order in exclusion to alternative ones (Rasch, 2007, p. 96).   
Schmitt’s orientation to paradox also comes close to “criteriological” 
orientation: for Schmitt, the legal order is fundamentally incomplete, incapable of 
grasping its own limits and grounding its own authority, thereby necessitating the 
purely non-legal decision to draw limits on law’s behalf and from a privileged outside 
position. The paradox of law seeking to limit itself, to ground its own authority, must 
be solved “existentially,” by the sovereign state.  
The existence of the state is undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity 
of the legal norm. The decision frees itself from all normative ties and becomes 
in the true sense absolute. [...] The two elements of the concept legal order are 
then dissolved into independent notions and thereby testify to their conceptual 
independence. (Schmitt, 2005, p. 12) 
2 I discuss both the example and the exception further, with references to literature, in Chapters 
4 and 6. 
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By dividing the legal order into law and “existential” political order, and 
allocating superiority to politics, Schmitt, it seems to me, prefers to see law as 
“completed” by the extra-legal rather than as inconsistent, as paradoxically self-
authorizing and self-ordering all the way through. The irony is that this choice is 
exactly the same as that of Schmitt’s theoretical nemesis, Hans Kelsen. Kelsen, as we 
will see in Chapter 2, also chooses (at least when read conventionally) incompleteness 
over inconsistency and switches to a higher level in his dealing with the paradox of 
law’s self-founding, although for him this metalevel is legal science, not the political 
existence of the state. In tracing their very different theories of the relationship 
between law and politics to a common choice between an incomplete totality and an 
inconsistent totality, we can ask what kind of implications does an alternative choice, 
that of preferring the inconsistent totality, has for our understanding of law and 
politics.   
Since Schmitt, the formal figure of the exception has been a central problem in 
political and legal theory. The oscillation between the political and the legal that the 
figure of the sovereign implies has been addressed by many prominent thinkers (e.g. 
Agamben, 2005a; Arendt, 2017; Benjamin, 1968; Benjamin, 1986; Butler, 2004; 
Derrida, 2005; Honig, 2009; Honig, 2007). The paradox has also been understood in 
a democratic key, in terms of constituent and constituted power, and it can be 
formulated as follows. On the one hand, constituted power (political and legal 
institutions) is incapable of consistently guaranteeing its own authority, which seems 
to make necessary a reference to constituent power (“the people”) as the ultimate 
ground of political and legal institutions. On the other hand, constituent power, “the 
will of the people,” presumably something irreducible to the institutional, only finds 
its expression when mediated by institutions. Attempts are multiple to solve the 
paradox by preferring either of the poles, the constituent side or the constituted side, 
the people or the law. In order to avoid making this introductory chapter overly long, 
I will postpone the discussion of this formulation of paradox and distribute it among 
different chapters (2, 4, 5 and 6).  
The phenomenon of paradox is thus well-known in legal and political theory. 
What seems to me to be less well recognized is that in the background of various 
conceptions of legal authority and the relation between law and politics lie different 
metalogical choices (I come to this notion in a moment) of interpreting the meaning 
of paradox. This dissertation is motivated by the belief that it is a worthwhile endeavor 
to map more systematically than has been done before 1. the metalogical choices in the 
interpretation of paradox in law that have been made by important legal and political 
formalists and 2. the implications that those orientations to paradox have for their 
respective understandings of legal authority and the relationship between law and 
politics. Often (too often) the paradox of exception has been reduced to play, as a “state 
of emergency,” the role of a paradigm of contemporary global politics. This is not, 
however, the only possible lesson to draw from this paradox and its implications for 
politics. In order for us to understand how and in which ways we can be “released” 
from following law, it is certainly important to understand how it is that law claims to 
form our lives in the first place. Considering more carefully different understandings 
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of legal and political formalism and their orientations to paradox might help to nuance 
the implications that paradoxes can be seen to have for our contemporary political 
situation.  
Thus, I propose to draw on the recent work by Paul M. Livingston (2012) on the 
metalogical choice between incomplete and inconsistent totalities in the 
interpretation of paradoxes in order to show how different choices lead to different 
conceptions of the structure and significance of “forms” for social, legal and political 
life. To get a clear understanding of the “metalogical choice,” we need to take a short 
look at formal logic and interpretative positions to paradox within that field. Before 
doing that, one final note on the notion of formalism. In line with Livingston who also 
studies the consequences of formalism for political thought, I think that Wittgenstein 
and his followers in legal theory point to a significant expansion of the notion of legal 
formalism. Following their example, legal formalism of “the legal form of life” is not 
the specific theoretical position according to which judges decide cases rather 
mechanically on grounds of pre-given norms, nor is it reducible to Kelsenian 
formalism. In the general sense that I adopt here, legal formalism is the notion that 
law can be understood as a form that captures a plurality of entities (norms, facts, 
behaviors or individuals) within a totality, gathers, or rather claims to gather, these 
together into a unity. Law orders the many into one, and thus presents a claim to a 
“formalization of life.” The emergence and significant implications of paradoxes in 
formal logic and mathematics of the twentieth century that we will take a look at next 
suggest, in turn, that legal formalism and formalization will also be affected by 
paradoxes and inconsistencies that the metalogical study of forms or totalities has 
discovered.  
1.3 Paradox in modern logic and mathematics 
1.3.1 Paradox and formalism 
What, formally speaking, is a paradox? In philosophy, the term paradox has 
been defined, for example, as a “set of propositions that are individually plausible but 
collectively inconsistent” (Rescher, 2001, p. xxi) and as “an apparently unacceptable 
conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable 
premises” (Sainsbury, 1995, p. 1; see also Perez, 2006, p. 5). Logical paradoxes have 
been seen as properties of (sets of) sentences, like in the classic case of Epimenides’ 
paradox (also known as the Liar paradox). “All Cretans are liars,” says Epimenides, a 
Cretan, seemingly implying that what he says is a lie. But is it? It seems that if it is 
untrue, then it is true, for that is what he is saying, and if it is true, then it is untrue, 
for the sentence is a lie. The paradox arises from the sentence’s applying the distinction 
true/untrue to itself, while already making use of this same distinction. The sentence, 
by a Cretan, says something about what all Cretans say, hence including itself in the 
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scope of what it is talking about and attempts to apply the distinction true/untrue to 
both the saying and what is said. Law is not reducible to language and sentences, so 
legal paradoxes are not simply properties of sentences nor do they exactly arise from 
(potentially false) reasoning from known premises (Perez, 2006, p. 13). They do arise, 
however, from the problematic relation between totality and self-reference. A more 
exciting formal definition of paradox, one applicable to law as well, than the one given 
above uses this insight, as we will see in a moment. 
The etymology of the word paradox is rooted in the Greek noun paradoxon, 
which is a combination of the preposition para-, which means “contrary to” or 
“against,” and the noun doxa, “belief, opinion.”  Doxa has its roots in the verb dokein, 
“to appear, seem, think.” A paradox thus goes “against the belief.” It appears as 
something contrary to what one would think and expect. If orthodox means the 
“straight” or “right” belief, a paradox is “the other belief” (Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, 2009, p. 61). A paradox “initiates the other speech, the other speaking, 
their expressing a belief contrary to the belief of their interlocutor. This contrary belief, 
however, is equally valid, with the result that the discussion returns to itself without 
ever concluding anywhere” (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2009, p. 61). Thus a 
paradox violates the interdiction of contradiction (not both P and non-P), and 
logicians have typically been at pains to explain paradoxes away and maintain the 
orthodoxy. As Willard V. Quine expresses this reaction in the following way: a paradox 
“produces a self-contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. It establishes that some 
tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and henceforward be 
avoided or revised” (Quine, 1976, p. 5). Before those whose faith went against the 
doctrine of the Church received the name “heretics” (from the Greek hairetikos, “able 
to choose”), they were in fact called “paradoxes” (Segal, 1988, p. 80). Like the heretics 
whose “ability to choose” the Church precisely denied, the phenomenon of paradox is 
something that philosophy and legal thinking have traditionally not tolerated. 
Within contemporary logic there are different views as to the importance of 
paradoxes. Some hold on to the traditional view that paradoxes are only curiosities 
with marginal significance. At the other extreme, some logicians defend “dialethism,” 
a reworked logic that at some defined occasions tolerates the presence of paradoxes 
and the inconsistency they imply (see e.g. Priest, 2006). Whatever the judgment 
concerning the centrality of paradoxes in logic, it is nevertheless the case that 
important strands in modern logic and analytic philosophy of language, that is, in the 
study of the structure and limits of (formal) language(s), have been significantly 
shaped as a result of the discovery of paradoxes. Paradoxes have emerged in the 
thinking through of the logic, and the metalogic, of forms and totalities. 
Set theory is the branch of mathematical logic that studies forms as collections 
of mathematical objects. Simply put, set theory is the study of the logic of the creation 
of totalities that group together a plurality of elements. Georg Cantor, the creator of 
set theory, defined the notion of totality as follows:  
By a ‘manifold’ or ‘set’ I understand in general any many [Viele] which can be 
thought of as one [Eines], that is, every totality of definite elements which can 
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be united to a whole through a law. (Cantor 1980, p. 204, footnote 1, quoted in 
English in Livingston, 2012, p. 4.)  
The logic of conceiving the many as one, united by a law: this is the core idea 
of modern formalism as I apply it here. It is in studying the logic of totalities that 
paradoxes and inconsistencies are encountered and the need to choose a position 
toward them emerges. Formal thinking in its basic mode of comprehending the many 
as one is by no means limited to mathematical logic or set theory but characterizes all 
conceptual thinking as a grasping of singularities under general concepts. Also, non-
mathematical and non-technical concepts and general terms that relate objects and 
singularities to some determinate predicate or general term pose questions concerning 
the relationship between the One and the Many that are formally speaking the same 
as in logic, and thus are also prone to encounter paradoxes.  
“[T]he operation of grouping or collecting individuals under universal concepts 
or general names can [...] be taken to be the fundamental operation of linguistic 
reference,” argues Livingston, and just like for mathematical logic, “the paradox has 
important consequences for thinking about language and representation as well” 
(Livingston, 2012, p. 23). Livingston defines the notion of form as “the (‘structural’ or 
‘operational’) basis of any grouping of (finitely or infinitely) many as one. This extends 
[...] to the unity of a technique or practice, understood as the unity of the 
determination of a set of empirical instances by a rule or law” (Livingston, 2012, p. 4, 
footnote 6). Formalization can then be thought of as any activity of reflecting on 
forms, their structure, limits and emergence, producing formalisms that in different 
kinds of languages capture the rules of forms they define.  
Defined in such wide terms, the notions of form, formalization and formalism 
are not restricted to “formal languages” such as mathematical ones, but can rather be 
seen to be operative in all forms of conceptual thought and discursive practice — legal 
ones included. “Forms” come into play whenever “something appears as something,” 
as phenomenologists would say, that is, whenever something, an object or entity, is 
spoken, categorized, thought, seen, understood, judged, interpreted to be as 
something meaningful or having a property, thereby grouped together with all other 
instances of that meaning or property. Formalization as a reflection of such grasping-
the-many-as-one can thus be seen as a perfectly ordinary operation not limited to 
formal sciences.  
An important consequence of such a wide definition of formalism is that social, 
legal and political thought now fall within it. Livingston argues that “collective life can 
be theoretically reflected in formal-symbolic theoretical structures and [...] such 
structures can illuminate the lived forms of community and social/political 
association” (Livingston, 2012, p. 4). Indeed, what is “a collective,” “legal order” or 
“social whole” other than a plurality of members (for example individuals, norms, 
groups and communications) “counted as one,” grouped together under some 
conception, rather than another, of what unites them? This also suggests that “legal 
formalism” is not to be reduced to a conception of mechanical solving of legal cases, 
but has much more general, and important, a meaning as a conception of how a 
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plurality (of comportments, norms, communications) becomes grouped under a 
totality (a legal collective, a legal order or system). 
1.3.2 The logic of paradox 
Let me note that my intention in this work is not to explicitly argue for any strict 
homologies between legal and mathematical forms (we will see an exception to this in 
the case of Badiou). However, if the wide definition of the notions of form, 
formalization and formalism is plausible, and I think it is, this suggests that it bears at 
least heuristic value for legal theory to shortly look at some paradoxes in logic and their 
(arguably) common structure. This will help to draw out some features (totality and 
self-reference; limits of thought; forcing a reconsideration of usual principles of logic) 
that are of importance for legal and political theory as well. Paradoxes have been one 
of those points in logic that has forced the whole enterprise to reconsider its basic 
assumptions, to reflect on its own structures and limits. My hypothesis is that 
paradoxes will do the same for legal theory and the operation of law itself.  
Let us begin with set-theoretical paradoxes. What is known as “Cantor’s 
theorem” states that every set can be divided into more subsets than it has members. 
The set of cows — to choose an example from Quine’s famous essay “Ways of Paradox” 
— has more subsets of cows than it has cows (Quine, 1976, p. 14). The set of all cows 
can be divided into the subsets of all cows that are brown and white, all cows that are 
brown, all cows that are black, all cows that are black and white, all brown and white 
cows, all black and white cows etc. Cantor showed that the power set, the set of all 
subsets of a set, is necessarily larger in size than the set itself. (In Chapter 5, we will 
see that Badiou makes a lot of this notion as well as of the closely related theorem of 
the point of excess, which says that in every power set, there is an element not 
presented in the original set (Baki, 2015, p. 129).)  
Cantor’s theorem becomes mind-boggling when the set under consideration is 
infinite. The set of all natural numbers is an example of an infinite set. Cantor defined 
such a set as countably infinite: there is no highest natural number, but each number 
has a successor, as it is always possible to count up one number. Furthermore, any set 
that can be put into one-to-one correspondence with a countably infinite set, is also 
countably infinite. For example, the set of even numbers (that is, only the “half” of 
natural numbers) can also be shown to be countably infinite by putting the two sets 
into one-to-one correspondence (1→2, 2→4, 3→6 etc. ad infinitum). As long as the
members of two sets can be paired off by pairing their members with each other, they 
are said to have the same size (or “cardinality”). Now, Cantor proved that there is also 
uncountably infinite sets that are “bigger” in size than countably infinite sets. He used 
indirect proof (reductio ad absurdum) and a technique called diagonalization to 
argue that the set of real numbers is bigger than the set of countable numbers. 
Attempting, for the sake of the argument, to map a listing of each real number between 
0 and 1 to a one-to-one correspondence with the list of all counting numbers fails and 
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necessarily ends up missing a real number. Real numbers, Cantor concluded, are 
uncountably infinite and “bigger” than countably infinite numbers, and thus infinities 
come in different sizes.  
Diagonalization argument, or the diagonal method, receives its name from the 
proof’s topological nature. First, Cantor set out a table of real numbers between 0 and 
1, matching each of them one-to-one with a natural number, and then, picking up 
numbers along the descending diagonal of the table on the side of the real numbers, 
he produced a real number between 0 and 1 not already noted in the table. That 
number “on the diagonal” shows the impossibility of one-to-one correspondence and 
the uncountable infinity of real numbers. The diagonalization technique essential to 
this result constructs an element that is formally a member of the list (i.e. a real 
number) but demonstrably not the same as any member already on the list 
(Livingston, 2012, p. 21). Diagonalization is a technical name for the paradoxical logic 
that we already discovered in our discussions of the example and the exception: given 
a set of, say, all students of mathematics or applications of a rule, the diagonalization 
articulates a member of this set that it simultaneously demonstrates not to belong to 
this set (because this member either exemplifies the set as its paradigmatic member 
or functions as the “sovereign” who decides whether the set of rules is in force).     
This same technique that “extracts” from a totality an element that both belongs 
and does not belong to it, is also behind the power set theorem (that there are more 
classes of cows than there are cows). It gives the theorem, in Quine’s words, “[a] 
distinct air of paradox” (Quine, 1976, p. 14). To continue Quine’s example:  
 
no correlation of cow classes to cows accommodates all the cow classes. The 
proof [via diagonalization; HL] is as follows. Suppose a correlation of cow 
classes to cows. It can be any arbitrary correlation; a cow may or may not belong 
to the class correlated with her. Now consider the cows, if any, that do not 
belong to the classes correlated with them. These cows themselves form a cow 
class, empty or not. And it is a cow class that is not correlated with any cow. If 
the class were so correlated, that cow would have to belong to the class if and 
only if she did not. (Quine, 1976, p. 14) 
 
Considering the non-membership of cows to classes of cows itself forms a cow 
class not already listed — a cow class that cannot be correlated with any cow! If it were 
so correlated, then the cow would paradoxically have to both be a member and not be 
a member of it. The attempt to build a one-to-one correspondence between a set and 
its power set thus is inconsistent.  
 
Given certain assumptions about the nature of properties (or predicates, 
attributes, universals, etc.), [the diagonalization method] establishes that the 
number of properties applicable (or not) to a certain logical kind of thing must 
always exceed the number of things of that kind. If we [seek to map] the things 
of the kind in question [... to the] properties applicable to them, and view the 
[corresponding one-to-one mapping] as indicating which things instantiate 
28 
which properties, we are prompted to ask whether or not there is such a 
property as not instantiating the corresponding property in the mapping. If so, 
it should be included in the mapping, but then the object that corresponds to it 
instantiates it if and only if it does not. (Klement, 2010, p. 18)  
As we saw with Wittgenstein, facts or signs can be mapped to meanings in 
contradictory ways. We can understand the diagonalization to establish an excess of 
representation over the thing represented: representation, predicating something of 
something, is never simply reducible to the something it represents, but it produces a 
surplus. The inconsistency and paradox that we encounter when we ask about the 
relation of the thing not represented to representation is what makes the excess 
manifest.  
If the power set of an already infinite set is necessarily bigger than the set itself, 
what about the universal set, the set of all possible (infinite and finite) sets? Can we 
consistently think of such a thing? This was the question that lead Bertrand Russell to 
discover the paradox that goes by his name. At first sight, it seems that the universal 
set does not have more subsets than it has members, for all its subsets are its members. 
But we can see the inconsistency of this idea by using diagonalization. The reasoning 
is essentially the same as in the cow example. The universal set must contain self-
membered sets (like itself) but also non-self-membered sets (trivially, the set of 
criminal laws and that of cows that are themselves neither laws nor cows). We then 
ask whether the set of all these non-self-membered sets is a member of itself, whether 
it has the property that constructs it — and end up in a paradox. For, as with the cows, 
if that set were a member of itself, then it must have the predicate of not being a 
member of itself, and thus it would not be a member of itself; however, if it were not a 
member of itself, then it would have the right predicate and be a member of itself. The 
set would belong to itself if and only if it did not. The attempt to build a set of all 
possible sets results in inconsistency.  
Russell noted that the formal set theoretical paradox had affinities with 
Epimenides’ semantic paradox (Livingston, 2012, pp. 23-24). In both of these 
contradictions, says Russell, “something is said about all cases of some kind, and from 
what is said a new case seems to be generated, which both is and is not of the same 
kind as the cases of which all were concerned in what was said” (Russell, 2004, p. 61, 
quoted in Livingston, 2012, p. 24, emphasis in the original). Whereas an assertion 
about the deceptive properties of all Cretans by a Cretan makes the assertion oscillate 
between truth and untruth, grouping together all sets by using the rule of non-self-
membership allows for the possibility to iterate this rule and create the paradoxical 
case of the set that seems to both belong and not belong to itself. It thus seems that 
paradoxes emerge when an attempt is made to delimit a totality: first one seeks to pin 
down the rule for the formation of the totality, but then, if one thinks further “along 
the diagonal,” a new case emerges that seems to both belong to the scope of the 
totality’s formative rule and not belong to it.   
The Austrian mathematician Kurt Gödel is another famous figure in thinking 
through the difficulties of the logic of totality, and his formulations will also be 
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important for this work. In “On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia 
Mathematica and Related Systems” (1931), Gödel showed that formal, axiomatic 
systems that are sufficiently complex to model basic arithmetic are necessarily 
undecidable, which he understood to mean that they are incomplete and incapable of 
proving their own consistency. Gödel’s theorems put into question the basic 
assumptions of arithmetic on which Russell’s and Alfred North Whitehead’s Principia 
Mathematica relied. The core assumption of Principia was that arithmetic systems are 
both consistent and complete. Consistency means that such systems are free from 
contradiction, that in them no correctly formed statement of the language of the 
system and its negation are both deducible, that is, provable as true. The completeness 
of a system means that any correctly formed statement of the language of the system, 
or its negation, is “decidable” in it, that is, can be proven true. The axioms of that 
system are assumed to contain enough information to allow the truth value of every 
arithmetical sentence to be deduced by using the regular rules of inference. The truth 
of a sentence formulated in the language of the system is equated with provability in 
the system (or it is a matter of simple analytic definitional truth), and everything a 
sound axiomatic system proves must be true (Gödel, 2004, pp. 5-6; Smith, 2013, pp. 
1-3).
Gödel’s so-called first incompleteness theorem states that formal, consistent 
systems complex enough to axiomatize arithmetic have a sentence that can somehow 
be recognized as true but that nevertheless is undecidable, unprovable in that system. 
Very roughly and informally, Gödel’s great innovation was to construct a mathematical 
coding, called Gödel numbering, that allows an arithmetic meta-calculus to speak 
about arithmetic first-order calculus. This coding allows arithmetic to refer to itself, to 
substitute both numbers and statements about numbers for Gödel numbers. With this 
coding, Gödel found a way to arithmetize the syntax of the arithmetic language in 
question, to represent the system’s structure of proof within itself. He created a 
metalanguage the statements of which have meaning both at the metalevel and, as they 
remain de-codable, at the “original” level. Gödel then produced, by using the technique 
of diagonalization, a sentence that encodes the claim that it itself is unprovable in that 
system. The sentence both is a sentence produced in the language of the system just 
like any other and demonstrably unlike any of its other sentences (as it says of itself 
that it is unprovable) (Gödel, 2004; Smith 2013, pp. 3–4, 136; Raatikainen, 2018; 
Livingston, 2012, p. 21). 
Informal reasoning for the truth of the Gödel sentence can depart from the 
assumption of the soundness of the system (that is, the system cannot prove a false 
sentence). If the system were to prove that sentence, then the sentence would be false, 
and given the assumption, this cannot be the case. So, the c of the Gödel sentence must 
be true, and its negation false. But the falsity of its negation must also be unprovable, 
as the system proves only truths. Hence the sentence is true and the system 
incomplete. The reasoning can also depart from the assumption of the consistency of 
the system (that is, the system cannot prove both a sentence and its negation true). 
Using reductio ad absurdum, suppose the claim “this sentence is unprovable” is false; 
then it is false that it cannot be proved. Then it is true that the sentence “this sentence 
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is unprovable” can be proved; but a proof of it would then also be a proof that it cannot 
be proved (as this is what it says). Thus, we have a contradiction on the assumption 
that the claim asserted by the Gödel sentence is false. Therefore, on pain of 
contradiction, the Gödel sentence must be true, and yet unprovable (as this is what it 
says). Gödel understood this result to show that consistent, non-paradoxical 
mathematical systems contain truths that they cannot “decide” and are therefore 
incomplete. The second Gödel theorem then states that no consistent mathematical 
system can prove its own consistency, or in other words, formal systems have to 
presuppose their own consistency, their consistency is an independent truth and they 
are incomplete in this sense (Smith, 2013, pp. 3-4; Raatikainen, 2018; Livingston, 
2012, p. 25). 
The undecidability of the Gödel sentence arises, because the sentence is a point 
at which the system becomes self-referential by using both first and second order 
language. “Gödel’s theorem shows that there can always be propositions that signify 
in language and metalanguage simultaneously and that they can be constructed to 
signify at cross-purpose,” as one commentator explains (Thomas, 1995, p. 251). 
Another commentator notes that “[w]hat is strange about [Gödel’s theorem] is that the 
theorem is itself set out and proved by means of a highly complex and extended 
formal-logical sequence of argument which cannot but depend upon just those 
resources that it shows to fall short of such probative warrant or ultimate 
demonstrative force” (Norris, 2012, p. 98). Quine, for his part, calls Gödel’s theorem 
“a latter-day paradox that is by no means an antinomy [like the Epimenide’s/Liar or 
Russell’s paradox] [...], and yet is comparable to the antinomies in the pattern of its 
proof, in the surprisingness of the result and even in its capacity to precipitate a crisis” 
(Quine, 1976, p. 16).  
The theorem is not always understood to be a paradox (Smith, 2013, p. 4), or it 
is defined, as by Quine, as a “veridical paradox” that cannot be deactivated by revising 
the guilty principles and rules, unlike in the case of “antinomies” under which Quine 
counts the Liar and Russell’s paradox (Quine, 1976, p. 17). Between the Liar and the 
Gödel theorem there is indeed at least the difference that, whereas in the Liar, when 
constructed in the form “This sentence is false,” the sentence refers to itself directly 
via the use of the deictic expression “this,” the Gödel sentence refers to itself indirectly. 
The indirectness is due to the diagonalization technique, in which self-reference can 
be understood in terms of naming and quotation instead of deixis. Quine, however, 
shows how the Liar can also be understood to involve indirect self-reference. The Liar 
paradox expressed with indirect self-reference is as follows: 
 
“’Yields a falsehood when appended to its own quotation’ yields a falsehood 
when appended to its own quotation.” This sentence specifies a string of nine 
words and says of this string that if you put it down twice, with quotation marks 
around the first of the two occurrences, the result is false. But that result is the 
very sentence that is doing the telling. The sentence is true if and only if it is 
false, and we have our antinomy. (Quine, 1976, p. 7) 
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Then the Gödel theorem in terms of quotation: 
For “falsehood” read “non-theorem,” thus: “’Yields a non-theorem when 
appended to its own quotation’ yields a non-theorem when appended to its own 
quotation.” This statement no longer presents an antinomy, because it no 
longer says of itself that it is false. What it does say of itself is that it is not a 
theorem (of some deductive theory that I have not yet specified). If it is true, 
here is one truth that that deductive theory, whatever it is, fails to include as a 
theorem. If the statement is false, it is a theorem, in which event that deductive 
theory has a false theorem and so is discredited [as inconsistent]. (Quine, 1976, 
p. 17)
The operation of quotation achieves formulation of a sentence that both belongs 
to the theory, as it is correctly formulated by the rules that the theory provides, and 
does not belong to it, as the theory cannot prove it.  
It has also often been noted that Gödel’s theorem and Russell’s paradox have a 
similar overall structure. Livingston pinpoints this similarity as follows: “[t]he 
problematic element, in both cases, reflexively captures the total structure of the whole 
system (the universe of sets, or the formal system under consideration), of which it is 
a part, at a fixed, local point within that very system” (Livingston, 2012, p. 25). The 
logician Graham Priest has, in a remarkable study of paradoxes across the history of 
philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to Kant and Hegel up to contemporary logical 
formalism and continental philosophy, formalized the common structure of these 
paradoxes. Although Gödel’s theorem, Cantor’s theorem, the Liar and Russell’s 
paradoxes all have different formal implications in logic and mathematics, a general 
structure can readily be seen, or this is at least what Priest argues. He calls them limit-
paradoxes, because they emerge at the boundaries of totalities. “Limits of [what can 
be expressed, described, known, or the limit of iteration of an operation] provide 
boundaries beyond which certain conceptual processes (describing, knowing, 
iterating, etc.) cannot go; a sort of conceptual ne plus ultra.” His thesis is then:  
that such limits are dialetheic; that is, that they are the subject, or locus, of true 
contradictions. The contradiction, in each case, is simply to the effect that the 
conceptual processes in question do cross these boundaries. Thus, the limits of 
thought are boundaries which cannot be crossed, but yet which are crossed. 
(Priest, 2002, p. 3) 
According to Priest, it is always possible to generate a formal limit-paradox 
when two conditions are fulfilled. The first is closure, the formalization of the 
necessary conditions for membership in a given totality. Closure is about giving the 
formative rule of the totality in question, drawing its boundaries and setting it apart 
from other possible totalities. The second condition is transcendence, an operation, 
paradigmatically diagonalization (but also an everyday operation, such as the 
formulation of an example), that, given a totality, is able to generate an element that 
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is outside this totality. “This construction,” Priest explains, “is precisely a boundary-
tearing heuristic which, given any boundary of a suitable kind, can be applied to violate 
it” (Priest, 2002, p. 4). If an element satisfies both of these conditions, it falls both 
inside and outside the totality. This is, Priest argues, simply a formal way of putting 
the difficulties which philosophers have encountered in their attempts at 
comprehending the limits of the totality of thought to which their very act of 
comprehension belongs. Trying to grasp the limits of thought is essentially an 
inconsistent operation that attests to this paradoxical topology of closure and 
transcendence that Priest calls inclosure (Priest, 2002, pp. 3-4, 147; Livingston, 2012, 
pp. 32-33).  
1.3.3 The metalogical choice 
A paradox in the logical sense is, thus, an argument that begins with known 
principles concerning truth and membership, for example, and proceeds with valid 
reasoning to a conclusion that has the form A and non-A. All paradoxes that we have 
shortly described emerge from a totality as if bending over itself, like a Möbius strip, 
to refer to itself; they form a point that “exists” at two, intertwined levels, so to speak, 
that are in contradiction with each other. By using another metaphor, one could say 
that a paradox punctures a totality that was thought to be complete, and, by 
constructing an element that does not belong to the totality, and yet is not simply 
irrelevant to it, shows the totality to be other than it is. For logicians like Priest,  
[p]rima facie, [paradoxes] show the existence of dialetheias [true
contradictions; HL]. Those who would deny dialetheism have to show what is
wrong with the arguments—of every single argument, that is. For every single
argument they must locate a premise that is untrue, or a step that is invalid. Of
course, choosing a point at which to break each argument is not difficult: we
can just choose one at random. The problem is to justify the choice. (Priest,
2006, p. 9)
Indeed, formalists and logicians have traditionally not tolerated the presence of 
paradoxes and they have not seen their contradictions as true. Quine distinguishes 
between falsidical paradoxes (like Zeno’s paradox of motion) that can be solved by 
simply pointing out the fallacy involved, antinomies that “establis[h] that some tacit 
and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and be henceforward avoided 
or revised,” therefore requiring “a repudiation of part of our conceptual heritage,” and 
veridical paradoxes that “we can get used to, thereby gradually sapping its quality of 
paradox” (Quine, 1976, pp. 3, 5, 17).  
What Quine calls an antinomy signals a perplexing and disorienting complexity 
that threatens what is held to be true and right. It blurs the simplicity of a binary value 
as a mere opposition (true/false, member/non-member) in its assertion that both 
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sides of the opposition are valid, or that no informed choice between them can be 
made. Suddenly the familiar distinctions do not work as we would expect them to. 
Sometimes the term aporia is used synonymously with paradox: áporos in Greek 
means “nonpassable.” With paradoxes and aporias we seem to reach the limits, the 
end, of our abilities to meaningfully grasp the world and move forward, and come 
instead face to face with what fractures our familiar ways of thinking and reasoning. 
When Gottlob Frege learned about Russell’s paradox, he thought that the foundations 
of arithmetic, as he had known them and on which his life’s work was based, had 
collapsed (Fletcher, 1985, p. 1267). A whole field of mathematical logic was brought to 
a temporary standstill by the discovery of the paradox that provoked the field to 
reconsider its basic assumptions and, as Niklas Luhmann would put it, “unfold the 
paradox,” to “deparadoxify” the paradox by inventing new distinctions with which to 
work. Alfred Tarski, for example, proposed just such a new distinction. He argued that 
since the Liar paradox suggests that the assumption of semantic closure is 
inconsistent, truth theory must abandon the assumption. “Semantic closure” means 
that within a language, the adequate usage of the term “true” can be specified for that 
same language, that is, how one meaningfully uses language can be described in this 
same language. But the Liar is true if, and only if, it is false, and this suggests that 
semantically closed language is inconsistent. Tarski then suggested a new distinction 
to address this problem of inconsistency, namely the distinction between different 
levels of language, “object language” and “metalanguage” (Tarski, 1944, pp. 347-351).3 
Similarly, as Livingston notes: 
Gödel’s result, which demonstrates the incapability of any sufficiently complex 
formal system consistently to represent its own logic of proof, was taken to 
demonstrate the existence of a metalanguage or -system which is capable of 
representing the proof of logic of the original system, as well as the Gödel 
sentence for that language itself. (Livingston, 2012, p. 29, my emphasis.)  
If closure presents inconsistencies, go one level up, and determine the rules of 
truth/proof on that level, or this is at least the solution to paradoxes that logicians have 
often proposed. After he had discovered the paradox in set theory, Russell spent four 
years trying to solve it, until he came up with a solution in his theory of logical types 
and their hierarchy. His solution to the paradox was, in its essence, simple: “I WON’T 
ALLOW IT. I FORBID IT! A set cannot be considered as one of its own elements!” 
(Segal, 1988, p. 85) If a self-referential totality is paradoxical, and given that we want 
to save consistency and overcome the paradox, self-reference must be avoided:  
[A]ll our contradictions have in common the assumption of a totality such that,
if it were legitimate, it would at once be enlarged by new members defined in
terms of itself. This leads us to the rule: “Whatever involves all of a collection
3 “Object language” is the formal language that the truth theory discusses by using 
“metalanguage.” This distinction between languages makes it possible, according to Tarski, to define 
those conditions in which true sentences are possible in the object language. 
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must not be one of the collection”; or, conversely, “If, provided a certain 
collection had a total, it would have members only definable in terms of that 
total, then the said collection has no total.” (Russell, 2004, p. 63, emphasis in 
the original.)   
 
This interdiction of self-reference is then spelled out in the stratification of 
logical types of sets that allow the membership of a set in another set, but only if the 
other set is of a higher type. In William Rasch’s pithy phrasing: “Poor Bertrand Russell, 
what a mean father. He was such a splendid procreator of paradoxes, but he cared so 
little for his offspring, always wishing they would deny their own existence or 
acknowledge their illegitimacy” (Rasch, 2007, p. 92).  
Some solution to the paradox that blocks it in fact underlies most contemporary 
set theory. Theorists have sought to eliminate the paradox by building hierarchies and 
levels in which the higher or metalevel comes to supplement the lower level, to close it 
from the outside, so to speak. But that level again has its own Gödel sentence, cannot 
be closed with its own means and is in need of a yet higher level — the hierarchy 
ascends without limit (Livingston, 2012, pp. 27-29). Furthermore, as mentioned, 
Cantor’s and Gödel’s theorems are not, interestingly, called paradoxes (at least in the 
sense of antinomies), but precisely theorems, and the hierarchization, or 
“parameterization” as Priest calls it, may suggest why. Although their proof involves a 
reductio ad absurdum and paradox, the theorems themselves are established by 
choosing consistency over paradox/inconsistency. Priest and Livingston argue that 
encountering the paradox presents, in fact, a possibility of choice between 
inconsistency and completeness, although traditionally inconsistency has not been 
considered a possible choice (Priest, 2006, pp. 24-25; Livingston, 2012, pp. 33-34). 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is “chosen” over the alternative, the 
provability of the sentence that leads to inconsistency (paradox). Priest argues that it 
is possible to avoid the paradox and the problem that within a totality, system or a 
language its own rules of truth or proof cannot be expressed consistently, but only by 
developing hierarchical metalevels and metalanguages that can do this for the lower-
level. This is indeed what the second Gödel theorem suggests: a system cannot itself 
prove its own consistency, but this proof must be provided at a metalevel. The 
cumulation of metalanguages, however, risks merely shifting the problem of 
inconsistency to yet another level (Priest, 2006, pp. 24-25). The requirement of 
consistency, Priest explains— 
 
forces on a theory a certain incompleteness, either expressive or proof theoretic. 
And it is the failure of a consistent theory to be able to express its own truth 
predicate which prevents it from being able to prove its Gödel sentence. 
Conversely, any (expressively) complete proof theory is inconsistent. (Priest, 
2006, p. 47) 
 
Is the choice between inconsistency and incompleteness a real choice? To claim 
yes is, of course, a highly disputed argument, for it would mean that inconsistency 
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would be a real option for logicians and mathematicians to take. Tarski, for example, 
when seeking to discern where the fallacy of the Liar lies, maps out its constituent 
parts, two of which are semantic closure and “ordinary laws of logic,” including of 
course the law of the excluded middle and the prohibition of contradiction (Tarski, 
1944, p. 348). Tarski does not consider that there could be anything to revise in the 
“ordinary laws of logic,” so for him the fallacy lies in the claim to completeness of 
semantic closure. Traditional logic has certainly not considered loosening the 
prohibition of contradiction a valid option. It is an option only for those who would 
accept that there may be some true contradictions.  
We do not need to be concerned here about the details of such rethought logic. 
It suffices to note that the idea of the possibility of taking different attitudes toward 
the paradox may have (will have, I argue) an interesting application to formalism in 
the loose sense (natural languages, all attempts to conceptually group reality into 
meaningful wholes), as well. After all, it is an ordinary occurrence that formalizations 
give rise to formalizations of themselves: 
Sets [...] may originally have functioned in our conceptualisation and 
manipulation of concrete objects; but, sets having been ‘‘invented,’’ it 
transpired that these objects of thought are subject to the very 
conceptualisation they produce. Similarly, we may suppose that, in response to 
the need to describe and explain the workings of language, semantic language 
[i.e. linguistic expression of the appropriate and meaningful language usage; 
HL] was produced. But having been produced, it was found that this very 
language applies to itself. Thus, the very acts of conceptualisation produce the 
closures which give paradox. Even though our conceptualisation/linguistic 
structure is, in a sense, a human product, it does not follow that we have 
complete control over what we produce. (This, after all, is the moral of 
Frankenstein, and, in a much more horrific way, of Capital.) In particular, a 
consequence of conceptualisation which must conceive, inter alia, of itself is 
contradiction. We might think of the cumulative hierarchy or the Tarski 
hierarchy as latterday Kantian attempts to retain a certain control over 
conceptual production. (Priest, 2006, pp. 47-48) 
Once a paradox has been discovered, one can then either opt for consistency 
and “forget” the paradox, as Luhmann (2004, p. 212) puts it, by constructing 
ascending hierarchies, or one can take on the pain of contradiction and deal with the 
inconsistent totality. This is what Livingston calls “the metalogical choice” and 
“metalogical duality” (Livingston 2012, pp. 52-53). The observation that there are 
different orientations to the paradox, one seeking to move away from it by making 
further distinctions, and the other seeking to embrace it and detail the implications, 
proves a fruitful heuristic mapping also for legal theory interested in spelling out the 
significance of paradox for law and politics.  
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1.3.4 Four orientations of thought to totality and paradox 
Let us now look at the alternative attitudes a bit more closely as well as what 
they would mean outside the field of mathematical and logical formalism. Developing 
from Priest’s observations, and borrowing from the work of Alain Badiou, Livingston 
has created a mapping of four different “orientations of thought” that in different ways 
deal with limit paradoxes (Livingston, 2012, pp. 51-60). What the emergence of the 
paradox challenges is the first orientation on Livingston’s list, namely the traditional 
metaphysical attempt at thinking of the totality as a consistent and complete One, as 
a comprehensive, all-encompassing, contradiction-free Universe. The first orientation 
is “onto-theological”: it posits a privileged being, a God transcendent to the order of 
beings it founds and the consistency of which it secures. Norms immanent to the order 
of beings have the origin of their authority in the unquestionable, absolute authority 
of the privileged being. This is the only orientation in which the paradox remains 
unreflected and thus has become impossible in post-Cantorian formal thought.  
As mentioned above, Livingston calls “metalogical duality” (Livingston, 2012, 
p. 53) the choice, forced by the emergence of the paradox that makes the consistent
and complete totality impossible, between consistency and incompleteness on the one
hand, and inconsistency (paradox) and completeness on the other. This choice gives
rise to the following three possible orientations. The second orientation is
“constructivism,” the “critical” (in the Kantian sense) or “criteriological” attempt at
tracing the limits of thought, language and knowledge. Badiou provides a trenchant
description of this orientation:
[The constructivist orientation] sets forth the norm of existence by terms of 
explicit constructions. It ends up subordinating existential judgment to finite 
and controllable linguistic protocols. Let us say any kind of existence is 
underpinned by an algorithm allowing a case that it is the matter of to be 
effectively reached. (Badiou, 2006b, p. 55) 
The constructivist, or “criteriological” as Livingston also calls it, orientation is 
about drawing clear, consistent limits between the sayable and non-sayable, about 
constructing criteria that allow the “critique” of thinking, language and knowledge, 
understood as the demarcation of the regulative line between sense and non-sense, 
knowable and unknowable. It is about “policing” these boundaries, with the conviction 
that limits of thought and expression can be consistently secured. Russell’s theory of 
types is a prime example. The constructivist-criteriological theorist understands 
himself as standing outside the order the boundaries of which he demarcates. This 
orientation, when it encounters the paradox of self-reference of the order it studies, 
resorts to “parameterization,” to the construction of hierarchically higher levels from 
which the boundaries of the lower-level order can be seen, making them consistent 
and complete. This is the traditional approach of logicians to the appearance of a 
paradox (Livingston, 2012, pp. 54-55). 
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The third orientation to paradox is the “generic” one, the orientation 
represented by Badiou. The main idea of Livingston’s interpretation is that, although 
otherwise his position is the total opposite to constructivism, Badiou shares with the 
constructivist position the metalogical choice of consistency over paradoxical totality 
(Livingston, 2012, p. 55). A key element in Badiou’s thinking, as we will see in Chapter 
5, is Cantor’s theorem of power set and the rejection of the inconsistent universal set. 
If the constructivists police the boundaries of the sayable and what thus can be said to 
intelligibly exist, Badiou, contrary to such a position, traces the possibility of “the 
event,” the emergence into existence of what is incongruent to and inexistent within 
the boundaries of a given consistent order of existence and representation. Whereas 
constructivism forbids the existence of anything that does not fit its consistent 
categories, Badiou, by extrapolating from contemporary set theory and category 
theory, seeks to bring this “nothing” to existence. And this is, from the beginning 
onwards, a political theory: a thinking about the emergence of the radically new into 
the structures that govern how beings can intelligibly live their lives. 
There is thus an important political register in formalization and the 
phenomenon of paradox. Capturing entities under general terms, sets or concepts, or 
indeed any meaningful apprehension of reality as something (in exclusion to other 
possibilities), is about forming totalities and orders, capturing a plurality of separate, 
singular beings under a common denominator. Formalization in this register is about, 
among other matters, drawing distinctions between socially intelligible and 
unintelligible life, between meaningful speech and nonsense, between what is 
recognized as a topic of “common interest” and what is not, between what is articulated 
as legally possible and relevant and what is not. Formalization in its political and legal 
registers is about organizing life under a general form, which allows for something to 
be recognized as “common” and as “legal,” but which, crucially, is simultaneously 
about the reduction of possibilities to organize and understand what is common.  
Once the onto-theological orientation and the imaginary of social order (and its 
reductions of possibilities) as natural, absolute and immutable — complete and 
consistent — has passed, the reflection on the nature of totalities under which we live 
and which make our existence meaningful as “common” becomes an issue. This 
reflection is precisely what the modern critical project is about: digging down to the 
fundaments of the order, to the structures and forms that make possible that 
something is lived as “in common,” as “shared” among a plurality of singulars (like a 
tradition, but also institutions such as the state or the legal order), and that make 
possible a language meaningful to an innumerable number of individuals and 
constitutes them as “speakers” of a language. The critical project of mapping the limits 
of thought becomes problematic, once it is realized that the very operation of the 
critical mapping of the structures of commonness in its different dimensions already 
presupposes those very structures also as its own condition of possibility. True 
critique, in its double epistemological and normative-political meaning, of the limits 
of thought and meaningful language seems to require a neutral and objective point of 
view on the other side of those limits, but the paradox of self-reference puts this effort 
in question.  
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The constructivist-criteriological project assumes that the circle of self-
reference can be broken and a neutral position for social and political critique found. 
In political and legal philosophy, the constructivist-criteriological attitude has, 
arguably, given rise to such diverse positions as the social contract theory, Rawlsian 
theory of justice with its thought experiment of the “veil of ignorance,” and the 
Habermasian discourse ethics as the logical ground of modern rule of law and 
democracy. They all, in different ways, seek to pin down the internal structure of the 
consistent (which in political philosophy can be understood as just or legitimate) 
political collective, and all come to struggle with the problem of self-reference and the 
inconsistency it implies.  
An example of an idea, popular in contemporary political theory, that seeks to 
break the circle of self-reference but succumbs to it despite itself, is that a political 
order is legitimate (or just or democratic) if, and only if, all those who are affected by 
it have a say in how this order ought to be set. The principle strikes one as intuitively 
plausible. But problems arise when we ask who counts as the “affected,” who do we 
count as belonging to the set of all those who are to have a say on matters that concern 
them. Being counted within the set of those who have the right to decide on matters 
that concern them, is certainly itself also a matter of concern. The criteria for drawing 
the limit between the affected and the unaffected, the concerned and the unconcerned, 
clearly also fall within the scope of those issues that a legitimate political collective 
ought to be able to decide (closure). But the scope of those who (have the right to) 
decide must be presupposed in advance for any such decision to be possible 
(transcendence). The limit between the affected and the unaffected must be both 
inside and within the scope of the decision, and outside it as its condition of possibility. 
The decision of who is affected requires that those who decide are not yet so identified, 
for otherwise the decision would not be legitimate on grounds of the principle itself. 
But how is a decision ever to come about if no predetermination is given about who 
the affected, and thereby the decision-makers, are? The decision-makers, thus, must 
both be and not be the affected (see e.g. Honig, 2007; van Roermund, 2013a; Lindahl, 
2018, pp. 273-278; Näsström, 2016).  
This paradox suggests that the legitimacy of the boundary between members 
and non-members cannot be consistently decided within the order. Political 
criteriologists have therefore sought recourse to a yet higher, “international” or 
“universal” order of human rights that encompasses lower-level orders, decides what 
being affected means for them, and thereby makes it supposedly possible to decide 
legitimately on the boundaries of membership in lower-level political orders (see e.g. 
Besson, 2012; Peters, 2009). Human rights are the privileged candidate for seeking to 
avoid infinite regress, the circling back to the same problem of self-reference that 
plagued the orders underneath. This is political theory’s version of “parameterization,” 
of the hope to ultimately avoid both inconsistency and incompleteness of a political 
totality.  
Badiou’s generic orientation follows, as noted, Cantor’s theorem of power sets 
and abandons the idea of the universal set, including its political versions such as the 
ideal of a consistent universal political-legal order grounded in human rights. The very 
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idea of a positive, universal political order is inconsistent, incapable of getting rid of 
the paradox of self-reference. Any order claiming to be universal would have an excess, 
the set of all those who count as “unconcerned” within it, which means it would not be 
universal after all. For Badiou, all sets, all positive orders that govern beings, legal ones 
included, are consistent: they provide non-contradictory presentations as intelligible 
of what exists. For Badiou, the matter of politics is precisely the unaffected, that is, 
that which remains incongruent to and indiscernible within any given, consistent 
positively existing order, showing such order to be incomplete. Rather than embarking 
on the futile criteriological project of seeking to draw legitimate boundaries, politics is 
about that what cannot be said, thought about, perceived, known, within the 
boundaries of a given order. This is in contrast to the conventionalism of the 
constructivist attempt to locate politics neatly within a positive, legitimate (universal) 
order; for Badiou, politics precisely cannot be located thus. It is rather about the 
“fidelity to the event” of the appearance of the incongruent, about discerning the 
coming into “maximal existence” within a given order of something that before was 
inexistent within it and tracing its implications for that order. For any given positive 
world, such as a world of institutional politics, the world of international relations, the 
world of global economy, or the world of a positive legal order, there is an inexistent, 
that what counts as nothing for it. Politics is then the operation, always particular to 
the world in question, of bringing that nothing into maximal existence within that 
given world.  
In Livingston’s interpretation, at least, this attempt to articulate how what is 
unsayable, imperceptible, unknowable within an order can nevertheless appear within 
it and have implications for it leads Badiou to abandon any critique of the limits of 
language and structures of sayability as fully confirming the constructivist-
criteriological, and politically conformist, program, and embrace pure mathematics as 
the only medium in which to adequately express the logic of the event of the new. The 
generic orientation takes the position that every positive language and order is 
consistent in its logic of naming what is sayable and doable within it but can be seen 
as incomplete, as excluding what remains incongruent to it. Hence politics is about 
carving space to what is irreducibly exterior to an order, thus exposing the 
incompleteness of the positive order in question (Badiou, 2006a; Livingston 2012, pp. 
55–56, 187). We return to this admittedly difficult idea in Chapter 5. 
Once it is acknowledged that setting limits for political, and legal, orders in a 
way that would be normatively legitimate is an inconsistent project, there indeed 
emerges a daunting problem concerning the possibility of political critique of those 
limits. If the idea of the universal political order and an ultimate neutral and objective 
viewpoint from which the extant orders can be criticized is inconsistent, is the only 
alternative the abandonment of critique? Given the embeddedness of critical 
operations in the structures they criticize, does any self-critique of the limits of extant 
orders amount to anything more than conformism? This conclusion is what defines 
the generic orientation in Livingston’s scheme. Against this abandonment of all 
(possible) powers of the self-critique of orders, Livingston, however, sets the fourth 
orientation in his scheme, which he names “paradoxico-critical.” Whereas Badiou’s 
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metalogical choice is to prefer consistency/incompleteness over 
completeness/inconsistency, the paradoxico-critical orientation prefers completeness 
over consistency, thus shouldering the pain of contradiction at the heart of every 
totality (Livingston, 2012, p. 56).  
For this orientation, politics is politics of the limits of totalities, taking place at 
the threshold of inconsistent totalities. Such totalities are always more and other than 
they are. Their self-inclusion (closure) is necessarily also self-exclusion 
(transcendence), which arguably implies that self-critique is not necessarily mere 
conventionalism and “more of the same.” This orientation, I will argue, first, 
understands politics as politics of the limits of positive orders, politics that traces the 
inconsistencies in all attempts to draw the limit between an order and the unordered 
and to claim this gesture of inclusion and exclusion to be consistently legitimate; and 
second, shows that, precisely because it is paradoxical, an order never achieves a 
consistent closure, a full control over itself and its rules of intelligible existence-in-
common. Affirming the inconsistency of any given totality points to the possibility of 
a “non-parameterizing,” “non-criteriological” self-critique that does not seek a neutral 
viewpoint at the metalevel, but neither lets positive orders normatively off the hook.  
The observation that there indeed exists a metalogical choice thus creates 
interesting opportunities for analyzing theoretical positions on social totalities and 
their limits:  
The [metalogical] duality [...] faces critical theory with a crucial choice as soon 
as it attempts to conceive of the inherent structure of the social order itself. 
Owing to the implications of the fundamental paradoxes and aporias that are 
released by the twentieth-century logical and metalogical thought, it is possible 
to conceive this order as internally consistent, but essentially incomplete (and 
hence as always capable moving in the direction of its successive 
supplementation by what was earlier excluded) or as fundamentally complete 
(or total) but essentially rent by inconsistency and paradox (and hence 
fundamentally structured by division and antagonism). (Livingston, 2012, p. 
284, partly my emphasis.) 
Both the generic and paradoxico-critical orientation reject the idea of a single, 
complete and consistent universal order of full inclusion, an idea that is still present 
in the criteriological programs of, for example, defending the all-affected principle. 
But what they do not abandon is what also motivates the constructivist to jump up the 
levels: the desire not to let positive, contingent orders normatively off the hook with 
their claims to order life as common. The limits of self-referential orders are also a 
matter of justice.   
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1.4 Orientations to paradox in legal formalism: the structure and main 
arguments of the dissertation 
What I propose to do in this work, then, is to use this mapping of the 
orientations of thought to totality and paradox to analyze positions in legal and 
political theory. Analogously to the formalisms of artificial languages of mathematics 
and logic, we can also sketch a mapping of legal theoretical attitudes to paradox. This 
requires, however, that we re-define the notions of completeness and consistency. 
What do these notions mean in law?  
Law can be understood to be complete in the sense that it will give a legal 
answer to every question posed to it. Everything that becomes an intelligible legal 
problem within a legal system will find some kind of legal answer (even the so-called 
“hard cases”). Completeness means here that it is within the legal system itself that the 
distinction between legally relevant and legally irrelevant, between law and non-law is 
drawn: because law only hears legal questions, it is able to treat conflicts as soluble 
and give legal answers to them. It is impossible for law to consider the relation between 
itself and reality in any other way than by using its own means. The positive effect of 
this is the solvability, in principle, of all legal problems. I thus understand 
completeness to mean that law can look at reality, and its own relation to reality and 
what distinguishes it from non-law, only through legal lenses.  
Completeness, the answerability of legal questions, thus implies, when it is 
predicated of law, also self-reference. Not all thinkers that we will study agree on what 
self-referentiality of law means, but I will take self-reference to be such a central 
feature of law that any legal theory worthy of the name will need to account for it (and 
because Badiou axiomatically rules out self-reference from “ontology,” as we will see 
in Chapter 5, and ontology is the “field” within which law would be situated in his 
theory, his theory is fundamentally at odds with the conception of modern law as self-
referential). Law’s self-reference takes place at several levels. In order for legal 
judgments and norms to qualify as legal, they need to refer to other legal judgments 
and norms (higher ones, Kelsen would insist). In other words, law regulates its own 
reproduction. 
Consistency, for its part, has been understood as the central idea of legal 
decision-making according to which, within a legal system, equal cases ought to be 
decided equally, unequal cases unequally. This idea expresses the notion of legal 
justice and holds that legal justice is done when a new decision in some important way 
is the same as a past decision concerning cases that are “equal” to the case at hand, as 
well as different in comparison to “unequal” cases. Legal justice is, thus, tied to the 
idea of the repetition of the same norm in similar cases. Legal consistency is also 
considered in terms of “the rule of law”: all acts of public power must have legal 
grounds and be empowered by the law. Legal consistency has, thus, to do with the 
identity of the legal system over time. In this work, we will study various ways of 
understanding this identity: Kelsen’s Stufenbau (Chapter 2), Luhmann’s recursivity 
(or linkage-capacity) and redundancy (Chapter 3), and Lindahl’s iterability of ipse and 
idem identity (recognizing again something as the same and as a self) (Chapter 6).  
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By now, we have learned to be suspicious of self-reference. Indeed, 
completeness is problematized when one asks how the legal system can consistently 
show or prove that the distinction it draws between the legal and the non-legal, or law 
and reality, is itself legally valid. If law is complete, a legal system will only be able to 
give a legal answer to the question of what differentiates it from non-law (say, moral 
norms, facts, acts of political power). This distinction cannot be made by an external 
authority, say, a legal scholar, natural law or the political sovereign; this would make 
modern law incomplete and seriously damage its self-referentiality and autonomy, as 
there would be another authority that would ultimately be responsible for what the 
law is. In modern positive law, this is unacceptable, at least according to the majority 
of thinkers that we study in this work. If this is so, if we accept modern law’s self-
referentiality, we are pushed to an important inconsistency. Namely, each legal 
attempt at showing the legal validity of the distinction between law and non-law must 
already presuppose this validity. It cannot consistently (in the sense of free from 
circularity) prove it. If the legal totality is autonomous and self-referential, it is also 
inconsistent. The distinction between law and non-law, a distinction that allows law 
to formulate the problems it confronts in such terms that make those problems legally 
solvable, has a price: the legal system cannot consistently show this distinction to be 
validly legal or illegal.  
Now, this is, in a nutshell, what I take to be the core of the metalogical choice 
in favor of inconsistent totality in legal theory. We can also understand this problem 
as the reflexive or metaproblem of justice: it is possible to ask after the justice of the 
very framework within which legal justice is delivered, but law cannot give a consistent 
answer to this question, without already presupposing this framework (thus, itself) as 
just. This inconsistency will also be, for the paradoxico-critics, the site of politics “in” 
law.    
In Chapter 2, we will see that Hans Kelsen’s famous basic norm can be 
interpreted to express precisely this metalogical preference. Conventionally, however, 
and this was perhaps Kelsen’s own understanding of his own work at least up until his 
late “skeptical” phase, a positive legal order is understood rather as incomplete, 
incapable of assuring that it is contradiction-free. Because the choice of 
incompleteness comes with the norm of consistency, the incompleteness of the legal 
system implies a move to a jurisprudential, legal scientific metalevel at which the 
consistency of the legal system can be guaranteed. In Chapter 2, I will thus argue that 
Kelsen’s account can be interpreted to oscillate between the metalogical choice in favor 
of a consistent, but incomplete, legal system, and (forcing his late thinking a little bit) 
in favor of an inconsistent, but complete and self-referential legal system. What is 
definitively out of the picture is the idea of both a consistent and complete legal system. 
Kelsen thus oscillates between criteriological-constructivist and paradoxico-critical 
positions. 
In Chapter 3, we will analyze the systems theoretical perspective of the legal 
paradox. Luhmann understands the legal system as fundamentally paradoxical: it 
cannot consistently regulate the application of its own code, legal/illegal, with which 
it operates, to itself. Luhmann argues, however, that for functional reasons, in order 
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to preserve its functional autonomy in a society of functional subsystems (such as 
those of politics, economy, education, religion and art), this inconsistency at the very 
heart of its autonomy must be “made invisible.” The legal system will thus attempt to 
give the impression to society that it is, in fact, consistent. Luhmann thus argues that, 
yes, a legal system is an inconsistent totality, but it must try to appear consistent, even 
if this means incompleteness and “coupling” with other subsystems, in particular that 
of politics, and resorting to a certain “parameterization.” Luhmann presents his 
sociological-constructivist account of de-paradoxification and rejection of the paradox 
as a counter-position to what he sees as Jacques Derrida’s sociologically erroneous 
affirmation of the paradox. Derrida can indeed be seen as something like a 
paradigmatic representative of the paradoxico-critical orientation. I will show, 
however, that because the paradox is by no means effaced by the legal system’s 
attempts at making it invisible, Luhmann’s analysis of legal decision-making readily 
carries the paradox with it. Luhmann thus cannot be clearly categorized in any 
orientation. He is a “paradoxical” theorist, albeit not a critical one, but rather a 
paradoxico-constructivist or a paradoxico-evolutionary theorist, as he thinks that 
inconsistency is an important motor of the legal system’s evolution (understood 
without any sense of “progress”). 
 For this reason, Luhmann’s position on the paradox also brings to the 
discussion the possibility of legal critique and, by extension, politics. “Politics” is the 
moment of critique, of presenting what Luhmann calls “the Third Question,” putting 
in question law’s only inconsistenly validated limits. Luhmann argues that the legal 
system functions as society’s “immune system”: it protects the society by offering it 
mechanisms for conflict resolution and management of disorder. This immune system 
is also “auto-immune” in the sense that the legal system needs to constantly update 
and transform itself in order to keep itself relevant for society. It will thus confront 
challenges that seek to expose its inconsistency by redrawing distinctions that cannot 
in any final way “solve” the inconsistency. The problem that the (auto-)immunizing 
structure of the paradoxical legal system poses to politics is law’s constitutive inability 
to “respond” in any direct way to reflexive, political claims: transformation is 
subordinate to the legal system’s self-preservation. Ultimately, the theory of 
paradoxical totalities risks becoming utterly nihilistic, that is, a description of how 
closed functional systems perpetuate themselves and their instrumental rationalities 
simply for the sake of self-perpetuation, effacing from view any normative and 
substantial claim that does not fit with their account of “reality.”   
In Chapter 4, we will first analyze how Luhmann’s constructivism balances a 
fine line between what could be called a minimal realism and nihilism for which any 
extra-systemic reality remains unknowable and simply as good as nothing. We will 
also see how Luhmann’s account of the immunitary logic of the legal system connects 
with contemporary political theory in which this logic is analyzed as paradigmatic of 
the modern notion of sovereignty: how it claims to protect the commonwealth against 
threats, but becomes thereby in fact itself a threat to it. Second, we will develop the 
theme of nihilism further with Giorgio Agamben. He offers a detailed account of 
modern law both as a paradoxical totality and as utterly nihilistic. Whereas Luhmann 
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sees in the paradox the impetus for its invisibilization and the system’s evolution, for 
Agamben, all attempts at making the constitutive inconsistency inapparent are 
exposed as mere juridical fictions in the contemporary conditions of biopolitical 
nihilism, in which the “state of exception” has become the norm. Agamben’s solution 
to nihilism is “post-juridical” politics: politics that seeks to render inoperative the very 
exhausted and inconsistent legal system and that de-activates all relations to law. For 
Agamben, the task of critique, when faced with the paradoxical legal totality, is to carve 
space for post-juridical “forms-of-life.”   
In Chapter 5, we will continue with another “post-juridical” account of politics: 
that of Alain Badiou. As mentioned, his work represents the generic orientation and 
the metalogical choice in favor of consistent, but incomplete, totality. Consistency is a 
concept that characterizes ontology, within which the “world of law” also theoretically 
belongs and which is, according to Badiou, best analyzed by set theoretical 
mathematics. This “throws” the paradox outside the law, into how the political event 
self-referentially articulates itself. It will be my modest suggestion that from the 
narrow perspective of the legal totality, this metalogical choice is also the problem of 
Badiou’s theory. He magisterially presents a theory of politics that transgresses 
ontology (and law) and gives a detailed account of “truth” that breaks with 
“constructivism” that, as we remember, is how Luhmann presents his epistemology. 
But this seems to come at the cost of going back to “old” legal theory in which the legal 
order does not self-referentially (and inconsistently) decide its own limits. For this 
reason, Badiou’s political theory is, in an important (although not in any simplistic) 
sense, post-juridical. 
In Chapter 6, we will discuss what to me seems like the clearest articulation of 
a paradoxico-critical orientation in legal theory: Hans Lindahl’s account of law as a 
form of “collective action.” His theory seeks to offer a non-nihilistic theory of the 
paradox that articulates the paradoxical limits of the legal totality as the site of politics. 
Lindahl’s theory of the legal paradox offers an alternative to Agamben’s and Badiou’s 
post-juridical politics, one that makes the metalogical choice in favor of the 
inconsistent totality but also insists on the possibility of a politics of law. From this 
perspective, a legal system is always different not simply from what it considers non-
law, but also from itself. In analyzing the legal order in terms of the drawing of legal 
boundaries, limits and fault lines, Lindahl builds an account of the legal totality as 
constitutively paradoxical, as an intertwinement of legality/illegality and a-legality, 
order and unordered, selfhood and strangeness, unification and pluralization. Here 
inconsistency means the impossibility of considering the totality of a legal system in 
any other terms than as a paradoxical totality that both includes and excludes itself 
and its other. This implies that the existence and the identity of a legal collective is 
constitutively contestable. A legal totality cannot get rid of its non- or “a-legal” alter 
ego. Its functioning requires both closure and transcendence — inclosure — and this 
paradox is the site of the politics of law. Lindahl’s answer to the threat of nihilistic 




Two final notes on my interpretation of the chosen authors and the structure of 
this work. The heuristic tool of the three orientations and the metalogical dualism will 
help me to focus my interpretation of each of the thinkers I have chosen, but it will 
also mean that I will, to an extent, have to simplify my accounts of them. Furthermore, 
although I in certain respects favor the paradoxico-critical orientation over its 
alternatives, and although I have tried to build a certain “progressive” narrative to how 
the chapters relate to one another, my intention is not to suggest that Lindahl’s 
account presents any kind of a dialectical synthesis that unambiguously overcomes the 
problems of previously discussed theories. As we will see, it in some ways preserves 
the problems already identified with Luhmann, and intensified with Agamben, 
although it succeeds, I think, in somewhat nuancing their picture of modern law and 
its relation to politics. In the Conclusion, I shortly recap the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the different orientations to the legal totality and paradox, and draw 
some general conclusions and points of orientation for further research.  
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2. “The hole in the whole”4: Kelsen and the paradox of the basic norm
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I bring the mapping of orientations to paradox to bear on Hans 
Kelsen’s theory of law, and in particular his famous basic norm (Grundnorm). My 
argument is relatively straightforward: the basic norm can be interpreted as an 
inclosure paradox, although Kelsen, at least during a major part of his career, and 
much of Kelsen scholarship do their best not to admit it. According to the conventional 
reading, Kelsen is, according to my categorization, a criteriological-constructivist 
thinker of the limits of legal totality, but I will show that his work can also be pushed 
toward the paradoxico-critical position. 
 The notion of paradox is not unknown to Kelsen scholarship, although it has 
been understood in very different ways and very different conclusions have 
accordingly been drawn. Stig Jørgensen argues, somewhat similarly to my position, 
that Kelsen understands the basic norm as a metanorm, and, as such, as external to 
the legal system, whereas what ought to be theorized is the tautological, self-referential 
and thereby paradoxical logic of the system that cannot have access to mere 
externalities ( Jørgensen, 1984). For Pierre-Yves Quiviger, the paradox is that on the 
one hand, Kelsen emphasizes the purity of the theory of law, its being “faithful” and 
descriptive of positive law (and in this sense it is an empiricist theory), but on the 
other, the theory is “intrusive,” it is an “active” theory that sets theoretical, “non-valid 
norms” that positive law ought to observe, and thus professes a kinship to a kind of 
“minimal natural law” (Quiviger, 2017).  
Although addressing his critique generally to legal positivism, and not only to 
Kelsen in particular, David Gray Carlson takes Russell’s paradox ultimately to show 
that legal totalities à la legal positivism are impossible because they are contradictory, 
and hence that law and morality cannot be separated (Carlson, 2013). Carlson accepts 
the conventional position in logic of preferring consistency and incompleteness as well 
as Russell’s “parameterization” and the type theory of sets. He further argues that 
Russell’s paradox and its solution indicate that also for legal theory, there cannot be 
“rules of recognition” (Hart) that would be capable of consistently binding legal norms 
into a legal system. Positive law, Carlson concludes, cannot be distinguished from 
morality, as such a distinction would presuppose that a consistent closure of a legal 
system would be possible. Law is thus to be evaluated by moral criteria.   
Likewise, the similarities between Gödel’s theorems and Kelsen’s basic norm 
have been briefly commented upon (Thevenaz, 1986; van Roermund, 2000, p. 211; 
Quiviger, 2017, p. 47), and without any formal definition of the paradox in mind, the 
4 I borrow this title from Bert van Roermund’s paper (van Roermund, 2000, p. 211). 
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basic norm has been described, among others, as “shrouded in mystery” (Stone, 1963, 
p. 35), “a great puzzle” (Paulson, 2013, p. 43) and “an ambiguity” (Stone, 1964, p. 104).
What adds to the “mystique” (Stone, 1963, p. 34) is the fact that Kelsen, toward the
end of his life, seems to turn away from his earlier characterizations of the basic norm
as a “transcendental-logical hypothesis” and redefine it as a “genuine fiction.” I suggest
that by applying the mapping of different orientations to the problematic nature of
totalities to Kelsen’s work and its reception, interesting differences arise both in the
development of Kelsen’s own thought and in the readings that his famous basic norm
has received.
In this chapter, then, I will revisit some well-known materials from Kelsen’s so-
called “classical” or “neo-Kantian” as well as the late “skeptical phases”5 in order to 
make the argument that although Kelsen, and many, if not most of his readers, are 
prone to make the metalogical choice (see Introduction) in favor of the incompleteness 
and consistency of the legal system, Kelsen’s repeated descriptions of the basic norm 
as being both inside and outside the system push him toward the alternative choice, 
the one preferring inconsistent totality. Insisting on the purity of the pure theory – 
that is, that a distinction between facts and norms, on the one hand, and between legal 
norms and morality, on the other, can be consistently and rationally upheld, and that 
the legal system must be seen as a non-contradictory system – leads Kelsen to view 
the legal system as incomplete, completed by the basic norm the necessity and truth 
(validity) of which is seen from the perspective of legal science. In this sense, he shares 
with the metaphysical tradition he otherwise criticizes the idea that social order must 
be seen as rationalizable in a metalanguage. Kelsen, however, lacks access to a 
metalevel, because he ultimately understands legal science as law’s self-reflection, and 
reflective philosophy comes to its own when it affirms its paradoxical nature, as we 
will see in a moment.  
Furthermore, Kelsen’s late “skepticism,” expressed for example in his 
rebranding of the basic norm as a “self-contradictory,” “genuine or ‘proper’ fiction” 
(Kelsen, 1991, p. 256) — a seemingly surprising change of heart, a “mysteriou[s] 
reject[ion]” (Bix, 2004, p. 114) of Kelsen’s former position that has so vexed his readers 
— can be interpreted as pointing toward a change in the metalogical preference (that 
remains, to be sure, implicit in Kelsen’s thought). Whereas in his earlier formulations 
of the basic norm, Kelsen clearly thinks of it as a truth (as a valid norm) that is 
unprovable in a system it nevertheless completes, and therefore prefers consistency to 
completeness, his late explicit description of it as self-contradictory suggests instead 
that the basic norm is a name for the inconsistent closure of a legal system. “The 
ultimate authority” of a legal order is an inconsistent idea, occupying a place both 
inside and outside the order it grounds: an inclosure paradox. A reflexive legal theory 
— legal theory that seeks to make explicit what is already implicit in legal practice, 
without simply mirroring it, nor merely constructing it — cannot jump to a neutral, 
external metalevel. There are thus, I suggest, ingredients for a paradoxico-critical 
interpretation of Kelsen’s work, as well.   
5 Stanley Paulson (Paulson, 1998a; Paulson, 1998b, p. xxiii-xxx) has authoritatively discussed 
the periodization of Kelsen’s work. 
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2.2 Formalism and the purity of the pure theory of law 
The basic idea of Kelsenian legal formalism is to study law as a system of norms. 
Kelsen’s pure theory of law aspires to be a scientific analysis of the structure of law, 
regardless of its actual or possible content. “Law is not, as it is sometimes said, a rule” 
says Kelsen. “It is a set of rules having the kind of unity we understand by a system” 
(Kelsen 1945, p. 3). The structural interrelations among norms are constrained by 
rules that jurisprudence can describe. As Joseph Raz puts it, for Kelsen the formalist, 
“[a] legal system is not a haphazard collection of norms. It is a system of norms because 
its norms, as it were, belong together” (Raz 1998, p. 48). How exactly they can be 
understood as belonging together, how it is that they form a whole, is the task of legal 
science to discover. As Kelsen puts it in a letter from 1933, the pure theory has a 
“radically universalistic character [...and it] takes as its point of departure the whole 
of the law, the legal system, in order to comprehend from this standpoint all other 
phenomena as parts of the whole” (Kelsen, 1998, p. 172, my emphasis).  
Seeking to study law as a totality implies an inquiry into its limits. As Kelsen 
explains in 1965, looking back at his long career and the pure theory’s central 
motivation:  
The problem that leads to the theory of the basic norm [and thus also to the 
theory of law as a whole of a multiplicity of norms; HL] — as I explained in my 
Reine Rechtslehre —is how to distinguish a legal command which is considered 
to be objectively valid, such as the command of a revenue officer to pay a certain 
sum of money, from a command which has the same subjective meaning but is 
not considered to be objectively valid, such as the command of a gangster. 
(Kelsen, 1965, p. 1144, my emphasis.)  
When Kelsen in the beginning of the Second Edition of Pure Theory of Law 
describes his theory as offering “a general theory of law [... as] a theory of 
interpretation” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 1), he means that he is explicating how it is that “acts 
of human conduct” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 3) or “acts of will” (Kelsen, 1986, p. 111) can be 
interpreted, understood or cognized, as legal acts establishing valid norms, in 
exclusion to being interpreted as mere acts of power or violence. The basic question 
orienting the pure theory is how a distinction between the fact of power and legal 
power can be made, and the limit between fact and norm drawn and sustained.  
Kelsen calls “subjective meaning” the way in which an individual (or a group of 
individuals) experiences and understands an event or an act, and this meaning may or 
may not “coincide with its objective meaning, that is, the meaning that the act has 
according to the law” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 3). Kelsen gives the example of a group of rebels 
that kills a man suspected to be a traitor and names its act “death penalty.” But such 
naming only expresses a subjective meaning: in the eyes of the law, and thus 
“objectively,” they commit a murder. Also, the “command of a gangster to turn over to 
him a certain amount of money” expresses merely a subjective will of that person that 
the other person undertake a certain activity (handing over the money). By contrast, 
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the command of a revenue officer expresses an objective legal meaning (Kelsen, 1967, 
p. 8). The factual acts may “look” the same – a certain amount of money is transferred
from one person to another – but their meaning is radically different. For Kelsen,
modern law is positive, posited law, law made by human decisions and “acts of human
conduct” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 3). Law is historical and made, not given and discovered. It
is no longer to be seen as sourced in nature or divine transcendence. As Raz notes, for
legal positivism “what is law and what is not is a matter of social fact” (2009, p. 37).
There are strict conditions for the possibility of singling out such “social facts,” such
“acts of will” that qualify as legal acts, as acts of norm-making or norm-application, to
the exclusion of all those acts that do not so qualify. Only human conduct interpreted
as a legal act is able to posit valid law.
So, for Kelsen, “this event [of human conduct] as such, as an element of nature, 
is not an object of legal cognition” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 3). Positive law is always made by 
human acts, but simply perceiving acts as events occurring in time and space is not 
enough to perceive them as legal acts. They may only have a subjective meaning, given 
to the act by the actor herself. It is on the condition that the event can be seen as 
referring beyond its mere factuality and subjective meaning to a norm that it can 
appear as possessing objective validity and thereby as a legal act, prescribing an 
“ought” that validly binds the behavior of its addressee. It is the norm that “confers 
legal meaning to the act, so that it may be interpreted according to this norm” (Kelsen, 
1967, p. 4). A norm functions as “a scheme of interpretation” (e.g. Kelsen, 1967, pp. 3-
4; 2002, p. 10) that makes it possible, as Hans Lindahl notes, to objectify events and 
conduct in the legal sense, to “disclos[e] the fact as ‘this’ or ‘that,’ e.g. as ‘theft’ or 
‘fraud’” (Lindahl, 2003, p. 775), or indeed as an objective act that validly commands 
that something ought to be done.  
Importantly, this norm (say, one empowering an individual to function as a 
revenue officer) that makes it possible to interpret the event as a legal command and 
exclude alternatives, refers to yet another, “higher” norm (say, a governmental tax 
regulation decree) that again refers to a higher norm (say, the tax law), and the regress 
can be continued until the highest posited norm (typically within a modern state, the 
constitution). An event owes its legal meaning to such structural relations within 
which it can be seen, by the legal scientist, to be embedded. For Kelsen’s “legal 
structuralism,”6 then, the legal meaning of an act or a factual event (or a “sign,” if 
expressed in the language we used in the Introduction), to the exclusion of its 
alternative interpretations, is a systemic or structural effect.  
2.3 The contingency of the legal system’s perspective of reality 
Kelsen is thus acutely aware that events and instances of human conduct can 
be interpreted in a plurality of ways, and that they do not carry “natural,” inherent 
6 As Peter Goodrich notes, Kelsen’s legal formalism has affinities with Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
structuralist linguistics (Goodrich, 1983, p. 249). 
 
 50 
meanings. An event may be equally well open to causal explanation, moral evaluation 
and juridical scrutiny. As is well known, Kelsen formulated his theory in response to 
nascent legal sociology and natural law theories re-emerging after the First World War 
with the aim of establishing a pure legal science of norms, purged from reducing legal 
normativity to mere social fact or morality (for an account, see Langford et al., 2017, 
p. 2). What his legal science proposes to do is to “mak[e] conscious what most legal 
scientists do” anyway, namely describe how:  
 
facts [are understood] not as causally determined [as sociologists and natural 
scientists do], but instead [...] their subjective meaning [is interpreted] as 
objectively valid norms, that is, as a normative legal order, without basing the 
validity of this order upon a higher, meta-legal norm, that is, upon a norm 
enacted by an authority superior to the legal authority [as natural law theorists 
do]. (Kelsen, 1967 204-205)  
 
Kelsen thus seeks to describe the structure of the specifically juridical 
perspective of reality. In order to do so, he closes legal cognition on two fronts: toward 
empirically observable causality and toward non-legal normative authority (Kelsen, 
1967, p. 1).7 At the origin of his legal science as a pure theory is a constitutive 
distinction between legal and non-legal interpretation (or cognition). In distinction 
to natural sciences that study reality in its spatio-temporal factuality, the object of legal 
science is normativity, and in distinction to morality that claims to discover moral 
norms through reasoning or revelation, legal science studies how, and under which 
conditions, norms can be created through factual human acts. Kelsen thus 
distinguishes between natural and social sciences, and between social sciences 
(sociology, legal and political theory), which all have their proper “objects of scientific 
cognition” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 2), and seeks to isolate what is the proper form of the legal 
cognition.  
In this sense, Kelsen’s project can be seen to express what William Rasch calls 
“a self-differentiated modernity” (Rasch, 2000, p. 10). According to this notion, in 
modern society there is no longer an all-englobing, totalizing, transcendent 
perspective that could provide society with a single, undifferentiated image of itself. 
Its constancy is that of “the inability to occupy a position from which society could be 
surveyed in one all-encompassing glance” (Rasch, 2000, p. 11.) Kelsen’s thought fits 
with the post-metaphysical and post-Cantorian observation that a universal, 
consistent and complete totality is no longer possible. Instead, there are a plurality of 
perspectives and their corresponding orders of meaning that offer meaningful, but 
incongruent, mappings of reality. The loss of the transcendent foundation and 
principle of the unity of society, or reality, as a whole is expressed in such 
fragmentation and specialization of societal and scientific rationalities. Kelsen looks 
 
7 Paulson, again, has presented critical accounts of Kelsen’s “normativity thesis” (the 
separability of law and fact) and “separability thesis” (the separability of law and morality) (see Paulson, 
1992b; Paulson, 2018). Being a formal theory, Kelsen’s approach would in principle also apply to a 
structural analysis of morality, were it understood as a system of moral norms. 
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at this differentiation of modern society from the perspective of law, seeks to detail the 
contours of this perspective as a perspective, and elevate this description to the status 
of science. He wants to describe how law can be seen as an autonomous form of 
rationality, distinct from others. To this end, what is to be avoided is “methodological 
syncretism” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 1) that can only lead to a blurring of cognitive boundaries.  
Pure theory is thus built on the insight that states of affairs themselves do not 
harbor any intrinsic meaning, but allow for multiple interpretations from a plurality 
of scientific and normative (moral, legal) perspectives. “Interhuman relations are 
objects of the science of law as legal relations only, that is, as relations constituted by 
legal norms,” implying that alternative ways of making facts intelligible are possible, 
but excluded (Kelsen, 1967, p. 70, my emphasis). This means that the legal 
interpretation of a state of affairs or particular behavior is non-necessary, contingent 
and reductive: it does not consider them from all possible perspectives but prefers the 
legal one. A Kelsenian answer to Kripkenstein (the problem of the relation between 
sign and meaning) lies, ultimately, in the systematicity of the legal order: “The norm 
which confers upon an act the meaning of legality or illegality is itself created by an 
act, which, in turn receives its legal character from yet another norm” (Kelsen, 1967, 
p. 4;  see also Pavlakos, 2018). For legal meaning to exist, for it to be possible to 
distinguish acts from legal acts, and thus to orient human conduct according to legal 
command, a legal totality is necessary. 
According to Kelsen’s Stufenbaulehre,8 or the doctrine of the hierarchical 
structure of law, each norm refers beyond itself to yet another, higher norm, and the 
existence of each norm depends on such reference. No legal norm is an island. Legal 
science “seeks to comprehend each and every phenomenon only in systematic 
connection with all other phenomena, to comprehend in every legal component the 
function of the legal whole” (Kelsen, 2002, p. 53). Similarly, each act that has a legal 
meaning refers to other acts that have legal meaning. A gangster’s demand does not 
register as a legal demand and remains a mere expression of subjective will, because 
neither legal scholars, legal authorities, nor for that matter the person being robbed, 
can see the act as referring to any other, higher norm that would confer authority to it 
and reinforce it (Kelsen, 1967, p. 47). 
The existence of the autonomous legal point of view to reality makes possible 
the distinction between power and legal power, between a mere threat or act of 
coercion and an authoritative and objective, and in this sense “rational,” command 
and coercion (legal coercion means that law attaches a sanction to behavior it forbids) 
(see Kelsen, 1967, p. 36, 44–45). Even though endowing this or that event with legal 
meaning always requires an actual act of will that performs such disclosure, the act 
itself is not the norm (Kelsen, 1967, p. 10). A norm, as the meaning of an act, persists 
beyond the actuality of any act. For example, Kelsen explains, “the statute put into 
validity may be valid long after these men [the legislators] have died and therefore are 
unable to will anything” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 10). What makes possible this distinction 
between positing the law as a factual, time- and place-bound and causally or 
 
8 As is well known, Kelsen received the idea of the Stufenbau from his colleague, Adolf Julius 
Merkl (see Merkl, 1931). 
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psychologically describable act and the norm it posits is that the legislators act as 
authorized by the constitution. The higher, ultimately constitutional norm regulates 
and enables the creation of the lower-level norm by empowering individuals to act as 
law-makers.  
2.4 The problematics of positing a norm as norm-application 
Kelsen’s important point is that even acts of norm-positing or creation are also 
always acts of norm-application, because only the norms created by those actors who 
have been authorized by suitable legal norms to act as law-creators count as valid and 
objective legal norms: “When an individual acts as he is authorized by the norm or 
behaves as he is permitted by a norm, he ‘applies’ the norm” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 16). No 
non-legal, non-empowered, non-applicative act can give rise to a valid norm. This is 
the basic principle of validity of a positive, and therefore dynamic, constantly changing 
legal system. It is the basic logic that keeps the legal system together through its change 
in time. All legal newness must be referred to what is already established as a norm in 
order to count as valid law, and in this application of extant legal norms of 
empowerment lies, for Kelsen, the ground of legal objectivity. All acts that perform 
legal functions, like the decision of a judge or the signing of a contract, are enactments 
of already extant legal powers. In other words, “the law regulates the procedure by 
which it is itself created” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 53). Similarly, only those acts of violence 
are permitted that can be qualified as “attributable to the legal community,” that is, 
that are authorized as sanctions and thus as a reaction against illegal behavior, 
commanded by properly empowered legal authorities in the name of the collective 
(Kelsen, 1967, p. 36). The stakes of the pure theory are therefore high: “to achieve the 
objective validity of the social order” (Kelsen, 1945, p. 251, my emphasis). 
As Bert van Roermund insightfully observes, for Kelsen, the authority of law, 
the validity of the norm N as a scheme of interpretation of factual behavior and the 
“ought” it imposes on that behavior, is internally related to authority about law, to the 
legal act that formulates the N, which, in turn, is internally related to authority in law, 
to showing that this legal act truly is such, a valid act according to another, 
empowering norm of the legal order in question. “A legislator L cannot claim with 
authority that some prescription or decision P is valid law in NL without implying that 
his claim to validity, as a legal act, is in accordance with another norm of valid law Q 
within L [sic; NL]” (van Roermund, 2000, p. 217). Positing a norm discloses a fact as 
a legally relevant fact. Such positing is about providing a legal interpretation of facts. 
This positing needs to show, “prove”  (nachweisen), as Kelsen puts it, that it is valid 
(Kelsen, 1981, p. 93, cited and discussed in van Roermund, 2000, pp. 206-207). 
Positing a norm, like the judge delivering a decision in a particular case, requires 
“proving” that this norm actually belongs to the legal order in question, and not simply 
claiming this to be the case (van Roermund, 2000, pp. 208-209).  
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“The one individual wills that the other individual ought to behave in a certain 
way” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 5). The subjective meaning of this act of will/command may, 
but need not, correspond to its objective or legal meaning. It is not necessarily, but 
only contingently, a valid legal command. In another paper, van Roermund helpfully 
distinguishes between norm-claims and their satisfaction, and between bindingness 
of norms and their validity.9 A norm-claim or “a candidate norm” is “the claim, made 
by any agent who performs an ‘act of will directed at the behavior of another’ (e.g. by 
commanding or requiring some action of someone), that the addressee ought to 
behave in a given manner” (van Roermund, 2013c, p. 20). Legal authorities, judges in 
particular, present norm-claims when they set new norms, that is, when they 
command their addressee to behave in a certain way rather than another. To 
distinguish between norm-claims and their validity is to point out that such a 
command is not necessarily warranted, and can turn out to be a merely “subjective” 
act that lacks legal objectivity.  
However, “authorities impose norms (thereby proclaiming their bindingness) 
under the claim that their validity can be cognitively tracked; authorities thus expose 
themselves to a scholarly test which may well prove them wrong” (van Roermund, 
2013c, pp. 39-40, my emphasis). A norm-claim that the addressee ought to do 
something, that she is bound to behave in the manner that the command prescribes, 
will only turn out to be a legal norm if it can be shown, proven, from the perspective 
of legal cognition, to be a warranted claim. A command that presents itself as applying 
a higher norm, as being authorized by law is not sufficient for establishing law, but 
another perspective, that of legal cognition, is necessary to establish retroactively, 
after the claim has been presented, whether it constitutes law or not. This exposure of 
the norm-claim to cognitive investigation, on the one hand, and the contingent 
retroactive establishment of the legal meaning of an act, on the other, have multiple 
implications that we will explore below. 
For Kelsen, the expression “invalid norm” is a contradiction in terms; a “valid 
norm,” a redundant expression (Kelsen, 1991, p. 171). Only by going through the test 
of validity can a norm-claim be established as a legal norm. If the claim fails this test, 
it never was a legal norm, but only proclaimed to be such. Therefore, van Roermund 
argues, “[a] binding norm is one whose existence is authoritatively proclaimed; a valid 
norm, one whose existence is cognitively established” (van Roermund, 2013c, p. 39). 
Pure theory “attempts to answer the question what and how the law is” (Kelsen, 1967, 
p. 1), and the perspective of legal science (as legal dogmatics), or knowledge of law, as 
the locus for tracking down if and how a norm-claim can be embedded within the 
system of law is essential to the establishment of how the law is.  
Thus, for Kelsen, positive law is inherently argumentative (or justificatory, see 
Paulson, 2008): presenting claims that need backing up by reasons that themselves 
are claims backed up by reasons. For Kelsen, “all legal problems are confronted and to 
be solved as systematic problems” (Kelsen, 2002, p. 53). In each particular case of 
 
9 Already in Das Problem der Souveränität, from the year 1920 (Kelsen, 1981), Kelsen 
distinguishes between the gesatz sein, “claimed to be valid” of a willed directive, and its gesetz sein, the 
will as “made to be valid” (van Roermund, 2000, p. 207). 
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norm-creation, whether a court decision or an enactment of new legislation, it is both 
possible and necessary to ask after the norm that is thereby applied, and this 
possibility translates into a regressive questionability. On what grounds is a novel legal 
ought uttered? On what grounds is the distinction between mere force and the force 
of law made in this particular case? One can always regress, ask for the grounds of 
legal enactments and to which secondary rules an instance of law-enactment refers as 
its source of authority and validity. Law-enactments cannot appear as tautologically 
circular (i.e. have the form “I decide what I decide because I decide what I decide”) in 
order to count as enactments of law. The task of the dogmatic legal science is to answer 
the questions by taking norm claims as its object and showing how they fit into the 
legal order as a whole (or not). It makes explicit and expresses in the propositional 
form if and how singular norm claims infer their validity from higher norms (see 
Minkkinen, 2005, pp. 241-242).  
 
 
2.5 The basic norm and retroactivity 
 
One can always regress — and here a problem emerges. If law is infinitely 
questionable and no final reason can be given to a question concerning the validity of 
a command, the whole “chain of creation” (Kelsen, 2002, p. 56) of valid norms 
collapses. This is the problem that also Wittgenstein’s paradox presents: reasons given 
for why a rule ought to be followed and how it ought to be followed can always be 
questioned. The result is “explosion”: no command can appear as a valid command, 
because all grounds for validity can be put to question. Therefore, asking after the 
validity of a norm-claim must have a limit: a legal order must be closed. It must have 
an ultimate norm that constitutes the final and unquestionable limit beyond which the 
questioning cannot go.  
The basic norm (Grundnorm) is the presupposition that such a supreme norm 
and ultimate, unquestionable limit actually exists: “The validity of the first 
constitution is the last presupposition, the final postulate, upon which the validity of 
all the norms of our legal order depends” (Kelsen, 1945, p. 115). If a properly legal 
perspective of reality is to be established (and remember that such a perspective is a 
contingent, not necessary, matter for Kelsen), there must be a blind spot that opens 
the perspective but does not itself come into view within it. This blind spot, or the basic 
norm, is the tacit presupposition, made explicit by the pure theory, held by any legal 
community that has actually come to be bound by a more or less effective legal order. 
The basic norm expresses the presupposition, held by a particular legal collective, that 
one ought to, as a member of this legal collective, behave in conformity with the 
constitution of that collective (Kelsen, 1986, p. 112). Accordingly, the basic norm 
expresses the fundamental rule that “coercion of man against man [exercised by the 
legal authorities in the name of this collective] ought to be exercised in the manner 
and under the conditions determined by the historically first constitution” (Kelsen, 
1967, p. 50).  
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What exactly the basic norm requires, is a task for the legal scholars of a 
particular legal collective to debate and find out (see van Roermund, 2000). The blind 
spot forms the “last reason of validity within a normative system” (Kelsen, 1945, p. 
111), the “point of final normative regress” (Thornhill, 2012, p. 420) of a legal order 
and the questionability of the validity of acts of power and coercion:  
 
The positivistic jurist, who cannot go beyond the fundamental facts, assumes 
that this original historical fact has the meaning of “constitution,” that the 
resolution of an assembly of men or the order of a usurper has the normative 
significance of a fundamental law. Only by making this assumption can he 
demonstrate the normative meaning of all other acts which he comprehends as 
legal acts simply because he ultimately traces them all back to the original 
constitution. The hypothetical basic norm which establishes the original 
legislator expresses this assumption; it consciously formulates it, nothing more. 
This means that legal positivism does not go beyond this original constitution 
to produce a material and absolute justification of the legal order. It stops at 
that point. The basic norm is an indispensable assumption, because, without it, 
the normative character of the basic historical event could not be established. 
(Kelsen, 1945, p. 396)  
 
Kelsen’s famous problematics of “the historically first constitution” thus deal 
with the question of how the political act from which a legal order originates can be 
seen as legally valid, given that there is no higher norm of positive law backing up its 
validity, nor can its validity be derived from natural law or God (Kelsen, 1967, p. 199). 
The constitution-establishing authority cannot be seen as a mere political power, 
because, for Kelsen, the origin of a legal system can only be legal. From a mere factual 
act of will no norm can be inferred. But how is then the origin of a legal order 
established as legal?  
The basic norm, Kelsen explains, can only be presupposed (vorausgesetz) in 
juristic thinking as the “scheme of interpretation” of the political act of enacting the 
historically first constitution. If seen through such a scheme, then the constitution can 
be grasped as legally valid. A legal order cannot have, for Kelsen, a simple origin in a 
specific time and place, because already the act of legislating the very first constitution, 
insofar as it can produce valid law, must refer beyond itself to a yet higher norm that 
it applies and that empowers it to act as such constituted-constituent power. All acts 
of norm-creation, with no exception, that are to succeed in what they aim at (i.e. in 
positing law), must become seen as norm-application. As François Ewald puts it, “[t]he 
law presupposes itself; it necessarily precedes itself. The fact that the law has no origin 
assignable to a fact is a fact which characterizes the law as law” (Ewald, 1988, p. 36).  
As Lindahl points out: 
 
[Kelsen’s] analysis unveils a paradox at the heart of the law: legislation, in its 
most powerful manifestation, is the exercise of constituent power, an act that 
creates the first constitution without being empowered to do so; but because 
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the law can only think of power as legal power, an act can only initiate a legal 
order if it is retroactively interpreted as an empowered act — the exercise of 
constituted power. (Lindahl, 2007a, p. 11, emphasis in the original.)   
The political act that seeks to establish a new constitution can only retroactively 
be seen as possessing legal meaning. It appears as legal indirectly through those acts 
of legal cognition that treat it as such, that is, through the “demonstrat[ions of] the 
normative meaning of all other acts which [the jurist] comprehends as legal acts [by] 
ultimately trac[ing] them all back to the original constitution” (Kelsen, 1945, p. 396), 
as Kelsen writes in a passage from General Theory of Law and State (cited above). 
Only indirectly, via the cognition of the validity of the lower level norms, can the 
highest constitutional norm be treated as a valid norm, although it cannot directly be 
put to the same test of validity than the lower level norms, because it is what makes 
the test possible in the first place. The basic norm, according to this reading, is nothing 
more than a concept of the pure theory of law that names this paradoxical retroactive 
temporality of legal signification. 
2.6 The difficult metalogical choice 
The constitution, as the final point of normative regress and the limit that 
makes the closure of the legal order possible, can thus be seen as somewhat similar to 
the Gödel sentence in the theory of proof that we discussed in the Introduction. It 
expresses the general principle of validity of all elements belonging to the legal system 
(that norms are valid by referring to a higher norm and ultimately to the constitution), 
and it is a norm itself within that system. The highest constitutional norm indicates 
that not all the norms of the legal system, namely itself, can be shown to be valid by 
the system’s internal logic of validation. A self-referential legal system cannot prove 
its own consistency, that is, the validity of all of its norms, but contains a norm the 
validity of which cannot be directly shown. As we discussed in the Introduction, this 
insight that a formal system cannot prove all sentences that belong to it can be 
understood to mean a) that the system is incomplete, that it contains a truth that can, 
and must, be proved in a metalanguage (the constructivist-criteriological position), or 
b) that the system is inconsistently complete and characterized by the inclosure
paradox. (There is also the generic option, which we discuss, as mentioned, in Chapter
5.)
The first choice is the traditional one, geared to make the paradox disappear. 
As Paul M. Livingston notes: 
Gödel’s result, which demonstrates the incapability of any sufficiently complex 
formal system consistently to represent its own logic of proof, was [at first] 
taken to demonstrate the existence of a metalanguage or -system which is 
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capable of representing the proof of logic of the original system, as well as the 
Gödel sentence for that language itself. (Livingston, 2012, p. 29)  
 Making this choice is what characterizes “constructive-criteriological” 
orientations to the problem of self-referential totalities, and their basic gesture is that 
of “parameterization,” that is, developing metalanguages or -systems within which the 
true, but originally unprovable Gödel sentence can be proved. The formulation of the 
basic norm in a way that affirms its paradoxical character, as we just did in the 
previous subchapter, can instead be understood as characteristic of the paradoxico-
critical orientation to totality and based on the choice to see the legal order as 
inconsistently complete. However, such affirmation of the paradox is by no means the 
only one in Kelsen scholarship. Quite the opposite: it seems to me that both Kelsen 
himself and most of his reception has rather had the intuition to choose the traditional 
option: that the basic norm is a truth that comes to complete the system from the 
outside, allowing it to be seen as free from contradiction. 
For example, Alf Ross, Kelsen’s student and a famous representative of Nordic 
legal realism, discusses at length the problematics of the highest constitutional norm 
in his famous essay “On Self-reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law” (Ross, 
1969). His account exhibits, I think, a preference for consistent incompleteness. Ross’s 
argument amounts to saying that the highest constitutional norm is incapable of 
consistently regulating its own amendment, and therefore a non-positive norm of legal 
reasoning must be presupposed as a true axiom, as “the ultimate basis of all 
deductions” “not [itself] demonstrable in the system” (Ross, 1969, p. 21). The non-
positive basic norm expresses the obligation to obey the delegation of the highest 
authority to its successor,10 which, Ross claims, makes the amendment of the highest 
posited norm consistent from the outside, as it were, and “enables us to express 
without logical absurdities and contradictions the ideas which actually govern the 
behaviour of people” (Ross, 1969, p. 24, my emphasis).  
Kelsen seems to share Ross’s metalogical choice, at least during his “classic” 
and “neo-Kantian” phases (see Paulson, 1998a). Kelsen sees the presupposition of the 
basic norm as a necessary supplement to the actual posited legal order that, by itself, 
is incomplete, incapable of showing the validity of all its norms: “the function of the 
hypothetical basic norm [is] to shape the empirical legal material into a meaningful, 
that is, a non-contradictory order” (Kelsen, 1945, p. 439, my emphasis). For Kelsen, 
it is the basic norm that “accounts for the unity of a plurality of legal norms” (Kelsen, 
2002, p. 55). Legal science whose task it is to see the structural connections between 
posited legal norms can see the necessity of the presupposition of the basic norm for 
the task of unifying law into a consistent order. This, Kelsen thinks, eliminates the 
threatening inconsistency of the constitution, that the legal status of the highest norm 
is unstable, and, by implication, of the legal system in question as a whole. Although 
the basic norm cannot be proved valid intra-systemically, it must necessarily be 
10 It says, according to Ross: “Obey the authority instituted by art. 88 [the highest constitutional 
norm of Denmark], until this authority itself points out a successor; then obey this authority, until it 
itself points out a successor; and so on indefinitely” (Ross, 1969, p. 24). 
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presupposed as true, that is, as valid by legal science (e.g. Kelsen, 2002, p. 58; Kelsen, 
1965, p. 1143).  
Only a valid norm can ground the validity of lower level norms, and allow the 
whole to be seen as consistent. “With the postulate of a meaningful, that is, non-
contradictory order, juridical science oversteps the boundary of pure positivism. To 
abandon this postulate would at the same time entail the self-abandonment of juridical 
science” (Kelsen, 1945, p. 437). This requirement of consistency excludes the 
affirmation of the legal closure as an inclosure, as a paradox. Seeing the legal system 
as a contradiction-free pyramid of valid norms through to the highest norm (Kelsen, 
1967, p. 201) requires a metalogical choice that the ultimate limit is a truth unprovable 
internally, but suggesting an external point of view from which its truth can be seen.  
While I think Kelsen’s intuition is, at least initially, to prefer incompleteness of 
the legal system to its inconsistency, there are, however, no available avenues for 
proving the truth of the basic norm. This is basically because, as I will try to show in 
the following, Kelsen’s legal theory is reflexive. It is supposed to be a theoretical 
reflection of what the legal practice already “unconsciously” presupposes, and this 
reflexivity forbids the recourse to ascending external metalevels on which the truth of 
the legal closure could be established.  
Kelsen vehemently banishes the recourse to natural law, God, and political 
power from the list of candidates for explaining the contradiction-free unity of the 
legal system. However, it seems that he nevertheless shares with the tradition of 
natural law the conception that the social order must be open to being rendered 
consistent, and such rendering requires taking a step back to a meta-position. For 
metaphysical thinking, there were clear avenues available for finding metalanguages 
and metanormativity external to human law within which such law’s legitimacy could 
be discussed. For Kelsen the post-metaphysical legal thinker, however, such avenues 
are closed.  
Kelsen can thus, I think, be seen as struggling to reconcile 1. his metalogical 
intuition that although a legal system cannot close itself by its own means and prove 
its own consistency, it cannot be conceived as inconsistent, which in turn suggests that 
a leap ought to be taken to a metalanguage in which its consistency can be shown, and 
2. his rejection of the traditional ways of conceiving metalanguage in legal theory. It is 
expressive of this struggle that Kelsen himself at an occasion speaks of the basic norm 
as “the minimum [...] of natural law” (Kelsen, 1945, p. 437). It has been duly noted by 
Kelsen scholars (although they disagree with its details and implications) that since 
Kelsen’s positivism is not empiricist, that is, for him the task of legal science is not to 
observe positive laws as empirical facts but to give a formal account of positive law and 
thereby formalize it, the scientific focus on positive law brings with it a non-legal 
normativity, a law of law (see e.g. Raz, 1998; Quiviger, 2017; Minkkinen, 2005). The 
difficult question is how such a “law of law” is to be understood, given that a recourse 
to an external normativity is not available.  
As is well known, Kelsen attempts to find the third way between the two 
traditional avenues of natural law and mere political power by drawing an analogy to 
Kant’s transcendental method: 
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Kant asks, “How is it possible to interpret without a metaphysical hypothesis, 
the facts perceived by our senses, in the laws of nature formulated by natural 
science?” In the same way, the Pure Theory of Law asks, “How is it possible to 
interpret without recourse to meta-legal authorities, like God or nature, the 
subjective meaning of certain material facts as a system of objectively valid legal 
norms that are describable in legal propositions?” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 202, 
translation slightly altered.) 
The recourse to neo-Kantianism has been interpreted as Kelsen’s attempt to 
build a “philosophical theory [in which to] demonstrate the transcendentally 
necessary presuppositions on which the claim of the positive law to validity rests” 
(Edel, 1998, p. 219). However, Kelsen’s Kantian arguments have often not been 
received as successful in making plausible a case for the transcendental a priori truth 
of the basic norm in the sense of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (see e.g. Paulson, 
1992b; Hammer, 1998; Luf, 1998). Stefan Hammer’s critique exemplifies the 
disappointed expectations:  
The transcendental nature of a Kantian theory of knowledge does not [...] 
overcome metaphysical pseudocertainty simply by presenting indemonstrable 
presuppositions as, so to speak, problematic objects. Rather, conditions that 
are prior to any theoretical reference to objects must be shown, lest the 
possibility of such reference not be established at all. (Hammer, 1998, p. 185, 
my emphasis.)11  
It is widely believed that demonstrating the truth of the basic norm is not what 
Kelsen’s “transcendental argument” amounts to, although this is precisely what is 
expected of it. Kelsen would then end up in something like a “weak parameterization”: 
upholding the belief that the basic norm is a valid norm not provable valid inter-
systemically, without, however, being able to formulate a proper metalanguage within 
which to successfully show this validity.   
As an alternative to neo-Kantianism, the basic norm has also been interpreted 
as holding an analogous metalinguistic status to Alfred Tarski’s attempt to solve the 
semantic paradox (according to which, as we saw in the Introduction, the truth theory 
of a language cannot be consistently described in the language itself) by distinguishing 
between the “object-language” and “meta-language.” Gerhardt Plöchl argues that 
although Kelsen was apparently unfamiliar with the details of the state of mathematics 
and semantic logic of his time, he “established a theory of [legal] science according to 
the same principles that [...] could be found in the latest developments of logic and 
mathematics” (Plöchl, 1990, p. 140). By “the latest developments” Plöchl means the 
attempts to solve the Liar and Russell’s paradoxes by what we above called (following 
Priest and Livingston) “parameterization.” 
11 Priest (2002) presents an analysis of Kant’s transcendental categories that shows how also 




[I]f Kelsen had chosen the term “metanorm” for this presupposed norm instead 
of “basic norm,” then it would be evident that his problem had the same 
structure as Tarski’s [the need for a distinction between object-language and 
meta-language]. Such terminology would not have been far from Kelsen’s own 
use, because he called “meta-legal” all those authorities (like God or “nature”) 
to which validity is traced back in natural law systems. If it is essential for the 
concept of a legal order that its norms “must be created by a specific process,” 
that they are “created by a legal authority,” then a norm which has not been 
created in this way, is not a norm but a meta-norm, which “decrees” — logically 
— the validity of the norm that is described by the person that presupposes the 
meta-norm for logical reasons. (Plöchl, 1990, p. 136) 
 
According to this conception, legal theory is a metalanguage capable of logically 
showing the truth of the basic norm and, hence, the validity of the highest posited 
norm that the positive legal system itself is unable to do.  
Kelsen himself, in response to Julius Stone’s fierce critique, suggests that the 
basic norm can indeed be understood as “meta-legal” “if by this term is understood 
that the basic norm is not a norm of positive law, that is, not a norm created by a real 
act of will of a legal organ” (Kelsen, 1965, p. 1141). However, he adds that: 
 
 [i]t [can also be understood as] “legal” if by this term we understand everything 
which has legally relevant functions, and the basic norm pre-supposed in 
juristic thinking has the function to found the objective validity of the subjective 
meaning of the acts by which the constitution of a community is created. 
(Kelsen, 1965, p. 1141) 
 
The basic norm cannot be understood only in terms of an external 
metalanguage, because it also “belongs” to the actual legal order, is relevant for it. The 
basic norm is inside the legal system, because “[t]he quest for the reason of validity of 
a norm is [...] terminated by a highest norm which is the last reason of validity within 
a normative system” (Kelsen, 1945, p. 1145, my emphasis). The basic norm is the 
presupposition that there is a valid highest norm that closes the legal order.  
In persistently describing the basic norm in these terms, as being both inside 
and outside, Kelsen is characterizing the closure of the legal system as an inclosure 
and the basic norm as a paradox. The legal system will close itself, if it is to emerge at 
all, but this closure remains inconsistent, oscillating undecidably between validity and 
being beyond validity. Kelsen’s conviction is that there cannot be science without the 
rule of the excluded third and this rule says that the legal order as a whole must be 
cognized as free from contradiction, but the very articulation of the legal perspective 
pushes Kelsen directly into the blind spot and inconsistency, and into implying, 
somewhat inadvertently, that inconsistency is, in a specific sense, actually productive 
for law and legal science. 
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2.7 A reflexive, and paradoxical, theory of the basic norm 
It might then be misguided to expect from Kelsen an independent proof for the 
basic norm, as many of his readers seem to do. It should be noted that Kelsen, after 
all, characterizes the basic norm as a “presupposition” and a “hypothesis” — that is, as 
something not proved, and this being-outside-of-proof character is only emphasized 
by the late description of it as a “genuine fiction.” If the basic norm is something that 
closes the legal system from the outside, its truth is not, for that matter, formulable in 
a language external to the system.  
Indeed, as we saw in the Introduction, to formulate the truth of the basic norm 
in a metalanguage would again produce a Gödel sentence necessitating a yet higher 
metalevel with its Gödel sentence etc. ad infinitum. The expectation that Kelsen would 
be able to provide an independent argument for the truth of the basic norm, and to 
prove the hypothesis correct, misunderstands that Kelsen’s project is reflexive. Kelsen 
cannot have a theory of ascending levels, precisely because such a theory would not be 
faithful to its object, it would not correctly describe law’s self-reference, namely that it 
regulates its own reproduction. As Herbert Schnädelbach points out:  
[m]erely metalinguistic speech is [...] per definitionem non-reflexive. The
attempt to grasp its constituting rules in a metatheoretical fashion leads to the
well-known endless hierarchy of metalanguages, in which reflexivity has no
place. (Schnädelbach, 1977, p. 136, cited in English in Gasché, 1986, p. 78.)
After all, Kelsen only claims to “mak[e] conscious what most legal scientists do” 
anyway (Kelsen, 1967, p. 204), “consciously formulat[ing]” what is already assumed 
(Kelsen, 1945, p. 396). The pure theory does not claim to do more than make explicit 
what is already implicit in the very practice of positive law: it claims to be positive law’s 
self-reflection. 
To be sure, Kant’s transcendental philosophy (like all forms of transcendental 
philosophy, Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology included) is also a philosophy of 
reflection: cognition of the structures of cognition. But as Livingston notes: 
in their initial formulation, such structuralisms typically take the critical form 
of the criteriological orientation [to the limits of thought and language]. 
Seeking to adumbrate structural principles and rules underlying the possibility 
of sense, they attempt a juridical regulation of language based on an 
examination of what are seen as its original founding principles. [...] However, 
the criteriological attempt to delimit language by means of an elucidation of its 
structure leads, almost inevitably, to a series of formal paradoxes that 
destabilize the boundary-drawing project [...], as soon as language is itself 
conceived as a total object of (linguistic) description. (Livingston, 2012, pp. 65-
66, original emphasis.) 
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This being-led-to-paradox, it seems to me, is exactly what happens to Kelsen’s 
criteriological orientation as well. He has the intuition that the theory must be pure 
and the limits of law cognitively rationalized and secured, “policed,” by a rational “law 
of law,” but he cannot help but describe his findings in a way that suggests an inclosure 
paradox rather than a theory of ascending levels, each of which would secure the 
rationality of the boundaries of the lower one. In a sense, reflective philosophy 
becomes aware of its own nature when it assumes itself as a paradoxical enterprise and 
acknowledges that the project of drawing the limits of thought takes place self-
referentially in the very act of thinking.  
Kelsen insists that the basic norm “is not an ‘intellectual construct’” because “it 
is not ‘created’ by juristic thinking, but presupposed in it” (Kelsen, 1965, p. 1148, 
original emphasis). But clearly Kelsen also does more than simply “presuppose” the 
basic norm — he analyzes it at length over the course of his whole long career (indeed, 
Kelsen himself says that “[a]bout no other problem have I said so much as about the 
basic norm” (Kelsen, 1965, p. 1143)). Kelsen describes at length in legal science the 
very foundation (the pre-supposition, Voraus-Setzung (Kelsen, 1965, p. 1149)) on 
which this activity itself is grounded. The pure theory claims to make explicit — not 
construct — not simply what the ordinary jurist and the member of a legal collective 
implicitly presuppose in their legally relevant behavior, but what the legal scholar 
must presuppose as well: that there is law, that an effective and valid positive legal 
order “is taking place.” As Kelsen often argues, law is not valid because it is efficacious, 
but it would not be valid, were it not sufficiently efficacious (e.g. Kelsen, 1967, p. 211).  
This makes sense as an idea of reflective legal philosophy: legal theory describes 
what the practice already presupposes in its very operation, namely that there is an 
effective legal order that empowers and obligates its authorities and members to act 
in specific ways, ultimately according to the constitution as the highest rule. If “the 
framework is shown as pre-established in being used, not by being mentioned on a 
metalevel prior to its use,” as van Roermund suggests, legal theory can be understood 
as law’s self-reflection: making explicit what the legal community (that includes legal 
authorities and ordinary members but also legal scholars) as a whole presuppose in 
their very “joint action” (see van Roermund, 2013c, p. 38), namely, that “we, as 
members, authorities and scientists of this legal collective, ought to behave in the way 
prescribed by the highest norm of the legal order, the constitution.”  
Note that to describe the basic norm in this manner is different from a 
sociological, i.e. an external description of what people believe, because it expresses 
reflexivity. That the legal order is more or less effective, requires that people take 
“commands” by legal authorities as legally binding on their behavior, as orienting their 
conduct in the world and toward each other. As Kelsen puts it, the final answer to the 
child that questions why he ought to obey his father’s orders can only be that God has 
so commanded and that “as a believer, one presupposes that one ought to obey the 
commands of God” (or in a more contemporary phrase, because this is what the rules 
of this family say, and as a member of this family, one ought to obey its rules) (Kelsen, 
1986, p. 112, my emphasis). Analogically, the ultimate answer to the question “Why 
ought the law be obeyed?” is that as a member of the legal collective whose law it is, 
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one is presupposed to obey its law. That is what its members do as members. While in 
the legal practice this “ought” is only proclaimed and implicitly assumed (like when 
the legal authorities claim to apply the law in accordance with, ultimately, the highest 
constitutional norm and their addressees, i.e. the ordinary members, take these claims 
as binding and orienting their behavior), in legal theory (legal dogmatics) such claims 
and assumptions are tested, hypotheses about the exact content of this “ought” are 
formulated and debated (see van Roermund, 2000, p. 210).12 
2.8 Reflective legal theory and the logic of the supplement 
 Self-reflection always implies difference: a difference between “me and 
myself,” between legal practice and legal theory, although the theory is nothing but a 
theory, a self-reflection, of the practice. As law’s self-cognition and self-understanding, 
the theory introduces a difference into the legal unity. This difference is similar to my 
self-reflection: when I am thinking about myself, I am both the one who thinks and 
the one who is thought about. In self-reflection, one stands both inside and outside 
oneself and is, in this way, a “unity in difference.” One stands within the something 
one attempts to grasp as a totality; an endeavor that necessarily leaves a blind spot and 
makes a leap to a neutral, disembedded level impossible (if, that is, the reflexive 
character is to be maintained):  
The purpose of reflective philosophy is to elucidate, explicate, or disclose the 
implicit structure of possible, or merely actual, experience. For here, it is said 
that “to analyze is to explicate the implicit.” The development of reflective 
philosophy may be understood as a growing consciousness of the nature of the 
primary task of philosophy: to render the implicit explicit. (Bartlett, 1975, p. 
185, citing Ricoeur, 1967, p. 99, original emphasis.) 
12 Does this reading not conflict, however, with Kelsen’s unambiguous critique of recognition 
theories, that is, of views according to which law’s ultimate authority lies in its addressees’ “agreement” 
to obey it (Kelsen, 1967, p. 218, footnote 83)? However, as van Roermund argues, “Kelsen expelled 
recognition theory from the Pure Theory of Law for the wrong reasons; and [...] he tacitly reintroduced 
it for the right reasons” (van Roermund, 2013c, p. 32). It is not that recognition means that the 
addressee of the law and the legal authority must share the same interests in order for the law to be 
obliging, as Kelsen thought. It is, rather, that insofar as law is regarded as imposing duties to its 
addressees, it “is dependent on the legal subject’s free, intentional reconstruction of official utterances 
or actions as not only reasons for action in general, but as reasons for her action” (van Roermund, 2013c, 
p. 33). A legal system would remain utterly superfluous and virtual were it not recognized by the legal
subjects as binding on their action here and now. This does not mean that they would need to
normatively accept or agree with the “rightness” of the duties in any moral sense, but simply recognize
that a norm-claim by a legal authority is addressed to them, regards them as members of this legal
collective and, on this basis, requires of them certain kind of behavior rather than another. The
requirement of recognition does of course not presuppose that all those addressed must in actual fact
act legally, but only that typically a legal order is regarded by its addressees as binding on them and
their actions in concrete situations (whether or not they always fulfill legal expectations). I come back 
to the theme of recognition in Chapter 6.
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As Bartlett further points out, reflective philosophy “may obtain certain 
descriptive results concerning such notions as ‘pre-reflective experience’ or ‘the 
implicit,’ but these results cannot be taken out of relation to frameworks rendering 
those results possible” (Bartlett, 1975, p. 188). Accordingly, legal theory is not a mere 
mirroring of legal practice, but has constitutive implications for its object, without this 
implying mere constructivism.13 Legal signification — the constitution of acts of will as 
having as their meaning a legal norm — is not mere constructivism, because it 
responds to an act that it takes as making a claim to validity. As Kelsen puts it in his 
posthumously published work General Theory of Norms, the validity of the legal norm 
is “conditional upon the act of will of which it is the meaning” (Kelsen, 1991, p. 234) 
(my emphasis); or in Derrida’s words: “the order of intelligibility depends in its turn 
on the established order which it serves to interpret” (Derrida, 2002, p. 270). Legal 
signification as a response also implies that it is reductive, and that other ways of 
interpreting the act were possible. Legal cognition is not mere mirroring, because that 
act to which it responds is only a claim to validity, exposed to a cognitive response that 
confirms, or not, its legality. Understood in this way, as responsive, legal signification, 
the disclosure of an act as a legal act, begins outside the law, that is, in the act of will, 
and unfolds as a response to the claim that the act expresses, confirming or 
disconfirming its legality.14  
We can formulate the legal inclosure paradox as the ultimate limit of the legal 
order that both belongs to it as its valid foundation and escapes it as impossible to 
prove valid by the order’s logic of belonging. To understand this paradox in the 
temporal terms of responsivity is, thus, to say that at no point does a legal collective 
encounter its factual origin directly, in a specific time and place. The act that 
inaugurates it can only be seen as such, as an inaugurating act, retroactively, as what 
the already established, effective legal practice and its description by legal scholars 
presuppose as the final point of validity of their cognitive endeavors. This paradoxical 
temporality is what Jacques Derrida calls “the supplementarity of origin” (or originary 
supplementarity) (Derrida, 1967, p. 314): the origin or foundation (the hypothesis in 
its Greek meaning, see Edel, 1998) can only be accessed indirectly, by the mediation 
of what allegedly comes only later, as indicating that foundation as its own ground. As 
Jean-Pierre Dupuy and Francisco J. Varela explain: 
another term, supposed to be secondary and subordinated, and which should 
be nothing other than a derivation or complication of the primary Concept (for 
instance: culture, writing, form, etc.), appears as indispensable to the 
constitution of the latter. The origin appears as full and pure but, without the 
supplement which nevertheless follows from it, it would lose all consistency. 
Thus the secondary term appears at the same time as perfectly dispensable and 
13 For these reasons the basic norm is also different from H. L. A. Hart’s “rule of recognition” 
(Hart, 2012, p. 100) the existence of which is “a matter of fact” (Hart, 2012, p. 110). 
14 Ferdinando Menga (2018, p. 48 ff) has recently presented an account of the experience of 
meaning along these lines. Lindahl’s work also articulates this point, and we will return to it later on. 
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perfectly indispensable. Even the most apparently perfect totality suffers 
inescapably from a constitutive lack. (Dupuy & Varela, 1992, p. 2) 
Legal cognition appears as both perfectly dispensable — surely it is the legal 
authority who posits the norm and not the legal scholar — and perfectly indispensable, 
for only from the perspective of legal science can the structural position of the posited 
norm vis-à-vis other norms be articulated and, hence, the validity of the norm claim 
verified or falsified. The logic of the supplement thus deconstructs a strict distinction 
between the creative power of authorities and the descriptive stance of legal science. 
What we have instead is an “entangled hierarchy”: “the form of a circular causality 
unifying two terms in spite of the fact that one claims to be hierarchically superior to 
the other” (Dupuy & Varela, 1992, p. 3).   
Legal theory cannot, thus, be conceived as purely constitutive, as constructive 
of law, because acts of will, not acts of cognition, posit the law; but neither can legal 
theory simply mirror law, because acts of will are only norm-claims, exposed to 
cognition that will or will not recognize in them the mark of validity. Legal practice 
and legal cognition are then “two levels which must be kept distinct, and yet which are 
undeniably intertwined” (Dupuy & Varela, 1992, p. 5). Cognition is the necessary 
supplement, because without it, positive law does not come to its own as a system of 
valid norms. But cognition, as a “mere” supplement, denies its creativity in its very 
operation, and assures the legal collective that it is simply describing what the law 
already was, without creating it for the first time.  
However, this is to read Kelsen through the lenses of the mature position of 
paradoxico-criticism, and therefore it is not as such, it must be admitted, reflected in 
Kelsen’s text. Kelsen could hardly offer an explicitly deconstructive theory of law. By 
contrast, he insists, for example, on the difference between the “authentic legal 
interpretation” provided by the law-creating legal organ when it creates a general 
norm (not applicable only to a particular case), on the one hand, and the “inauthentic” 
legal scientific interpretation of the law and the interpretation of the law by the rule-
following individual, on the other: 
This act of will creates [...] a lower-level norm[.] This act of will differentiates 
the legal interpretation by the law-applying organ from any other 
interpretation, especially from the interpretation of law by jurisprudence. [...] 
The interpretation by a law-applying organ is different from any other 
interpretation – all other interpretations are not authentic, that is, they do not 
create law. (Kelsen, 1967, p. 354) 
In his theory of legal interpretation presented in the second edition of the Pure 
Theory of Law, that is, in the application of the higher-level norm and the creation of 
the lower-level norm by means of interpreting the meaning of the higher norm, Kelsen 
clearly holds a “mirror view” of legal scholarship: it merely describes, without 
constituting, the law already created by the law-giving organs. There is no 
acknowledgement of the paradoxical temporality of retroactivity in this theory.  
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Furthermore, for Kelsen, the law-giving organs themselves interpret legal 
norms in particular cases on grounds of what Kelsen calls “the frame”: “the law to be 
applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications are possible, 
whereby every act is legal that stays within the frame” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 351). Legal 
interpretation in rule-application is not mechanical, but the way in which the higher-
order norm binds the lower-level norm can never be “complete,” because it leaves 
room for “discretion” and several interpretative possibilities offer themselves to the 
judge. However, these possibilities are already given within the law and are simply 
waiting to be discovered. Not only the political legislator but also the judge create law 
by applying a higher-order norm and selecting one of its possible applications that are 
all of equal weight. There are no absolutely correct applications of the norm that legal 
science could establish. Instead, the selection is a matter of “legal politics” and will, 
not simply cognition, is involved in identifying what the rule means in a particular 
case. Acts of will are free to choose how the norm ought to be applied in the case at 
hand, although this will is not absolute. Law-creation is not unsupported by the 
already extant law, for the decision must pick an application already provided by the 
frame (Kelsen, 1967, pp. 349-353).15 “In the application of law by a legal organ, the 
cognitive interpretation of the law to be applied is combined with an act of will by 
which the law-applying organ chooses between the possibilities shown by cognitive 
interpretation” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 354).  
The task of legal science, then, is to provide the cognitive interpretation and 
make manifest which possibilities there are for the will to pick:  
 
[J]urisprudential interpretation [...] exhibit[s] all possible meanings of a legal 
norm. Jurisprudence as cognition of law cannot decide between the 
possibilities exhibited by it, but must leave the decision to the legal organ who, 
according to the legal order, is authorized to apply the law. (Kelsen, 1967, p. 
355, my emphasis.) 
 
This amounts to an exercise of complexity- and ambiguity-reduction within the 
law and by science, of clarifying indeterminacies and insecurities of meaning and 
application that could otherwise emerge. Legal-scientific representation of the 
possible applications of a norm advances legal consistency, Kelsen argues, and thereby 
the rule of law or “legal security” (1967, p. 356). As Lindahl characterizes Kelsen’s 
understanding of the legal frame and its exhibition by the legal cognition: 
 
the scientific viewpoint allows legal cognition to reproduce, by way of legal 
propositions, all and only those meanings contained in a norm. To interpret is 
 
15 Kelsen argues, however, that “authentic” interpretation can also create law beyond the frame, 
and that for instance supreme courts may create new valid norms in this way (Kelsen, 1967, p. 354). 
This raises the question of the relation of such creation to the higher-order norm supposedly 
empowering authentic interpretation and to Kelsen’s other argument that it is legal cognition, not mere 
norm-claim by a legal organ, that is needed to establish new law. Van Roermund  claims that the 
distinction between “validity” and “bindingness” solves this apparent inconsistency (van Roermund, 
2013, p. 25-26). 
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to represent, and to represent is to articulate an original range of meanings 
given directly to cognition. (Lindahl, 2003, p. 774, my emphasis.) 
However, if this is the case, if the scientific, cognitive interpretation simply 
mirrors or directly copies a range of possible meanings already there in law, the 
specificity of both the original, implicit scope of possible meanings and the posterior, 
explicit scope seem to be lost. What, in fact, can differentiate them, if legal cognition 
simply repeats what was there already? To insist that legal theory and legal 
propositions are purely descriptive (like Kelsen seems to think in the Pure Theory)16 
risks obscuring what added value the legal scientific framing may bring. 
For this reason, I think Kelsen has two possibilities (neither of which he takes). 
I cannot discuss these options and the implications they would have for Kelsen’s work 
at length here and will only put them on the table, so to speak. If Kelsen wants to hold 
on to the view that a legal norm, as posited by a legal authority, “possesses” in some 
sense its own application/meaning prior to its interpretation, and if he still wishes to 
defend the view that legal cognition has added value, he can think of the norm prior to 
its interpretation as simply the scope of all cases of its application. This would be to 
understand the norm extensionally, as simply defined by its applications (the scope of 
which may in principle be infinite), rather than intensionally, defined by a concept, 
textual meaning of the norm, the will of the legislator etc. A pre-interpreted legal norm 
would simply be the open set of all its applications and interpretations. Legal cognition 
would then provide a representation that articulates all applications that are possible 
for that norm. In other words, a norm is the extension of all cases of its application, 
and the added value of the scientific representation is to show how the norm may be 
applied by taking into consideration, for example, the hierarchy of norms and the 
systematic relations of norms to other norms, thereby providing “the frame” for how 
the norm may be applied in a valid manner. Here representation is not mere repetition 
of the original set, but it provides an “excess” of information as it groups the norm with 
other norms.      
As we will see in our discussion on the basic set-theoretical grounds of Badiou’s 
“metaontology” in Chapter 5, extensionalism and the distinction between a set and its 
“representation” is not, however, a reflexive relation, but quite simply the formation 
of a “scientific norm,” a “law of law” that stipulates on what conditions a single norm 
may be applied by legal authorities. By choosing the extensional understanding of the 
norm, Kelsen would need to abandon the understanding that legal cognition is 
reflexive, law’s own reflection of itself that seeks to make explicit what was already 
implicit in the law, without constituting a separate metalanguage on top of it.  
The alternative would be to relax the strict distinction between “authentic” or 
law-creating acts and “inauthentic” or merely interpreting (reproducing) acts. This 
would lead to the dropping of the frame theory of interpretation insofar as it is 
accompanied by the idea of the pre-interpreted norm having a fully independent 
16 There exists, of course, the well-established debate whether Kelsen abandons the view that 
legal theory is merely descriptive and comes to endorse the view that it has constitutive, “law-creating,” 
significance. I cannot, however, enter that debate here. 
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identity (intensional or extensional), and understanding interpretation in terms of 
“the scheme of interpretation” that we discussed above. Each act that posits a legal 
norm must claim validity to itself, requires a claim to empowerment by other norms 
already in place. Legal cognition is responsive to such claims, exercising constitutive 
power on law to the extent that it establishes whether and how the norm-claim fits 
within the legal system and whether and how it can be legitimated and, hence, the 
norm it posits rendered a valid – legal – norm. Legal cognition is, thus, neither merely 
descriptive nor merely constitutive of law, but precisely reflexive, keeping law and its 
cognition in a mutually constitutive relation in which neither side has absolute 
independence. Taking this option brings us back, however, to the paradoxico-critical 
view of the legal totality.   
2.9 Self-contradictory, but useful: the fictitiously willed basic norm 
Acknowledging a certain anachronism in my reading, which shows Kelsen’s 
work in a light that he never himself explicitly intended, I propose to read Kelsen’s late 
characterizations of the basic norm as a “fiction” and his surprising affirmation of a 
“fictitious act of will” from the paradoxico-critical perspective. Kelsen’s late reflections 
on the basic norm as “self-contradictory” (Kelsen, 1991), but nevertheless necessary 
and useful for a contingent legal form of life to arise, come perhaps the closest to 
articulating the paradoxical-reflexive nature of the basic norm. Having argued for 
decades that the basic norm is a presupposition of juristic thought, and not posited by 
an act of will, Kelsen now adds: “To the assumption of a norm not posited by a real act 
of will but only presupposed in juristic thinking, one can validly object that a norm can 
be the meaning only of an act of will and not of an act of thinking” (Kelsen, 1986, p. 
116). He continues: “along with the basic norm, presupposed in thought, one must also 
think of an imaginary authority whose (figmentary) act of will has the basic norm as 
its meaning” (Kelsen, 1986, p. 117).17 This is self-contradictory, says Kelsen, because it 
contradicts the idea that basic norm authorizes the highest authority. To think of this 
contradiction as “useful” suggests, however, that the relation between the fictitious 
will and the fictitious basic norm is circular in the sense of “self-legislation.” The unity 
of the legal system refers to a collective agent that is “subject” (or rather a “self”) in 
the two-fold sense of being both the ultimate agent who wills the law into being and 
the collective of members whose behavior the legal order regulates.   
17 To be sure, already in the Second Edition of the Pure Theory Kelsen writes: “Just as we can 
imagine things which do not really exist but ‘exist’ only in our thinking, we can imagine a norm which 
is not the meaning of a real act of will but which exists only in our thinking. Then, it is not a positive 
norm. But since there is a correlation between the ought of a norm and a will whose meaning it is, there 
must be in our thinking also an imaginary will whose meaning is the norm which is only presupposed 
in our thinking – as is the basic norm of a positive legal order” (Kelsen, 1967, pp. 9-10). 
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Let me clarify this reading incrementally. As is well known, Kelsen’s new 
“skepticism” (see Paulson, 1992a; Paulson, 1998a)18 as to the role of logic in law was 
contemporary with a re-appraisal19 of Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of fiction. In his 
Philosophy of the “As If” (1911), Vaihinger makes the distinction between fictions and 
hypotheses: “The latter are assumptions which are probable, assumptions the truth of 
which can be proved by further experience. They are therefore verifiable. Fictions are 
never verifiable, for they are hypotheses which are known to be false, but which are 
employed because of their utility” (Vaihinger, 2000 p.xlii;  see also Vaihinger, 2000, 
pp. 266-270).20 Perhaps Kelsen came to think of his characterization of the basic norm 
as a “hypothesis” as suggesting too much, as promising something that was not 
forthcoming, namely verifiability. Indeed, he seems to say as much when he writes:  
[i]t should be noted that the Basic Norm is not a hypothesis in the sense of
Vaihinger’s philosophy of As-If — as I myself have sometimes characterized it
— but a fiction. A fiction differs from a hypothesis in that it is accompanied —
or ought to be accompanied — by the awareness that reality does not agree with
it. (Kelsen, 1991, p. 256)
One could think that for Kelsen, a legal fiction “has to imply a claim which 
stands in opposition to the legal order, which cannot be deduced from the legal order” 
(Kelsen, 2015, p. 13), as he writes in his early, 1919 critique of Vaihinger’s thought, but 
neither ought one think it can be proved in a metalanguage. Instead, as Frederick 
Schauer suggests, it seems that for Kelsen, “it simply does not matter whether [the 
basic norm] is true or not” (Schauer, 2015, p. 116). It is not a truth of the legal system 
the system itself is capable of proving, thereby implying that proving is a task to be 
conducted at a metalevel. The problem with the formulation of the basic norm as a 
“hypothesis” could then be seen to be this: it might suggest that “further experience” 
— or further “parameterization,” further construction of metalevels — will be able to 
prove its truth.  
Kelsen’s novel characterization of the basic norm as a fiction has not been met 
with enthusiasm among his readers. As Stanley Paulson, for one, writes:  
the fictitious character of the basic norm amounts to a concession that the 
normativity thesis [that the pure theory of law is the third way between natural 
law theory and political theory of law: HL] is not defensible, and the result is 
the overturning of the Pure Theory of Law as we know it from Kelsen’s classical 
period. (Paulson, 1992a, p. 270)  
18 Kelsen has also famously been accused of “irrationalism” (Weinberger, 1981) in his late 
thought in which he questions the applicability of the principle of the excluded third to legal norms (but 
not to legal propositions of legal science) (Kelsen, 1973). 
19 Kelsen had written on Vaihinger’s philosophy of fiction already in 1919 (Kelsen, 2015). 
20 Vaihinger also distinguishes between legal hypothesis and legal fiction, or “conjecture” and 
“invention” (Vaihinger, 2000, p. 32). 
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Paulson regrets Kelsen’s change of heart and sees it as undermining what is 
unique in the pure theory (Paulson, 1992a, p. 273). Although the paradoxico-critical 
reading of Kelsen goes beyond the very letter of his work, structuring the different 
phases of his work with the concept of the metalogical choice at least has the benefit 
of spinning Kelsen’s late thought into an alternative framework, rather than simply 
seeing it as a failure. 
One can nevertheless ask whether the notion of fiction is a better choice to 
characterize the basic norm than hypothesis, even if it expresses the fact that no proof 
is coming for it. Robert Alexy is among those who argue in the negative:  
a further basic norm would have to be invented to empower the fictitious 
authority to issue the basic norm, which would amount to not only denying the 
original basic norm its character as a basic norm, but also — since the further 
basic norm, too, could only be the content of an act of will — presupposing ad 
infinitum further fictitious authorities and the fictitious basic norms 
empowering them. (Alexy, 2002, p. 111; see also Stewart, 1986, p. 132; Duxbury, 
2007, p. 9.)  
However, the infinite regress arises only for a non-reflexive theory of the basic 
norm. If the “fictitious authority” is understood simply as the legal collective itself, 
that is, if the basic norm is understood reflexively, the fiction of the willed basic norm 
expresses the idea of collective self-empowerment, and no regress arises. What we do 
have instead is self-reference and an inconsistent closure, but as Kelsen and Vaihinger 
both suggest, some inconsistencies may indeed be “useful.” 
The plausibility of the reading that the “fictional authority” is the legal collective 
as a whole finds some grounds from Kelsen’s early discussion of Vaihinger’s book 
(Kelsen, 2015). Kelsen argues that the only genuine legal fictions are the fictions used 
in legal cognition (and there are no genuine juridical fictions in legislation or 
adjudication, contrary to what Vaihinger claims), and his example is the legal person, 
both in its singular and collective meanings. The legal person is a personification of a 
complex of norms, and as such a cognitive construct of — response to — the available 
legal material. It is, for Kelsen, “an auxiliary construction of legal thinking” (Kelsen, 
1967, p. 292), and as such it does not directly correspond with anything in positive law, 
nor for that matter in empirical reality. This implies “logical untenability,” but this 
abnormality “does not militate against its actual practicability” (Kelsen, 2015, p. 7).  
“After all,” Kelsen writes, “legal science — as cognition of a particular object — 
can only be possible if one assumes the sovereignty of the law (or, which is the same, 
of the state), i.e. if one takes the legal order as an independent system of norms which 
is not dependent on any higher order” (Kelsen, 2015, p. 18, partly my emphasis). To 
the legal order corresponds a legal collective that Kelsen identifies with the state or, in 
another text, with “the People.” No legal collective preexists its legal order. Kelsen 
warns of “the danger that comes with any personification: its hypostatisation into an 
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actual object of nature” (Kelsen, 2015, p. 8).21 As a “fiction,” the legal person in its 
collective meaning as the state or the legal collective is not a natural entity, “a real 
being” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 291) that could be directly perceived or that could actually will 
something. It can only be accessed indirectly, namely as the fictitious agent or the 
“acting subject” to whom the acts of legal authorities can ultimately be imputed.  
This interpretation gains additional support from Kelsen when he writes, 
already in Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1920/1929) (The Essence and Value 
of Democracy), that although the idea of “the People” is of utmost importance for 
democracy, as a political notion it cannot be sociologically observed. This is because, 
empirically speaking, its unity as a collective dissolves into “national, religious, and 
economic differences” and “the People” succeeds in only “represent[ing] more a 
bundle of groups than a coherent, homogeneous mass” (Kelsen, 2013, p. 36). “Here,” 
he continues:  
 
one can speak of unity only in a normative sense. As a consensus of thoughts, 
feelings, and wills and as a solidarity of interests, the unity of the People is an 
ethical-political postulate. National or state ideology asserts the reality of this 
postulate by way of a common, no longer questioned, fiction. At bottom, only a 
juristic fact is capable of circumscribing the unity of the People with some 
accuracy, namely: the unity of the state’s legal order whose norms govern the 
behavior of its subjects. (Kelsen, 2013, p. 36, my emphasis.) 
 
Kelsen reminds that a “person never belongs completely” to the social, or for 
that matter, state legal order, but that order regulates “only very specific aspects of the 
individual’s life” (Kelsen, 2013, p. 36). Because of this gap between life and its legal 
regulation (which also forms an important dimension of freedom for Kelsen), the 
notion of the political collective as a unity is a “fiction”: it does not correspond to 
anything in the world. It has no “being.” It is simply a scheme of interpretation, one 
could say, that allows for legal interpretation of a multiplicity of behaviors as 
attributable to the legal order. “The People” is not “as is often naively imagined, a body 
or conglomeration as it were, of actual persons,” but it is a juristic fiction, a form that 
gathers a “multiplicity of human actions [...] as the content of the norms making up 
the [legal] order” (Kelsen, 2013, p. 36). This unity, then, “is merely a system of 
individual human acts regulated by the state legal order” (Kelsen, 2013, p. 36). For 
Kelsen, collective unity is clearly an effect of the articulation of legal norms into a 
system: a multiplicity of human behaviors can be interpreted as a unity if it is seen 
through the lens of the legal order.   
Similarly, in the politically active sense “the ‘People’ does not actually exist as a 
viable political force prior to its organization into parties,” Kelsen argues (Kelsen, 
2013, p. 40). He seems to think that “the people,” the constituent power in a 
democracy, only exists as the reference point of constituted, legally regulated power, 
as that collective agent in the name of which all political parties ultimately claim to act. 
 
21 This, from Kelsen’s perspective, is the error that Carl Schmitt makes in his constitutional 
theory (see e.g. Lindahl, 2007a). 
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In his later work Kelsen comes back to the jurisprudential fiction of the legal person 
and the state as such a person and its relation to the legal system. “[T]he problem of 
the state as an acting person,” he explains, “particularly as a person fulfilling legal 
obligations and exercising legal rights — is a problem of attribution” (Kelsen, 1967, p. 
291):  
From the point of view of cognition directed toward the law, only a function 
determined by the legal order — that is a legal function in the narrower or wider 
sense of the term — can be comprehended as a function of the state. Since the 
attribution of a function determined by the legal order and performed by a 
certain human being to the state as a person is only a way of expressing the idea 
that a function is referred to the unity of the legal order which determines this 
function, any function determined by the legal order may be attributed to the 
state as the personification of this legal order. (Kelsen, 1967, p. 292)  
The state can be represented by individuals on the condition that they are 
empowered in their acts by the legal order. In this way, the acts of will by legal 
authorities can be attributed to the state as their ultimate agent.  
Understanding this account of attribution in reflexive terms takes it one step 
forward. If the basic norm is a scheme of interpretation that allows the retroactive 
understanding of the constituent political act as a legal act, then the fiction of the 
authoritative act of will that posits the basic norm is the fiction of the legal collective, 
of “the people,” to whom the actual act of positing the constitution is, retroactively, 
imputed. The fictitiously willed basic norm expresses the self-empowerment of a legal 
collective, the legal collective’s giving to itself its own legal order. As we have seen, 
Kelsen’s problem is to explain how it is possible to see the historically first constitution 
as legal. The fiction of the basic norm is an attempt to solve this problem: if legally 
cognized, the first constitution appears as if it was an application of law, and not 
simply its creation. The fiction of the highest authority is, for its part, a fiction of a 
collective in the name of which the individuals enacting the constitution can come, 
retroactively, to be seen to have acted. As Vaihinger writes, “[i]n the fictio juris [...] 
something that has not happened is regarded as having happened” (Vaihinger, 2000, 
p. 34).
In his Force of Law, Derrida famously discusses Montaigne’s characterization 
of “legitimate fictions” as law’s artificial supplements to natural law. He cites 
Montaigne: 
Even as women, when their naturall teeth faile them, use some of yvoire, and in 
stead of a true beautie, or lively colour, lay-on artificiall hew [...] embellish 
themselves with counterfeit and borrowed beauties; so doth learning (and our 
law hath, as some say, certaine lawfull fictions, on which it groundeth the truth 
of justice). (Montaigne, 1933, p. 970, cited in Derrida, 2002, p. 240.)  
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Montaigne compares law’s legitimate fiction to women who resort to artifice 
when their natural beauty grows old: positive law, an additional, fictional, non-natural 
justice, comes to supplement the natural law. For Derrida, the supplement, as we saw 
above, is no mere addition or substitute; rather, it is the only way to claim access to 
what is “natural” and “prior” to the emergence of the artifice itself. Kelsen’s conviction 
is that law is nothing natural, and that no act of will is directly, without “the 
supplement” of legal cognition able to count as an act of law-positing. The fiction is, in 
the end, nothing more mystical than legal signification itself, that is, a name for a 
contingent legal perspective of reality that neither simply mirrors it, nor simply 
constructs it. The fiction as an auxiliary construction is a supplement in Derrida’s 
sense: something that comes second, as a response, to political facts and brings out, 
for the first time, what they already claim to possess.  
Pace Paulson (1992a), then, Kelsen’s reference to “figmentary will” does not 
necessarily mean that his late position would now suddenly be equivalent to the same 
will theories of law, like to Austin’s theory of law as the pure command of the 
sovereign, that he earlier so vehemently criticized. Although underdeveloped, his idea 
of the auxiliary fiction fits with the idea of legal signification so important to him 
during his whole oeuvre, if read with the paradoxical temporality of retroactivity in 
view.  
That Kelsen would write already in 1919 that “we have to speak of a fiction as 
soon as cognition (and especially juridic cognition) takes a detour in knowing its object 
(and in juridic knowledge this object is the law, the legal order, the legal ought), a 
detour in which it consciously sets itself in contradiction to this object; and be it only 
in order to better grasp it” (Kelsen, 2015, p. 5), suggests that Kelsen was from the 
beginning seeking to express his pure theory as a reflective philosophy. Legal cognition 
does not simply “present again” what is already the case in positive law. In this sense, 
it does set itself as if against the fact of law. However, this does not mean that legal 
cognition merely imagines something completely detached from the law. Rather, it 
seeks to grasp the law itself. It seeks to make explicit what is implicit in law, and what 
is implicit, can only be seen as having been there all along after it has been made 
explicit. The logic of the supplementarity of origin is an attempt to express this 
ambiguity in self-reflection: what is original comes to its “true” meaning only in an 
auxiliary fiction.  
The basic norm as a fictional norm willed by a fictional authority can, thus, 
finally be understood as the fiction of the finiteness of a contingent perspective of a 
legal collective to reality, as the presupposition that a closure has been made that 
allows for legal signification, the interpretation of (political) authoritative acts as legal 
acts imputable to the collective as a whole and, therefore, valid and objective. Finitude 
and closure make it possible to resolve social conflicts as legal conflicts, and thereby 
avoid the paralysis suggested by Wittgenstein’s paradox. However, the price to pay is 
the inclosure paradox: the limits of law cannot be drawn in a consistent, fully rational 
and objective manner. They cannot be secured from a neutral, detached perspective, 
but they are reflexive and inconsistent. For this reason, because positive law is unable 
to fully validate itself in the only operation of validation available to it, the distinction 
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between mere power and legal power, between coercion and valid coercion, between 
politics and law, between subjectivity and objectivity, cannot be made as neatly as 
Kelsen would have wanted. “Gewalt, then” as Derrida reminds, “is both violence and 
legitimate power, justified authority” (Derrida, 2002, p. 234).  
How ought, then, a legal collective deal with its contingent limits? On the one 
hand, some limits must be drawn in order for that particular juridical perspective of 
reality to arise: some political acts must be seen as valid acts of law-making. On the 
other hand, the collective cannot legitimate the limits it draws in a fully consistent way. 
A legal perspective is nothing but a contingent, non-necessary perspective of social 
reality (and this is, of course, not nothing). Its post-metaphysical self-referentiality 
closes off effective ways of fully rationalizing and objectifying its contingent limits. All 
this implies that novel ways of dealing with the ambiguity of the limits, and the 
reduction of alternative ways of interpreting the facts that legal signification implies, 
must be considered, if legal collectives are not simply let off the hook with their 
inconsistent contingency.  
For if it is so that the limits of the legal collective and its legal order are 
inconsistent, so that they cannot be fully legitimated, then this means that the outside 
is already and irreducibly inside, that politics is within the law, and mere coercion 
within the valid coercion. If legal theory and legal signification are responsive, they 
begin in what is other to them, in politics and the norm-claim that is not yet, and 
perhaps never will be, a legal norm. For this reason, then, the pure theory is never, not 
exactly, pure, uncontaminated by its other. Therefore, it is also not possible to say to 
the anarchist, as Kelsen does (Kelsen, 1967, p. 218), that she is, pure and simple, 
outside the game of law. The paradoxical hypothesis (in its Greek meaning of 
“foundation,” “that what lies under the thesis”), the arkhē (which means both 
“beginning, origin” and “rule, authority”), is always already accompanied and 
undermined by its constitutive other, the anarkhia. To this problem and its many 
implications we will return. 
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3. The art of not being paralyzed: Niklas Luhmann’s evolutionary
theory of legal paradox
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that Niklas Luhmann presents a constructivist-
evolutionary theory of paradox. According to Luhmann, social systems, such as the 
legal system, deal with their fundamental paradox by “unfolding” it, by inventing new 
distinctions that seek to hide the paradox in socially adequate ways. At stake is nothing 
less than the very self-reproduction, or evolution, of the system. To preserve 
themselves, systems need to get creative in seeking to direct their attention, as well as 
the attention of their audience (their social environment), away from their paradoxical 
nature.  
Furthermore, I will argue that although Luhmann presents his sociology of 
paradox and its creative potentialities as an alternative to Jacques Derrida’s take on 
paradox, his account of how the “deparadoxification” functions follows, in fact, the 
paradoxical logic of the supplement. Unfolding the paradox itself is a paradoxical 
temporal process. Several scholars have paid attention to Luhmann’s and Derrida’s 
different orientations to paradox (see e.g. Teubner, 2001b; Teubner, 2006; Clam, 
2006; Kastner, 2006; Stäheli, 2000; the essays in Teubner, 2008b). Günther Teubner, 
for one, draws the distinction between systems theoretical and deconstructive 
orientation in the following way: 
Luhmann aims at a productive deparadoxification in the immanence of 
institutions and constructs a world of legal system’s autopoiesis that reacts to 
crises in its environment with the impulse: “Draw a distinction!” Derrida’s 
thought, by contrast, aims at transcending them [institutions] by 
reparadoxification and creates an alternative world of différance in which the 
deconstructive double movement uncovers constantly the institutions’ 
foundational antinomies and the resulting paralysis, but also simultaneously 
requires that the concrete routines of decision-making are broken within the 
law: “l’intensification maximale d’une transformation en cours.” (Teubner, 
2008a, p. 4, my translation.)22 
22 “Luhmann zielt auf produktive Entparadoxierung in der Immanenz der Institutionen und 
konstruiert eine Welt der Autopoiese des Rechtssystems, die auf Umweltkrisen mit dem Impuls 
reagiert: ‘Draw a distinction.’ Derridas Denken dagegen zielt auf ihre Transzendierung durch 
Reparadoxierung und entwirft eine Gegenwelt der différance, in der die dekonstruktive 
Doppelbewegung permanent die Gründungsantinomien der Institutionen und die daraus resultierende 
Paralysierung aufdeckt, aber zugleich die befreiende Durchbrechung der konkreten 
Entscheidungsroutinen im Recht verlangt: ‘l’intensification maximale d’une transformation en cours’.” 
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While it is illuminative to pit Luhmann’s certain “conservativeness” against 
Derrida’s “radicality,” my aim in this chapter is to participate in this discussion by 
applying to Luhmann’s work the mapping of orientations to paradox. This will allow 
us to see how Luhmann’s theory of paradox is situated within formal thinking of law 
and politics more generally. Although Luhmann is not, as we will see, a traditional 
constructivist as he does recognize, unlike Russell for example, the ineliminability of 
paradox, he nevertheless prefers to observe how systems strive for consistency in order 
to remain functional. It will be the guiding thread of this chapter to observe how the 
legal system, according to Luhmann, unfolds its paradox, and how the way in which it 
does this is itself paradoxical.  
As we will see in the present and following chapters, Luhmann’s position could 
be characterized as “paradoxico-evolutionist” rather than paradoxico-critical: he 
acknowledges that social systems are foundationally paradoxical, but emphasizes the 
way in which they use the paradox and critique for the benefit of self-maintenance in 
always new societal situations.   
Luhmann’s work, and the scholarship commenting on it, is vast. I will be 
faithful to Luhmann’s maxim that everything begins with “drawing a distinction” and 
read his complex work only very selectively. I will, for example, leave aside his more 
empirical-historical work on the evolution of social systems and will not enter into 
controversies of evolution theory more generally. I will focus on a key formal notion —
paradox — in Luhmann’s writings on communication systems in general and the legal 
system in particular and reconstruct his abstract theory of the evolution of 
communication systems from the perspective of deparadoxification.  
The chapter begins with an overview of my argument that Luhmann presents a 
constructivist-evolutionary theory of (legal) paradox (3.2). It then goes on to 
reconstruct in greater detail the evolutionary theory of communication systems, the 
legal system included, as unfolding of the paradox (3.3). After that, I seek to show how 
Derrida’s (non-)concept of supplementarity figures in Luhmann’s theory of law and 
the legal system’s unfolding of its paradox and discuss Luhmann’s account of law as 
society’s immune system (3.4). In the last section (3.5), I wrap up my reading of 
Luhmann’s theory of legal evolution as deparadoxification. My discussion of Luhmann 
continues in the next chapter, which begins with remarks on the status of conflict, 
critique and politics in Luhmann’s systems theory.     
3.2 The art of civilizing the paradox 
3.2.1 Constructivist orientation to paradox rethought 
Luhmann has a particularly acute sense of the ambiguous significance of 
paradoxes for societal communication. On the one hand, social subsystems — law, 
politics, science, religion, economy, art, education — are, for him, constitutively 
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paradoxical. The paradoxes at the heart of systems using a binary code, like 
legal/illegal (lawful/unlawful, recht/unrecht), cannot be eliminated in the sense 
logicians have traditionally thought. On the other hand, Luhmann sees in Russell’s 
and Tarski’s attempts at parameterization examples of a more general strategy of 
“unfolding the paradox” that is repeated in different social systems (Luhmann, 1995b, 
p. 46; Luhmann, 1988b; see also Löfgren, 1978). The theorist ought then, Luhmann
argues, not simply stand in awe before the paradoxical foundation of orders, which is
what Luhmann accuses deconstruction of, but observe the unfolding of the paradox of
the binary code as a mechanism in the evolution of social systems (Luhmann, 1991,
pp. 58-59).
Recall Russell’s solution to the paradox of a self-referential set: “Don’t look at 
the paradox! Look at this new distinction (reformulated set theory) instead!” For 
Luhmann, such creative constructions of new distinctions is a way of 
“deparadoxifying” (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 47; Luhmann, 1995a, p. 33)23 the paradox 
within the respective system (science) that can be observed (by the sociologist, for 
example, or by logicians themselves) as the system’s evolution. This does not count as 
a solution to the paradox, but as the successful continuation of scientific 
communication temporarily paralyzed by the paradox. Whether new distinctions 
succeed in what they are attempting, that is, in getting scientific communication over 
the paralysis, depends on their reception within the system, that is, whether the 
scientists indeed begin to look the other way and work with the new distinctions.     
According to Luhmann’s own categorization, there are three possible positions 
to paradox that Luhmann names by recalling the myth of the dreadful Gorgon sisters. 
The first is to view the paradox, with Frege and Russell, as the mortal Medusa and, 
thus, eliminable. In my terms, this is the classical constructivist view that sees no 
alternative to understanding totality as consistent, thus requiring that a solution to 
paradox be found. The second is to stand in awe, with Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
Derrida, before the immortal, fascinating Stheno, enjoying the thrill of looking at her 
horrifying face. This “sthenography,” or paradoxico-criticism in my categorization, has 
achieved a sea-change, Luhmann argues, in the philosophy of the paradox by moving 
from the elimination of paradox to its admiration: it has brought about a 
“paradoxification of civilization” but not, however, a “civilization of paradox” 
(Luhmann, 1991, p. 60). Such civilization is what Luhmann attempts to observe. The 
paradox can take the form of Euryale, who is immortal, like Stheno, but whose face we 
need to, and can, learn not to look at. A foundational paradox, if exposed, halts 
communication, which implies that it needs to be dealt with in some way, de-
paradoxified, so that communication can go on. “Euryalistics” is then the science of 
the art of not being paralyzed by the presence of a paradox (Luhmann, 1991, pp. 71-
72). Euryalistics is an evolutionary theory of autopoiesis, of the system’s self-
reproduction through continuous actualization of new operations and distinctions, 
with the constitutive paradox as its engine.  
23 In German Entparadoxifizierung, translated also as “de-paradoxicalization” or “de-
paradoxication.” 
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Thus, Luhmann does not exactly fit into Livingston’s mapping of orientations 
to totality and paradox that we discussed in the Introduction. Luhmann accepts from 
the classical constructivist position the need to externalize, to change perspective in 
order to break the short-circuit produced by the paradox. Unlike Russell, Tarski and 
other philosophers of “parameterization,” Luhmann does not, however, claim that the 
paradox would thereby be strictly speaking dissolved. It is rather only displaced to 
another distinction that may, or may not, work for a while in allowing communication 
to go on. Luhmann is not interested in solving logical puzzles but observes instead how 
social systems manage their foundational paradoxes so that they need not to confront 
them. Social evolution is, for him, paradox management. In his insistence on the final 
uneliminability of the paradox, Luhmann’s position is close to the paradoxico-critical 
orientation. However, his is an evolutionary theory of the paradox, and Luhmann 
observes critical reparadoxification as a trigger for further creative systemic evolution. 
For him, a paradox is not really a site for political conflict over the “common.” Just like 
with other constructivists, Luhmann’s focus on deparadoxification makes his theory 
of the paradox profoundly conventional in the sense that he sees deparadoxification 
as an important mechanism in the evolution of social systems but does not consider 
the paradox of law as a site of political critique and conflict over “the common form of 
life.” 
3.2.2 The paradox of the legal system 
The fundamental paradox of social subsystems is that “of a binary code applied 
to itself” (Luhmann, 1988c, p. 154, my emphasis). The legal system, like all social 
subsystems, is based on a binary code or a guiding distinction. Using the code 
legal/illegal allows the legal system to distinguish itself from its “environment,” which 
includes other social subsystems as well as living systems and systems of 
consciousness, and everything else that lacks relevance for law. For this reason, 
dealing with the problematic self-reference of the code — is the distinction between 
legality and illegality itself legal? is the framework for distributing justice itself just? 
— is essential for the continuity of the legal system’s functional identity and autonomy 
as well as its continuous relevance in the functionally differentiated modern society. 
Indirectly it is significant also for the maintenance of the functionally differentiated 
society itself.  
The code legal/illegal is the basic “frame (or scheme) of observations” 
(Luhmann, 1993a, p. 764) of the legal system (note the similarity of formulation to 
Kelsen’s account). It is by coding events in its environment and within itself as legal or 
illegal that the system observes the world and itself. The code forms the basis of the 
legal system’s social function, which is to deal with social conflicts by deciding which 
of the parties in conflict has legitimate normative expectations of what ought to be 
done. The legal system does not decide what is true or untrue (this is the code of the 
system of science) nor, say, who has money and who is poor (possession/non-
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possession is the code of the economic system), but is trusted by other systems to say 
who is, legally speaking, in the right and who is in the wrong. Law “observes” its 
environment through its code. To give an analytically specific account of the concept 
of observation, Luhmann notoriously draws from the British logician George Spencer 
Brown’s calculus, or protologic24, developed in The Laws of Form (1969). What 
Spencer Brown calls a form consists of a distinction between two sides and an 
indication of one of those two sides (Spencer Brown, 1972, p. 1). Drawing a distinction 
establishes a boundary: “As a result, we have two sides; however, they are subject to 
the condition that both of them cannot be used simultaneously” (Luhmann, 2006, p. 
43). If the distinction is to make any sense at all, one of the sides that the distinction 
has made emerge must be preferred at the expense of the other (Luhmann, 2002b, p. 
74). For Luhmann, then, “observation [is] the use of a distinction for the purpose of 
indicating one side and not the other” (Luhmann, 2000, p. 59). A form encompasses 
“an inside,” the indicated side of the distinction, and “an outside” that “is a nameless 
residual, an unmarked leftover, from which the marked side is delineated” (Schiltz & 
Verschraegen, 2002, p. 58).  
A distinction is, Luhmann argues, a unity of two sides only one of which is 
preferred. It is a unity in difference — the code legal/illegal, as well as the distinction 
law/non-law, contain two sides — but it has operative value only as a distinction (see 
Luhmann, 1995a, p. 20). Something can be observed now as legal or illegal, but it 
would be uninformative to try to observe something as both legal and illegal at the 
same time (what is now legal can, of course, be observed as illegal in the future, if the 
law changes). Each observation thus requires preference of one of the sides over the 
other (Luhmann, 2012, p. 29). In drawing a distinction, there is both structural 
simultaneity that encompasses both sides (this pertains also to the distinction 
system/environment) and operational sequentiality that implies asymmetry of 
preference. Formally speaking, a paradox is then an operational simultaneity of the 
two sides and a situation of being unable to prefer only one of the sides. The legal 
system enters into a state of inoperativity if it tries to decide, by using its code, if this 
code is itself legal or illegal. It will be inconsistent if it has to say that “the illegal is the 
24 Jean Clam’s observation of Spencer Brown’s, and Luhmann’s, theory of form in relation to 
more traditional forms of logic is illuminative: whereas classical logic includes, among other things, a 
theory of enunciation and inference and a formal body of theorems, “Spencer Brown’s program is an 
inquiry into the pre-discursive laws emerging with the most elementary position of ‘something.’ These 
laws must be situated at a level preceding the level of expression grasped by classical logic. Protologic 
denotes, thus, in our context, the logic implied in the most general act of appearance or position of a 
something (a form). [...] The form, as it is understood by Spencer Brown, is prior to anything logic can 
thematize at its own levels of generality” (Clam, 2000, pp. 68-69). Luhmann also calls the theory of 
form “prelogical” (2000, p. 28). Dirk Baecker notes that the fact that sociologists, obsessed by 
understanding social differences, are intrigued by mathematics is not, perhaps, so strange after all. For 
they can “learn from mathematical equations how to treat the different (the two sides of the equation) 
as identical (with respect to the equal sign)” (1999, p. 1). Furthermore, “[a]ll mathematical 
achievements are devices that bear witness to the peculiarities of communication” (Baecker, 1999, p. 
2). This is also what Kripkenstein, in its naivety, also hints at. Equations as operations are also 
communications in the system of science. For Baecker, Spencer Brown’s calculus “exhibits all the 
strengths of mathematical computation, yet at the same time captures communication’s capacity for, 
and anchoring in, ambivalence and ambiguity” (Baecker, 1999, p. 2). It is thus perhaps worth the trouble 
to think about the significance of the abstract theory of form for the paradox of law. 
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legal” or “the legal is the illegal.” As we saw in the previous chapters, if the operation 
that uses the code legal/illegal is applied to itself, we ultimately end up at a point that 
is undecidably both legal and illegal: a paradox.   
The problem for a system functioning on grounds of a binary code arises with 
the elementary critical question: “What, then, about the right or the wrong to decide 
about right and wrong? How is it that somebody has the right to say that a position or 
an opinion is wrong?” (Luhmann, 1988c, p. 154) At stake in the response to this critical 
question is nothing less than finding an answer to the question: “How can a society 
enforce a binary code?” (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 155) The difficulty is that the system must 
answer this question in other than simple self-referential terms, that is, it must not be 
tautological (“it is right because I say it is right”) nor inconsistent (“it is undecidably 
both right and wrong”). Such classical answers of legal theory to the question 
concerning the legitimating ground of society’s legal order as the social contract, 
natural law or democracy are all, in Luhmann’s parlance, attempts at unfolding the 
paradox, seeking a third term that would provide a way out of the code’s inconsistent 
self-reference.  
However, as we already saw, Luhmann’s suggestion as to how the legal system 
evades the paradox is not a classical constructivist one of identifying the final 
metalevel that would secure the consistency of the legal order. He does not analyze the 
legal system in normativist terms, seeking law’s final legitimizing (moral) grounds. He 
is a post-metaphysical thinker for whom “the point from which all further 
investigations in systems theory must begin is not identity but difference” (Luhmann, 
1995a, p. 177). In the beginning, if such a term can be used at all, is the unity of a 
distinction, and therefore a paradox, not a self-identical, fully consistent entity. 
Furthermore, Luhmann observes the legal system in the dimension of time as a 
dynamic social system, and the paradox appears, so observed, as a trigger of legal 
evolution.  
There are paradoxes everywhere, wherever we look for foundations. The 
founding problem of law, then, is not to find and identify the ultimate ground 
or reason which justifies its existence. The problem is how to suppress or to 
attenuate the paradox which an observer with logical inclinations or with a 
sufficient degree of dissatisfaction could see and articulate at any time. 
(Luhmann, 1988c, p. 154, my emphasis.) 
The attempt is not to logically eliminate the paradox for good. Instead, 
Luhmann observes sociologically how observers (systems) deal with their 
foundational paradox of the self-referential code by seeking to find new distinctions 
that would successfully hide the paradox, at least for the time being. The measure of 
success of this endeavor is nothing other than the fact that the system’s 
communication and autopoiesis continues, without being paralyzed by the 
observation of the paradox. It is not the task of the sociological systems theorist to 
solve paradoxes, but to observe how systems evolve by unfolding, invisibilizing, the 
paradox at their heart.  
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The societal aim of deparadoxification in the legal system is to “unask the 
question” (Luhmann, 1988c, p. 154) concerning its sovereign right in society to judge 
what is right and what is wrong, to prevent this “third question”25 from arising and 
rendering the legal system inoperative. Deparadoxification seeks to make the societal 
conditions benign for the continuation of legal communication. Paradox is the name 
for the lack of necessary foundations of a social system that understands reality 
through its own leading distinction (its code), without ever being able to fully justify 
the gains and the losses that the use of this filter implies. Deparadoxification is the 
system’s attempt to “cheat” (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2006): to create the 
appearance of itself as rational, consistent and grounded in the eyes of society, and 
thereby to preserve itself. 
3.2.3 The evolution of communication systems as unfolding of the 
paradox 
Luhmann’s “evolutionary” theory of paradox aims at “transfor[ming] a logically 
insoluble problem into a genetic one” (Luhmann, 2012, p. 251). “Evolution theory,” he 
explains:  
shifts the problem to time and attempts to explain how it is possible that ever 
more demanding and ever more improbable structures develop and function as 
normal. The basic proposition is that evolution transforms low probability of 
origination into high probability of maintenance. (Luhmann, 2012, pp. 251-
252)  
From this evolutionary perspective, the paradox of the binary code implies the 
logical situation of “explosion,” that is, the principle of ex contradictione quodlibet 
(from the contradiction, everything follows) (see 1.2.2). A paradox is “the world as a 
frameless, undistinguishable totality that cannot be observed” (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 
775). A paradox is “an entity without connective value” (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 769). By 
contrast, communication is about connecting one communication with another, 
thereby entrenching a certain selection of what is informative in the world, at the 
exclusion of the uninformative. A paradox is a non-selection and therefore a jam in 
communication; it indicates inoperativity and undecidability, the inability to choose 
between the legal and the illegal. It is something that is excluded by normal legal 
communication, which always prefers the one or the other. Paradox, thus, is the name 
for an observation of uninformative complexity, an observation of “the unity of a 
manifold” (Luhmann, 2012, p. 78, emphasis omitted).  
In Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule-following, any choice of conduct is possible, 
and a rule forfeits its function of selecting the correct conduct if its application and 
25 I capitalize this expression in the following to emphasize critique as the site of disclosing the 
paradoxical foundations of a social system/order. 
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correct following cannot in some way be indicated and secured (at least for the time 
being). Similarly, for Luhmann, the very operation of the legal system is paralyzed if 
the paradox of the self-referential code becomes observed as such. This makes 
selection necessary, even if selections never have any ultimate justification and cannot 
be proved “correct.” It is possible to observe how a rule “explodes,” how it is a unity of 
all the manifold, possible ways of applying and following it, but in its actual operation 
such complexity is “reduced” to a manageable level. Once the legal system is in place 
and operation, it will select between correct and incorrect following and application: 
such selection is the normal state of the system, the explosion the abnormal.  
We can thus observe in the Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein paradox, if interpreted 
from a Luhmannian perspective, a failure of communication and a situation of 
paralysis. Given the multiplicity of equally possible mappings from a set of facts to 
different meanings, how is successful communication possible? This would be a 
Luhmannian question. The formulation of the paradox could be seen as suggesting a 
“contra-phenomenological effort [that] view[s] communication not as a phenomenon 
but as a problem [...] we must first ask how communication is possible at all” 
(Luhmann, 1981, p. 123). For Luhmann, successful communication is indeed not a 
given but improbable, “despite the fact that we experience and practice it every day of 
our lives and would not exist without it” (Luhmann, 1981, p. 123). Since there is no 
natural meaning, how is meaningful communication nevertheless possible? Besides 
asking, with Kant (and Kelsen), after the conditions of possibility of (legal) knowledge, 
practical reason and aesthetic judgment, Luhmann insists on the necessity of asking 
about the conditions of possibility of social order (Luhmann, 2002b, p. 315). His 
sociological answer is a theory of the evolution of communication systems. 
“All recognizable order is based on a complexity that demonstrates that things 
could be otherwise” (Luhmann, 2012, p. 79). Social systems are contingent, historical 
systems without necessary and sufficient reasons: they create social order and thus 
“reduce” complexity (some facts come to count as illegal in exclusion to others). This 
reduction is not without alternatives, could be done otherwise, and is consequently 
itself complex. Luhmann observes society from his sociological perspective in 
evolutionary terms, how relatively stable social systems have emerged that allow 
certain stable forms of communication to operate. He cites as an achievement in the 
evolution of communication systems that we, rarely, in fact, find ourselves in such 
situations as described by the Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein paradox. Luhmann’s 
problem is not the classical philosophical-skeptical doubt about the possibility of 
knowledge but rather how to “explai[n] the normal as improbable” (Luhmann, 1995a, 
p. 115). As a sociologist, Luhmann is not a skeptic but “assume[s] that there are 
systems” (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 13) and “analyze[s] real systems of the real world” 
(Luhmann, 1995a, p. 13). He studies the system of society and its subsystems as 
enabling “the transformation of the improbable into what may be routinely expected” 
(Luhmann, 1981, p. 128).  
Luhmann, therefore, sees the unfolding of the paradox in the context of his 
research on the evolutionary improbability of communication and processes of 
normalization of behavior. The paradox has been unfolded, if it can be observed that 
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the situation of explosion is improbable and abnormal: “If meaningful communication 
becomes possible at all, every specific utterance being equally probable at every 
specific point in time becomes improbable” (Luhmann, 2012, p. 253). The more 
probable the continuation of normal communication, the less probable the 
observation of the paradox of the code becomes. A social system that offers relatively 
stable patterns of normalized behavior — “a form of life” — offers itself as an answer 
to the threat of explosion. Or rather, the sociological observer can observe it as 
unfolding of a “mythical” situation of the explosion (see Stäheli, 2000, pp. 47-48) — 
“mythical” insofar as one observes a normally functioning communicative system as 
more probable than the emergence of an inoperative paradoxical situation. The 
paradox has been, in a sense, normalized away. 
However, it is of course always possible to observe that a social system using a 
binary code is based on a paradox. This is at all times possible for anyone with a 
“sufficient degree of dissatisfaction” with the system, as Luhmann puts it in the 
quotation above. The re-emergence of the Third Question thus remains a risk for the 
system. But Luhmann accepts the classical logical position that paradoxes “have to be 
replaced with stable identities,” inconsistency with consistency, insofar as he sees this 
as necessary for the emergence and maintenance of successful and temporally 
continuing communication (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 770). Luhmann borrows the concept 
of “unfolding the paradox” from the Swedish cybernetician Lars Löfgren (Luhmann, 
1988b, p. 28). Löfgren, for his part, follows Tarski’s distinction between object 
language and metalanguage and argues that this distinction can also be maintained 
for general systems, where the introduction of the metalevel “unfolds” the paradoxical 
self-reference of the system. Unfolding self-reference means “explaining” it by taking 
ascending steps, each of which expresses the foundations of the lower formal area 
incapable of itself expressing them consistently, without paradox or tautology. Like for 
Tarski, for Löfgren, the unfolding implies the restriction of free self-reference and 
prevents the properties of the observer from entering into the descriptions of his 
observations (Löfgren, 1978, pp. 243-244).  
The concept of unfolding the paradox thus seems to indicate the metalogical 
choice in favor of incompleteness of the formal system the consistency of which is 
explained, and inconsistency unfolded, by subsequent metasteps. As noted, in 
distinction to Russell and Tarski, Luhmann argues that unfolding the paradox does 
not mean solving it, so the inconsistency cannot be in any final sense avoided. For 
deparadoxification is about drawing new distinctions, and every distinction is, for 
Luhmann, by definition paradoxical (as it is a unity in difference) (Luhmann, 1993a, 
p. 770). For this reason, every new distinction may at some point in time become 
visible as a paradox, thereby requiring deparadoxification in its turn: “the paradox, 
like the sun, passes underground and reappears in the future” (Luhmann, 1988c, p. 
159). This construction of new distinctions that temporarily ease the inconsistency of 
the self-referential system is indeed how systems evolve. What Luhmann, then, thinks 
he sees when he observes social subsystems and their histories are sequential 
processes of de- and reparadoxification (Luhmann, 1995b). For example, grounding 
positive law on natural law functioned for the legal system as a societally effective 
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deparadoxification mechanism — until it did not. After the reference to natural law 
became implausible as the answer to the Third Question, the paradox at the heart of 
the legal system was exposed and a new unfolding became necessary.  
In the modern juristic self-understanding, Luhmann writes, “all law is valid law. 
Law which is not valid is not law. It follows that the rule that makes validity 
recognizable cannot be one of the valid rules.” We already discussed this above in our 
analysis of Kelsen. “There cannot be any rule in the system that regulates the 
applicability/non-applicability of all the rules of the system. The problem has to be 
‘gödelized’ by a reference to an external foundation” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 125). 
Consistent self-reference of valid rules is impossible, as self-reference leads to the 
paradox of the highest rule. This forces, Luhmann argues, the legal system to eject the 
ground of validity outside itself. For Luhmann, then, the legal system for functional 
reasons makes the metalogical choice in favor of consistent, but incomplete, totality. 
The deparadoxifying solution par excellence in modern society is to eject the ground 
of validity to the political system. The political system is, from the perspective of the 
legal system, the metasystem that offers a societally credible answer to the Third 
Question, to why the legal system is in the right when it decides between right and 
wrong: the political, extra-legal origins of legal norms break the circle of self-reference. 
The use of the code legal/illegal is “right,” legitimate, because the rules for its use, 
namely laws, are decided in a political and democratic process. The legal system, then, 
also reciprocally deparadoxifies the paradox of the political system, namely that of 
“binding of necessarily unbound authority” by offering the legal and hence “objective” 
medium for the decisions of the political sovereign. The constitution couples these two 
systems together in a stable, structural way, and allows them to mutually deparadoxify 
each other’s paradoxes, at least for the time being. Constitutional laws, Luhmann 
argues, express this reciprocal deparadoxification. They do so, on the one hand, by 
saying of themselves that they belong to the legal order of which they are the metarule. 
On the other hand, they refer to an extra-legal authority, in particular that of the 
people’s will, which is what the constitution is said to express. The constitution is a 
central instrument for unfolding the paradox of the validity of the rule of valid rules. 
(Luhmann, 2004, pp. 405-410) 
Urs Stäheli describes deparadoxification as a creative moment that is about 
making a decision or drawing a distinction without deriving it from the system as it 
currently stands (Stäheli, 2000, p. 51). The supplement, like the people’s will, is 
understood as something external to the system that comes to break the oscillation to 
which the exposure of the paradox has led. The structural similarity to 
“parameterizing” solutions to paradox seems clear, but what complicates this 
assessment is that, for Luhmann, it is the system that deparadoxifies itself by referring 
to and coupling with what is external to it. Self-reference is displaced rather than 
eliminated. The reference to an external metalevel that cannot be derived from the 
system itself is made within the system. It is an internal construction of externality. In 
Luhmann’s terms this is “the paradox of re-entry”: the making of the distinction 
between system and environment in the system itself and as system’s description of 
itself and what is other to it and absent from its autopoiesis (see Luhmann, 1995a, p. 
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42). The system will form internally an understanding of what happens outside it, in 
its environment. What is different (system/environment, self/other) is the same 
(system, self), and we have a paradox. “The other side remains included, but as 
excluded” (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 46).  
This destabilizes the understanding that the supplement that comes to close the 
system from the outside is simply external, and this also clearly marks Luhmann’s 
difference from the traditional constructivist position on unfolding the paradox. Law’s 
marking of “the people’s will” as something real and external that ultimately 
authorizes valid law is law’s own construction. It is precisely the point both outside 
and inside the totality: an inclosure paradox. The unfolding of the paradox cannot 
escape the paradox but rather reconfigures it (see also 3.4 and 3.5 below). As 
mentioned, Luhmann takes his own theoretical position to be a critical development 
of the deconstructive position on the paradox. He understands systems theory as 
already deconstructive in its analysis of systems as “based on” difference (between 
system/environment, as well as a binary code, like legal/illegal) and takes 
deconstruction further by “sociologizing” the difference, observing its evolutionary 
implications (Stäheli, 2000, p. 16). We will see in greater detail below how in order to 
distinguish his position on the paradox from Derrida’s (or rather from what Luhmann 
understands Derrida’s position to be), that is, in order to give an account of 
deparadoxification as a key part of a theory of paradox, Luhmann uses the 
deconstructive (non-)concepts of retroactive temporality and the logic of 
supplementarity that carry the paradox with them. This is no secret: Luhmann openly 
states that deparadoxification is deconstructible (Luhmann, 1993a, p. 770). 
The more important point than a rather superficial comparison between 
systems theory and deconstruction is that an unfolding of the paradox cannot 
eliminate the risk of inoperativity that the paradox carries with itself. The unfolding of 
the paradox of the code as structural coupling with the political system introduces a 
new distinction (law/politics), which clearly has been a success in the history of the 
modern state. It has allowed both legal and political communication to continue, while 
avoiding at least some fundamental critique. That the legal system succeeds in 
appearing politically legitimate is one central way of creating social conditions in 
which the legal communication can proceed relatively undisturbed. From Luhmann’s 
perspective, constitutionalization lowers the risk of a wide-spread critique of the use 
of law (and political power). Let me note here that emerging global legal orders 
relatively independent from the traditional constitutional structures of legitimation 
are particularly vulnerable to reparadoxification, that is, they risk facing the critical 
question concerning their right to deal global justice. This may suggest that 
constitutionalization as an effective form of legal paradox invisibilization is nearing its 
end.  
What is at stake in the whole problematics of the paradox and its unfolding is 
the durable possibility of contingent, historical, artificial, difference-based 
communication systems to remain in operation despite the fact that there are always 
alternatives and that these systems always face the risk of critique that re-introduces 
the excluded alternative. Deparadoxification is a technical name for a kind of 
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“immune mechanism” that seeks to protect social systems against their destabilization 
and, thus, indirectly the functional differentiation of modern society. According to 
Luhmann, as I discuss in a moment, the legal system functions as an immune system 
that protects the continuation of the autopoiesis of society by providing the means for 
managing social conflict. The immune system protects the survival of the autopoiesis 
of society (and thus ultimately that of the legal system itself, as legal communication 
is part of societal communication) by responding to the conflict with “adequate 
complexity,” by re-drawing distinctions that the system deems a fitting response to the 
situation of conflict at hand. The reference to the political system and “the people” is 
not the only expression of the modern legal system’s unfolding of its paradox. In the 
following, we will see how the operation of the legal system itself can be seen as a 
continuous deparadoxification.  
 
 
3.3 Paradox and its unfolding in communication theory 
 
Let us now focus on the basics of Luhmann’s general theory of communication. 
Social order arises, in Luhmann’s account, when single events of communication 
connect with other events of communication. Deparadoxification is an “immune 
mechanism” that seeks to secure this connectivity.  
  
3.3.1 The paradox of insincerity and the myth of double contingency  
 
What the Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein paradox intimates is the contingency of 
every selection among interpretative possibilities: there are always alternative 
possibilities of understanding, interpreting and explaining uttered signs or a situation. 
Kripke’s thought experiment relied on the claim that simply by observing the student’s 
record of past equations (that have a value below 57) it is not possible to say from the 
outside and based only on “the facts” whether the student understands what she is 
doing as addition or quaddition (or whatever else). Nor can Kripke defend himself 
against the crazy skeptic who claims that Kripke can refer to no facts about his past 
calculations that prove he was using the addition function instead of the quaddition (if 
his past equations were under the value 57). Kripke’s attempts at convincing the 
skeptic that what he truly meant was the addition function fall on deaf ears. His 
discussion of the paradox revolves around how it can be objectively shown, and shared, 
what an individual “privately” means and intends “in her mind.”  
In contrast, from the Luhmannian perspective, Kripkenstein testifies to the 
incommunicability of sincerity. Luhmann calls this incommunicability “a general 
paradox in communication theory,” which states that although “[o]ne does not have to 
mean what one says (e.g., when one says ‘Good Morning’)[,] one cannot say that one 




One can easily utter something about oneself, about one’s own state, moods, 
attitudes, and intentions; but one can do this only to present oneself as a 
context of information that could also be otherwise. Therefore communication 
unleashes a subversive, universal, irremediable suspicion, and all protestations 
and assurances only regenerate suspicion. [...] The insincerity of sincerity 
becomes a theme as soon as one experiences society as something that is held 
together not by a natural order but by communication. (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 
150, my emphasis.) 
 
Luhmann’s point of departure in his theory of communication is the argument 
that we are, as singular consciousnesses or “psychic systems,” “black boxes” to each 
other (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 109). Ego has no direct access to alter ego’s consciousness. 
Neither can ever experience the other’s experiences, think the thoughts of another 
consciousness. Psychic systems are operatively closed to one another, as Luhmann 
puts it. This implies that the ego can never be absolutely certain what the alter “means” 
or “intends” in her mind. Even “communication permits no access to the other’s 
interiority” (Luhmann, 2000, p. 12).  My (ego’s) experience of what the alter means or 
intends, is irreducibly just and only that: my experience of her intention. My 
experience is, thus, indirect, colored by my expectations concerning the way she 
orients herself toward the world, and me, around her. For alter, the situation is similar, 
and ego experiences alter as such, as an alter ego. As King and Schütz aptly put 
Luhmann’s point: 
 
all that is visible for one system (A) [e.g. me, the ego; HL] is the way that the 
other system appears to deal with the external environment. What is invisible 
to A is the selectivity of the other system (B) [e.g. alter’s actual experience of a 
situation or event, how she intends it in her consciousness on grounds of her 
past experience of similar situations; HL]. It has no way of seeing the way that 
B interprets the external environment (including A itself) except by the use of 
its (A’s) own selectivity. (King & Schütz, 1994, p. 272)  
 
That we cannot experience each other’s experiences and think each other’s 
thoughts already makes it improbable that “one person can understand what another 
means” (Luhmann, 1981, p. 123). It is one of the reasons why communication is 
improbable. It is also what makes sincerity incommunicable. Alter’s/communicator’s 
self-referential communications about what she means when she says something (“I 
meant the addition function in my past arithmetic exercises, and not the quaddition”) 
do not make the black box any “whiter,” because also alter’s self-referential 
communications depend on her own selectivity that remains invisible to 
ego/understander. Past facts about a set of calculations do not make the calculator’s 
intention transparent, nor do the calculator’s expressions about them. Self-referential 
communications do not make present and visible the intention about which they 
communicate; they represent something that remains invisible by communicating it 
as this kind of an intention rather than that. In other words, they come with a horizon 
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of other possibilities of interpretation, with “a context of information that could also 
be otherwise”: they are complex, which implies the risk of misunderstanding. This also 
applies to communicating sincerity (“I really meant what I said”), which leaves open 
the possibility of insincerity about sincerity. (The partner can, of course, choose to 
ignore this possibility and believe the communicator, but the irreducibility of the 
horizon of other possibilities suggests that such belief is risky and may turn out to be 
unwarranted.) “I don’t know if I mean what I say,” says Luhmann (verging on the 
performative contradiction). “And if I knew, I would have to keep it to myself” (cited 
in Moeller, 2006, p. 9). 
The liar paradox (in the form “What I now say is a lie”) exposes the 
incommunicability of sincerity in a striking way (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 151): whether or 
not the person is lying cannot be decided on the basis of that person’s testifying to her 
own intent. The paradox discloses that the risk of insincerity cannot be eliminated. 
Alter’s communications about the contents of her consciousness of the type “I swear I 
will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help me God” do not 
solve the problem of the inaccessibility of her consciousness to the ego, but only 
thematizes it as a limit of communication, as what cannot be known and made 
transparent. It is impossible to exactly translate conscious experience into a 
communication (Moeller, 2006, p. 80).  
Luhmann calls the situation of mutual opacity of consciousnesses (or social 
systems) “double contingency.”26 Luhmann defines contingency in reference to 
Aristotelian modal theory as something that is neither necessary nor impossible 
(Luhmann, 1995a, p. 107) (later we will see how Agamben reworks this notion). All 
selections, all interpretations, understandings and explanations — all mappings of a 
set of facts to a meaning rather than another — are contingent, which means that 
alternative mappings were possible, and the current selection might not have been 
made (Luhmann, 1976, p. 509). Contingency is thus “something given (something 
experienced, expected, remembered, fantasized) in the light of its possibly being 
otherwise; it describes objects within the horizon of possible variations” (Luhmann, 
1995a, p. 106). Because of this, the risk of insincerity cannot be eliminated, although a 
communicative system can mitigate it.   
In Luhmann’s work, “ego” can be understood as an individual consciousness 
but also as a social system (Luhmann, 2002b, p. 318). The possibility of ego to 
communicate something meaningful or informative that alter understands depends, 
first, on the possibilities available to ego. What I can try to communicate to others 
about, say, a factual situation around me is, first, a) a contingent selection among 
possibilities and  b) dependent on “what [my] own memory supplies” (Luhmann, 1981, 
p. 123). Second, ego’s communicative intent is irreducibly susceptible to interpretation
by alter that is also conditioned by this same contingency. Thus, “[w]here two social
systems [or psychic systems] encounter one another, each selection of system A
depends not only upon its own selectivity (that is, its selection of meaning from those
available to it), but also upon the selectivity of the other system, B” (King & Schütz,
1994, p. 272). Ego makes her selection dependent both on expectations of alter’s
26 Here he follows the sociologist Talcot Parsons (Parsons & Shils, 1951). 
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selection and expectations of alter’s expectations of ego’s selection. “Each system 
therefore constructs its relationship to the other from meaning that is available 
exclusively to itself” (King & Schütz, 1994, p. 272), even when it concerns alter. (See 
here once more the “re-entry” that we mentioned above in a different context.) This 
internal constitution of meaning concerns also what ego thinks that alter thinks of 
ego’s thinking of alter. On the other side as well the same thing happens, as ego and 
alter are both egos, which means that there is, in fact, a “double ‘double contingency’” 
(Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 81).  
Ego and alter approach “the same” situation from their own, irreducible 
perspectives that remain reciprocally opaque. Ego cannot know for sure what alter will 
do, and alter cannot know for sure what ego will do. No theory of meaning and 
communication can rely on the idea of ego and alter both somehow magically making 
in their minds the “same” selection within “the same” horizon of possible variations. 
Because of the “eigen-selectivity” of each system (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 107) (each 
experiencing unsharable experiences of the world on grounds of their own past 
experience), alter necessarily escapes the calculation by ego. “Because operative 
closure locks the door to the inner life, imagination, and thoughts of others, the other 
holds us captive as an eternal riddle” (Luhmann, 2000, p. 13). Such incalculability is 
for Luhmann a mark of alter’s “freedom” (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 112). Communication 
arises not despite but on grounds of this freedom, as a reduction to a manageable level 
of the contingency and complexity of possibilities it entails. Each person is too complex 
to be contained in knowledge about that person; there can only be reductive 
anticipations of how a person will behave. The notion of anticipation, or expectation, 
implies the possibility of its non-satisfaction. Free persons may always surprise. But it 
also implies normalization: some kind of behavior becomes expected as normal 
behavior, whereas other kinds become less so.  
This insight about the inaccessibility of the alter’s perspective for the ego has 
multiple implications in Luhmann’s theory of communication.27 First, the concept of 
meaning has to be rethought. Meaning is nothing positive, like a stable relation 
between the word “lion” and all existing real lions, but a difference: a difference 
between actuality and potentiality. Meaning is self-referential: meaning refers to other 
meanings that are not actualized at this very moment but could be. When observed 
sociologically, Luhmann argues, it can be seen that social systems operate in a way 
that introduces certain relatively stable “cuts” within the form of meaning (i.e. a 
distinction into actualized meaning and the horizon of possible meaning). For 
example, the systems of science and education exclude “quaddition” from the possible 
meaning of calculations. The system’s programs that allocate the truth value (science) 
and the value of learning (education) prevent in a relatively stable manner that 
possibility from actualizing itself successfully. “Quaddition” would simply count as an 
error and non-learning within these systems of meaning.      
 
27 The implications become visible as implications in the case that this inaccessibility is taken 
as an entry point into a theory that defines its key concepts circularly (see Baraldi et al., 1999, pp. 7-11); 
after all, systems theory discovers itself as one of its objects, i.e. as a self-referential system (Luhmann, 
1995a, pp. 13-16). The suggested entry point therefore breaks theory’s circularity for the benefit of a 
selected order of exposition, indicating that other expository paths could have been taken. 
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Second, the relation of consciousness to communication is indirect, mediated 
by language, gestures, eventually by communication systems and “symbolically 
generalized media” (see Luhmann, 2012, chapter 2, sections 9-11) such as law, politics, 
science and religion. Also, the body as a living organism is observed only indirectly in 
communication systems, in the observing system’s own terms, and its operative 
processes as such are excluded. Both consciousness and the body can, however, 
“irritate” communicative systems, because they share a “material continuum” 
(Luhmann, 2012, p. 54), that is, they are causally (although not operatively) related. 
Significantly, Luhmann generalizes operative closure across different types of systems 
and argues that also social systems are operatively closed. This has implications for 
how the theory conceives of the relation between law and non-law.   
Third, because consciousnesses are black boxes to each other and operate on 
grounds of “eigen-selectivity,” communication between them has to be conceived 
differently than in terms of the sender transmitting to the receiver informational 
content that is the same on both sides. A theory of communication has to take seriously 
the plurality of incongruent perspectives and the operational closure of consciousness. 
This leads to non-reductivism: the refusal to reduce communication, and 
communication systems, to individuals exchanging information. The Kripkenstein, 
reformulated in Luhmannian terms, states that meaningful communication is 
impossible as consciousnesses are operatively closed to each other, but this very same 
double closure also makes meaningful communication possible. In fact, only now does 
it receive a strong formulation: the conditions of impossibility of communication are 
its conditions of possibility.  
It must be understood, however, that in Luhmann’s evolutionary theory, double 
contingency is somewhat equivalent to a “hypothetical state of nature” (Stäheli, 2000, 
p. 47) in classical political theory. It is not an actual historical origin that has causally 
given rise to communication systems. The paradox of sincerity and the closure of 
consciousnesses to each other are rather “origin myths” internal to communicative 
systems: they are “the other” that the successful evolution of communication has 
succeeded in repressing. This means that a system of communication never directly 
observes its own beginning. It has always already solved the problem of double 
contingency insofar as it actually operates and holds the normal continuation of 
communication probable. In normally functioning everyday communication, the 
problem that ego and alter do not have direct access to each other’s mind can be 
forgotten, at least as long as no interruptions and conflicts arise. If and when 
interruptions arise, when ego and alter no longer understand each other, the paradox 
of sincerity and double contingency become visible for the participants as something 
that normal communication now unsuccessfully solves, thereby demanding further 
inventions and explanations to get communication going again. “As long as ego cannot 
act without knowing how alter will act and vice versa, the system is underdetermined 
and thereby blocked” (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 131). Insofar as no determining and thereby 
information-producing selection succeeds in excluding alternatives, social actors are 
overwhelmed by an abundance of possibilities and no orientation as to how to continue 
action in relation to the others can arise.   
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3.3.2 The autopoiesis of communication  
 
Paradox is, for Luhmann, embedded in the theory of systems’ autopoiesis. “The 
concept,” he explains, “belongs to the wider context of chaos theory or the theory of 
catastrophe” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 466). Paradox is the trace of “original” chaos within 
an autopoietic system, the chaos and unmanageable complexity that the system has 
managed to suppress in its normal operation. For Luhmann, communication systems 
are autopoietic, which means that they “are the products of their own operations” 
(Luhmann, 1993a, p. 771).28 Living cells produce living cells, communication produces 
communication, and this production is what they do. There is no communication, 
unless communication itself establishes something as communication. Autopoietic 
systems are, literally, self-reproducing, and their emergence cannot be understood 
causally, as a result of a maker exterior to them. No communication can emerge from 
non-communication, but only from another communication. It is not possible to locate 
the emergence of a communicative system to a given moment. Their emergence is, 
paradoxically, always already about their reproduction.  
This is the operational closure of systems: operations of a system are produced 
recursively, by its own operations. For Luhmann, “[a] system then is an ‘andness.’ 
Unity is provided by the ‘and’ but not by any one element, structure or relation” 
(Luhmann, 2006, p. 46). Systems “exist as a closed network of the production of 
elements [i.e. operations] which reproduces itself as a network by continuing to 
produce the elements that are needed to continue to produce the elements” (Luhmann, 
1990a, p. 145). By reproducing itself, the system reproduces in each operation its 
difference from what it is not. Without such recursive reproduction through actual 
operations, there is no system, and no environment. The operative closure of 
reproducing the system’s elements (like thoughts or communications) simultaneously 
reproduces the distinction between thought/non-thought and communication/non-
communication, that is, the distinction between the system and the non-system, i.e. 
the environment (Luhmann, 2002b, pp. 79-80). “The system creates itself as a chain 
of operations,” Luhmann writes. “The difference between system and environment 
arises merely because an operation produces a subsequent operation of the same type” 
(Luhmann, 2006, p. 46). And elsewhere: “Operationally speaking, an observer 
emerges as a system through a consecutive sequence of his observational operations” 
(Luhmann, 1999, p. 19).  
We saw with Kelsen that law can only understand acts as legal acts, and no 
“constituent power” can create a legal order without appearing already as a 
 
28 Luhmann borrows the term autopoiesis from the work of the Chilean biologists Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela, who used it to describe the self-reproduction of biological systems, like 
the production of cells from other cells. Luhmann explains that Maturana originally invented the term 
as a sort of combination of Aristotle’s notions of praxis and poiesis. Praxis denotes action that does not 
have an external purpose, but its purpose is itself as an action. Virtuous public action in the polis, 
playing flute, philosophical reflection — all these actions can be conceived as actions for their own sake, 
without an external object. Poiesis, by contrast, is about producing something external to the act of 
production itself. Autopoiesis then bridges these concepts: it is action that produces itself, or in systems-
theoretical terms, an operation that has as its product another operation of the same type (Luhmann, 
2002b, pp. 110-111). 
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“constituted power.” For Luhmann, the social subsystem of law cannot be understood 
in terms of “acts” at all. Society and its subsystems do not originate in acts of human 
beings. They are not products of human will. Instead, they are communicative systems, 
and they only “consist” of communications that link up with other communications. 
Whereas Kelsen still entertained the possibility of an image of a static origin (i.e. the 
basic norm) of an otherwise dynamic legal order, for Luhmann, no such highest norm 
to which other norms could refer exists. The only possibility is to see the basic norm 
as a theory figure (like Hart’s “rule of recognition”) that attempts to deparadoxify the 
code’s self-referential paradox (Luhmann, 2004, p. 125). Law operates always on 
grounds of past law, as if law had always already existed, already before acts of 
constituent power and as its ground of validity. “In the beginning there is a distinction, 
and even if it were only the construction before/after, it always (like every distinction) 
first emerges retroactively” (Amstutz, 2008, p. 126, my translation).29  
Autopoiesis has, according to Luhmann, three dimensions: factual, temporal 
and social.30 Factually, autopoiesis of communication is about drawing a distinction 
between the communication (self-reference) and the communicated (hetero-
reference) in the communicative event. Temporally, it is about operativity, recursively 
referring this event back to previous communications and anticipating further 
communications. Socially, it is about the exposure of the communicated meaning to 
understanding (and further to acceptance or rejection) (Luhmann, 2000, p. 11). All 
these dimensions circularly refer to each other and cannot be thought in isolation. 
The factual dimension of autopoiesis means that for a communication to arise 
something needs to be communicated. Something must become uttered in some way 
(spoken, written, gestured) and this utterance received as an informative 
communication. An utterance needs to succeed in making a distinction between itself 
as an utterance and what it wants to communicate as information, that is, to 
distinguish self- and other-reference. An utterance refers to something beyond itself, 
to a communicative theme. Something about the infinite complexity of the world is 
selected as relevant and interesting enough to merit being communicated as 
information. Thus, information “‘is definable as a difference that makes a difference’” 
(Luhmann, 1995a, p. 40, referring to Gregory Bateson). It “is not something that the 
system takes in from the environment. Information does not exist ‘out there,’ waiting 
 
29 “Am Anfang steht Unterscheidung, und sei es auch nur die Konstruktion des 
Vorher/Nachher, die ja immer (wie jede Unterscheidung) erst im nachhinein entsteht.” 
30 For Luhmann, the spatial dimension — the boundary between the inside (system) and the 
outside (environment) — is arguably only metaphorical. It is not a stricto sensu spatial boundary, but 
rather a temporal one. It is to be understood as the maintenance of the capacity of system’s operations 
to continue to link up with the system’s subsequent operations (see Fuchs, 2013, pp. 99-100). “The 
closure takes place in time through the connections or supplements that recognize prior events as 
apposite, as compatible with the system” (Fuchs, 2013, p. 100, my translation). (“Die Schließung erfolgt 
in der Zeit durch die Anschlüsse bzw. Nachträge, die Vorereignisse als passend, als systemkompatibel 
diskriminieren.”) Social systems are, as non-spatial, nowhere to be encountered; they do not have “a 
postal address.” This is why, Fuchs suggests, social critique is such a difficult topic for systems theory: 
“the society,” “law,” “economy” or “politics” cannot hear any critique, conventionally understood 
(Fuchs, 2013, pp. 101-106). Thereby it is understandable that attempts to think about ”critical 
autopoiesis” have also been attempts to rethink the status of space, bodies and materiality in systems 
theory (see Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2011). I come back to the question of law’s spatiality in my 
discussion of Lindahl’s theory. 
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to be picked up by the system” (Luhmann, 1990a, pp. 3-4). Information is rather a 
result of selection and, thus, system-specific.  
Furthermore, perhaps counterintuitively but importantly, the sender of the 
communication is not the origin of the distinction between utterance and information. 
This follows from the emphasis on autopoiesis that excludes the external maker. 
Luhmann emphasizes that communication is not about the transmission of 
information contents:  
The metaphor of transmission locates what is essential about communication 
in the act of transmission, in the utterance. It directs attention and demands for 
skillfulness onto the one who makes the utterance. But the utterance is nothing 
more than a selection proposal, a suggestion. Communication emerges only to 
the extent that this suggestion is picked up, that its stimulation is processed. 
(Luhmann, 1995a, pp. 139-140)  
Luhmann rejects the conception of communication as ego transmitting a fully 
formed informational content to the alter who receives it as such, the content being 
the same on both sides. The receiver of information is not passive but instead has 
communication-constitutive significance. There is a primacy of the receiver that 
Luhmann emphasizes by naming the sender “alter” and the receiver “ego” (Rasch, 
2000, p. 54, Luhmann, 1995a, pp. 141-142). A communicative event emerges as such 
only if the receiver makes a distinction between utterance and information by 
understanding what the utterance conveys as information. This is the social 
dimension of communication: the sender exposes her communication to the selectivity 
of other systems (psychic and social) that are constitutive of the utterance in order for 
it to count as information. A communicative proposal is at best an irritation that the 
receiver understands, or not, and then accepts or rejects.  
It is important to note that, for Luhmann, “understanding” does not mean 
overcoming the mutual opacity of ego and alter. “Understanding” is, rather, a 
communicative event in its turn. “By ‘success’ [of a communication],” Luhmann 
writes, “I mean that the recipient of the communication accepts the selective content 
of the communication (the information) as a premise of his own behaviour, thus 
joining further selections to the primary selection and reinforcing its selectivity in 
the process” (Luhmann, 1981, p. 124, my emphasis). How ego experiences alter’s 
selection in the privacy of her mind is irrelevant for the purposes of communication. 
What matters is that ego’s behavior meets alter’s expectations of that behavior. 
Confirmation of expectations re-entrenches the initial selectivity, thereby making 
communication on its basis more probable than communication on an alternative 
selection.  
What, then, presents “the solution” to the problem of double contingency is 
time and the iteration of certain selections and confirmation of certain expectations 
over time. A social system has emerged when behavior can be seen as being able to 
connect with behavior (Anschlussfähigkeit): ego responds to the alter as accepting her 
selection as informative and takes it as a premise of her subsequent behavior. An 
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utterance is taken to be a communication to which further communication will be 
connected. Communication systems are irreducible to psychic systems and challenge 
all theories that explain social order by tracing them to the individual’s will, action or 
needs. Both psychic and social systems operate within or as their respective recursive 
circles, and can irritate, but not directly steer each other.  
Operative closure suggests that systems operate according to their own time. 
This is the third, temporal dimension: each communication refers to past and future 
communications of the system to which it is identified to belong, just like each thought 
refers to past and future thoughts of the same consciousness, but these two operative 
temporalities (consciousness and communication) do not fuse. If each communication 
already presupposes communication in order to count as such, no pure origin as a 
present moment in time can be singled out as the first step, and the system itself 
cannot observe its own beginning. An account of system genesis is an external account 
by the sociologist, although systems, like the legal system, can of course come up with 
narratives of their own history, and these histories unfold the paradoxical origin by 
presenting the emergence of the system in a sequential (rather than retroactive and 
recursive) manner. But to come up with one’s history requires that the system is 
already (presupposed to be) in place. Luhmann insists that communication is not like 
creatio ex nihilo, but a single communication only makes sense against a background 
of communication, in a network of communication and accumulated meaning. 
Communication that only happens once and as a pure singularity does not and cannot 
make sense. New communication is possible only as an iteration of other 
communications that both differs from the past and repeats known grounds 
(Luhmann, 2002b, pp. 111-113).  
3.3.3 Binding time 
Social systems are, thus, forms of social order that limit what kind of behavior 
has connective and communicative value. Only by behaving in certain ways rather than 
others, only by taking a system-specific selection of behavioral possibilities as the 
premise of one’s own behavior, does one count as a social actor, as someone 
communicating intelligibly (and avoiding sanctions for deviant behavior). “[E]ach 
communication,” Luhmann writes, “is binding time in so far as it determines the state 
of the system that the next communication has to assume” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 144). 
In other words, a system operates by structuring the future, by anticipating, on 
grounds of their memory of their own operations, what will, and/or what ought, to 
happen in the future. In cases of disappointment of its expectations, the system will 
either modify its expectations on grounds of new information or uphold them despite 
their dissatisfaction. This is Luhmann’s famous distinction between “cognitive” and 
“normative” expectations. To sum up in Luhmann’s own words: “The openness of the 
initial situation [of double contingency] is transformed into a projection of [systemic] 
structure” and this means “delimiting ranges of possibility” (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 133) 
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for social actors. “They [societal subsystems] employ their selection pattern as a 
motive to accept the reduction, so that people join with others in a narrow world of 
common understandings, complementary expectations and determinable issues” 
(Luhmann, 1976, p. 512). It is against the background of such a narrow world that the 
paradox looks like an explosion. 
Double contingency, just like a paradoxical situation understood as an 
explosion, is uninformatively complex: there are too many, an unrestricted number of 
possibilities, which paralyzes observation of meaningful things and coordination of 
expectations. Such complexity must be reduced to an order within which only a finite 
number of possibilities can be expected in order for communication to happen, 
conflicts to be resolved and being legally right or wrong to be distributed. “The 
repeated use of communicated meaning fulfills a double requirement: the results are, 
finally, a meaning that is fixed by language and a differentiated societal 
communication” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 144). In Luhmann’s account of the genesis of 
meaning, meaning is “condensed” over time and through repeated use. Meaning has 
emerged if in new situations something can be recognized as the same as before. Social 
order arises through iterating some selections of communication rather than others 
across different situations (Luhmann, 2004, p. 144). Its “foundation” is nowhere else 
except “in” its own iteration. It only exists as its own autopoiesis. The structures (i.e. 
expectations) that guide operations have their source in nothing else except their 
“condensation and confirmation” by those very operations (Luhmann, 2004, p. 85). 
Social structures emerge, when expectations about the next suitable communication 
emerge: for Luhmann, “social structures are expectational structures” (Luhmann, 
1995a, p. 292).  
Systems are not only “first order observers,” but also “second order observers,” 
that is, observers of their own observations. This means that they do not only 
communicate about something, but also about what they take to be their own 
communications. In other words, they regulate their own communicative operations. 
As Dirk Baecker puts it: 
 
[s]ocial systems must themselves decide whether, how, and by whom they 
demand the mere calling again [i.e. iteration; HL] of their distinctions; whether, 
how, and by whom they tolerate the crossing of their distinctions [i.e. non-
acceptance or deviant behavior; HL]; and whether, how, and by whom they 
support the observation of the form of their distinctions [i.e. critique; HL]. 
(Baecker, 1999, p. 5)  
 
What systems deem as not confirming their expectations is dealt with by the 
means that systems themselves have invented for this purpose. Therefore, the 
communications of Kripke’s skeptic in the context of Kripke’s story (classroom) will 
simply count as an error and as unable to connect to subsequent communications. 
Deviance is socially costly, and results in exclusion from the communication in 
question, unless the system itself decides to identify deviance as a learning opportunity 
and an occasion for adapting expectations. The stability of meaning (of mathematical 
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functions) is ultimately guaranteed by the operativity of the system in question (of 
science, of education). Although an external observer (the critic, Kripke) can formulate 
the paradox and even see that it points to the problem of the origin of meaning and 
social order, operating systems have always already deparadoxified the paradox by 
determining with sufficient precision what can count as a meaningful communication 
within them.  
Contingent communication systems thus reduce complexity in temporal, social 
and factual dimensions and make meaningful and informative communication 
possible. They limit, from their own perspective, what counts as relevant topics of 
communication, how communications connect with past and future communications, 
and who is expected to conform to expectations created by the system and what 
happens in cases of deviance. Communication happens against the background of 
double contingency, and as the reduction to finite and manageable proportions of the 
complexity it implies. Such reductions happen at many different levels, all the way 
from patterns in simple interaction systems, like familiar everyday behavior among 
friends and family, to social orders at the level of functionally differentiated social sub-
systems of law, science, education and economy.  
 
 
3.3.4 The retroactive construction of communication 
  
To finish this section, let me highlight the significance of the indirect 
constitution of something as an informative communication. Luhmann emphasizes 
the importance of the perspective of the receiver for something to count as a 
communication. In the following sections, I will then seek to show how this 
indirectness characterizes the operation of the legal system as an immune system for 
society and draw some implications from it to Luhmann’s understanding of conflict, 
critique and justice.   
Jean Clam notes that “[t]he structural consequence of such a setting [of the 
constitutive significance of the receiver for communication is] a backward 
construction of communication from its understanding (Verstehen) to its conveyance 
(Mitteilung) [i.e. utterance; HL] and from the latter to its information or content 
(Information)” (Clam, 2013, p. 24). Alter’s communicative intent registers as such 
only after the fact, if the ego receives it by understanding it. Clam describes beautifully 
this complicated temporality of the constitution of communication: 
 
 [W]e don’t know what comes up from our communication intention; our 
intention, what we want to say, to do, to initiate, to provoke, to hinder, to leave 
undone and so on, is not first in ourselves and has to be expressed, exteriorized 
by means of operations of communication. It is what it is from its backward 
response or non-response, from its striking on the demand of the other — which 
in its turn is nothing by itself but comes to pass by striking the demand it 
encounters. Information (flowing in channels of communication), intentions of 
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communication (skewing the contents it conveys), understandings of such 
intentions and informations are never given as such, are in a way never there. 
They come to their own significance post factum, they find their meaning 
nachträglich, in the aftermath of communication. (Clam, 2013, p. 25, original 
emphasis.)  
 
It should perhaps be noted that the concept of Nachträglichkeit that has been 
translated as variedly as “afterwardness,” “retroactivity,” “après-coup,” “deferral of 
meaning” (see Eickhoff, 2006), was originally used by Sigmund Freud to describe a 
traumatic or sexual meaning attributed only retroactively to the memory of earlier 
events. It indicated a complex temporality of the formation of personal identity, in 
which later meaning-constitution of memories shows the given experience in a new 
light but, paradoxically, allows the person in question to “finally” understand who she 
“really” was all along. Traumatic memories that before were pushed to the unconscious 
now receive meaning, which constitutes for the person how her past “truly” was. “As 
the traumatic event was not understood while it was happening, it becomes 
recognizable at a place and at a time that do not correspond to the original situation” 
(Eickhoff, 2006, p. 1464). This deferral of meaning, the becoming-available of 
meaning of the past only in the present, implies “the darkness of the blink of an eye,” 
inaccessibility of the lived moment (das Dunkel des gelebten Augenblicks);31 only later 
does the memory of the undecipherable lived moment become deciphered in a way 
that elucidates the darkness of the past and constitutes it as a part of who the person 
is. What before was neutral or unconscious for the person, becomes articulated as 
possessing identity-constituting significance. The temporality of the Nachträglichkeit 
signifies an inversion of causal temporality — first a cause, then an effect — as it 
suggests that only what comes later, as a supposed effect and supplement, makes it 
possible to see something as a cause or an origin. What comes later constitutes its own 
origin and claims that this is how things were all along. “[S]upplementarity produces 
après coup that to which the supplement should simply have been added on,” as Fabio 
Ciaramelli puts Derrida’s take on the (non-)concept of retroactive temporality 
(Ciaramelli, 1998, p. 259, my translation).32 And more: only as supplemented by what 
comes later can the origin be accessed. The past becomes interpretable as a significant, 
non-neutral past of the present only from the perspective of the present, that is, when 
there is no longer direct access to the origin.  
Communication is, in all its closed and self-referential autopoiesis, responsive: 
a system responds to irritations from its environment that it understands and 
interprets according to its own system-specific means. The event of utterance is 
constituted as communication nachträglich, in and through its understanding 
reception by a system. This suggests that communicative systems emerge as a response 
to affection, or “irritation” in Luhmannian terms, although only the specific sensitivity 
of the system is responsible for the meaning of that affection/irritation. Something 
 
31 Ernst Bloch in The Principle of Hope, quoted in Eickhoff, 2006, p. 1453. 
32 “[L]a supplémentarité produit après coup ce à quoi le supplément aurait dû simplement 
s’ajouter.” 
98 
irritates the system and becomes observed as meaningful and informative in some way 
rather than another, regulated by the system-internal law of communication. Because 
“[i]nformation is an internal change of state, a self-produced aspect of communicative 
events” (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 10), it requires an internal articulation of time as the 
system’s own past enabling certain kinds of linking of future communication. System-
internal time allows for understanding new events as a difference between system’s 
past and future. Nachträglichkeit indicates, however, that there is a “gap in time,” an 
interval, between the system and what irritates it, that whatever happens 
simultaneously in the environment is inaccessible for the system in any other terms 
except in its own:     
What comes to be as an identity, will each time be established retroactively, 
through connections that take up what happened as something determinate, as 
belonging; through connections that themselves are assigned to connections. 
The operative event is then not a singular cognition or communication, but 
their observation after the fact, in the mode of a “thereafter” that creates its 
“before” — for the time being. (Fuchs, 2013, p. 100, my translation.)33 
Luhmann distinguishes between causality and operativity, insisting that system 
boundaries block direct influence on its operations. What is in the environment of a 
system does not directly regulate and direct the system’s operative states, although it 
may irritate the system causally, push it to alter its current state. Such alteration is, 
however, always a system-internal operation. The system itself in its own recursive 
loop interprets the meaning of its irritations, and the relation to the environment is 
indirect. Operative closure does not mean that causality would not play any role at all 
— for Luhmann, social systems are causally dependent on conscious and living 
systems, as well as on certain “physical conditions for life on earth” (Luhmann, 2004, 
p. 80). But as producers of meaning and social order, social systems are closed upon
their own operations. Their operations constitute something as relevant, as
informative for the system, and in this way the something is present in the system —
otherwise it remains absent for it. Luhmann describes this absence with Derrida’s help
as follows:
 What is excluded [from the system], what does not take part operatively, will 
still be handled as present. The system’s boundary to the psychical and the 
biological [like to other social systems and everything else in its environment] 
is built into its functioning as a presupposition or a requirement. These are 
theoretical figures that emerge from time to time in philosophy. In Jacques 
Derrida, for example, there is the idea that there is a non-present factor that 
leaves traces, traces in French, íchnos in Greek, and then the traces will be 
33 “Was jeweils als Identität zustande kommt, wird in der Form der Nachträglichkeit ermittelt, 
durch Anschlüsse, die das, was geschah, als Bestimmtes, als Zugehöriges aufgreifen: durch Anschlüsse, 
die selbst auf Anschlüsse angewiesen sind. Das operative Ereignis ist dann nicht die singuläre Kognition 
oder Kommunikation, sondern deren Hinbeobachtung im Modus eines Danach, das sein Vorher erzeugt 
– vorübergehend.”
99 
erased and nothing visible remains of them. Whether there is enough blood 
flowing in the brains is not talked about constantly in communication. [But] 
this possibility to talk about it requires that it is already there. “The absent,” in 
Derrida’s jargon, is present, even if it is not exactly present: a clear paradox in 
the formulation. (Luhmann, 2002b, p. 266, my translation.)34 
The “something” “already there” that irritates the system and that the system 
comes to observe in its internally regulated process of communication is rendered 
present for the system only insofar as this is allowed by the system’s possibilities for 
connectivity. This is one more paradoxical articulation of the externality that is 
constructed as such inside, within the system. 
3.4 Law as society’s immune system 
Let us now draw some implications of this general theory of communication for 
the legal system, paying in particular attention to Luhmann’s claim that the legal 
system functions as the society’s “immune system” (e.g. Luhmann, 2004, p. 384). 
3.4.1 Protecting normative expectations 
What, then, can be expected of the other and of her expectations? Luhmann 
holds that in modern society, the normativity of “normality” (i.e. how a “normal 
person” behaves in a given situation) is no longer sufficient to reduce the uncertainties 
implied by double contingency; normality and normativity are distinguished. The legal 
system is the locus for spelling out and entrenching artificial normativity that is not 
mere “familiarity” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 153). At the most general societal level it is the 
legal system that answers the question of what can be expected of the other. Although 
custom and morality still produce normative expectations, only law provides a second-
order normativity that offers structures for the creation, change and enforcement of 
legal (first-order) normativity. In other words, the legal system stabilizes society’s 
normative expectations of normative expectations over time. What the legal system 
does is “transfor[m] the distinction between cognitive and normative expectations into 
an object of expectation in its own right” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 157). That is to say, the 
34 “Was ausgeschlossen wird, was operativ nicht teilnimmt, wird trotzdem wie anwesend 
behandelt. Die Grenze des Systems zum Psychischen und Biologischen hin ist als Präsupposition oder 
als Voraussetzung des Funktionierens mit eingebaut. Das sind Theoriefiguren, die in der Philosophie 
gelegentlich auftauchen. Bei Jacques Derrida zum Beispiel gibt es eine Idee, dass es einen nicht 
anwesenden Faktor gibt, der Spuren hinterlässt, traces im Französischen, íchnos im Griechischen; dann 
werden diese Spuren gelöscht, nichts davon wird sichtbar gemacht. In der Kommunikation wird nicht 
ständig darüber geredet, ob die Durchblutung des Kopfes ausreicht. Spuren werden gelöscht. [Aber] 
diese Möglichkeit, darüber zu reden, setz voraus, dass es immer schon da ist. Das ‘Abwesende’ — im 




legal system protects society’s expectations that there will be legally determined 
normative expectations of how one ought to behave that will resist disappointment 
and be upheld in cases of disappointment, and that those who deviate, will face legally 
determined consequences.   
For Luhmann, law’s function in society is temporal: it tries “to anticipate, at 
least on the level of expectations, a still unknown, genuinely uncertain future” 
(Luhmann, 2004, p. 147). Luhmann understands legal norms from this functional 
perspective as attempts to bind the future by stipulating what ought to happen. Law 
makes it known in society “which expectations will meet with social approval and 
which not” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 148), thereby pushing behavior in a legally normalized 
direction. However, “[n]orms do not promise conduct that conforms to norms,” and 
indeed commonly enough, factual conduct does not correspond to norms and law is 
breached (Luhmann, 2004, p. 150). Therefore, law can only promise that it will 
“protect all those who are expecting such a conduct” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 150). Law 
protects, in other words, normative expectations of norm-conforming conduct: it is 
legitimate to expect that other people’s behavior satisfies legal expectations. In 
probable cases of dissatisfaction, law protects the expectation that law deals with this 
dissatisfaction and “a violation of rights is not just tacitly accepted” (Luhmann, 2004, 
p. 159).  
Luhmann defines norms as having an “if, then” structure. Law creates 
“conditional programs” that determine the conditions for the correct application of the 
code legal/illegal. A legal norm uses the code, but it is the program that gives the 
content to the norm, that establishes what kind of conduct will be considered legal or 
illegal (Luhmann, 2004, pp. 196-197). Norms as stabilized normative expectations 
regulate conduct across temporal, material (factual) and social dimensions: they spell 
out what is regulated (law’s matter), i.e. what kind of conduct the law considers as legal 
or illegal; they will be upheld against their factual disappointment and be altered only 
according to the temporal rhythm determined by the legal autopoiesis (legally 
regulated processes of legislation and adjudication); and they determine who is 
expected to conform to legal expectations, to accept and not reject them, by taking 
them as a premise of their own conduct.  
Legal autopoiesis creates and protects normative expectations, which do not 
necessarily correspond with individuals’ expectations: “The norm is maintained by 
previous and subsequent practice, by sequences of operations that always make the 
norm turn out the same way (whatever the discretionary ambit that interpretations 
may provide)” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 109). Norms can of course also be changed and 
expectations adjusted, but change must always take place under autopoietic 
conditions of incorporating the change into the ongoing practice of the system’s 
decision-making (Luhmann, 2004, p. 109). This also applies to legislation as a process 
in the political system. Political decisions claim to be “collectively binding” and as 
legislation, they must take a legal form (Luhmann, 2004, p. 392).    
Luhmann’s account of the legal system is based on the analysis of the genesis of 
system autopoiesis and operational closure. “There is, in other words, no external 
determination of structures. Only the law itself can say what law is” (Luhmann, 2004, 
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p. 85). The legal system is the only “authority in society which can proclaim: this is
legal and this is illegal” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 100, emphasis omitted). Legal
communications use the binary code legal/illegal, and this code is what allows the legal
system to distinguish between legal and non-legal communications, and thereby
establish a distinction between itself and its environment (this includes all other
communications except those that the legal system itself identifies as legal).
Luhmann’s distinction recht/unrecht, or Recht/Unrecht, thus translates both as
“legal/illegal” (or “lawful/unlawful”), which means that things can be either legal or
illegal for law, and as “law/non-law,” which means that by deciding what counts as
legal and what illegal, the legal system differentiates itself from the domain that
remains irrelevant to it, i.e. from its environment (King & Thornhill, 2003, pp. 55-56).
It is through the allocation of this code to those events in its environment that it deems
relevant, that the legal system observes its environment and reproduces itself in the
process. As Luhmann puts it, “[a] communication is not unlawful, rather it is an
impossible one [within the legal system], if it does not fit into the coding legal/illegal”
(Luhmann, 2004, p. 120). The code legal/illegal does not accept third values, and this
is why it is both paradoxical when applied to itself, and in need of “unfolding,” which
seeks to make the binary code socially adequate regardless of the inconsistency and
lack of grounding that haunt it.
Normative expectations are society’s immune system, which “prevent[s] 
disappointment from resulting in the annulment of structures” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 
384, see also Luhmann, 1995a, p. 375). If I suspect that somebody has stolen my 
property, I can take my case to the police, and ultimately to the court, to investigate of 
whether a theft took place and who the guilty person was and receive compensation 
from that person. I do not have to give up on my normative expectation that I alone 
have the right to decide what to do with my property, but in case of a disappointment 
of this expectation, the legal system assists me in entrenching this expectational 
structure by punishing those whose behavior disappoints it and recognizing my right 
to compensation for losses. In investigating this conflict and deciding whether and 
how a dissatisfaction of normative expectations has taken place (i.e. by applying its 
code with the help of programs), the legal system differentiates itself from its 
environment. For example, it may not see as relevant to the legal assessment of the 
case the economic status of the parties, for instance that the person who took my 
property was “poor” according to some economic criteria. It is, however, not excluded 
in any absolute sense that non-legal facts, such as the economic status of the 
defendant, are recognized as relevant for the legal decision. Being hungry may 
function as a mitigating factor and save the defendant from being convicted of a petty 
theft, should the legal system consider such a fact relevant to its decision.  
It is commonsensical to understand “expectation” as something that one has 
now in the present moment, something the content of which one knows, and 
something that will either be confirmed or disappointed in the future. Its temporality 
is sequential: first expectation, then its confirmation or disappointment. First, there is 
a determination of the expectation (norm) by a legal decision, and, then, after the 
decision, the expectation binds future conduct, at least until law itself reconsiders its 
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bindingness. This is also the legal system’s self-understanding of its own temporality. 
Furthermore, legal expectations have to be made public, so that law’s addressees will 
know what is expected of them now and in the future. Retroactive law is explicitly 
forbidden. As King and Thornhill write, normative expectations “must restrict 
freedom of conduct in advance, so that it can be known by ‘anyone who wants to act 
in that way that they will be violating expectations and so be disadvantaged right from 
the start’” (King & Thornhill, 2003, p. 53, referring to Luhmann, 1993b, p. 129, my 
emphasis). In the court of justice, then, the already known normative expectation of 
how one ought to behave can simply be picked up and used as a rule for solving the 
case.  
However, within such a complex system, it must frequently be unclear for both 
addressees of the law and the law itself how legal expectations regulate a given 
situation. What kind of behavior will count as legal and what illegal here and now? 
This is arguably not always, nor perhaps even in the majority of cases, evident even for 
legal authorities before a legal decision is taken. After all, many legal conflicts concern 
precisely different interpretations of what the valid normative expectation is. 
Expectations regulating a situation now will, instead, become formulated only if 
determined by a legal decision and, therefore, only after the decision. In fact, the very 
generality of law, and ultimately the protection of expectations of normative 
expectations itself, requires that expectations be left relatively indeterminate. Should 
the legal system attempt to regulate the future in its smallest detail, it would become 
internally too complex to operate (see Luhmann, 2004, p. 140).   
Indifference to detail, or generality, protects the operability of the norm. Legal 
norms have to be formulated sufficiently generally, which implies that normative 
expectations must also remain relatively general — and sometimes this generality 
looks in the eyes of the addressees of the law like uncertainty of what exactly is 
expected of their behavior. Can they even always be certain that the legal system will 
clarify such uncertainty for them, according to its processes of decision-making, given 
that it is the legal system itself that will decide which cases merit consideration?35 The 
legal code has universal applicability, but the system will decide when and to which 
issues to apply it. A legal decision, consequently, does not determine expectations only 
for the future, but also for the past, although it will not admit that this is what it is 
doing. The circular relation between structures (spelling out expectations) and 
operations (both being guided by and condensing structures) must imply that the 
decision will spell out, for the first time, what the legal system expected to be the case 
all along. The identity of the legal system — which normative expectations bear the 
stamp of legality and which not — becomes established in each decision and 
retroactively, although the court cannot explicitly say that this is what it is doing. 
Admitting it would count as exposing the temporal paradox and lead to inoperativity. 
The legal system as society’s immune system entrenches extant normative 
expectations, but it does not do this automatically. The distinction between cognitive 
and normative expectations is not absolute. The legal system may react to a critique 
 
35 For an illuminative discussion of the difficulties that migrants face when seeking to have their 
cases admitted to the European Court of Human Rights see Dembour, 2015, p. 2 ff. 
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that poverty may be a legally relevant fact in some situations: if law is too ignorant of 
the economic statuses of the litigants, it may be that it fails to adequately assist society 
in dealing with the risk of conflict related to economic inequality. If law comes to see 
poverty as constituting a significant risk of social conflict, it may take this into 
consideration in solving legal conflicts that have been brought to court. Singular 
decisions, like using economic status as a mitigating factor in a legal judgment, have 
surplus value in the sense that future legal resolutions of conflict will have to take them 
into consideration. In this way, by balancing the entrenchment of extant structures 
and their modification, the legal system develops itself as a dynamic immune system 
that is capable of conditioning social conflicts and preventing them from escalating. It 
seeks to achieve what Luhmann calls “adequate complexity”: normative structures 
that are effective in dealing with future social risks (Luhmann, 2004, p. 219, 476). 
Entrenching extant normative expectations implies that the legal system must be 
indifferent to much of what happens in its environment. However, in order to maintain 
the immunity function of these structures, the system also needs to learn from the way 
its environment irritates it. The system must balance these two conflicting demands 
in order to maintain its own relevance as an autonomous social subsystem. 
Modification of some normative structures may seem necessary in order to maintain 
the general function of the legal system, the protecting of normative expectations. 
 
 
3.4.2 The supplementarity of programs and the paradox of decision 
 
Let us in the following subsections look more closely at this ambiguous 
immunologic. As should be clear by now, law as an immune system is not a metaphor 
for Luhmann (Luhmann, 2004, p. 475). We will see that it deconstructs, among other 
things, the facile opposition between law that is made (law from the perspective of the 
courts) and law-making (law from the perspective of the legislator), and characterizes 
the legal system as a paradoxical “controlled form of instability” (Åkerstrøm & 
Stenner, 2020, p. 81). I will show how this account of the legal system, which puts the 
emphasis on the paradoxical temporality of law’s operation, questions the simple 
dichotomy between law as made and law-making, the perspectives of the judiciary and 
the legislative. We will see how, in its attempt to respect this institutional division of 
powers, the legal system displaces, but does not resolve, its paradox.  
As mentioned, Luhmann notoriously insists on a distinction between the legal 
code (legal/illegal) and the legal programs that allocate the code and regulate how the 
code is to be used, when behavior is to be considered legal and when illegal. Figuring 
out how the code ought to be used, how to apply norms in a legal way in particular 
cases and to particular facts, is what the legal system does at the level of court 
proceedings. “Only the code — which allows for the attribution of the values legal and 
illegal, but leaves their application open — can produce the uncertainty on which the 
[legal] proceedings feed,” Luhmann writes. “They, in turn, use this uncertainty as a 
medium for their own autopoiesis” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 206). Indeed, for Luhmann, 
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“[a]utopoiesis is [...] possible only if the system is in a constant state of uncertainty 
about itself in relation to the environment and can produce and monitor this 
uncertainty through self-organization” (Luhmann, 2018, p. 30, original emphasis). 
Repeatedly, in an always new present, the legal system has to reorganize itself by 
deciding what is now the legally valid way of allocating the legal code. Uncertainty 
about this functions as an irritant for the system (Luhmann, 2004, p. 208), requiring 
a response so that the system can re-identify itself and go on. “Every ‘transcendental’ 
identity could endanger the further reproduction of the system by itself” (Luhmann, 
2018, p. 31), Luhmann warns. That a system is autopoietic and functions as an immune 
mechanism means that it does not have a fixed, substantive identity, but it is always 
burdened by the task of finding itself again in all its actual operations, to find again 
how communication connects with past and future communication. This requires, for 
the legal system in particular, the making of decisions.  
For Luhmann, “a system exists only at the point in time at which it operates” 
(Luhmann, 2004, p. 283), which is the present. It is not determined by its past in any 
straightforward way, although it will always need to pretend that it is (as retroactive 
law counts as invalid and thus is no law). Instead, it needs to reactualize itself, its past 
included, again at each moment of operation. No structures are strong enough to force 
a legal decision, to select in advance the outcome of a legal decision in an actual case. 
The present is the time of decision-making, and “every present is burdened with the 
problems of redescribing its past and reprojecting its future” (Luhmann, 2018, p. 109). 
The distinction between the past and the future has to be continuously re-drawn. An 
autopoietic system is “a system that produces further operations from the state in 
which it has put itself” (Luhmann, 2018, p. 32), but it is in the present where the 
system needs to identify what exactly that state is. For a system:  
everything that is happening is happening in the present. [...] Also past and 
future are always, and only, relevant at the same time, and are discernible as 
such only in the present. Their recursive linkages are established in their 
actual operations. [...] An observer is [...] caught in the system that is tied to 
the conditions of time in its own right, that is, tied to the time which he 
respectively constructs as his horizon through its own distinctions in his own 
present time. (Luhmann, 2004, p. 82, my emphasis.)  
This means that the past cannot be understood, in theory, as determining the 
decision (although in practice it will be so understood). If the decision was determined 
by the structures, this would mean that it was made already before the making of the 
decision, and hence the decision would be redundant and superfluous, no decision 
operatively arrived at. “The decision operates within its own construction, which is 
only possible in the present. [...] It opens up or closes down possibilities, which would 
not exist without it” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 283, my emphasis).  
This cannot mean, however, that the decision arises ex nihilo. “At the moment 
of decisions, judges can make a variety of determinations, but they do so against a 
background of considerable redundancy” (Nobles & Schiff, 2009, p. 32). In systems 
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theory, redundancy is a central concept that explains why such problems of 
inoperativity and explosion (or in information theoretical terms, “chaos”) as the one 
suggested by Wittgenstein’s and the Kripkenstein paradox do not typically arise. It 
explains how the consistency of communication can be maintained by simply labeling 
the student’s communication as an error, as being unintelligible given the background 
that sets the parameters for what can be meaningfully and correctly said at school (or 
science). Similarly, for law, the new case at hand must produce relevant information 
that is capable of connecting to the chain of past, similar and dissimilar, cases, and, 
for instance, to established legal principles, and thereby seek to avoid what can easily 
be labeled as “error,” a wrong decision. Redundancy precisely reduces the freedom for 
legal communication, by establishing “the need for a judiciary to utilise a common 
basis for what is capable of identifying a legal communication” (Nobles & Schiff, 2009, 
p. 37).  
Redundancy as a concept originates in information theory, and its importance 
for systems theory lies in that it denotes those necessary preconditions for something 
to count as an informative, and hence new, communication (Nobles & Schiff, 2009, 
pp. 27-28). Redundancy is the background of what is already known, formed by past 
communication and information, against which something can appear as new 
information (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 40). That the system is redundant means that it has 
already reduced the complexity of the situation in such a manner that the next 
operation does not have to begin everything all over again. It can instead rely on the 
fact that the system already is indifferent to much that happens in its environment, 
and on grounds of this indifference, sensitive to its environment in a particular way 
that helps the system not to be overwhelmed by environmental complexity and not to 
miss relevant new information. Only because redundancy makes possible a certain 
focusing and high degrees of indifference, can new information be acquired 
(Luhmann, 2004, pp. 316-317).  
On the one hand, then, what is new can only be informative and “surprise” the 
system by comparison to what the system already knows. Information is what 
distinguishes a new communication from mere repetition of what is already known. 
The new needs the background of the old from which it is distinguished as the not-yet-
known. On the other hand, new information must be connected to this background. 
Redundancy is the established “stock” of knowledge and meaning that puts limits to 
how information can be received and transferred, to what can be said and written 
within a social system, to what can count as an informative communication in a new 
situation. It also reduces system-internal complexity. Each new, intended selection of 
something as relevant unintentionally reproduces the system’s redundancies 
(Luhmann, 2004, pp. 317-318). 
Therefore, “[e]very decision that describes itself as a decision,” Luhmann 
writes, and a court decision certainly describes itself as such, “runs into a paradox” 
(Luhmann, 2018, p. 104). On the one hand, there is no decision that does not repeat 
known grounds, but on the other, no past can determine a decision. No operation can 
take place without structure, but no structure simply causes an operation. Structure 
and operation are mutually dependent (recall, here, our discussion of the example in 
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the Introduction). Redundancy cannot exist somehow in itself, as a ready-made, 
already selected premise of the decision to be made, so the decision needs to decide its 
own past, its own grounds and claim that they exist prior to the decision and are what 
make it possible:  
Structures are only really real when they are used for linking communicative 
events; norms only when they are quoted explicitly or implicitly; expectations 
only when they are expressed through communication. [...] [T]he system is only 
actualized through its operations; [...] only what happens happens. (Luhmann, 
2004, p. 82)  
What is redundant cannot exist without a present that selects it as such, as 
what precedes the present as its ground. Only when it happens, when it is selected for 
use, is structure “really real.” Redundancy is not a free-standing stock of available 
meanings — this would push Luhmann’s theory from a resolutely operative, 
difference-based theory of the legal immunologic into the domain of theories of 
structure as some sort of stable substance. If the system only exists in its operative 
actuality, this also applies to redundancy, which means that the bindingness of the 
past in the present must be indicated in the present and by the decision itself. The 
present operation indicates the significance of the past for itself: it is the actual 
operation that retroactively, in the present moment, constitutes what it takes as its 
own past, as a past relevant in the now and for the decision. The meaning of the past 
is not simply recollected, repeated, but is rather constituted as a past in the present 
and for the present: “A social system must run a parallel procedure of recognition 
while performing its autopoiesis, which determines which earlier and later events have 
to be counted as communication (and especially as communication within its own 
system) and which not” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 88, emphasis omitted). 
This suggests that the distinction between finding and making law is more 
complex than simple opposition. Judges who decide legal cases and put an end to legal 
proceedings that have been feeding themselves on the uncertainty of the proper 
application of the code will insist that they only discover and find the law rather than 
invent it (see Luhmann, 2004, p. 281). They present as consistent something that is 
inconsistent, as sequential something that is retroactive: they unfold the paradox. The 
principle of the division of powers may thus well be thought of as yet another 
deparadoxifying mechanism. The determinate content of the law is identified in the 
legal decision for the very first time in that particular articulation, but it is presented 
as already established law and thereby distinguished from unsettled law requiring law-
making (see Nobles & Schiff, 2009). The past is given meaning in the present as a 
present-determining past — although this very operation, in the now, of determining 
the past as determining the present shows that the past is no such thing.  
It is unlikely that any legal decision will explicitly describe itself as constituting 
its own past. What the law is cannot simply be assumed to be ready-made, because the 
“recursive support shifts from situation to situation” (Luhmann, 1990a, pp. 9-10), and 
yet there is the pressure of claiming that what is new was there already. The system of 
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courts consistently describes itself in distinction to the legislative and distinguishes 
between adjudication that is based on already existing law and political law-making 
that creates new law. This is a constant legal self-description in the modern legal 
system, as such part of the legal system’s redundancy and definitely an important legal 
“ideology” in Luhmann’s sense, that is, a self-description that seeks to make the legal 
system consistent and paradox-free in the society’s and its own eyes. This “ideology” 
(and this term has no pejorative meaning for Luhmann) quite effectively prevents 
judges from describing their own actions as law-making (see Nobles & Schiff, 2009). 
They must make the paradox of the decision invisible, for if they admitted that they 
did create the law, this would lead to a crisis in the continuity of the legal 
communication. The coupling of the court’s judgment with further legal 
communications would be endangered, because the decision would probably not 
count as a valid one and be therefore rejected as a legal communication. The court 
could be accused of entering the field of the legislator, of becoming political. The 
maintenance of the separation of powers is, however, important for the maintenance 
of the functional differentiation between the legal and the political system in modern 
society.  
Theoretical, second-order observation can see, however, that the legal system 
has to “ascertain what it has done so far or what it will do in future in order to specify 
its own operations as legal ones” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 90). A system not only refers to 
its other and selects what is informative, but to do this, it must refer also to itself to 
select — give meaning to — what counts as a relevant past operation for the present 
and the next step. It has to construct its memory, all the redundancies on the basis of 
which it can be sensitive, or not, to novelty, variation and change:  
 
Memory is not simply a repertoire of past facts but above all the organization of 
access to information. This organization — and not really what happened in the 
past — is what leads to its use in concrete operations, which can only be 
executed in the present. (Luhmann, 2004, pp. 137-138)  
 
A system has no other access to its own resources — to its own identity — than 
via distinctions and selections that it makes in the present, always anew. “Past and 
future facts can be attributed with meaning arrived at in the present time” (Luhmann, 
2004, p. 118, emphasis mine). Luhmann clearly emphasizes the significance of the 
present in the sense that the past is only accessible via the present:  the meaning of the 
past as the past significant for the present and structuring the present operations is 
constituted in the present.  
“The recursive interconnection of operations follows neither logical nor rational 
rules,” says Luhmann. “It merely produces connections and the prospect of 
connectivity” (Luhmann, 2018, p. 32). For him, “the system’s boundaries are defined 
by the legal system itself, with the aid of a recursive referral of operations to the results 
of (or the prospects for) operations by the same system” (Luhmann, 1988a, p. 141, my 
emphasis). However, this analysis of retroactive meaning-bestowal shows that 
because such recursive referral of operations to past operations only selects them as 
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the relevant past of the present, the past is not simply there, available for repetition 
but there is rather a deferral of meaning of operations to the future. Only operations 
taking place in a present moment that is coming in the future can determine the 
meaning of past operations for that present. “Only the law can say what is lawful and 
what is unlawful, and in deciding this question it must always refer to the results of its 
own operations” (Luhmann, 1988a, p. 139); the results are not simply there, available 
in themselves, but become accessible as the past of the present only by a present 
operation of indicating them as such.  
Furthermore, a decision seeks to control the future by treating it as changeable, 
that is, a decision presents itself as a determining, binding past of a future present, 
which it cannot, but will always try to, be. Normative expectations will be held 
according to this decision! Or, this is at least the self-description of a legal decision. 
However, it will, of course, also be the case in the future that future decisions will not 
be in any straightforward sense determinable by their past. The autopoiesis-irritating 
uncertainty gets repeated, and again a novel decision has to select a past relevant for 
it. This description characterizes the meaning of operations for next operations as 
deferred: no operation contains its meaning for next operations in itself, but the 
meaning is deferred to a future that selects it, paradoxically constituting the past as a 
significant past, as a past that limits possibilities in the present and with which it may 
simply “link.” Autopoiesis must be thought of as both referral and deferral of meaning; 
that is, it must be deconstructed.  
The legal system “thereby holds out the prospect of resolving conflicts (and at 
the same time makes it possible to seek out and withstand conflicts), for it contains a 
preliminary decision (however unclear it may be in the individual case) about who has 
to learn from disappointment and who does not” (Luhmann, 1988a, p. 140). Although 
the system’s relevant past must be established each time anew, law nevertheless 
always takes itself as having made such a preliminary decision. And this must also be 
how the society receives the legal system, as consistent in its decisions, effectively 
protecting normative expectations and binding future – “must” in the sense that if 
society’s faith in law begins to falter on a large scale, and if the legal system is unable 
to respond to this through modifying expectations, the conditions for its continued 
evolution are weakened. For Luhmann, the temporal paradox of the legal system’s 
identity and decision must be concealed, so that the legal system’s societal function 
can be maintained. Although the identity of the legal system can, from the theoretical 
point of view, be seen as constituted by a paradoxical temporality, this paradoxicality, 
Luhmann insists, cannot be visible in the legal practice itself. Law has to describe itself 
as unfolding sequentially, claim that its inconsistencies are consistent, its decisions 
based on binding past decisions and law already made.  
3.4.3 Legal immunologic as the conditioning of social conflict 
Legal decisions are called for as a response to social conflicts, and conflicts offer 
for the legal system an occasion for self-re-identification and -modification. Let us now 
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investigate how, for Luhmann, the legal system as an immune mechanism balances 
redundancy and variation in its attempt to condition social conflict.  
Because communication is constituted retroactively and is dependent on the 
point of view of the receiver for its acceptance, understanding and continuation, it 
remains risky: the receiver might reject the initiative. Luhmann identifies this as a 
structural insecurity. Remember that, for Luhmann, communication is improbable, 
not a given, and its continuation is at all times faced with the risk that the receiver says 
“no,” in which case communication cannot proceed (even if such a risk might be 
observed as low) (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 390). Such a “no” is what gives rise to a social 
conflict: “a conflict exists when expectations are communicated and the 
nonacceptance of the communication is communicated in return” (Luhmann, 1995a, 
p. 389). For Luhmann, a conflict has the structure of a contradiction between a 
communication that expects acceptance but is answered by a refusal, by a “no.” This is 
not a simple failure of communication, but rather an irritation that pushes it to find 
alternative continuations (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 390). 
The functional task of the legal system is to re-condition or re-enact conflicts in 
order to solve them legally and thereby enable social communication to continue (or 
if the parties to the conflict are singular persons, the legal solution to their conflict 
allows their interaction system, like family life, to continue). The legal system will 
understand conflicts and claims as of significance to it and will resolve them within 
the limits of its own selectivity. The legal system uses social conflicts as occasions for 
its own autopoiesis and for the formulation of legal expectations (Luhmann, 2004, p. 
477; Teubner, 2001a). It must be remembered that, for Luhmann, law’s function is not 
so much to steer behavior, to make deviant behavior less probable and prevent 
conflicts, but rather to offer the forum for deciding whose normative expectations have 
the force of law: it offers a medium for communicating about conflicts and avoiding 
their violent resolution. The legal system conditions conflicts, offers an “adequately 
complex” framework for their articulation and solution. The legal system is society’s 
way of dealing with structural insecurity: the irreducible risk of contestation of 
contingent structures of communication that can always be otherwise and that are not 
necessary, that is, that can not-be. (See Luhmann, 1995a, p. 376, 379, 394.)   
This conditioning of the conflict expresses the closure of the legal system that 
allows for a limited, legal perspective of social reality. The retroactive temporality is at 
play: law will reconstruct the conflict (who started it, how it unfolded, what it was 
about) in its own material, social and temporal terms, which allows for the resolution 
of the conflict in legal terms, for making it finite and lifting it from the infinite circle of 
double contingency. The code legal/illegal provides universal applicability to law by 
giving it the means to attribute itself to anything that irritates it and that it finds 
relevant. Attributing the code legal/illegal to any relevant communication can be 
understood as a second-order observation that observes first-order observers 
observing and that uses this observation as an irritation to formulate the legal 
perspective of the issue — formulating a legal observation that is “quite independent 
of the motives of the first-order observers” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 102). “[I]f law is to be 
used,” Luhmann argues, (pointing out that this is of course not necessary but 
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alternative forms of conflict-resolution are often available), “that is, if there is a 
question as to law and injustice, it can be used only on the terms set by the legal 
system” (Luhmann, 2004, pp. 102-103, original emphasis). The legal system, 
Luhmann reminds us, “may well communicate about its environment but not with it” 
(Luhmann, 2004, p. 466, original emphasis). A conflict can only irritate law, not 
control how it is legally communicated about, and the legal system’s sensibility to its 
environment will always be regulated by its sedimented patterns of selectivity. 
Luhmann writes: 
 
[I]t is important to note that law does not necessarily solve the original conflicts 
but only those that it can construct on its own terms. The deep structures of and 
motives for conflicts in everyday life, as well as the question of who commenced 
them, are largely ignored. This is one of the reasons why it is so difficult for the 
law to assess the effects which legal decisions, or legally enforced mediation, 
have on the situations that underlie conflicts. (Luhmann, 2004, p. 169) 
 
The legal reconstruction of conflict will signify that there may be “a 
considerable degree of temporal [and material and social] disintegration in relation to 
the social environment” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 210) — and that the law will be unable 
to gauge the difference between the two in any other terms than by observing its own 
ability to continue operating. No matter how the conflict will be understood by the 
people involved in it, this understanding as such will be absent from the law, as the 
conflict registers within the law only in terms that the law itself provides (see 
Christodoulidis, 1998). As Günther Teubner puts it, “the quaestio juris has very little 
or virtually nothing to do with the original social conflict” (Teubner, 2001a, p. 22). 
What the parties to the conflict expect that ought to be done and what the law identifies 
as legal expectations may be totally incongruent, which implies that what law takes to 
be a conflict resolved may continue to be formulated as a conflict in other, non-legal 
terms. Law makes the conflict finite and decidable, but only in law’s own terms. It does 
not necessarily do so in the eyes of those whose own understanding of the conflict 
differs from the one law provides. The distance between the legal resolution of the 
conflict and the “original” conflict is invisible for law; only an external observer is able 
to gauge it and interpret its significance.   
 Thus, “least of all [can the legal conflict resolution be understood] as a point-
by-point response to impulses from outside” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 259). Legal 
responsivity is dependent on law’s own understanding of the conflict and what is asked 
of it. This retroactive reconstruction of conflict that brings the conflict to its own 
significance — that is, to its own significance in law’s eyes — implies a systemic 
presence of something that is constitutively absent. Law does treat the conflict as 
coming first and as something other to itself, as something that is observed and then 
resolved, although it can understand the conflict only within its own network. The 
meaning of the conflict is deferred to law, the conflict is received by the law according 
to its own recursive referral of its operations to its (past and future) operations. The 
system presupposes that the conflict itself is a social conflict and therefore outside the 
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law, but only understands what it is about when translated in legal terms. Law is not 
co-extensive with the world and it does not take itself as such, but simultaneously the 
only way for it to access what is outside and absent from the legal present is to make it 
present in law’s own terms.  
No system is absolutely self-sufficient but depends on the alter that always 
escapes the system’s calculus of meaning-production. A social system of 
communication that discloses utterances as informative communication “validates” 
the utterer as a socially relevant speaker with a meaningful message that merits being 
considered for acceptance or rejection; yet, no such system reproduces itself without 
being affected by alter’s response-triggering utterances. Socially meaningful 
subjectivity on both sides depends on alterity that remains unknown, a black box, and 
made transparent, understandable, only in terms that in no straightforward way 
originate in the alter herself. As Luhmann puts it: “Without ‘noise,’ no system” 
(Luhmann, 1995a, p. 116). All social systems, the legal one included, are, for Luhmann, 
“emergent realit[ies]” (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 111), making order from noise.  
Law uses conflicts also for its own benefit, namely, to reproduce itself through 
the legal decision and the arguments provided for the decision that present a selective 
interpretation of the system itself. A conflict is an occasion of self-re-identification for 
law. Indeed, the immune response is not a determinate one, it is not wholly pre-
programmed. It is a balancing act of known structures that regulate the system’s 
responses and the novelty of the situation, which surprises the system and which it 
may deem as requiring a modification of the responsive structures such that 
communication can continue. The legal system will seek to deal with the gap between 
the social conflict and its legal conditioning, but, again, from its own perspective. 
Immunity is, as Luhmann puts it, a symptom of “the unknown causes of disturbances” 
(Luhmann, 2004, p. 476). To repeat once more: the difference system/environment is 
made within the system.  
Thus, “[t]he system does not immunize itself against the no but with the help 
of the no; it does not protect itself against changes but with the help of changes against 
rigidifying into repeated, but no longer environmentally adequate, patterns of 
behavior” (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 372-373, original emphasis). When modifications of 
legal structures are called for is dependent on the legal system’s own assessment of the 
situation which it faces. The legal system (just like a living organism) cannot have only 
a fixed and determinate set of possibilities of responding to conflicts, although it 
always has some set of possibilities that dispose it to respond in some ways rather than 
others. This set of possibilities must be open to transformation, to a controlled 
destabilization. Otherwise, the system would quickly become useless in a society that 
constantly changes. Conflicts and the immune response help the system to maintain 
its societal function. Immune mechanism (protecting normative expectations) is thus 
also an auto-immune mechanism that protects the legal system from its own 
structures, which risk becoming too rigid (Åkerstrøm & Stenner, 2020, p. 85).  
 
One must guard against the widespread error of thinking that destabilization 
as such is dysfunctional. Instead, complex systems require a high degree of 
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instability to enable on-going reaction to themselves and their environment, 
and they must continually reproduce this instability – for example, in the form 
of prices that constantly change, laws that can be questioned and changed, or 
marriages that can lead to divorce. (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 368, my emphasis.) 
Contingent social orders cannot afford too rigid structures that might put their 
existence at risk rather than securing it, and this applies to the legal system as well, 
even if its very function is to protect structures. “It [immune mechanism] is not simply 
a mechanism for correcting deviations and re-establishing the status quo ante; it must 
manage this function selectively, namely, must be able also to accept useful changes” 
(Luhmann, 1995a, p. 370). That is, when the legal system solves legal conflicts, it is not 
simply punishing the guilty and re-affirming the extant legal norms of expected 
behavior, but it will also modulate that structure, if and as it sees “useful.” 
3.4.4 Justice as deparadoxification 
The immunologic is thus thoroughly ambiguous: in order to be able to continue 
to protect normative structures from threats, it needs to be ready (also) to attack these 
structures. In Chapter 4, we will look at a critique of this logic that has been presented 
in political theory, and how such critique motivates a certain turn away from the 
paradoxical legal order and an articulation of a politics beyond all law. In Chapter 6, 
we will see that Lindahl presents a theory of legal transformation that is in some 
respects very similar to Luhmann’s immunologic. Lindahl, however, interprets this 
transformability in an explicitly normative and political key, as a feature of contested 
legal authority, while for Luhmann, it is, as we have seen, mostly functional.  
There are, however, in Luhmann’s theory of law as the society’s immune 
mechanism some considerations of the role of justice and critique. Let us finish our 
exploration of the Luhmannian legal immunology and his theory of the legal paradox 
by analyzing how justice and critique figure within them.  
For Luhmann, the legal system is the locus for distributing justice in modern 
society after references to natural law and absolute moral justice have lost their 
plausibility and effectivity as solutions to social conflicts. By implication, the legal 
system must exclude, or rather try to keep excluding, its own operations from being 
considered critically in terms of justice (Luhmann, 2004, pp. 213-214). “[H]ow can we 
rightly or wrongly differentiate the right and the wrong? At least under modern 
conditions we cannot avoid the issue. But it is also possible to unask the question and 
to transform the paradox into a less troubling issue” (Luhmann, 1988c, p. 154). As we 
now know, the justness of the framework for deciding questions of justice cannot itself 
be consistently answered within that framework. The system can offer no all-things-
considered type of answers to critical questions. It cannot, or can only inconsistently, 
show that the operations for dealing legal justice are themselves just. This is the “blind 
moment of the blink of an eye” that allows for the legal vision of justice. Law operates 
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on grounds that it is unquestionably just to legally decide between what the law expects 
and what not, and that such decisions count as justice.  
Clearly alternative understandings of what “justice” (even legal justice) might 
amount to in the situation at hand, and “functional equivalents” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 
168) that solve the conflict, are always possible. Luhmann gives the example of “social
dependence, for instance in a work situation, [that] often does not permit
communication about actionable rights,” and that therefore calls for alternative
framing of the conflict between the employees and the employer, “establishing it as a
permanent conflict in which all who are involved can take their chances” (Luhmann,
2004, p. 169). That the legal system takes itself as the privileged site of justice in
society may itself raise claims to injustice. One only needs to think about indigenous
peoples’ refusal to be considered members of a colonial state and thus to view its legal
system as the locus in which to present their claims of justice. How can it be, however,
communicated to law that its perspective on its environment and the legal distribution
of justice are only contingent, that they exclude alternatives in a way that law can never
justify in any absolute sense? With what right does law distinguish here between right
and wrong, thereby boldly identifying its decision and justice? That there are
alternative institutional conflict-resolution methods and subsequent legal forums on
which one may re-open one’s case can be understood as institutional attempts to
deparadoxify this paradox, to seek to deal with it in a way that answers the concerns
that the legal system’s ungroundedness evokes in society, thereby managing its
foundational paradox.
The significance, for Luhmann, of legal critique, the raising of the Third 
Question and the communication of contradictions must be understood within the 
immunitary paradigm (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 371). “Evolution proceeds by 
undecidabilities,” he states, repeating the point that paradoxes have creative value for 
systems. “It uses the opportunities that undecidabilities sort out as opportunities for 
morphogenesis” (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 361). A conflict has the structure of a 
contradiction (the simultaneity of “yes” and “no”), and “contradiction has a double 
function in all self-referential systems, namely, to block and to trigger, stopping 
observation that encounters contradiction and triggering connective operations that 
cope with contradictions and owe their meaningfulness exactly to this coping” 
(Luhmann, 1995a, p. 361). Critique irritates and disturbs the operation of the legal 
system – and if it does not do so, it fails to register within the law altogether – and it 
can “nudge” the system to transformation (that the system, to be sure, itself controls). 
It is not, Luhmann stresses, that the law will now know the society better, but only that 
it has, according to the logic of autoimmunity, modified its internal complexity (its 
structures of normative expectation) with which it aims to better fulfill its societal 
function in the future (see Luhmann, 1995a, p. 372). Such an estimation is, of course, 
itself risky. 
Law operates on grounds of its autopoietic closure, but it must try to be 
“adequately” sensitive to its environment, to resonate with its changes in some 
regulated ways (Luhmann, 2004, p. 219). Of course, there is no neutral, non-self-
referential way for the legal system to observe whether its conception of justice truly 
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is “adequately complex” (see Luhmann, 2004, p. 219), whether it is able to adequately 
respond to the conflict. It can only judge this adequacy by observing its own ability to 
continue to operate after the judgment. The ability to continue to operate can again be 
counted as invisibilization of the law’s paradox. As long as the law can keep on 
functioning, the paradox poses no problems but only makes the system’s particular 
perspective and autonomy possible. 
Justice is, in Luhmann’s scheme, a reflexive concept that expresses the legal 
system’s attempt to make decisions that are both consistent and responsive to the 
environment (see Luhmann, 1988a, p. 141). Legal decisions do not simply answer to a 
conflict in (what the decisions understand as) its factual singularity. Rather, they react 
to the conflict by attempting to satisfy the expectation of legal consistency, that is, the 
requirement that equal cases ought to be decided equally and unequal cases unequally. 
Justice as the law’s “formula for contingency” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 214) suggests that 
law needs to combine two demands that are difficult to reconcile: redundancy, or 
“equality” and legal consistency, and variety, or “responsiveness.”  
First, the legal system must meet “the requirement that consistent decisions be 
made” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 219). It preserves legal consistency in seeking to find ways 
of treating equal cases equally and unequal cases unequally. It must preserve its 
redundancy, entrench its selective indifference to environmental complexity by 
referring the new and singular case to the already known cases. It must show that there 
is an already existing rule with which the case can be solved. The legal system tries to 
meet the normative expectations that law will serve justice by making consistent 
decisions. Luhmann thus boldly concludes: “If justice is given by the consistency of 
decisions, we can also say: justice is redundancy” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 319).  
Within the immunological paradigm, however, the paradoxical temporality of 
which we have just been at pains of analyzing, justice cannot, when observed 
theoretically, simply be about legal consistency. As a self-description of the immune 
system of society, “justice as redundancy” hides beneath itself the paradox. 
Redundancy can be contrasted to the actual new information that is subtracted from 
what is already known, but also to variety, to the system-internal possibilities of 
communication that the system may need to modify in response to irritations. The 
value of consistency and justice as redundancy need to be combined with 
autoimmunity, that is, variation, learning from irritations by modifying the 
expectational structures. This modulates the system’s selective sensitivity to its 
environment. Variation can mean the creation of new rules or occur, for example, as 
analogical reasoning, generalizing an existing rule to cover new cases (Luhmann, 
2004, pp. 219-220,  319-320).  
As an evolutionary totality, the legal system must maintain itself as a relevant 
conflict-solver in modern society. It must seek to have adequate levels of internal 
complexity, not in order to mirror society point-to-point, but in order to be, generally 
speaking, prepared to meet social conflicts in ways that allow for their legal resolution. 
After all, the system is contingent and historical, which means that its redundancy is 
“without a final reason for its being as it is” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 318). Because of this, 
it needs to constantly balance between the need to stay “relevant,” on the one hand, 
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and its indifference to environmental complexity, on the other – indifference, which 
both makes its particular perspective possible and may put it at risk of ignoring 
something that may later turn out to harm legal autopoiesis. An example of such harm 
might be the inability of the legal system to recognize the difficulties of workers, who 
are dependent on their superiors for their livelihood, to express wrongs they encounter 
at their workplace in legal terms. The legal system’s inability to create new legal norms 
that seek to instantiate such general principles as social rights adequately to new forms 
of labor, may lead, besides the continuation of social injustice, to side-tracking the 
legal system. The court and “hard law” as the important loci for conflict-resolution in 
society might be supplanted by non-litigable, non-legally binding “soft law” (see 
Christodoulidis & Dukes, 2008, pp. 417-421). 
This implies that critical claims to justice addressed to the legal system may well 
irritate the system to renew itself, to distribute the code legal/illegal in a way that the 
system has not done before. But, to repeat once more, this renewal must be presented 
and narrated as built on redundancy and closure, and thus consistent with the system’s 
past. Luhmann focuses on the ways in which the legal system (like other systems) seek 
to make its biased reality-constructions as unproblematic for themselves as possible. 
There is no other way for the system to access reality than a biased one, which implies 
that there necessarily is some loss in how the irritating “something” is received and 
responded to by the system, although that loss would only be visible outside the law. 
The only way for the system to know whether its decisions are adequate or not, 
whether justice has been done or not, is to observe its own continued ability to operate. 
Justice as a formula for contingency is, for Luhmann, deparadoxification, overcoming 
the system’s inoperativity and its critique by auto-immune destabilization of its extant 
structures for the sake of the continued existence of the system itself. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion: Legal evolution as deparadoxification   
 
Let me now wrap up this chapter by detailing once more Luhmann’s 
paradoxico-evolutionary orientation to totality, the importance of deparadoxification 
and how Luhmann’s account only displaces and carries with it, rather than resolves, 
the paradox. We may conclude that for Luhmann, the legal system is constitutively 
paradoxical, but a distinction then needs to be made between the theoretical (or 
critical), second-order observation and those meanings and self-descriptions that the 
legal system has given to itself and of itself in its operation. The latter are ways of 
attempting to deparadoxify what the theory can at all moments identify as a paradox. 
“Becoming paradoxical means losing determinacy, thus connectivity for further 
operations” (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 34), so the thematization of paradoxes at the level of 
the system’s operation must be avoided.  
Remember that the leading distinction Recht/Unrecht has a double meaning: 
it means both legal/illegal, which for Luhmann is the code, the basic distinction that 
the legal system uses in its operations and in order to observe something; it also means 
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law/non-law, the distinction between the legal system and its environment. The legal 
system is nothing but its difference from what it is not, and it itself differentiates itself 
from what it is not — it itself decides what is law and what is not — in and through the 
use of the code legal/illegal in its operations. The code legal/illegal is always applied 
within the legal system; it has “re-entered” the distinction law/non-law (legal 
system/environment) on the side of the law. The legal system is, structurally speaking, 
an inclosure paradox.  
Now, the first-order observation is blind to the distinction that it uses, and this 
applies also to law. “One has to apply this distinction even though one can neither ask 
nor answer the question (because it would lead to a paradox) as to whether the 
distinction between legal and illegal itself is legal or illegal” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 177). 
This is law’s own distinction that allows it to differentiate itself from all other social 
systems using other codes (and every other communication in society). To ask about 
the legality or illegality of the form legal/illegal is to ask, whether the use of this 
distinction is legal or illegal, that is, whether law itself is legal or illegal. The same 
distinction cannot consistently both be used and observed with itself. Trying to do that 
will end up saying that law is legal or law is illegal: a tautology or a contradiction. The 
“wounding” of the world with the distinction law/non-law can admit neither the stable 
value legal nor the stable value illegal: “[l]aw, in other words, cannot [consistently] 
prohibit or sanction its own use” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 178). All social orders, the legal 
system included, are ultimately grounded on nothing else than on “an arbitrary 
distinction, a contingent split on the world’s surface” (Clam, 2000, p. 70). The split 
opens the possibility for the self-referential operation of the order, and thus makes the 
allocation of legality and illegality possible. For this very reason, it cannot itself admit 
of any absolute value. A paradox emerges, when the conditions of possibility of an 
operation are at the same time its conditions of impossibility (Baraldi et al., 1999, p. 
131; Luhmann, 2004, p. 182).    
However, the paradox “can be understood as an inducement, even a 
compulsion to solution. This means: as a challenge to reconstruction with the help of 
distinctions that enable stable identification” (Luhmann, 1998, p. 112). Paradoxes are 
not simply paralyzing but also productive: “paradoxical communications [are] 
deframing and reframing, deconstructing and reconstructing operations” (Luhmann, 
1995b, p. 41, my emphasis). Paradoxes push toward creative solutions and responding 
to the same key question in meaning and information production: how can an 
abundance of possibilities and unmanageable complexity be turned into an 
improbable distinction between a choice and excluded alternatives? How can a certain 
selection of behavioral possibilities be normalized in exclusion to others and over 
time? In a way, the problem of unmanageable complexity, for Luhmann, already 
contains its own solution: “Complexity [...] means being forced to select” (Luhmann, 
1995a, my emphasis). Orientation becomes possible only as a response to a “primal 
injunction” (Schiltz & Verschraegen, 2002, p. 58): Draw a distinction! Select! “Draw a 
distinction, otherwise nothing will happen at all,” Luhmann warns: “If you are not 
ready to distinguish, nothing at all is going to take place” (Luhmann, 2006, p. 43). The 
only medicine for the ills of the paradox is to redraw distinctions — which, to be sure, 
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is itself paradoxical as all distinctions are unities in difference, but, perhaps, for a while 
at least, the new distinction will not invite critical observation and bother the system’s 
autopoietic evolution.  
To critical questions, then, the legal system will answer self-referentially, yes, 
but it will try to make these answers socially meaningful (from its perspective) and 
hide their self-referentiality. It has an arsenal of deparadoxifying and 
detautologisizing techniques at its disposal, and indeed it will evolve as looking after 
ways of making itself seem internally consistent, just and socially relevant. 
Temporalization is again central here, as are law’s ideologies, self-descriptions and 
narratives of its environment. Law not only uses the code but also programs how the 
code is to be used. As noted above, the abstractness of the code generates uncertainty 
upon which legal autopoiesis feeds. It forces the law to specify the conditions in which 
the code is rightly applied. The immutability of the code is supplemented by programs 
that vary (Luhmann, 2004, p. 192, here Luhmann explicitly refers to Derrida’s notion 
of the supplement). Programs allow law to give an account of the social facts (other-
reference) that are relevant for it and allow it to recognize when normative 
expectations are not met (Luhmann, 2004, pp. 197-199). They introduce the 
supplementary distinction, namely the one “between right and wrong application of 
the criteria for the attribution of the values legal and illegal” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 205). 
What we achieve with programming, then, is the invisibility of the paradox of the code 
legal/illegal, because programming now regulates when to prefer the legal and when 
the illegal side of the code. The “answer” to the paradox can only be its temporalization 
into a chain of episodes (Luhmann, 2004, p. 208): deciding what counts as the right 
application of the legal code in the situation at hand.  
Programs are not, however, enough to allocate the code, but another 
supplement — the legal decision — is also required. Recall here the discussion of the 
deferral of meaning in the autopoietic referral of operations to past operations. 
Conditional programs, Luhmann explains:  
refe[r] to past facts, which are stated in the present. This can include legal facts, 
for instance, by means of the question whether a statute has been passed validly 
and if so when. Here it is crucial that the attribution of the values legal and 
illegal depends on what can be treated as past at the moment of the decision. 
In this respect law always operates as an ex-post-facto [...] system. (Luhmann, 
2004, pp. 197-198, my emphasis.)  
That a legal decision cannot be determined by the past implies that it is a 
supplement in Derrida’s sense: the redundancy and force of the past “lack” force until 
the moment of the decision that selects the past as obligating. The legal decision is 
needed as a supplement for the conditional programs; programs – structures of 
normative expectations –  do not have the force to determine the right application of 
the code without it (we knew this since Wittgenstein!). The legal process, thus, is the 
supplementary site for the determination of the right application of the legal code and 
for the unfolding of its paradox.   
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The prohibition of the denial of justice (see Luhmann, 2004, p. 279) — the 
obligation of the courts to deliver a decision in a case in front of them — also functions 
as a mechanism of unfolding the paradox. Law deals with its paradox by forbidding its 
own inoperativity, by making the drawing of a distinction (i.e. its condition of 
possibility) into a legal obligation. Interestingly, this prohibition allows for a legally 
regulated version of inoperativity. “The legal system,” writes Luhmann, “has been 
provided with the possibilities to delay decisions and to operate with uncertainty for a 
while,” that is, during the court proceedings (Luhmann, 2004, p. 205). In a way, the 
court provides an opportunity for the law to observe its code as a unity during a period 
of self-regulated inoperativity – inoperativity in the sense of temporary suspension of 
the choice between legality/illegality. Luhmann even calls the uncertainty of the 
allocation “the third value” that supplements the rigid binary code legal/illegal: “the 
paradox of the unity of the difference between the legal and the illegal is [...] solved 
[...] by defining the code as a unity through the value of the uncertainty of the decision” 
(Luhmann, 2004, p. 207). So, once more, another supplement for unfolding the 
paradox. The list of supplements could be continued: the distinction between 
procedural and substantive law (Luhmann, 2004, p. 207) that allows formulating both 
the right application of the procedure and the right identification of the content of the 
law. Law will also deal with the rightness of its norms by assigning them the value of 
validity (Luhmann, 2004, p. 122 ff). Norms have been formulated in normatively 
regulated processes that only will make them legally valid, and only in such processes 
can this value be withdrawn from them. Another supplement, then: legal validity.   
To its critic who questions the rightness of the application of the code, law can 
then respond: “Hold on, let us investigate how the code is rightfully applied! Give me 
some time to understand who you are and what you are saying, and prepare my 
response!” This self-regulated, temporary inoperativity is required for the decision to 
be (legally) just. Law will give itself time to construct a mapping of its environment 
and situate itself within it, spelling out what belongs to itself and what belongs to the 
non-self, the environment, what of the environment is relevant to its operations. It 
does all this from its own perspective, which already presupposes and does not efface 
the cut between the system and the environment. “The system/environment 
distinction occurs twice over: as difference produced through the system and as 
difference observed in the system,” Luhmann reminds us, once more reformulating 
the notion of re-entry (Luhmann, 2012, p. 19, original emphasis). The legal decision 
will be a self-produced answer to the critic, and the law will not see any difference 
between itself and justice, which of course remains a possibility for the critic. Reaching 
a just decision takes time, but only the finite time of the legal decision. But at least the 
straightforwardness of the code has been spun into a whirlwind of supplements, and 
(defeasible) arguments can be given for why it is applied as it is applied. Selections are 
needed to produce finitude, to help overcome the infinity the paradox suggests.  
“Observed as a paradox,” Luhmann writes, “any form symbolizes the world” 
(Luhmann, 1999, p. 18, original emphasis). That is, as a unity of what is different, any 
form symbolizes the infinite complexity of the world that does not offer paths for 
orientation unless a choice is made, the world rendered asymmetrical and a finite 
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order established. “[P]aradoxes do not originate (inevitable) vicious circles, but such 
circles will result from unsuccessful attempts to deparadoxize” (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 
137). The indicating distinction that makes the observation of something as something 
possible, drags the “rather than something else,” i.e. the excluded and the 
marginalized, unavoidably with itself, but suspends its relevance for the observation 
in question. This solution to the paradox is only a “solution,” as it does not eliminate 
the paradox — a paradox is not a mortal Medusa — but only suspends it for the benefit 
of identification of something as something. A distinction both is a paradox that halts 
communication, and a selection that enables communication (see Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, 2006, p. 224).  
The paradox is Euryale that is not looked at, but something else must be 
observed instead. The paradox does not disappear, Euryale can still turn her unlucky 
observer into stone, but a distinction between levels of observation is made. The 
distinction is not thematized by the system itself and observed as a distinction, but 
rather is only used in operations: “Observation has to operate unobserved to be able 
to cut up the world” (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 46). “Observing systems” has a double 
meaning: it can mean second-order observation, observing the observer and, thus, the 
unity of the distinction and the paradox, or it can mean first-order observing, 
observing something meaningful in the world that is blind to the paradoxical 
distinction it uses (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 43). 
Luhmann’s metalogical preference is inconsistent completeness, but he argues 
that systems always (implicitly) prefer consistent incompleteness for the sake of the 
continuity of communication. Unlike the classical constructivists, Luhmann does not 
claim that the paradox would thereby be eliminated. What the system needs to do “is 
not to avoid paradox or tautology but to interrupt self-referential reflection so as to 
avoid pure tautologies and paradoxes and to suggest meaningful societal self-
descriptions” (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 136, original emphasis). For Luhmann, it is an 
observable fact of sociological evolution that functional subsystems are forced to seek 
to appear consistent to themselves and to other subsystems. The cost of the failure to 
do so is the inability to operate, which is counter-productive for functional evolution. 
However, the evolution of subsystems by deparadoxification as the drawing of 
supplementary distinctions can itself be observed to be paradoxical. But Luhmann 
insists that any observation of a paradox must also pay attention to how the paradox 
is unfolded (Luhmann, 1996, p. 101). Paradox and its unfolding are two sides of the 
same coin. So, if the constitution, programs, decisions and the contingency formula of 
justice are all ways of dealing with the foundational paradox of the code legal/illegal, 
they only displace the paradox to themselves. This does not necessarily count as a mere 
repetition of the problem elsewhere. The sociologist can observe whether 
deparadoxification succeeds in determining the “natural” conditions for the 
distribution of the code, that is, conditions that the legal system does not doubt or put 
into question (see Luhmann, 1996, pp. 100-101). Deparadoxification helps to 
determine how the code is correctly, unproblematically and consistently applied. It 
effectively suppresses the Third Question and fundamental critique of the legal 
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system. Unfolding of the paradox, if successful, at least temporarily turns the 
contingent into a social necessity.  
For Luhmann, then, the naturalization of the conditions for the application of 
the code legal/illegal is an evolutionary achievement. The legal system owes its 
stability to such artificial naturalization of its contingent origins. Avoiding the 
exposure of the paradox, and overcoming it when it is exposed, is a priority if 
meaningful and informative communication is to reproduce itself. As, for Luhmann, 
“[t]he point from which all further investigations in systems theory must begin is not 
identity but difference” and since paradox is the form of unity (even if a unity of a 
difference), we cannot stay in it (Luhmann, 1991, p. 75; Luhmann, 1995a; Luhmann, 
2012, pp. 28-29). Or at least we have to imagine that we are not staying in it, for the 
supplementation that “solves” the problem does so always in a somewhat illusionary 
manner (Teubner, 2006, p. 50).  
“Nothing, of course, is paradox per se — not the world, not nature, not even self-
referential systems” (Luhmann, 1990a, p. 247). Paradox is not, it is not a being or a 
thing, but an observation and a description of something (distinction) as something 
(as a unity), and for this reason, it can also not be looked at. Euryalistics is possible, 
for Luhmann, because everything that exists, exists in the actuality, and in the actuality 
different operations can take place and different observations at different levels can be 
made. “To call something a paradox,” he argues:  
 
is nothing but a description, and it is appropriate only if one wants to draw 
conclusions or use other ways of long-chain reasoning. Paradoxes are obstacles 
only for certain intentions. [...] The question of the ultimate meaning [e.g., with 
what right is the distinction between right and wrong made?] can be raised at 
any occasion — but not all the time. [...] Then, society develops forms of coping 
with this problem, of answering this question, forms that deparadoxize the 
world. (Luhmann, 1990a, pp. 147-148, original emphasis.)  
 
It has in fact been said that “systems theory evolves around the problems 
created by the paradox of the blind spot” (Stäheli, 2012, p. 115). Luhmann’s art of not 
looking at the paradox is motivated by his evolutionary functionalism, which means 
that he unwaveringly prefers the side of autopoiesis of the distinction 
autopoiesis/inoperativity.  
 
Paradox makes the observer oscillate, that is, to swing very briefly (but still: for 
a short duration) between an assessment and its contrary. But if one takes the 
position of a second order observer, one can simultaneously observe how a first 
order observer comports himself, how he makes his paradox invisible for 
himself, how he replaces and adjusts himself through distinctions, how he 
changes indeterminate complexity into determinate complexity and thereby 
makes his information loads finite. The second order observer is by no means 
obliged to do the same. But at least he can see that it is possible, and maybe he 
is enough of a functionalist to keep looking for other, functionally equivalent 
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solutions to the problem. (Luhmann, 1991, p. 71, my translation and 
emphasis.)36 
The functionalist priority is to keep communication operating, and to this end 
the invisibilization of the problematic paradox is necessary. This is also what motivates 
Luhmann’s self-distinction from deconstruction and the way in which Derrida, 
according to Luhmann, only attends to how paradoxes deconstruct assumed 
certainties, without paying due attention to how dealing with them fuels societal 
meaning-formation in functionally specialized systems. Luhmann may, however, not 
be as far from Derrida as he would like to be insofar as he resorts to the notion of the 
supplement to describe the art of not looking at the paradox. But we should not infer 
too much from this: Luhmann’s functionalism also succeeds in drawing a credible 
distinction between the two paradoxologies.  
36 “Die Paradoxie lässt den Beobachter oszillieren, nämlich ganz kurz (aber immerhin: 
kurzzeitig) zwischen der einen Feststellung und ihrem Gegenteil pendeln. Wenn man aber die Position 
eines Beobachters zweiter Ordnung einnimmt, kann man zugleich beobachten, wie der Beobachter 
erster Ordnung sich verhält, wie er sich seine Paradoxie invisibilisiert, wie er sich durch 
Unterscheidungen ersetzt und verstellt, wie er unbestimmbare in bestimmbare Komplexität umwandelt 
und damit zu endlichen Informationslasten kommt. Der Beobachter zweiter Ordnung ist dann 
keineswegs gehalten, es ebenso zu machen. Aber er kann wenigstens sehen, dass es möglich ist, und 
vielleicht ist er Funktionalist genug, um nach anderen, funktional äquivalenten Lösungen für das 
Problem Ausschau zu halten.” 
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4. Paradoxical law, politics and the problem of nihilism: Luhmann and
Agamben
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I turn to the analysis of the relationship between law, paradox 
and politics, and will do so by reading together two very different thinkers: Luhmann 
and Giorgio Agamben. I will argue that Luhmann’s and Agamben’s positions are 
diametrically opposite: the first prefers the self-perpetuating legal system that 
ultimately absorbs all politics without notable remainder, and the second argues for a 
“messianic” politics that deactivates all relations to law in order to render its 
inconsistent operation inoperative and bring the law to its “end.” I will thus contrast 
Luhmannian paradoxico-evolutionary orientation to Agambenian paradoxico-
criticism.    
Let me shortly recap the Luhmannian position in order to motivate the task for 
this chapter. If we choose to observe the legal system as an inconsistent totality, that 
is, as based on the use of a distinction between legality and illegality the value of which 
remains undecidable within the system itself, and if we also choose to follow 
Luhmann’s account of this paradox, we see that the system seeks to protect itself 
against this constitutive inconsistency by developing different mechanisms and 
strategies (the constitution, programs, justice as the formula for contingency, etc.). 
However, as we saw, the retroactive temporality involved in the establishment of legal 
consistency itself reproduces the inconsistency despite its best efforts to hide it. The 
consideration of the legal system as a temporally operating and developing system 
destabilizes the legal value of each particular moment. The non-linear temporality of 
retroactivity is at odds with the linear temporality suggested by legal consistency (that 
first there is a valid legal norm, then there is a legal decision made on grounds of that 
norm). This is by no means necessarily a problem for the law’s capacity to operate, but, 
as Luhmann argues, rather the way in which it operates. Because the attempts at 
invisibilization cannot efface the inconsistency, the legal system defends itself against 
its internal threat by means that reproduce this threat.  
In this chapter, we shall continue the analysis of this paradoxical logic. 
Luhmann’s paradoxico-evolutionary, functional approach to legal totality emphasizes, 
above all else, the self-preservation of the functional system. Law functions as an 
immune system of society that seeks to condition social conflicts, and this immune 
function also implies an auto-immune relation of the law to itself. The legal system 
needs to maintain itself as adequately complex vis-à-vis its constantly changing 
environment and vary normative expectations in order to maintain its social relevance. 
The emphasis on deparadoxification implies that the inconsistent system is dynamic 
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and capable of transforming itself, but transformation is always geared to preserving 
the system itself in operation.  
We will see that this immunitary logic presents a problem for a theory of the 
legal paradox in a political register. I understand politics here to mean not the society’s 
political institutions to which Luhmann seems to reduce politics. I understand it rather 
as the thematization and challenge of the paradoxical limits of a social system, like the 
legal, economic or the political system, that seeks to expose the inability of the always 
contingent and historical system to consistently legitimate its own operation and the 
ensuing illegitimacy and even violent imposition with which it operates in the society 
it claims to serve.  
The problem that the immunizing structure of the paradoxical legal system 
poses to politics is law’s constitutive inability to “respond” in any direct way to 
reflexive, political claims. To the same extent that the legal system is “open,” 
“responsive” and “hears” the claims that it has, in the past, been unjust, and modifies 
itself accordingly, it is also “closed,” “unresponsive” and “deaf.” That the legal system 
functions as an immune system for society implies a fundamental ambiguity: on the 
one hand, the system must be dynamic and transformable, and hence in principle open 
to political claims for change. On the other hand, this transformability is subordinate 
to the system’s self-preservation, and thereby necessarily limited.  
If the legal system constructs a self-centered account of its environment and 
regulates how it allows “the real” to irritate itself, modifying itself in response with a 
view to its own self-preservation, what independence can be given to “the real,” that 
is, to those challenges that resist their reception by the system, even if the system is, 
from its own perspective, “adequately responsive”? It will be my argument that 
Luhmann’s functional-evolutionary theory of paradoxical totalities risks becoming 
utterly nihilistic, that is, a mere description of how functional systems perpetuate 
themselves and their instrumental rationalities simply for the sake of self-
perpetuation, effacing from view any normative and substantial claim that does not fit 
with their account of “reality.”   
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses Luhmann’s 
epistemological constructivism and its difficult relation to “ontology,” immunologic 
and conception of politics. I begin with a short account of Luhmann’s constructivist 
epistemology that balances a fine line between minimal realism and nihilism for which 
any extra-systemic reality remains unknowable and simply counts as nothing. I then 
explore in more detail Luhmann’s take on the immune system of law and how he sees 
politics confined only within the institutional political system. The notion of the 
immunologic also opens Luhmann’s theory to contemporary political theory, in which 
this logic is analyzed as paradigmatic of the ambiguity of the modern notion of 
sovereignty: how it claims to protect the commonwealth against threats, but becomes 
thereby itself a threat to it.  
In the second part, I develop the theme of nihilism further with Agamben. He 
offers a detailed account of modern law both as a paradoxical totality and as utterly 
nihilistic. Whereas Luhmann sees in the paradox the impetus for its invisibilization 
and the system’s evolution, Agamben seeks to expose all attempts at making the 
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constitutive inconsistency inapparent as mere juridical fictions in the contemporary 
conditions of biopolitical nihilism, in which the “state of exception” has become the 
norm. Agamben’s solution to this contemporary legal-political nihilism is wholly 
other, “messianic” post-juridical politics: politics that seeks to render inoperative the 
very exhausted and inconsistent legal system and that de-activates all relations to law.  
The methodological limitation to focus on the notion of paradox applies also to 
my reading of Agamben: I concentrate on analyzing how Agamben sees the relation 




4.2 Paradoxico-evolutionary orientation to legal totality and its relation 
to politics 
4.2.1 Luhmann’s epistemological constructivism, nihilism and “a reality 
that remains unknown”37 
  
As we already noted in the previous chapter, Luhmann’s epistemology is 
constructivist. There is no point-to-point mirroring between a system and its 
environment, but the system constructs its own knowledge of its “reality” and is unable 
to pull itself up by its own bootstraps, so to speak, to observe whether its knowledge 
corresponds, or not, to how things “really” are. The crucial question then is whether, 
and if yes, how, such systems that can only access reality via the mediation of their 
own construction can in any way acknowledge that this inaccessible reality is not 
reducible to their own constructions of it.  
The roots of Luhmann’s notion of “constructivism” are in mathematics 
(Luhmann, 1990b, p. 65). As a mathematical term, constructivism refers to the view 
according to which mathematical objects need to be “found” or “constructed” for them 
to exist. In the Introduction (1.3.4), we defined constructivism with Badiou and 
Livingston as an attempt at tracing the limits of thought, language and knowledge that 
“sets forth the norm of existence by terms of explicit constructions” (Badiou, 2006b, 
p. 55): only what can be named exists. Only those objects that can be positively named 
in a mathematical language can be said to exist, and mathematical knowledge is 
possible of them alone.38 (As we will see in the next chapter, this is precisely the view 
against which Badiou presents his notion of “truth” and transgressive politics as a 
“truth procedure.”) It seems to me that insofar as Luhmann is, as some of his 
formulations that we will look at below suggest, a pure constructivist who abandons 
all consideration of the significance for systems of what they cannot access, his 
 
37 The last part of this subtitle refers to Luhmann’s essay “The Cognitive Program of 
Constructivism and a Reality that Remains Unknown” (Luhmann, 1990b). 
38 As we have already seen above (3.2.1), Luhmann is not, however, a traditional constructivist, 
as he recognizes the existence of the paradox, which makes the constructivist policing of the boundaries 
of a knowledge ultimately inconsistent. 
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position is vulnerable to a nihilism, that is, to the claim that only what a system can 
name and recognize, exists for that system.    
It must be noted, however, that Luhmann does not deny reality independent 
from epistemological constructions in the sense that he does not explicitly argue that 
reality simply collapses into the internal productions of social subsystems. He does not 
wish to be a naïve idealist. He rather only maintains that “we have no direct contact 
with” reality (Luhmann, 1990b, p. 64). The existence, or not, of a cognition-
independent reality is simply undecidable, because everything that we can know about 
it is mediated by systems (biological, conscious and social) (Luhmann, 1990b, p. 67). 
Closure from reality is the precondition of openness to reality: 
Without knowing, cognition could not reach the external world. In other words, 
knowing is only a self-referential process. Knowledge can only know itself, 
although it can — as if out of the corner of its eye — determine that this is only 
possible if there is more than only cognition. Cognition deals with an external 
world that remains unknown and has to, as a result, come to see that it cannot 
see what it cannot see. (Luhmann, 1990b, pp. 64-65, my emphasis.) 
In other words, knowledge must presuppose that it is knowledge of knowledge-
external reality, although knowledge of this reality is self-referential. Knowledge is 
knowledge of reality that it represents as this or that in its system-internal operation. 
I argue, however, that Luhmann’s constructivism does not give enough weight to this 
distinction between “of” and “as” but rather chooses the side of “as” (that is, system-
internal cognition). His account thereby risks becoming nihilistic and undermining its 
own argument that it is not a form of idealism and that system-specific cognition is 
not all there is. The quote above implies an ontological account, which we could call 
“minimal realism.” However, Luhmann’s explicit denunciation of all ontology in favor 
of epistemology, which we will explore below, undermines this realism. Such minimal 
realism is crucial, I further argue (more fully only in the Conclusion), for a critical legal 
theory that wishes to avoid an utterly nihilistic account of the legal system.   
Let us begin with Luhmann’s rejection of “ontology.” William Rasch has 
pointed out that “for Niklas Luhmann, ontology is not a perennial puzzle to be solved 
anew, but a historically-determined category to be dismissed” (Rasch, 2012, p. 85). 
Luhmann conceives of his own constructivist position as a quintessentially modern 
one, enabled by the collapse of pre-modern realism that still operated with the 
ontological distinction being/non-being (Rasch, 2012). Indeed, Luhmann argues that 
his constructivism must be described as “a de-ontologization of reality” (Luhmann, 
1990b, p. 67, original emphasis). The cognitive program of constructivism rejects as 
valid the distinction being/non-being and operates with the distinction 
system/environment instead. Modernity rejects, Luhmann argues, the value of 
ontology the defining feature of which is the belief in the complete, hierarchically 
ordered social reality or being with the Absolute, Transcendent Being, God, as its 
secure ground (see Luhmann, 2013, pp. 185-190).  
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In Luhmann’s sweeping analysis, premodern ontology had its equivalent in the 
premodern social hierarchy. There is within premodern, stratified social reality a 
“second-order observer” position equivalent to God, like the aristocratic court (in 
distinction to peasants) or the city (in distinction to the periphery) from which the 
social whole, being, can be observed. Such a position itself is not a being among others 
and thus cannot be observed and questioned within society. The paradox of the unity 
of the distinction “being of the social whole” / “non-being of its outside from which it 
can be seen as a whole” cannot become visible, because no further metalevel observer 
can be imagined that could observe this distinction. The omniscient observer is 
absolute, constitutively incapable of being observed as an observer. Rasch vividly 
describes this premodern structure: 
One is reminded of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s image of Homer’s noble 
landowner, Odysseus, who surveys the campfires of his sheep herders from his 
castle walls. He alone can discern the complete pattern of lights these campfires 
project within his field of vision; he alone can see that this terrestrial pattern 
reflects perfectly the light produced by the celestial harmony of the fixed stars 
and their regularly orbiting satellites. He alone immanently represents the 
transcendent, omniscient demon. But he cannot see the historical and social 
condition, the “eye” of his privileged situation that allows him this view. (Rasch, 
2012, p. 90) 
This is a perfect image of what we called in the Introduction the onto-
theological orientation to totality that is still capable of entertaining the possibility of 
a complete and consistent whole. Being can be imagined as such a totality, because the 
observer of this whole remains unobserved, not a being in its turn, and thus 
unproblematic. The omniscient demon is the point of view from which the campfires 
can be seen as a patterned whole, but that itself remains invisible. Being is what exists 
within the comprehensive, well-ordered whole; non-being is simply what does not 
belong to this whole but “is” the point beyond being from which being can be observed 
(see Luhmann, 2013, p. 185). 
In Luhmann’s account, modernity problematizes and de-absolutizes the 
concept of second-order observation, which ultimately makes ontology obsolete. Now 
second-order observation no longer means simply a faithful, omniscient mirroring of 
an objective reality that makes the observer itself invisible. Rather, the contingent and 
historical nature of such observation, or reflection, is exposed, that is, it becomes 
evident that whatever knowledge there is of reality, is relative to an observer-position, 
to a systemic, non-absolutizable and limited perspective. The observer becomes 
observed – and thus a being – in its turn. “Unlike the fixed and final reflection of our 
omniscient demon [...] these second order reflections cannot, in theory, be limited, for 
every reflection may now be subjected to a further reflection, every observation to 
another observation” (Rasch, 2012, pp. 91-92). There is now a plurality of limited 
observers who can each be a second-order observer and observe other observers and 
see what they cannot see. In other words, the self-implicative nature of observation 
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becomes itself visible, and this destabilizes the distinction being/non-being. 
Observation of reality can no longer be conceived as mere mirroring of the divine 
structure of being. The distinction being/non-being becomes obsolete, because 
knowledge is conceived as a construction that has no correlate in the “real” reality, 
which remains unknowable, or accessible only via systemic mediation. One must now 
always ask who it is, which system, that observers and constructs knowledge. As in 
each observation of reality the mark of the observer is now visible for other observers, 
the distinction being/non-being loses its significance, and the new guiding difference 
is the constructive one: observer (system)/environment. In the phrase “knowledge of 
reality as something,” the “as” receives all the weight and the “of” becomes less and 
less significant.  
Nihilism can be understood as the modernity-characterizing view that extant 
forms of system-centered reflection are all there is, given that reality as such can no 
longer be accessed. It is the opposite view to onto-theology: while the observer beyond 
being guarantees the autonomy of social order from the (human) beings it regulates, 
in nihilism the observer becomes a being among other beings on which all order is 
dependent. The importance of “as” fully overcomes the importance of “of.” There is no 
reality as such that we could reach – nor, for that matter, any independent normative 
ideals of justice or right that could guide us. What is unobserved, excluded from the 
system’s constructions and of which the system in question can know nothing simply 
counts as nothing for it. All knowledge and all values are system-specific and 
constructed by them. Because reality per se, the Kantian Thing-in-itself, has lost 
plausibility and been itself reduced to a state of undecidability, we are thrown fully to 
constructivist epistemology. Reflection “can and must not ground itself [or: stop at] 
anything beyond itself, and in this sense it becomes nihilistic,” Werner Stegmaier 
notes in his account of Luhmann’s constructivism as precisely nihilistic. In this sense 
of constructive epistemology, nihilism is not an end of philosophy but rather its new, 
modern beginning (Stegmaier, 2016, p. 43, original emphasis, my translation).39  
Nihilism is the exposure of the radical self-referentiality of knowledge, or more 
generally, of closed systems as centers of meaning-production and communication as 
such. If premodernity could still prioritize the distinction being/non-being, because it 
could not conceptualize second-order observation as an observation (as a distinction) 
but only as an absolute, invisible and transcendent point beyond being, in modernity 
observation itself is observed as what allows all access to “being,” and therefore it is 
reality that is pushed to “nothingness” (see Rasch, 2012, p. 93). Being is subordinate 
to observation, and hence must renounce any “enforceable” claim to autonomy. What 
can be known of reality is always a system-centered construction.  
Luhmann even seems to argue that nothing restricts the self-perpetuation of 
extant, positive, contingent social orders, because all limitations become fuel for 
system’s self-transformation and evolution: 
 
 
39 “Sie [Reflexion] kann und muss sich an nichts mehr jenseits ihrer selbst halten, sie wird in 
diesem Sinn nihilistisch.” 
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If one starts from the assumption [...] — as constructivism does — that this 
[observation] is always a real process in a real environment, which is always 
subject to limitations coming from the environment, what might then be the 
problem?  
 The problem could reside in the question of how a system is able to 
transform such limitations into conditions for increasing its own complexity. 
The non-arbitrariness of knowledge would then be nothing other then [sic] the 
evolutionarily-controlled selectivity of this process of change. (Luhmann, 
1990b, p. 77, original emphasis.)   
 
Constructivist knowledge is not, Luhmann argues, arbitrary, because 
knowledge is produced in response to limitations that the unknown reality sets for the 
system’s constructions. Contrary to his explicit claim that ontology is obsolete, this 
claim clearly has implicit ontological implications: it presupposes that there is a reality 
of which knowledge is possible, and that cognitive constructivism is not all there is. 
However, if the resistance of reality can only count as an irritation for the system’s own 
evolution, what independent meaning can it have? System evolution would not be 
possible without the unknowable reality that becomes system-internally constructed 
as an environment with the help of system-internal distinctions. Irritations may nudge 
the system to the auto-immune relation to itself, to controlled instability and self-
transformation, but it is unclear whether the resistance of reality has any other value 
or significance than pushing the system to change its current state. As Stegmaier 
explains, “[t]he construction constructs out of the unknown, uncertain, ungrounded, 
nihilistic nothing. The nihilistic nothing becomes the constructivist nothing. It is not 
unreal, but that what then counts as ‘the reality’” for the system” (Stegmaier, 2016, pp. 
44-45, my translation).40  
Rasch argues that, despite his explicit rejection of all ontology, Luhmann’s 
constructivist epistemological position implies that: 
  
the empirical reality of which knowledge is produced requires a concept of 
ontological reality in order to see itself as empirical. That is, empirical reality 
can only recognize itself as empirical reality — as the domain of science or the 
domain of Luhmannian constructivism — if it contrasts itself to a necessarily 
“real” reality, a reality that acts at the very least as a logical condition of 
possibility. [...] To protect constructivism from the charge of idealism [and 
mere nihilism; HL], the distinction between ontological reality (which may very 
well remain both unknown and unknowable) and empirical reality is contained, 
ambiguously and almost as if by accident, in Luhmann’s loose use of the word 
“reality.” (Rasch, 2012, p. 98, original emphasis.) 
  
 
40 “Die Konstruktion konstruiert aus dem Unbekannten, Ungewissen, Haltlosen, dem 
nihilistischen Nichts. Aus dem nihilistischen Nichts wird ein konstruktivistisches Nichts. Es ist nicht 
irreal, sonder das, aus dem das konstruiert wird, was dann als ‘die Realität’ gilt.” 
129 
In a sense, reality is split within itself into a self-perpetuating 
system/environment unit and reality of which nothing can be said except that it is only 
accessible through system-internal distinctions and that, as each distinction can be 
seen to be contingent and giving rise to finite observation, the reality that can be 
observed with their help can indirectly be marked as irreducible to any such 
observation-enabling distinction. Luhmann’s claim that ontology (the significance of 
“real” reality) has become obsolete in modernity is hasty, as it makes his constructive 
epistemology somewhat unable to draw a plausible distinction between nihilistic 
idealism and his implied minimal realism. Although the reality can only be accessed 
via the mediation of systems – it can only be accessed as something presented by a 
system – such constructions are constructions of something incongruent to them.  
To see the relevance of this for our purposes, let us consider an example: the 
decolonization of the Global South. As has been argued by critical international 
lawyers, for example by Sundhya Pahuja, for the Global South even to begin to resist 
colonialism and address the economic and political wrongs that it had endured, it was 
a practical necessity to formulate this fight in terms of international law (see, e.g., 
Pahuja, 2011). That is, the Global South had to formulate its resistance within the very 
same system that in many ways had contributed to their oppression and that had been 
formed by the history of colonialism and the political and economic values of the 
North. While international law certainly was able to transform itself and include 
decolonized states as new, independent states, this transformability has been shown 
to be seriously limited and the victories of the Global South have remained ambiguous. 
Pahuja argues that the newly gained independence required of these states conformity 
to a certain form of socio-political organization defined by a specific set of Western 
values and ideals (Pahuja, 2011). The newly decolonized, sovereign states of the Global 
South were cast as “developing states,” and thus put onto a progressive scale at the top 
of which was the ideal image of the Northern capitalist, anti-communist democratic 
state. The exercise of state sovereignty was, by implication, constrained by this image 
of the “normal” or “developed” state that was also enforced by the economic 
international law. The transformation of international law and its inclusion of new, 
decolonized states as “equals” has, thus, by no means meant a genuine economic 
autonomy, but, rather, legally enforced conformity to a certain economic model 
legitimized in terms of “development.” The claims to justice of the Global South, 
Pahuja argues, were “divert[ed] […] toward a highly specific economic programme for 
development, delimiting the open-endedness of the possible meanings of justice and 
curtailing the political potential in international law” (Pahuja, 2011, p. 49). The claims 
to justice presented in the Global South were not reducible to the way in which they 
were received in the transformed international legal and political system to which they 
were addressed. It is crucial for critical legal theory to emphasize this difference 
between claims to justice and their institutional reception and the ambiguity of legal 
transformation: the way in which the legal system answers to such claims may mean 
the growth of its internal complexity, but it may also mean misrecognizing the claim, 
answering to it in a way that leaves the claim unaswered. 
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Insofar as Luhmann’s epistemological constructivism emphasizes the 
functional continuity of the system vis-à-vis the irritations of the reality it encounters, 
it is unable to theoretically address the significance of this ambiguity and, for this 
reason, drifts dangerously close to normative nihilism: the dynamic international 
order is, simply, all there is, the incongruent claim to justice vanishes from view just 
like the ambiguity of the legal response.  
Given that system-independent reality is undecidable, and that the undecidable 
is, in Luhmannian terms, the other side of a distinction “decidability/undecidability,” 
Luhmann decides for decidability, that is, he prefers system-internal decidability and 
knowledge over the “reality that remains unknown.” Critical legal theory seeks, in 
contrast, to bring this distinction itself into focus. Law presents justice as this or that 
kind of justice. Although we cannot access any justice “in itself” or “as such” beyond 
our representations of it – we cannot, in our post-Cantorian age go back to the onto-
theological view – such particular constructions of justice must in some way 
acknowledge their particularity and that they are not identical to justice as such, if they 
are to distinguish themselves from mere nihilism and arbitrary subjectivism and 
idealism. They must in some way come to see that although they cannot see that they 
cannot see what they cannot see, their vision of the world is not identical to the world. 
So, on the one hand, Luhmann’s constructivism makes explicit that positive 
orders of knowledge are limited and historical, and that no one of them can possibly 
offer privileged access to reality. There are always alternative descriptions. On the 
other hand, his constructivism in its emphasis on the functionality and evolution of 
systems that make all considerations of “reality as such” obsolete bears the danger of 
becoming an account of mere self-perpetuation of positive systems devoid of purpose 
other than instrumental, using all “irritations” merely as fuel for self-maintenance. 
Constructivism can lead to nihilism if the self-maintaining, limited and inconsistent 
functional system that provides the only means for accessing an intelligible and 
meaningful reality itself becomes absolutized, in the sense that the reality that remains 
unknown and unknowable simply counts as nothing for it. Pure constructivism 
undermines the insights that the theory of the ineliminable paradox offers. In legal 
nihilism, the legal system is left free to consider its constructions of justice as justice 
tout court, with no ambiguity. In order for Luhmann’s constructivism not to collapse 
into a sort of nihilistic idealism in which irritations are fully aligned to the system’s 
immunitary autopoiesis, a stronger notion of the system’s ontological, minimally 
realistic dependency on “the unordered” would be needed. Agamben, Badiou and 
Lindahl, as we will see later, are all concerned with the status of the presupposed 
reality beyond systemic boundaries, and all of them seek in different ways to rethink 
ontology and articulate in a political and normative register the system’s relation, or 
rather non-relation, to what exceeds it. In the following, before turning to Agamben, 
let me wrap up the discussion on Luhmann’s constructivism by looking at its 




4.2.2 The status of political critique in Luhmann’s immunological theory 
of law 
We are interested in Luhmann’s epistemological constructivism, because the 
way in which it fails to draw a plausible distinction between epistemological nihilism 
and minimal realism is arguably also visible in Luhmann’s account of the relations 
between law and politics. As we saw in the example we just discussed, critique, or what 
can be said to amount to the same: politics, shares the same status as “the reality that 
remains unknown” in Luhmann’s constructivism. It is of utmost importance, I argue, 
that the theory of paradoxical, contingent systems addresses the threat of normative 
nihilism, that “justice” neatly falls within the positive legal system and that system 
transformation absorbs all critique without remainder.  
Critical questions are always in principle possible, Luhmann acknowledges, 
because second-order observation, the observation of other observers as well as self-
observation, is always possible, and the paradoxes of observing systems are readily 
visible from such an outside position. But social systems, like the legal system, also 
operate on grounds of second-order observation, and they need to constantly 
formulate an image of themselves as part of their environment and assess how to 
operate in a novel situation. For this reason, second-order observation is by no means 
necessarily the same thing as critique (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2009, p. 19). 
Because the omniscient position of the divine observer is no longer possible, critique 
can only take place as society’s self-critique. There is no absolute outside from which 
critique could be pronounced: 
For the observer is no longer a subject with transcendentally justified special 
rights in his safe; he is at the mercy of the world that he perceives. He is 
permitted no self-exemption. He has to place himself on the inner side or the 
outer side of the form that he uses. He is, says Spencer-Brown, a “mark.” For 
every observation of the world takes place in the world, every observation of 
society, if carried out as communication, takes place in society. Social critique 
is part of the system criticized; it can be inspired and subsidized, it can be 
observed and described. And under present-day conditions, it can be quite 
simply embarrassing if it claims to have the better morality and better insight. 
(Luhmann, 2013, p. 328, my emphasis.) 
Social critique is, as we saw above in the example of anti-colonial resistance, 
part of the system it criticizes, but it must also be a non-part, and seek ways to remain 
such, in order not to become fully aligned with the system. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Luhmann sees the significance of critique and conflict from the perspective 
of the continuation of autopoiesis and invisibilization of the paradox. As a sociologist, 
he prefers unwaveringly to observe the autopoiesis of systems to detailing possibilities 
for critique to inflict inoperativity on systems. Critique and conflict function as 
irritations that may lead to a response from the irritated system, but Luhmann is not 
very interested in thinking about the significance of the ambiguity in legal 
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transformation that we just explored. For Luhmann, the role of critique and conflict is 
to be understood within the immunological theory of society (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 
371): law maintains normative expectations in society and in this way manages the risk 
of conflict for the society (its immune defense, the maintenance of social order), but 
also allows for controlled modification of these expectations in response to critique 
(auto-immunity) in order to maintain its societal function. We could describe this as a 
dynamic or resilient form of conservatism. Let us return briefly to this notion of 
immunity, as it is a notion that has also emerged as central in contemporary political 
theory of (biopolitical) nihilism and law’s role in it, and it will also allow us to connect 
Luhmann’s theory to Agamben’s.  
As mentioned above, the legal system uses conflicts to reproduce itself, to learn 
and augment its internal complexity, in order to keep itself relevant for the society. 
Conflicts that always concern different issues thus allow the legal system to keep itself 
updated and prepared for new threats. “[T]he formulation of rules is like the 
generation of antibodies for specific cases” Luhmann stresses. “If no demands are 
made on the immune system of society, it cannot learn and consequently cannot 
generate disturbance-related defense mechanisms” (Luhmann, 2004, p. 477).  
The occurrence of critique and conflict makes manifest that the system to which 
the critique is addressed is not adapted to its environment. By developing an immune 
mechanism, the system can maintain its differentiated functional and structural 
autonomy and sensibility instead of adapting itself to the environment (point-to-point 
correspondence with environmental stimuli). The function of the immune system is to 
register internal conflicts, solve and memorize them so that the memory can then be 
used to fight future conflicts. Given that environmental irritations always change, the 
immune system must learn from novelty in order to maintain itself as efficacious. This 
leads to internal modulations in the system and to an adjusted, varied sensitivity and 
capacity to respond to irritations in the future.  
Reparadoxification of law as a form of legal critique, the explicit formulation of 
inconsistencies inherent in the legal system, is, from this perspective, an aspect of law’s 
own immune defense. The paradox and contradiction are “the other” to knowledge, 
just like the reality that remains unknown, but their unknowability does not prevent 
the system from taking a stance toward them. Luhmann writes: 
Like pain, contradiction seems to force, or at least to suggest, a reaction to itself. 
To connect with (react to) a contradiction, one need not know what contradicts 
the usual expectations, or try to discover what a contradiction is, or even value 
what is contradictory in its own right. Contradiction permits reaction without 
cognition. All one needs is the characterization brought about by the fact that 
something takes on the semantic figure of a contradiction. This is why one can 
invoke an immune system and coordinate the theory of contradictions with an 
immunology. Immune systems also operate without cognition, knowledge of 
the environment, or analysis of disturbing factors; they merely discriminate 
things as not belonging. (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 371, my emphasis.) 
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The irritated system does not need to know anything about the reflexivity, 
singularity of the system irritating it; it only responds to its own construction of an 
outside irritation. Remember here the retroactive construction of informative 
communication: it is not that an informational content (for example, how a case of 
domestic violence is experienced by those involved in it) is directly transferred, as 
such, to law, but rather that the legal system interprets independently the meaning of 
a conflict that irritates a reaction out of it.  
As Roberto Esposito has noted, the etymological roots of the notion of 
“immunity” go back to the Latin noun immunitas and its corresponding adjective 
immunis, which are negative terms the meaning of which derive from what they 
negate, namely, the munus, meaning a task, obligation or duty. Immunitas, then, 
means being released from an obligation toward somebody, being exempted from the 
reciprocal relations between the right-holders and obligation-bearers (Esposito, 2011, 
p. 5; see also Esposito, 2011, pp. 45-51). Analogically, within the immunitary paradigm
of law, there are no reciprocal relations between law and the non-law; the only place
for reciprocity is within the law. It cannot be stressed enough that, for Luhmann,
systems do not communicate directly with their environment, they communicate
within themselves about the constructions they form about their environment.
Because the legal system is immune to, released from direct relations with, reality, it
can maintain its autonomous perspective and give legal responses to what irritates it.
The immune mechanism has a “life-protecting” and life-prolonging function for the
system, just like it does for a living organism. It is the system’s security mechanism
that monitors, entrenches and, if need be for the goal of survival, modifies the
distinctions with which it operates. A high degree of indifference is the precondition
for something to make a difference for law, as well as for law to make a difference to
society. However, the distinction between what makes a difference for the system and
to what it remains indifferent is not hypostasized, but dynamic, transformable if the
system so decides. By protecting itself (which may mean modification of its extant
expectations, as we noted above), the legal system protects its functionally-specific
place in modern society. Immunity also holds the system at arm’s length from what
challenges it: it operates by hearing only such claims that it is prepared, or can prepare
itself, to hear.
 This ambiguity of the immune system of law can be further illustrated by the 
recent theorization of migration as “autonomous.” According to the notion of 
“autonomy of migration,” migration does not simply obey such “objective” structural 
causes as poverty or wage differentials, but is, significantly, driven by “the subjective 
desires and projects migrants pursue with their migrations” (Scheel, 2013, p. 579). 
Autonomy of migration scholars argue that: 
the subjective movement of living labour constitutes a driving force in the 
evolution of capital accumulation. [...] contemporary migrations are 
structurally in excess of the equilibriums of (national) labour markets and 
codified forms of citizenship that practices of rebordering try to maintain, 
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thereby forcing these (and other) institutions into a process of permanent 
reorganisation and adaptation. (Scheel, 2013, pp. 579-580)   
 
Migratory movements are always one step ahead of practices of containing 
them, thereby constantly irritating the system of migration governance to keep up, to 
find and control the new migration routes that human beings irreducible to the 
system’s attempts at behavior regulation always find, subverting extant forms of 
border control. Here, conflict, in the sense of migratory movements always finding the 
cracks in the edifice of border control, clearly is a source of stress for the system to 
keep on maintaining itself “adequately complex” and functionally optimal.  
 Autonomy of migration scholars are inspired by the tradition of autonomist 
Marxism that “regard[s] the social and political struggles of the working class as the 
‘motor of history’” (Scheel, 2013, p. 581). Stephan Scheel argues that “[t]he autonomy 
of migration is seen as ‘a constituent force’ that articulates various political and social 
struggles of the neoliberal era” (Scheel, 2013, p. 579) and even that the “proponents 
[of the autonomy of migration] conceptualize borders not as the impenetrable walls of 
an imagined fortress, but as dynamic sites of contestation and negotiation, where 
migrants’ practices and tactics encounter the strategies and devices of control, 
entering a ‘relationship of reciprocal determination’” (Scheel, 2013, p. 579, 582, citing 
Bojadžijev & Karakayali, 2007, p. 204; original emphasis omitted, emphasis mine).  
 However, such entering of migrants’ protests at the borders into a reciprocal 
relation of influence with the control system seems unlikely, precisely because social 
systems function with the immunitary logic that releases them from any reciprocity 
with conflict systems outside them. While I agree with the autonomy of migration 
scholars that state borders, and the boundaries and limits drawn by legal orders in 
general, certainly are not politically neutral and the so-called “irregular migration” can 
be seen to “politicize” them, it cannot exercise any direct influence or “constituent 
force” on the systems defending and re-drawing their own boundaries and limits.41 
Immunitary logic poses a serious challenge for political theory to articulate a notion of 
politics that 1. takes into consideration the asymmetry between the system and what 
challenges it and 2. refuses to accept that systemic responses to irritations simply 
make invisible the gap between the political claim to justice and legal justice. We can 
neither plausibly argue for migrant protests directly constituting migratory regimes 
once we accept Luhmann’s convincing view of the systemic closure, nor can we remain 
with Luhmann insofar as his position is overtly functionalist and merely constructivist. 
For Luhmann, in situations in which the legal system becomes dogmatic and 
shows signs of becoming irrelevant, reparadoxification can serve to irritate the system 
to create novel internal complexity more adequate to society in its current complexity. 
 
41 Stephan Scheel, in fact, himself notes that, for example, the Visa Information System that 
contains biometric data on migrants such as fingerprints, constitutes migrants’ “traceability” and their 
“data double” that allow the security officials to turn the acquired knowledge of migrants’ past 
movements into the control of their movements in the future, “thereby forstall[ing] previously 
successful mobility strategies,” such as apprehended migrants’ practice of hiding their identity (Scheel, 
2013, p. 596). The system does learn from the migrants’ “constituent force,” but in a way that exclusively 
benefits its own internal, functional rationality. 
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The system will reject inconsistency because it must prefer consistency, and, in the 
process, it succeeds in updating itself. To immunize is, for Luhmann, to deparadoxify 
(see Richter, 2018, p. 231). “Social systems [...] need contradictions for their immune 
systems, for the continuation of their self-reproduction under difficult circumstances” 
(Luhmann, 1995a, p. 386). According to Luhmann:  
 
One can clearly see how contradictions fulfill their function of warning and 
alarming. For an instant they destroy the system’s total pretension to being 
ordered, reduced complexity. For an instant, then, indeterminate complexity is 
restored, and everything is possible. But at the same time contradictions 
possess enough form to guarantee the connectivity of communicative 
processing via meaning. The system’s reproduction is merely directed into 
different paths. (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 373, original emphasis.) 
 
If the rule explodes, like in Wittgenstein’s paradox, and cannot momentarily 
find its correct application and following, “everything becomes possible” instead. This 
moment of inoperativity feeds the autopoiesis of the system. It does so by offering it 
an occasion to reconsider itself, re-indicate its relevant past and re-formulate the 
program for the correct application of the norm in a way that seeks to respond to the 
environmental disturbance and, above all, keep the autopoiesis operating.  
Luhmann’s functional-evolutionary view of law and the necessity of dealing 
with the paradox for the sake of the stability of the function – maintenance of order – 
poses the question of whether this is not an entirely reductive view of law’s relations 
to its others and to the problems the contingency of its order poses. What about the 
ethics and politics of the paradox? As Christodoulidis remarks, for Luhmann: 
 
[c]onflict is necessary for law because it provides input to the reproductive 
process without which the system of law would stagnate. But in dealing with 
conflict, law only achieves a new return to order. It pushes back the threat of 
disorganisation by conceiving and resettling disturbed practice on the basis of 
uncontroverted practice (Christodoulidis, 1998, p. 214).  
 
Luhmann only sees in the exposure of the paradox a rather mythical threat to 
the operability of the system, something that is observed to be always already 
suppressed by the normally operating system, or it is the internal irritation that forces 
a reaction from the system that returns it to an adjusted order. Its exposure and 
reparadoxification do not count, for Luhmann, as achievements of a political conflict 
over forms of commonness, but rather as an evolutionary occurrence (although they 
can use political semantics, such as the semantics of revolution, see Luhmann, 1996). 
The paradox is there necessarily, and the system needs to constantly react to its 
ineffability, but Luhmann does not understand the play between de- and 
reparadoxification in law as a site of political disagreement over the legal form of 
collective life.  
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The problem for any critical legal thinking, Christodoulidis argues, is law’s 
institutional inertia and its current coupling with the demands of the global capital. 
The legal system controls its own reflexivity and, therefore, also the possibilities of 
legal change, and given that it is coupled with the economic system, also the 
opportunities for political change that challenge legally entrenched structures of global 
capitalism:  
[T]he effort to generalise legal strategies of [political] rupture comes up against
the limits of the “institutional”: institutions reduce the contingency of human
interaction, they entrench models of social relationships and, in that, hedge in
imaginative political uses and opportunities. In all this they afford a limited
language to challenge entrenchment and, with it, remove the purchase point for
“rupture.” (Christodoulidis, 2008, p. 10)
“Mechanisms of deliberate deadlock” are one version of institutional inertia 
that Christodoulidis identifies. These include “the ‘rigidity’ of Constitutions, the 
formality of constitutional amendment procedures, the exclusion from amendment by 
any majority of, typically, basic rights and safeguards of property” and “a progressive 
dismantling of labour protections as an unavoidable effect of the global organisation 
of trade that circumvents any possible municipal safeguards.” These are empirical-
institutional mechanisms that hedge in constitutional discussions and political 
conflicts over the effects of global capitalism in such a way as to effectively block its 
victims’ opportunities for redress (Christodoulidis, 2008, pp. 10-14, original 
emphasis).  
Another form of institutional inertia is law’s “homology.” This is about 
“repetition and entrenchment, coherence and stability of expectations, and it finds 
expression, amongst other things, in the characteristically conditional form of law’s 
programming” (Christodoulidis, 2008, p. 10). If x happens, y ought to follow, is how 
law anticipates future conflicts, and if the future disappoints its expectations, the legal 
system will need to resort to “controlled innovation.” It will itself control what 
“surprises” it, “what registers as information that might lead it to vary expectations” 
(Christodoulidis, 2008, p. 11). The degree of radicality of legal change is reduced by 
the function of the legal system to maintain normative expectations and “the 
exigencies of the rule of law” in society (Christodoulidis, 2008, p. 11). It is simply not 
possible for law to allow radical rupture, because that goes against its societal function 
and society’s expectation that normative expectations be upheld in cases of their 
disappointment. Luhmann, Christodoulidis reminds us: 
argues that if law is to reduce complexity successfully it must be able to handle 
multiplicity operatively, and to handle multiplicity operatively plurality must 
be related to a unity and symbolised by it. This coupling of open multiplicity to 
the unity of the legal system does not of course do away with “excess.” But it 
orients it functionally to the legal system. (Christodoulidis, 2008, p. 20) 
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Everything that is new, must be capable of linking back to what is already 
institutionally established, so the need for redundancy seriously limits what novelty 
there can be in law and legal language; too radical a novelty will simply not be 
recognized as a legal communication at all, and thus lacks the “linkage capacity” 
necessary for the operation of communication. “Chance,” Christodoulidis writes, 
“becomes the condition of variation — (from a functional point of view, therefore, not 
an ‘excess’ at all!) — and thus the condition of the evolution of the system. Nothing less 
than the system’s own reproduction is at stake” (Christodoulidis, 2008, p. 20).  
Furthermore, for Luhmann, the reflexivity of the legal system is not to be 
understood in the political terms of “collectivity” and “commonality” at all. According 
to him, it is the political subsystem of society whose function it is to produce 
“collectively binding decisions,” although it does so in the medium of law (Luhmann, 
2002a, p. 87). Luhmann locates politics fully within the autonomous political system, 
that is, within institutional politics. During the evolution of the functionally 
differentiated modern society, political power has been concentrated into that system, 
making other social subsystems accordingly “unburdened” by politics, de-politicized. 
The political system functions on grounds of the code governing/governed, which 
provides the distinction between those who have power and those over whom power 
is wielded, and further within the side “governing,” with the code 
government/opposition (Luhmann, 2002a, p. 86; King & Thornhill, 2003, p. 71). The 
implication, then, that: 
 
Luhmann’s analysis leads us to is that the political intelligence of democracy — 
its sensitivity — is determined by and circumscribed by what the code 
“government/opposition” can make visible. Only what affects and modifies the 
prospects of the government or opposition acquires political relevance. What 
can be politically observed is opened up and at the same time delimited by the 
conditioning difference. (Christodoulidis, 1998, p. 250) 
 
Political conflict over the “common” form of life registers in the political system 
and offers the occasion for that system to modify itself and keep itself relevant. The 
field of the political is, thus, circumscribed to what that system can absorb. 
Here Luhmann does not consider the possibility of the theoretical figure of “the 
double inscription of the political” (see Stäheli, 2000, pp. 261-266): “The ‘political 
dimension’ is,” Slavoj Žižek writes,  “[...] doubly inscribed: it is a moment of the social 
Whole, one among its subsystems, and the very terrain in which the fate of the Whole 
is decided” ( Žižek, 1991, p. 193). That is to say, “politics” might be understood in a 
double sense as the operation of the political system, as institutional politics and what 
registers within institutional politics, and as the making of decisions in conditions of 
undecidability in general. The political is the event of the critical exposure of the 
ungroundedness, contingency and paradoxicality of a system-grounding distinction 
that no invisibilization on the part of the system can fully absorb; a critique that insists 
on the system’s inability to fully “justify” its decisions and reductions, an event that 
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can be generalized to all systems claiming to order reality in an exclusionary and 
reductive way.  
Although Luhmann knows that “communication means limitation (placing 
oneself and the other within limits)” (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 40), that it is based on 
preference among alternatives that cannot be justified in any other way than that 
which the preference itself makes possible, he does not thematize such limitation and 
drawing distinctions — such reduction of pragmatic, behavioral and communicative 
possibilities — as itself a political act. He does not think that emergence of forms and 
totalities would have anything political to them (apart from the emergence of the 
specific system of politics of course). From the perspective of the double inscription of 
the political, by contrast, “the very genesis of society is always ‘political’: positively 
existing social system is nothing but a form in which the negativity of a radically 
contingent Decision assumes positive, determinate existence” (Zizek, 1991, p. 194). 
Hanna Richter has, however, recently argued that “Luhmann explores how the 
immunisation of modern politics which epistemologically governs the demarcation 
between inside and outside, complexity and its resolution in meaning, necessarily 
opens up a space of political potentiality” (Richter, 2018, p. 233, partly my emphasis; 
see also Christodoulidis, 1998; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2009; Stäheli, 2000 
and the essays in Amstutz & Fischer-Lescano, 2013 for re-appraisals of the possibilities 
of critique in Luhmann). Luhmann’s account of critique might be, and has been, 
pushed toward understanding legal critique as immanent critique as developed in the 
tradition of the leftist critical theory, as critique that uses the internal contradictions 
of the legal system to compel it to transcend and transform its present state, rather 
than simply repeat the status quo (see Christodoulidis 1998, 2008). However, 
although Luhmann’s work certainly offers material for such use, he himself seems to 
consistently prefer autopoiesis over inoperativity, functionality over normativity, 
decidability over undecidability, deparadoxification over the paradox, augmenting of 
the system’s internal complexity to the ambiguity of the legal response, nihilistic 
constructivism over minimal realism. As a self-identified sociologist, he maybe cannot 
do otherwise. 
Hans-Georg Moeller is correct when he notes, with Luhmann, that “the partial 
blindness that comes with evolution also implies a certain ethical and pragmatic 
blindness. Since it is impossible to see everything, it is also impossible to see what is 
good for all” (Moeller, 2011, p. 71). Normative-political critique is not possible in the 
traditional universalist sense in which absolute normative criteria could be used to 
regulate society. The splitting of society into different, autopoietically evolving spheres 
of rationality makes impossible an objective, totalizing perspective on society and the 
direction it ought to take. However, this does not mean that social critique would be 
impossible, or that only a “neutral” observation and description of evolutionary 
processes would be possible. Critique must register within the particular sphere of 
social rationality and be able to irritate it and not simply be ignored by it, but it must 
also present a moment of independence with regard to it, if it is not to simply align 
itself with it. And the system must in some indirect way acknowledge critique as such 
an inclosure paradox, if it is not to collapse into mere nihilistic self-perpetuation in 
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which the excess of reality simply counts as nothing. Reality itself is “doubly 
inscribed.”  
Politics is what keeps the paradox and the ambiguity of the legal response alive 
and prevents the functionally oriented legal transformation from naturalizing itself. 
Luhmann gives a sociological account of functional, societal evolution, somewhat 
eschewing its resonance as an enduring conflict over social ordering and thereby also 
the task of rethinking systems’ responsibility of their own contingency for a post-
universalist society. There is a negativity in positive orders that is a matter of politics 
rather than mere impetus for further normalization. 
4.3 Agamben on modern law, biopolitical nihilism and post-juridical 
politics 
As we will see by the end of this dissertation, a survey of different theoretical 
positions analyzing paradoxical totalities suggests, perhaps unsurprisingly, that what 
we have named “immunologic” is itself thoroughly ambiguous. It is both a “positive” 
logic that gives rise to a specific perspective to reality and a particular system of 
rationality; it is what makes possible, for example, the legal system. Complexity-
reduction, selected indifference and drawing of a distinction between what counts as 
relevant and what irrelevant is necessary for the formation of a positive order of 
meaning. It is also a precondition for a plurality of centers of meaning to arise, for a 
plurality of perspectives of reality and for a “freedom” understood as not being taken 
within a rationality of another social system, being left on one’s own, so to speak. 
Immunity is also a “negative” logic that may push positive orders to nihilistic 
perpetuation of themselves and their instrumental rationalities. Nihilism, the modern 
loss of a common reality and substantive values, takes the form of a full degradation 
of “the real,” that is, the loss of signification for law of everything but itself, such that 
systems recognize nothing as really resisting their operation and thereby become, in a 
sense, imperialist. Nihilism is the predicament that faces a fully positivized law, law 
that itself, autonomously, decides what is law and what is not, rejecting all substantive 
value considerations from the formal and procedural concept of law. In a word, 
immunologic marks all positive, contingent and finite orders that cannot possibly offer 
a mirroring representation, a neutral and objective bird’s-eye-view of reality, but only 
represent it as something, leaving out other possibilities. In Chapter 6, we will discuss 
Hans Lindahl’s theory of law, which seeks to give a full expression to this ambiguity, 
also teasing out a sort of ethics of finite legal collectives that endeavors to separate 
them from nihilism. Before going to Lindahl’s work, let us in the remainder of this 
chapter, as well as in the next chapter, discuss two positions that in different ways 
understand politics as post-juridical and messianic in a specific sense: those of Giorgio 
Agamben and Alain Badiou.  
I turn first to Agamben’s understanding of modern nihilistic law. Agamben has 
offered perhaps the strongest account of the negative and nihilistic implications of the 
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immunologic of the legal system as the law’s indifference, which abandons human 
beings to sovereign violence. Agamben’s account (in)famously turns around the 
analysis of the Schmittian sovereign exception (see also 1.2.3). As our discussion of the 
alignment of political claims to the system’s self-perpetuating logic and a certain 
complicity of critique with the system criticized may already suggest, contemporary 
political theory has sought to find ways of thinking about radical political 
transformation that would be able to resist such re-alignment. In this context, the 
immune paradigm has been discussed in the seemingly archaic, biblical terms of the 
“katechon,” “the restrainer.” As Esposito puts it: 
  
[t]he simultaneous presence of development and restraint, opening and 
closing, positive and negative — typical of the immune paradigm — is 
represented in exemplary fashion by the enigmatic figure of the katechon: 
whoever its historical or political bearer might be, it still embodies the principle 
of defense from evil through its preliminary internalization. (Esposito, 2011, p. 
11) 
 
We return to the figure of the katechon in a moment. Agamben’s solution to the 
legal paradox is, as we will see at the end of this chapter, to think about “messianic” 
politics, politics as the deactivation of systems functioning with the paradoxical 
immunologic. Contrary to what I have been suggesting, for Agamben there is little to 
be saved in the paradoxical law. 
 
 
4.3.1 The state of exception 
 
“The juridical system of the West,” Agamben writes, “appears as a double 
structure, formed by two heterogeneous yet coordinated elements: one that is 
normative and juridical in the strict sense (which we can [...] inscribe under the rubric 
potestas) and one that is anomic and metajuridical (which we can call by the name 
auctoritas)” (Agamben, 2005a, pp. 85-86). It is the paradoxical structure of 
connection and disconnection of these elements, nomos and anomie, in the law that 
Agamben studies by focusing on the figure of the state of exception that makes this 
relation, which is also a non-relation, explicit.  
For Schmitt, the thinker par excellence of the state of exception on whose work 
Agamben draws, it is the sovereign (auctoritas) that secures the application of law 
(potestas) to facts. The sovereign, as we saw in the Introduction, holds the paradoxical 
position of being both a part of the legal order and outside it. In Schmitt’s theory, the 
danger of “the enemy,” chaos, the dissolution of the social order, is negated by the 
sovereign who has the capacity to step outside the law and suspend it in order to 
restore the normal state of affairs. The sovereign is neither fully regulated by the law, 
nor irrelevant to it. Sovereign oscillates between law and life, guaranteeing the 
possibility for the application and following of the law but maintaining for itself the 
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power to suspend (not to destroy) the law in order to target society without legal 
mediation. 
The state of exception is “state power’s immediate response to the most extreme 
internal conflicts” (Agamben, 2005a, p. 2). It is the most extreme manifestation of the 
immune system in which the threat of civil war, insurrection or revolution, that is, the 
threat of anomos and the dissolution of the extant legal-political order, is met with a 
controlled anomos, the suspension of the legal ordered by the sovereign. The state of 
exception, Agamben argues, is not simply a marginal phenomenon but rather exposes 
the fundamental structure of Western legal-political order: 
 
The norm is applied, so to speak, to the exception in dis-applying itself, in 
withdrawing from it. In this way, the exception is not a mere exclusion, but an 
inclusive exclusion, an ex-ceptio in the literal sense of the term: a seizing of the 
outside. In defining the exception, the law simultaneously creates and defines 
the space in which juridical-political order is granted value. In this sense, for 
Schmitt, the state of exception represents the pure and originary form of the 
enforcement of the law, and it is from this point only that the law may define 
the normal sphere of its application. (Agamben, 2005b, p. 105, original 
emphasis.) 
 
Now, this quite closely follows the immunologic as we have been discussing it 
with Luhmann. In drawing the limit between itself and non-law, in withdrawing from 
something and exempting something from its regulation, the legal system opens the 
space of the application of its code. In order to be able to include something within its 
scope, law needs also to exclude, and not simply something else but also alternative 
interpretations of the “same thing.” Law excludes the anomie, the non-law (a-nomos), 
but also exclusion is a mode of relation. Agamben calls it in the quote above inclusive 
exclusion: including something only in the mode of withdrawing from it and excluding 
it. An ex-ceptio is captured, “re-entered” outside: reality that is excluded in the very 
inclusion of it as the law’s own environment. Nomos is dependent on the anomie it 
nevertheless excludes. Furthermore, the sovereign immunologic is autoimmune: in 
the exceptional case, it defends the legal order by suspending that order.  
In Agamben’s analysis, the basic structure of inclusive exclusion has profound 
implications for the operation of the Western law and politics. In the state of exception, 
in which the sovereign’s legally unmediated power (that is, power immune to law and 
law’s autoimmunity) comes to light, law’s necessary selective indifference also comes 
to light. It is the exposure of the law’s dependency on anomie that the legal system in 
normal conditions succeeds in making invisible and at least relatively unproblematic. 
In the actual state of exception in which the sovereign suspends the application of the 
law to a conflict at hand to the benefit of its political, or executive, solution, the limited 
perspective to reality that the legal order provides is exposed as such. The legal order 
itself becomes thematic as a totality, as a specific, limited totality of norms. Its relation 
to reality is thematized as well, in contrast to the normal situation in which the relation 
is simply presupposed. Agamben argues, following Schmitt, that it is precisely this 
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relation to reality, to fact and life, that the law as a system of norms can never itself 
guarantee. In the state of exception, it becomes evident, Agamben argues, that law 
needs the exception, the sovereign anomic authority, in order to secure this relation: 
“[T]he state of exception separates the norm from its application in order to make its 
application possible. It introduces a zone of anomie into the law in order to make the 
effective regulation [normazione] of the real possible” (Agamben, 2005a, p. 36).  
As we saw in the Introduction, the state of exception corresponds structurally 
to Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule-application as it is precisely the moment in which 
the inability of the rule to autonomously secure its own relation to the real is exposed. 
It is the moment in which the reality that remains unknown for law (in any other way 
than as a legal reality) pierces law’s closure and shows the dependency, despite all 
attempts of the legal system to render this dependency invisible, of the “autonomous” 
legal system on the anomic political decision or the “effective operation” (Agamben, 
2005a, p. 40) that no structure or form of law is able to fully determine. The decision 
is not, Agamben specifies, “the expression of the will of a subject hierarchically 
superior to others,” but it is, rather, about “the inscription within the body of the 




4.3.2 Juridical fiction, the force-of-law and language 
 
The state of exception can also be seen as the inverse image of Kelsen’s basic 
norm that functions as the legal fiction, as the juridical scheme of interpretation, 
through which the political, revolutionary act of constitution-making can be 
interpreted as a legally empowered act undertaken within a legal system.42 Just like in 
our discussion with Kelsen of the basic norm as the final point of regress of the 
validation of legal norms, we encounter here the limit of a legal order: the measures 
taken in the state of exception are “in the paradoxical position of being juridical 
measures that cannot be understood in legal terms” (Agamben, 2005a, p. 1). The state 
of exception has the structure of the inclosure paradox: a point in which law slips 
outside itself without fully severing a relation to its inside. It is “the legal form of what 
cannot have legal form” (Agamben, 2005a, p. 1). Agamben criticizes the tradition of 
legal theory for not recognizing the impossibility of establishing a simple 
topographical opposition inside law/outside law with regard to the state of exception, 
and of endlessly debating whether the law is capable of regulating it or whether it is a 
purely political act (Agamben, 2005a, pp. 22-23). For in question is rather “a zone of 
indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with 
each other” (Agamben, 2005a, p. 23).43 
 
42 Dyzenhaus (1997) and, in particular, Vinx (2015) have studied extensively the debate between 
Kelsen and Schmitt. 
43 Insofar as the dogma of the law’s necessity to render invisible all inconsistencies guides 
Luhmannian legal scholarship, systems theoretical sociology does not seem able to fully appreciate this 
Agambenian zone of indistinction characteristic of not only the state of exception but also the right to 
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The sovereign, Schmitt maintains, is the one who bears the power of 
suspending the basic norm, that is, temporarily to release the state power from its 
obligation to obey the constitutional norms that regulate the use of power. It is the 
power to act as if not bound by the legal order. If the legal system is the society’s 
immune system, as Luhmann argues, which helps society to deal with risks by 
formulating expectations of how things ought to unfold and preparing for the 
disappointment of these expectations, then, in the state of exception, the political 
sovereign suspends this immune system for the sake of its continued possibility. In 
other words, what the immune system protects against — anomie, loss of order — is 
itself used to protect the nomos. The sovereign is, for Schmitt, der Hüter der 
Verfassung, the guardian of the constitution (Schmitt, 1996). Insofar as the state of 
exception is recognized as a legal possibility and explicitly regulated by the legal order 
(as to its temporal duration and the obligation to declare it with a law, for instance), 
the law (or legal cognition, as Kelsen would maybe say) constructs a fictio iuris of its 
own temporary suspension. The state of exception then is a legal fiction, a legal as if, 
of a political act performed as if not bound by the law.44 This legal fiction of the 
sovereign exception as the guardian of the constitution is important, or so Agamben 
argues, for it allows Schmitt to maintain a relation between politics and law in the 
mode of its suspension, and to emphasize that, as a feature of the immune mechanism, 
a state of exception is not about abolishing the law, but only an extreme technique for 
its protection. I return to this point and the importance of fiction below.  
For Kelsen, the problem was to show how political acts of constitution-making 
can be seen as legal and possessing the force of law. For Agamben, the problem is that 
within an established constitutional order, decrees of executive power that do not 
constitute law according to the principle of the distribution of powers come to possess 
the force of law. This not only confuses the distribution of powers between the 
legislative and the executive but actually “separat[es] ‘force of law’ from the law” 
(Agamben, 2005a, p. 38). On the one hand, when executive decrees overrule statutes 
made by the legislator, the established norm cannot apply to the situation and thus is 
deprived of its force, its legal effect on reality. On the other hand, acts that do not 
typically count as law now come to have its force. This “force-of-law” characterizes, in 
fact, both the state of exception that suspends the constitution as well as the revolution 
that establishes a new constitution (Agamben, 2005a, p. 38). In both cases, an act that 
cannot be legally empowered in the usual manner claims to act with the force of law. 
Agamben’s strange notion of “force-of-law” thus points to what we have been 
analyzing in the terms of the paradoxical retroactive temporality. 
Furthermore, Agamben argues that there is a structural analogy between law 
and language. In the same way as words are not reducible to their uses in actual speech 
 
resistance (see Agamben, 2005a, pp. 10-11, for the right to resistance; Nobles & Schiff, 2013 for a 
systems theoretical discussion of the inability of law to recognize such a right). 
44 Agamben discusses the “as not” in relation to juridical fictions and Vaihinger’s philosophy of 
the als ob in The Time that Remains, noting that much more is at stake in fiction than Vaihinger (or, 
we could add, Kelsen) is aware of (Agamben, 2005b, p. 28, 35-37). McLoughlin, too, notes the 
connection of the notion of fiction to Kelsen in his discussion of Agamben (McLoughlin, 2016, pp. 523-
524). 
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acts, also rules do not coincide (and ought not coincide insofar as they ought to be 
general) with the singular cases to which they apply. Both maintain their 
meaningfulness beyond any particular act of use and application. As we have noted, 
the iterability of a rule, its repetition in an indefinite number of cases, is what a rule is 
about. On grounds of this irreducibility of language and law to their concrete use, 
Agamben argues that they both presuppose a state of exception, namely the “virtual” 
existence of law and language in a state of non-application (Agamben, 2005a, pp. 
36-37; Agamben, 1998, pp. 20-21).
A word can in an actual occurrence of speech refer to and denote a segment of 
non-linguistic reality “only insofar as it is meaningful in its own not-denoting (that is, 
as langue as opposed to parole [...]), so [in an analogous way,] the rule can refer to the 
individual case only because it is in force, in the sovereign exception, as pure 
potentiality in the suspension of every actual reference” (Agamben, 1998, p. 20). 
Language can be analyzed as grammar or langue, that is, as the abstract system, as 
“the pure potentiality to signify” of language (Agamben, 1998, 21), and as parole, that 
is, as the concrete, actual speech act in which the potentiality to signify non-linguistic 
reality is actualized. So it is also for law: it can be seen both as an abstract system of 
norms, as the pure potentiality to regulate, and as the actual application of norms to 
concrete situations in which this potentiality is actualized.  
Both language and law presuppose a reality external to them to which they 
potentially refer, that is, to which they are both able actually to refer (in parole, in 
judgment) and able not to actually refer (as langue, as a system of norms). The 
exception is the situation in which the actualization of this potentiality to refer is 
suspended. Thematizing language as the linguistic system allows for observing it as 
pure langue, as “the linguistic ‘state of exception’” (Agamben, 1998, p. 25), and 
therefore also observing the general potentiality of language to relate to the non-
linguistic (actualized in cases of parole) in a state of pure potentiality or, as Agamben 
puts it, impotentiality. As this thematization of language and its relation to the non-
linguistic itself also happens in language (and thus no neutral metalanguage is 
available), we can then say both that “there is nothing outside language” and that 
“language is always beyond itself,” as it denotes the non-linguistic (Agamben, 1998, p. 
21). We can see how “language excludes and separates from itself the non-linguistic, 
and in the same gesture, it includes and captures it as that with which it is always 
already in relation” (Agamben, 2016, p. 264). Similarly, “force of law,” Agamben 
writes, “in which potentiality and act are radically separated, is certainly something 
like a mystical element, or rather a fictio, in which law seeks to annex anomie itself” 
(Agamben, 2005a, p. 39). 
While in the normal operation of the legal system the regulative relation of legal 
norms to facts is unproblematic and taken, just like in normal and everyday speech, to 
simply refer to a non-legal reality, the state of exception thematizes the very form of 
law and makes the asymmetry that we discussed with Luhmann between law and 
reality visible. The legal exception makes thematic in law its own form as a system of 
norms that, in general and in the normal case, relate to an outside, to non-law (life, 
fact). Its own limit with the non-law, or the zone of indistinction, is thematized. In 
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analogy to the thematization of the langue, “the paradox can also be formulated this 
way: ‘the law is outside itself,’ or: ‘I, the sovereign, who am outside the law, declare 
that there is nothing outside the law [che non c’e unfuori legge]’” (Agamben, 1998, p. 
15). Law’s closure presupposes its inconsistency, which splits the law within itself, 
bringing an anomic element to its heart. The state of exception has such a fundamental 
significance for Agamben, because it makes this condition explicit, purging it from 
attempts to render the inconsistency invisible. The thematization of the zone of 
indistinction that normally is simply presupposed creates a “cognitive confusion” 
about what belongs inside and what outside, making it difficult to say what, if 
anything, is strictly speaking outside the law, and what, if anything, is strictly speaking 





The exception, thus, actualizes the potentiality of the law not to be applied to 
reality. Agamben famously reads the Western notion of sovereignty back to Aristotle’s 
theory of potentiality and actuality, in particular to Aristotle’s insight that in order for 
a potentiality to do or be something (like the ability of the architect to design) not to 
always immediately disappear when it is actualized, a true potentiality must also be 
able not to pass over into actuality. For example, the architect must be able to maintain 
his ability to design buildings even when he is not designing. Every potentiality is a 
potentiality to do or be something, but also to an equal measure a potentiality not to 
do or be that something, an impotentiality. Actualizing a potentiality is thus not about 
destroying or consummating it, but rather about suspending the impotentiality 
inherent in it. For Agamben, the thinking of contingency turns around the notion of 
potentiality (Agamben, 1998, pp. 45-46).  
What the figure of the sovereign and the state of exception in the Western 
political tradition stands for is, according to Agamben, a certain colonization of the 
“universality” of potentiality, a colonization of what most defines human beings: their 
lack of necessary tasks and vocations. Human beings, ontologically speaking, do not 
have essential tasks to accomplish, but they are “without work” (see Agamben, 2016, 
pp. 3-5), beings that are defined by potentiality to be or do something that is not a 
necessary task and therefore something they also can not be or do. For Agamben, no 
human essence restricts how human beings can shape and form their life: 
 
Beings that exist in the mode of potentiality are capable of their own 
impotentiality; and only in this way do they become potential. They can be 
because they are in relation to their own non-Being. [...] [H]uman beings, 
insofar as they know and produce, are those beings who, more than any other, 
exist in the mode of potentiality. Every human power is adynamia, 
impotentiality; every human potentiality is in relation to its own privation. This 
is the origin (and the abyss) of human power, which is so violent and limitless 
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in relation to other living beings. Other living beings are capable only of their 
specific potentiality: they can only do this or that. But human beings are the 
animals that are capable of their own impotentiality. The greatness of human 
potentiality is measured by the abyss of human impotentiality. Here it is 
possible to see how the root of freedom is to be found in the abyss of 
potentiality. To be free is not simply to have the power to do this or that thing, 
nor is it simply to have the power to refuse to do this or that thing. To be free is, 
in the sense we have seen, to be capable of one’s own impotentiality, to be in 
relation to one’s own impotentiality. This is why freedom is freedom for both 
good and evil. (Agamben, 1999, p. 182, original emphasis.) 
For Agamben, human life is characterized by “its radical openness and 
indeterminacy, the separation from one’s immediate environment [...] and absence of 
specialisation” (Prozorov, 2014, p. 36). Orienting oneself in the world is not about 
“executing tasks” through which social systems observe and legal orders regulate this 
orientation. Human life has no necessary ends that must be executed, but each human 
power is an impotentiality. The problem, for Agamben, is that the governmental 
apparatus operates on the grounds of a certain separation of human beings from their 
impotentiality that makes of the state of exception its only manifestation. Leaving 
aside the question of whether Agamben is correct in his claim that the behavior of non-
human animals can be explained by their genetic code,45 what he calls biopolitics is, 
for him, a certain animalization of human life. Biopolitics determines this life as a 
specific kind of life, gives this life particular ends, separates it from its potentiality not 
to be so determined and confines it to the actualization of the ends it sets. The only 
form in which impotentiality appears in the contemporary world is, in Agamben’s 
diagnosis, the paradoxical apparatus of anomic, suspended law that clears the space 
for the sovereign dominance of life beyond legal protection. Anomic law colonizes 
impotentiality with the help of juridical fictions, ultimately with the fiction of the force-
of-law and the sovereign exception as the guardian of the constitution that seeks to 
legitimate the sovereign claim to protect life by submitting it to anomic violence. 
Under biopolitical nihilism, human life cannot manifest its contingency and 
impotentiality, its irreducibility to and possibility not to be confined to specific social 
destinies, but is reduced to what Agamben calls “bare life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 4). To 
restore to human beings their impotentiality is, for Agamben, the task of “coming 
politics” (Agamben, 1993, p. 86), as we will see below. 
45 Elsewhere Agamben, however, also gives animal behavior as an example of impotentiality: 
“[t]he cat who plays with a ball of yarn as if it were a mouse [...] [and thus] knowingly uses the 
characteristic behaviors of predatory activity [...] in vain. These behaviors are not effaced, but, thanks 
to the substitution of the yarn for the mouse [...], deactivated and thus opened up to a new, possible 
use” (Agamben, 2007, p. 85). 
147 
4.3.4 Inclusive exclusion in law and language 
In the two following subsections, let us now investigate in more detail what 
Agamben means by the separation of human beings from their impotentiality and how 
this characterizes the modern anomic legal apparatus. Again, there is, according to 
Agamben, a strict analogy to how language and its signifying function have been 
understood in the history of Western thought.  
A legal system is, Agamben argues, not simply based on a Landsnahme, the 
taking of the land as it is for Schmitt (note that Schmitt adds the dimension of space 
to law that Luhmann ignores despite his metaphorical use of inside/outside), but 
rather on an Ausnahme, the “taking of the outside,” the ex-ception (Agamben, 1998, 
p. 19). Luhmann’s “drawing of a distinction” corresponds precisely to Agamben’s zone
of indistinction between inside and outside that allows the preference of the inside and
the asymmetrical relation to the outside: taking in what is outside, forming a legal
construction of reality, presupposing a reality that remains legally unknown and
unknowable, but to which law still forms the legal relation. “To refer to something, a
rule must both presuppose and yet still establish a relation with what is outside
relation (the nonrelational),” Agamben writes. “The relation of exception thus simply
expresses the originary formal structure of the juridical relation” (Agamben, 1998, p.
19, my emphasis). This is not very far from what we called above “minimal realism.”
For Agamben, what characterizes both law and language is the inclusive 
exclusion of life, reality and what he in a discussion of Plato’s philosophy of knowledge 
calls “the thing itself” (Agamben, 1999, pp. 27-47). An inclusive exclusion establishes 
a linguistic and legal relation to them, saying something of them or positing an 
interdiction on them, understanding them only as something of which something can 
be predicated and as something legal, which simultaneously means that life and 
reality, “the thing itself,” remain excluded. “Human language is necessarily pre-sup-
positional and thematizing,” Agamben argues, “in the sense that in taking place, it 
decomposes the thing itself [...] that is at issue in it and in it alone into a being about 
which something is said and [...] a quality or determination that is said of it” 
(Agamben, 1999, p. 106, partly my emphasis). The thing itself is the something of 
which something is said and that is known as something rather than something else, 
but that itself is only presupposed, thus unspeakable in language (and unknowable in 
knowledge). This inclusive exclusion Agamben also calls the structure of negative 
foundation (Agamben, 2006, p. 61). Something extra-linguistic and extra-legal must 
be presupposed of which something meaningful and legal can then be said, but that 
itself remains unspeakable beyond its predicates. “To speak of a being,” Agamben 
argues, “human language supposes and distances what it brings to light, in the very 
act in which it brings it to light” (Agamben, 1999, pp. 106-107). It both discloses the 
something as something, and distances the something, presupposes that it is already 
there, before language, so that something can be said of it, so that it can be brought to 
language. Language is a decomposing apparatus for Agamben, an apparatus that 
presupposes separation for its functioning. 
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No unmediated, non-linguistic relation to reality is possible that would 
neutrally transmit what reality, life or the thing itself are “beyond” language and law, 
but still language, knowledge and law claim to relate to reality, to speak of it, know it 
and regulate it. “One could say, with an apparent paradox, that the thing itself, while 
in some way transcending language, is nevertheless possible only in language and by 
virtue of language: precisely the thing of language” (Agamben, 1999, p. 31). As Sergei 
Prozorov explains, “the thing itself only exists within language even if, for now, it 
remains unspeakable within it. [I]t is included in language (i.e. it is nothing extra-
linguistic) but solely in the mode of its exclusion (i.e. as unspeakable)” (Prozorov, 
2014, pp. 61-62, original emphasis omitted, my emphasis).  
Although it has been understood in the history of philosophy as a metaphysical 
postulate of a mind-independent reality that possesses its own inherent structure that 
knowledge and speech ought to mirror, “the thing itself,” just like Luhmann’s “reality 
that remains unknown,” is simply the presupposition of language, knowledge and law 
that language speaks of something extralinguistic, that knowledge is knowledge of 
something outside knowledge and that law relates to an extra-legal fact. “In 
remaining ineffable, it [the thing itself; HL] thus guarantees that discourse has a 
meaning, that it is founded, and that it speaks about something (that it speaks by 
means of a hypokeimenon, a pre-supposition)” (Agamben, 1999, p. 108). New 
knowledge is only possible, Luhmann argues, on grounds of previous knowledge, and, 
as Agamben points out, new linguistic utterances are only possible on grounds that 
there already is language, but this self-referential closure is nevertheless thought of as 
an openness to reality. Without such openness language and knowledge would 
collapse into themselves and simply be tautological. Analogically, a legal decision is 
only possible because there already is law from which to draw, but this self-reference 
does not prevent, but rather makes possible, that the legal decision is addressed to 
facts and claims to express their own meaning as legal facts.  
The thing itself is, thus, not strictly speaking a thing, but rather the very power 
or intention of signifying, of bringing something to expression, the presupposition that 
something can be said of something. This very power of language to signify and bring 
something to speech remains unsaid in the communicative operation of language that 
focuses on the content, on what is said. Unable to put their own power of signifying 
into expression, every actual speech act nevertheless manifests it. Similarly for law: its 
power to disclose reality in a particular way is its blind spot, both presupposed and 
what remains outside legal expression, and yet manifested in each legal decision. As 
Agamben explains: 
 [The] thing itself is not a thing; it is the very sayability, the very openness at 
issue in language, which, in language, we always presuppose and forget, 
because it is at bottom its own oblivion and abandonment. The 
presuppositional structure of language is the very structure of tradition; we 
presuppose, pass on and thereby — according to the double sense of the word 
traditio — betray the thing itself in language, so that language may speak 
about something. The effacement of the thing itself is the sole foundation on 
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which it is possible for something like a tradition to be constituted. (Agamben, 
1999, p. 35, my emphasis.) 
 
The very openness at issue in language, the always contingent fact of bringing 
beings to linguistic or legal expression, has been treated, according to Agamben, in the 
whole Western history as a negative foundation: what is presupposed but remains 
unsaid and forgotten – made invisible in the very operation of the system it 
nevertheless makes possible. What has not been expressed in language is the very fact 
of language, that there is linguistic signification.  
For Agamben, in exact opposition to Luhmann, all problems begin with the 
forgetfulness and invisibilization of the fact of linguistic signification, of bringing 
beings to speech (and law). For Agamben, all legal relations and predications 
presuppose that there is life beyond law to which law can relate itself, just like language 
is “always presuppositional and objectifying, in that it always supposes that the being 
about which it speaks is already open and has already taken place” (Agamben, 1999, 
p. 107). Law considers life uniquely through the lens of its own ends (like maintaining 
normative expectations), but that lens itself is not brought into visibility within it. To 
establish a legal relation is to take a living being within the law, to say something of 
legal relevance of it, but this very speaking of the law, law’s relating to an anomic 
reality, remains its blind spot — that is, at least until the exception thematizes it.  
What then, according to Agamben, is specific to modernity is a certain crisis of 
the presupposition (Agamben, 1999, p. 111) that brings this presupposition of 
linguistic signification into light as such. As we noted in the discussion on Luhmann’s 
constructivism, in modernity it is no longer possible to imagine representation (the 
something as something) as mirroring a pregiven being, but the role of observing in 
observation is itself revealed. The self-reference of observation becomes visible, and 
the ground of knowledge as observation-independent becomes obsolete and replaced 
by system/environment distinction. Whereas premodern onto-theological 
metaphysics mystified the presupposed reality and produced the imagery of God as 
the absolute, unobserved observer, nihilism is the modern experience of the loss of the 
mystified presupposition that throws us face to face with observation and, for 
Agamben, the linguistic signification, and their paradox: 
 
Thus we finally find ourselves alone with our words; for the first time we are 
truly alone with language, abandoned without any final foundation. This is the 
Copernican revolution that the thought of our time inherits from nihilism: we 
are the first human beings who have become completely conscious of language. 
For the first time, what preceding generations called God, Being, spirit, 
unconscious appear to us as what they are: names for language. (Agamben, 
1999, pp. 45-46, my emphasis.) 
 
Nihilism is the experience of “abandonment of the word by God” (Agamben, 
1999, p. 46), the exhaustion of the presupposition as an independent metalanguage 
and reality in itself capable of grounding the meaningfulness of human language and 
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knowledge (and law). “God” is revealed as a “name for language,” that is, as a name, 
given by metaphysical thinking, to the fact of linguistic signification, to the taking 
within meaning of beings. In other words, modern Western humanity is thrown to its 
“own words,” to the contingency and groundlessness of all meaning, which ushers it 
into crisis. 
The crisis is that of nihilism. Nihilism “interprets the extreme revelation of 
language in the sense that there is nothing to reveal, that the truth of language is that 
it unveils the Nothing of all things. The absence of metalanguage thus appears as the 
negative form of the presupposition, and the Nothing as the final veil, the final name 
of language” (Agamben, 1999, p. 46, my emphasis). The crisis of the presupposition of 
God-created, human-independent reality of which language speaks and that language 
can bring to signification leads to nihilism in which reality counts as nothing, in which 
language reveals nothing but itself and itself as empty speech unable to speak about 
anything but itself. Only a short step from here to the affirmation that everything 
collapses into particular languages and particular functional rationalities of social 
systems that reveal nothing but their mere contentless operation.  
What is then at stake in philosophy, for Agamben, is a critique of this nihilistic 
interpretation of the revelation of linguistic signification and the crisis of the 
presupposition. Drawing from Wittgenstein’s illustration of philosophy as showing a 
way out for the fly trapped in the bottle (Wittgenstein, 2009, § 309), Agamben writes: 
“What does it mean to see and to expose the limits of language? (For the fly, the glass 
is not a thing but rather that through which it sees things.) Can there be a discourse 
that, without being a metalanguage or sinking into the unsayable, says language itself 
and exposes its limits?” (Agamben, 1999, p. 46, original emphasis). The task of 
philosophy is to bring to expression the limits of language, that what tradition has 
betrayed by simply presupposing and making invisible, that is, to bring to expression 
the unspeakable: the very taking place of language itself as the medium through 
which things appear intelligible. Its task is to expose the presupposition itself, the very 
opening of meaningfulness as such, that has been either mystified as the ineffable 
foundation or, in nihilism, reduced to mere foundationless and meaningless speech. It 
is not that language reveals nothing, a mere loss of foundation; it reveals its own taking 
place, which makes meaning possible. The task of philosophy is to attend to this 
experience of language in its inoperativity, not in its normal communicative operation 
that always renders itself invisible and unspeakable as a medium (which is Luhmann’s 
choice as a sociologist), but in the manifestation of the potentiality of linguistic 
signification as such. What Agamben thus proposes, as Prozorov notes, is “this 
experience of occupying the threshold of speech that provides a resolution of the 
problem of negative foundation” (Prozorov, 2014, p. 73) (my emphasis). It is the very 
occupation of what we have been calling the inclosure paradox, without always already 
seeking to fictitiously “solve” it like Luhmann does, that provides, for Agamben, the 
solution to the ineffability of language itself.  
Agamben thus rejects the onto-theological orientation to totality when he 
rejects the view that self-reference cannot be said in language and must remain 
unspeakable, a position which leads to mystifying metalanguages or nihilism. It is not 
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that self-reference, the language showing its own taking place, cannot be said: it can 
be said, although only inconsistently. He also rejects the nihilistic orientation to 
paradox that says that self-reference simply collapses into what it is, into its actual 
empty operation. As a paradoxico-critical thinker, for Agamben, it is the threshold, the 
very inclosure paradox that, arresting the normal communicative operation, shows 
language in a state of inoperativity and impotentiality: in its irreducibility to any 
communicative function, in its freedom “not to express” anything particular. Such 
freedom is the precondition for every “new use” of language, like the poem that “is 
precisely that linguistic operation that renders language inoperative” and uses 
language in a new way that breaks with language’s communicative function (Agamben, 
2011b, pp. 251-252). See, in the following quote, Agamben’s metalogical choice in favor 
of the inconsistent, but complete, totality (we come to the “naked life” he mentions in 
a moment):      
A completed foundation of humanity in itself should signify the definitive 
elimination of the sacrificial mythologeme and of the ideas of nature and 
culture, of the unspeakable and the speakable, which are grounded in it. In fact, 
even the sacralisation of life derives from sacrifice: from this point of view it 
simply abandons the naked natural life to its own violence and its own 
unspeakableness, in order to ground in them every cultural rule and all 
language. The ethos, humanity’s own, is not something unspeakable or sacer 
that must remain unsaid in all praxis and human speech. Neither is it 
nothingness, whose nullity serves as the basis for the arbitrariness and violence 
of social action. Rather, it is social praxis itself, human speech itself, which have 
become transparent to themselves. (Agamben, 2006, p. 106) 
The decisive difference between Luhmann and Agamben is the following. 
Luhmann is satisfied in describing how, with the help of functional equivalents to 
premodern metalanguages, the legal system is able to constantly invisibilize its 
inconsistent nature as a systemic perspective and hide its own taking place as an 
opening, which pushes his account close to nihilism. Agamben’s emphasis as a critical 
thinker falls, by contrast, on how such invisibilization perpetuates the inclusive 
exclusion. He investigates how the excluded, the unspeakable and the unknowable, 
what is always presupposed in the communicative operation but what remains 
included in it in the mode of exclusion, can be brought to expression. His focus is on 
“the betrayal” of the ineffable and the unsayable that makes all traditions and 
evolutions, whether linguistic, epistemological or legal, possible. To trace the roots of 
our contemporary predicaments of, say, “war against terror” or refugee camps, back 
to a structure analogous to the very structure of language certainly implies that any 
truly transformative politics encounters daunting problems. However, Agamben’s 
discussion of the philosophy of language as attending to language in the state of 
inoperativity in which its potentiality “not to” and new possible use can be seen, 
already suggests that, for him, the task of politics is to recuperate inoperativity and 
impotentiality — the paradox — from its dominating manifestation in the legal-
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governmental-biopolitical apparatus. But in line with the claim that modern nihilism 
brings us face to face with language and thus forms a momentum for expressing what 
has not been possible to express in the tradition of Western onto-theological thought, 
we will see that, for Agamben, it is the figure of the exception and the state of 
inoperativity and impotentiality it implies that carries the seeds not only of destruction 
of life but also its redemption.    
4.3.5 Indication and the Voice 
Before going to Agamben’s analysis of the contemporary nihilistic political 
situation, let us continue for a little while with the structural analogies that Agamben 
sees between language and law. A central problem in his thought can be seen to be the 
same that we identified already in the Introduction with Wittgenstein: how can 
language and law relate to fact and life? We have been discussing blind spots and first 
and second order observation, which always, even in the case of an observation of 
observation, operate inconsistently, or on grounds of a blind spot. Agamben speaks of 
the thing itself and the sayability that itself remains presupposed and ineffable within 
language and law. What cannot be directly expressed, can only be manifested or 
indicated. Agamben shows that example and exception are two logical figures in which 
the relation of law/language to reality becomes itself thematic. At odds are then the 
operation of language and law that renders ineffable or invisible its own nature as a 
contingent opening, and the manifestation of this opening by the example and the 
exception (that, in Agamben’s analysis, has been colonized by the governmental 
apparatus). 
Wittgenstein’s solution to the problem between law and life was the notion of 
“the form of life”: the genesis of relatively stable patterns of use of words/rules will 
help to determine the meaning of words, or correct and incorrect use of rules 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, §§ 23, 43, 241). It could then be said that a certain normalization 
of language/law, the formation of a “linguistic/legal tradition,” if you will, is necessary 
for the ability of words to have relatively stable and determinate meanings and norms 
to have relatively stable and determinate applications and followings. That a tradition, 
a form of life, itself is not, however, an objective metalanguage capable of providing 
flawless consistency to the use of rules was already suggested by our discussion of the 
example and the exception (see Introduction).  
What is an example? An example is, as we saw, an instance of language, or 
normatively regulated behavior, that not only uses language and the rule but also 
makes this use explicit. An example demonstrates how the general and abstract relates 
to the particular and factual: it occupies the very place of application of rule to fact 
itself and indicates that this is what it does. An example shows the very happening of 
the relating to the fact of a norm or a word.  “Exemplary being,” Agamben writes, “is 
purely linguistic being. Exemplary is what is not defined by any property, except by 
being-called. Not being-red, but being-called-red; not being-Jakob, but being-called-
Jakob defines the example” (Agamben, 1993, p. 9, original emphasis in the original). 
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To command somebody to “be an example!” is to command that this person make 
manifest in her behavior how one ought to behave — how one ought to correctly use, 
follow or apply, a norm or a rule — in a given situation. An example manifests the 
normal that the tradition establishes and iterates but that usually remains unreflected 
and taken for granted. It shows that and how a norm takes place, without itself being 
merely defined by the norm. By doing so, it also shows in this localized manner that 
the problem of explosion that the paradox of rule following indicates can be avoided 
— and has successfully been avoided within the form of life that the example 
exemplifies. An exception, for its part, holds the inverse logical place: it makes 
manifest the suspension of the application of law to the fact. It indicates both that 
normally there is a taking place of law, that normally a rule is applied to facts and facts 
follow a rule (in ways made manifest by the example), and that at this moment, this 
application has been withheld. An exception shows that there is a legal order but that 
now this order is not actualized.   
Now, what the logic of the example and the exception suggests is the 
importance of indication for law. If Wittgenstein’s rule paradox exposes that the 
relation of the rule to fact, its application and following, is problematic, then finding 
ways to indicate this relation within law is of crucial importance. An example and the 
exception are two names for indicating the relation itself of the general norm to the 
particular factual situation that it regulates or from which it withdraws. But there are 
also others. What linguistics calls indexicals — “here,” “there,” “now,” “tomorrow,” “I,” 
“you,” “we,” “ours” — and quasi-indexicals such as “own,” can also be seen to function 
in the same manner. Agamben points out that “[i]ndication is the category within 
which language refers to its own taking place” (Agamben, 2006, p. 25). For him, the 
problem of “sense and reference” is as central as it is to all other philosophers of the 
so-called “linguistic turn,” Wittgenstein included (see Livingston, 2012, pp. 37-42; 
Clemens, 2008, pp. 43-45). Indexicals are those parts of the speech act the reference 
of which shifts at every occasion of speech: what I refer to now as “tomorrow” will be 
different from what I tomorrow refer to as “tomorrow.” Indexicals locate discourse to 
a speaker and to a time and place, and in this way they “refe[r] exclusively to [the] 
taking place [of the speech act], to its instance, independently and prior to what is said 
and meant in it” (Agamben, 2006, p. 25). Justin Clemens explains that deixis “(1) 
anchors utterance to its speaker; (2) refers to the situation of its own taking place (one 
might even say ‘locution, location’); (3) is supposed (or is at least implied) in every 
utterance; (4) must always be repeated, must always take place again” (Clemens, 
2008, pp. 46-47, emphasis omitted.)46 As Paul M. Livingston notes: 
[i]t is only by way of the capacity for deixis, for saying ‘‘here,’’ ‘‘now,’’ and above
all ‘‘I,’’ that a subject indicates its own assumption of the enunciative function,
its own paradoxical capacity (which remains without name [i.e. ineffable, HL])
to move from the abstract reality of the rules of langue to the actuality of their
real application in concrete discourse. (Livingston, 2009, p. 309, my emphasis.)
46 These features of deixis are also central to Lindahl’s theory of law as “collective action” and 
we return to the problem of indication when discussing his work. 
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Indication is thus an intra-linguistic manifestation (that, normally and 
traditionally, remains unsayable) of the shift from langue to parole, from the code to 
message (Clemens, 2008, p. 47). Agamben gives this manifestation of the taking place 
of language that we always tend to forget the name “Voice” (Agamben, 2006, p. 35). 
Indexicals receive their meaning and can indicate the instance of discourse when a 
human voice speaks them. The Voice is the name for how the enunciation in which 
langue shifts to parole and delivers langue to world has been traditionally understood. 
Its structure is, once more, that of inclusive exclusion: human voice is separated from 
itself, included as linguistic expression and excluded as the Voice. Human voice allows 
language to anchor itself in an instance of discourse, and only through voice is an 
instance of discourse identifiable as such (Agamben, 2006, p. 32). But the voice itself 
remains unsayable and presupposed. The Voice is the zone of indistinction between 
mere sound (phonē) and human language (logos), it is the removal (exclusion) of the 
mere “animal phonē” from meaningful language that must nevertheless presuppose 
(include) this “animality” in order to find its presence in the world, in time and place. 
Once more we encounter a liminal figure — “of a no-longer (voice) and of a not-yet 
(meaning)” — (mis)understood as simply ineffable in the history of philosophy, 
suggesting that the task of philosophy is to provide a re-appraisal of indication, of the 
Voice and its paradoxical structure (Agamben, 2006, p. 35, original emphasis).  
The Voice, the example and the exception can indicate how language relates to 
fact, or that this relating has been suspended for now, only because they are 
paradoxical limit figures, both within language and without it. Agamben also notes 
that: 
[e]xception and example constitute the two modes by which a set tries to found
and maintain its own coherence. But while the exception is, as we saw, an
inclusive exclusion (which thus serves to include what is excluded), the example
instead functions as an exclusive inclusion. (Agamben, 1998, pp. 21-22, original
emphasis.)
The Voice, the example and the exclusion are all indications of the blind spot, 
the very relation of the rule and language to fact. The example and the exclusion do so, 
however, in diametrically opposite ways. An example both is a normal case of following 
a rule and is not because it indicates this normality: it “shows its own signifying and 
in this way suspends its own meaning” (Agamben, 1998, p. 22, original emphasis). It 
excludes itself from the normal case to exhibit belonging to, inclusion into it. An 
exception also suspends the normal signifying, but in order to indicate its non-
belonging to the rule. For Agamben, the example and the exception “are ultimately 
indistinguishable and [...] come into play every time the very sense of the belonging 
and commonality of individuals is to be defined” (Agamben, 1998, p. 22). This suggests 
that a re-appraisal of indication in philosophy would go hand in hand with a re-




4.3.6 Abandonment and bare life 
 
Let us now finally articulate the structure of inclusive exclusion in its legal-
political register. Life that is both presupposed and to which law forms a relation is 
what Agamben calls “bare life.” Bare life is structurally similar to the Voice, and it is 
formed in the inclusive exclusion of life in/from the legal order. The notion of bare life 
presupposes the distinction between the mere fact of life, or what the Greek antiquity 
called zoe and conceived as shared by gods, humans and animals alike (and thus 
without determining predicates), and the properly human life lived in the polis, named 
as bios (Agamben, 1998, p. 1). “Bare life” is then formed by the “re-entry” of mere fact 
of living into political life. Political life, the preferred side of the distinction zoe—bios, 
“re-enacts” (includes) within itself what it has excluded from itself, i.e. mere living, 
thus forming a political conception of non-political life: bare life.47 For Agamben, 
“[t]he originary structure of Western politics consists [thus] in an ex-ceptio, in an 
inclusive exclusion of human life in the form of bare life” (Agamben, 2016, p. 263). 
Bare life is life that in the hierarchical (because preferential) re-entry “has been cut off 
and separated from its form” (ibid.), whatever form it has or would have had the 
potentiality to have beyond the inclusive exclusion. As a negative foundation, in bare 
life “something [life] is divided, excluded, and pushed to the bottom, and precisely 
through this exclusion, it is included as archè and foundation” (Agamben, 2016, p. 
264). Political life in the city is founded on the exclusion, made on the side of political 
life, of mere life. The same old presuppositional logic that grounds language is 
repeated in a political register.   
What this inclusive exclusion of bare life then amounts to, according to 
Agamben, is what he (following Jean-Luc Nancy) calls “the ban”: “this potentiality (in 
the proper sense of the Aristotelian dynamis, which is always also dynamis mē 
energein, the potentiality not to pass into actuality) of the law to maintain itself in its 
own privation, to apply in no longer applying” (Agamben, 1998, p. 28). To the same 
extent that the law includes and actualizes its potentiality as a normative force, it also 
excludes, suspends this potentiality and withdraws itself from the living and thereby 
bans them from the law, abandons them. “[I]f the law employs the exception,” 
Agamben argues, “as its original means of referring to and encompassing life, then a 
theory of the state of exception is the preliminary condition for any definition of the 
 
47 Luhmann’s sociological position on life is nearly the opposite to Agamben’s diagnosis of life 
and politics becoming in actual political reality indistinct in the figure of the bare life. As Anton Schütz 
explains: “This relation [of law and life] is placed under the sign of its successful interruption in 
Luhmann, who celebrates, as the decisive coup de génie or evolutionary achievement on which 
functional differentiation and indeed the very workability of hypercomplex societies are predicated, the 
closure of social autopoiesis from both the autopoiesis of organism and the autopoiesis of 
consciousness” (Schütz, 2000, p. 112). Agamben’s thesis on the state of exception becoming a “new 
normal” would signify the collapse of functional differentiation between the legal and political systems. 
Luhmann is not, except in the case of National Socialist State, prepared to make such a sweeping 
diagnosis that the evolution of the modern society has been overturned (although it is of course an 
evolutionary possibility). 
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relation that binds and, at the same time, abandons the living being to law” (Agamben, 
2005a, p. 1). By the ban and abandonment Agamben does not simply mean that while 
these human beings are included and made legal subjects, those others are excluded. 
He rather means that because the taking within the law of life as legally intelligible is 
also an exclusion of that life, life is “abandoned” to this ambiguity, to this “as” that 
brings together and separates, to this paradox and zone of indistinction between 
inclusion and exclusion. Bare life is life at the limit between law and non-law, neither 
fully outside, nor fully inside. 
Agamben understands the exception as an abandonment of life to an 
ambiguous state in which the law is in force but without protective significance, which 
implies that life is thereby “exposed and threatened” by anomic sovereign violence 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 28). Life is both abandoned from the law’s protection (say, in the 
form of fundamental rights) and, in the worst case, abandoned to unmediated 
sovereign violence. An exception, Agamben explains, is how “non-belonging can be 
shown [...] at the center of the class” (Agamben, 1998, p. 22). In the exception, bare 
life shows its non-belonging to the juridical-political class of objects, shows its very 
not-being-protected-legally, by being included within the class only in terms of an 
exception to the normal case (i.e that of being protected by the norm). It is included in 
law as excluded from its protection allowed to “the normal case.” 
The sovereign and bare life are mirror images of each other. Both are structured 
by the inclosure paradox of “[b]eing-outside, and yet belonging” (Agamben, 2005a, p. 
35) (original emphasis). The logic of inclusive exclusion is, according to Agamben, at
the heart of all sovereign power, ancient or modern (Agamben, 1998, p. 9). Because all
forms of social order, even language, are constitutively paradoxical, have a zone of
indistinction at their heart and capture life by splitting it, Agamben can also argue that
“[b]iopolitics is as old as the sovereign exception” (Agamben, 1998, p. 6).48 Western
antiquity excluded bare life from the polis as exemplified by a figure in the archaic
Roman law, homo sacer, an individual who has been cast out of both the religious and
human community as a punishment and can thereby be killed without committing
murder although not sacrificed. What is specific to modernity, is that bare life is no
longer merely pushed to the margins of the polis, but becomes its dominating figure
(Agamben, 1998, p. 8-9). In conditions of modern nihilism and loss of metaphysical
foundations of social order, the contingent and irreducibly paradoxical (non-)ground
of legal-political order is increasingly difficult to hide. As the state of exception
becomes a regular technique of government, the paradoxical structure of legal-
political order begins to displace the application of the rule as the normal juridical
state (Agamben, 1998, p. 20).
48 This claim is the core of Agamben’s critique of Foucault’s conception of biopolitics as 
something quintessentially modern and different from sovereign power (see e.g. Prozorov, 2014, pp. 
93-99).
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4.3.7 The normalized state of exception 
The choice of the word “abandonment” already suggests that for Agamben, the 
paradox of law/sovereignty is a very insecure and risky place to be: the zone of 
indistinction is a site of undecidability, it is the site of explosion of the rule in which 
no security as to which direction one ought to go can be found. As we have noted, the 
nihilistic loss of grounds and the crisis of the presupposition that characterize Western 
legal structures signifies, for Luhmann, a new challenge for the legal system to secure 
the space for legal security. For Agamben, by contrast, it rather opens the space for the 
growth of executive authority and government of life in a state in which legal security 
and its (fictional) consistency count less and less. “As long as the two elements” of 
authority and power, sovereignty and law, decision and rule “remain correlated yet 
conceptually, temporally, and subjectively distinct (as in republican Rome’s contrast 
between the Senate and the people, or in medieval Europe’s contrast between spiritual 
and temporal powers),” Agamben writes:  
their dialectic — though founded on a fiction — can nevertheless function in 
some way. But when they tend to coincide in a single person, when the state of 
exception, in which they are bound and blurred together, becomes the rule, then 
the juridic-political system transforms itself into a killing machine. (Agamben, 
2005a, p. 86) 
In Agamben’s analysis, the exposure of the paradox of sovereignty, its being 
inside and outside the law, in a state of exception that becomes the regular state of 
affairs, is by no means a liberating moment (as I suggested above), but rather a 
moment of the exposure of the violent origins of the legal order and the capture of life 
as bare life. 
As we have known since our study of Kelsen, the legal fiction, the establishment 
of the “as” that allows the legal perspective on reality, is what joins and separates 
power to/from a legal power, act to/from a legal act, violence to/from a legal violence, 
social order to/from a legal order, revolution to/from treason, living being to/from a 
legal person, political constituent act to/from act of constituted power. Agamben 
suggests that the dialectic this fiction opens may have functioned relatively well in the 
history of Western politics, but today its very nature as a fiction has become exposed 
and the ambiguity of the relation has become visible. The “final” juridical fiction is 
Schmitt’s fictio iuris that the state of exception functions as the guardian of the 
constitution. For Agamben, this fiction can, and must, now be seen for what it is: a 
fiction that seeks to cover a political reality in which law and the force of legal rules 
have withdrawn to a virtual existence of impotentiality, of being “in force without 
significance” (Agamben, 1998, p. 51), thereby increasingly giving space to the 
biopolitical and legally unmediated governing of life as bare life.  
Although Luhmann would not agree with Agamben’s diagnosis that the state of 
exception has become a new normal, Agamben’s account does confirm Luhmann’s 
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insistence on the necessity for the legal system’s continuous autonomous operation to 
make its paradox invisible. If the inconsistency at the heart of the legal system is 
continuously exposed in the exception, as it is if we concur with Agamben’s diagnosis, 
law becomes utterly virtual, losing its directive “force” in society, abandoning living 
beings at the mercy of the governmental biopolitical apparatus. In a sense, what 
Agamben describes as our contemporary modern condition is the explosion of the rule. 
In the state of exception that has become the normal state, no distinction between 
inside and outside the law can be made, so the law coincides with reality. It is, as in 
Wittgenstein’s paradox, impossible to distinguish between behavior that follows a rule 
and behavior that transgresses it (Agamben, 2005b, p. 105). Legal acts, such as 
walking down the street after curfew, may be seen illegal, and illegal acts, such as mob 
violence against political protesters, may be allowed if politically expedient (Prozorov, 
2014, p. 102). The ultimate anomic space of the explosion of the rule is the Nazi 
concentration camp: when the Nazi party suspended articles of the Constitution, it 
became impossible to formulate laws, and when no laws discriminate between licit and 
illicit, “everything becomes possible” (Agamben, 2005b, p. 106).49  The exposure of the 
zone of indistinction at the heart of the legal order has given, according to Agamben, 
all the space to governmental power to target life in a legally unmediated way, while 
still upholding the legal fiction of the sovereign suspending the law for the benefit of 
the law. In Agamben’s controversial diagnosis, since World War One, National 
Socialism and up to our day, the normative force of law has suffered and been 
contradicted by the impunity of governmental violence and ignorance of international 
law to which corresponds domestic restriction of fundamental liberties (Agamben, 
2005a, p. 87; see also e.g. Deranty, 2008; Lechte & Newman, 2013, pp. 96-118).   
Now that any possibility of a fictitious state of exception — in which exception 
and normal conditions are temporally and locally distinct — has collapsed, the 
state of exception “in which we live” is real and absolutely cannot be 
distinguished from the rule. Every fiction of a nexus between violence and law 
disappears here; there is nothing but a zone of anomie, in which a violence 
without juridical form acts. The attempt of state power to annex anomie 
through the state of exception is unmasked by [Walter] Benjamin for what it is: 
a fictio iuris par excellence, which claims to maintain the law in its very 
suspension as force-of-law. What now takes its place are civil war and 
revolutionary violence, that is, a human action that has shed [deposto; deposed, 
overthrown] every relation to law. (Agamben, 2005a, p. 59, my emphasis.) 
Agamben dates the notion of a “fictitious or political” state of exception back to 
Napoleon’s decree from the year 1811 that provided for the possibility of the emperor 
to declare a state of siege regardless of whether a city was actually under attack or 
49 See also Hannah Arendt’s account of how in totalitarianism “everything is possible” and how 
this differs from the more traditional nihilistic claim that “everything is permitted” (Arendt, 2017, p. 
440). While the latter form of the suspension of the rule is, according to Arendt, the usual form of 
utilitarian advancement of the interests of the ruler, the first, totalitarian suspension of the rule loses 
all connection to all forms of utility and becomes purely ideological. 
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threatened by enemy forces. Agamben’s argument is that gradually the notion of the 
state of exception has been detached from any notion of a (wartime or other) necessity 
and thus fully politicized or fictionalized (Agamben, 2005a, pp. 4-5). This becoming 
independent of any supposedly “real” necessity means that the state of exception, in 
the form of the expansion of the powers of the government to control the civil sphere 
that take on features of military authority’s wartime powers, the narrowing down of 
citizen’s constitutional liberties and the erosion of the legislative powers of the 
parliament in favor of governmental decrees, is normalized and increasingly becomes 
“a technique of government rather than an exceptional [and thus only temporary] 
measure” (Agamben, 2005a, p. 6-7). This, Agamben famously argues, leads to the 
blurring of the difference between democracies and totalitarian states (Agamben, 
2005a, p. 3). On the other hand, Agamben, drawing from Benjamin’s notion of the 
“real state of exception” (Agamben 2005a, p. 57; Benjamin, 1968, p. 257), which is the 
collapse of the legitimating fictions in the contemporary nihilistic political situation, 
also notes the possibility of human action to “shed every relation to law,” to put the 
exhausted, paradoxical law itself to an “end.” We return to this “messianic politics” 
beyond all law in the final subsection. 
As Anton Schütz observers, for Agamben, the demarcation line between law and 
life: 
functions as a triggering or enabling device for its own transgression, an 
indicator of an always colonisable, indefinitely politicisable territory. It is this 
last point that, far from inducing it into the standstill of a paradox, gives its 
spin, its dynamic, to the legal/sovereign institution. The space declared 
improper for politics is singled out and indicated as the space of politics 
properly speaking. (Schütz, 2000, p. 122, original emphasis omitted, my 
emphasis.)  
The dynamism of nihilistic law thus means, for Agamben, that all legal limits 
are transgressible in favor of the biopolitical government of life, that there are no 
legal limits to the sovereign power’s reach, only the shallow shell of a legal fiction that 
functions as a transparent attempt to legitimate biopolitics. There is nothing that can 
restrict the operation of sovereign biopolitics. For Agamben, the exception and the 
inoperative law function as a device with which to politically target whatever and with 
whatsoever means the sovereign deems necessary. In a kind of inverted (and 
perverted) image of the full inclusion to a universal legal order without exclusion as 
the telos of a fully human humanity that, as we saw in the Introduction, characterizes 
the “criteriological orientation” to legal-political totality, Agamben understands with 
the state of exception becoming a norm a “universal” (global) condition of the capture 
of human life within the sovereign ban that severs this life from whatever forms it 
might have otherwise taken — severs it from its im-potentiality — and includes it in 
the juridico-political sphere that has in conditions of nihilism no other aim or goal 
than the very governing of that life as bare life. The device of the suspension of the 
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application of the law signifies, in the ultimate case, the global, nihilistic domination 
of life in the biopolitical apparatus (Agamben, 2005a, p. 2).  
4.3.8 The Katechon 
What Agamben claims to observe is the coming into light of the logic of the 
katechon, or the immunologic of the sovereign as the guardian of the constitution that 
turns auto-immune, that is, against what it was supposed to protect. This logic is the 
“vicious circle in which the emergency measures [...] justif[ied] in the name of 
defending the democratic constitution are the same ones that lead to its ruin” 
(Agamben, 2005a, p. 8). In The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt discusses this biblical 
notion, the katechon, from Paul the Apostle’s second letter to the Thessalonians; a 
notion that has later proved important to contemporary discussions in political 
philosophy on nihilism, biopolitics and the possibility of political change (see e.g. 
Esposito, 2011; Virno, 2008). In its biblical-escathological context, the katechon 
means “the restrainer”: the power that withholds the Antichrist and therefore 
postpones the Second Coming of the Christ, as the “lawless one” must be revealed 
before parousia, the end of the world, will happen. Paul leaves the katechon 
unidentified, but Schmitt follows the tradition that interprets it as the Holy Roman 
Empire (Prozorov, 2012, p. 485). As a historical (secular) power, the Christian Empire 
“restrain[s] the appearance of the Antichrist and the end of the present eon” (Schmitt, 
2006, p. 60). The imminence of the Christ’s Second Coming would devalue historical 
and political action, so understanding the Empire as the katechon offers a way to link 
the eschatological promise with secular history, to give meaning to the secular power 
of the Christian State as what delays the end of the world by fighting against “the 
lawless one” (Prozorov, 2012, p. 485). To understand the Roman Empire as the 
katechon gives, according to Agamben, “the only possible foundation for a Christian 
doctrine of State power” (Agamben, 2005b, p. 109). Delaying the end gives meaning 
to human action.  
As said, this seemingly arcane notion of katechon has been perhaps surprisingly 
important in recent discussions of the so-called “messianic turn” in continental 
political philosophy, that is, in the attempt to think about radical political change and, 
importantly for our present purposes, about political nihilism of the “lesser evil” that 
keeps radical change from happening. According to Agamben, “every theory of the 
State, including Hobbes’s — which thinks of it [the state] as a power destined to block 
or delay catastrophe — can be taken as a secularization of this interpretation of 2 
Thessalonians 2” that Schmitt’s account epitomizes (Agamben, 2005b, p. 110). In 
Agamben’s interpretation, the katechon is the name for the force of “every constituted 
authority” to delay “the state of tendential lawlessness that characterizes the 
messianic” (Agamben, 2005b, p. 111), that is, radical political transformation.  
As Sergei Prozorov explains, in this discussion “the katechon refers to any 
constituted authority, whose function is to delay the social catastrophe while 
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simultaneously withholding a radical redemption from it” (Prozorov, 2012, p. 487). 
Katechon is the name for understanding collective self-preservation as a fight against 
what is excluded from the collective and identified as an existential threat to it against 
which the collective must be protected. As Esposito puts it, the restrainer “blocks the 
anomos, the principle of disorder, rebellion, separation from the constraint of law” 
(Esposito, 2011, p. 63). According to Agamben, Hobbes’ theory of state can be 
understood as the paradigmatic secularization of the katechon. The function of the 
Hobbesian sovereign is precisely to constitute and preserve the body politic by warding 
off the threat of the dissolution of the commonwealth, the war of all against all. 
However, Agamben notes that the way in which the existential threat is fought against 
— ultimately by deciding on the state of exception — itself brings this threat of the 
anomos inside the commonwealth. This is the core, for Agamben, of modern 
biopolitical, autoimmune nihilism: the sovereign claims to fight against an existential 
threat to the collective existence (this is the juridical fiction of the guardian of the 
constitution) by itself becoming that very threat in the form of legally non-mediated 
violence. Esposito notes that “most important” in the notion of the katechon “is the 
way [the blocking of the anomos] takes place, the manner in which evil is restrained: 
the katechon restrains evil by containing it, by keeping it, by holding it within itself” 
(Esposito, 2011, p. 63).  
Hobbes’ theory of the state of nature and the social contract epitomizes this 
nihilism. Modern political theory of the state of nature thus imagines nothing “truly 
external to nomos” but rather “a principle inside the State revealed in the moment in 
which the State is considered ‘as if it were dissolved’,” that is, in the state of exception 
(Agamben, 1998, pp. 35-36, referring to Hobbes’ De Cive). The Hobbesian sovereign 
is the “only one to preserve its ius contra omnes” after the social contract has been 
made: the natural law principle of the preservation of one’s own life that is valid in the 
state of nature is preserved in the person of the sovereign (Agamben, 1998, p. 35). The 
war of all against all in the state of nature, that has, in fact, always been understood as 
a fiction and never as a historical condition, is nothing but a fictionalization of the 
political reality of the state of exception in the commonwealth (Prozorov, 2014, p. 105). 
The existential danger of the war of all against all that the social contract and the 
surrender of one’s natural right to self-preservation to the sovereign were supposed to 
ward off is re-discovered at the heart of the commonwealth, in the sovereign decision 
of the state of exception that exposes all citizens to the legally non-mediated violence 
of the sovereign: 
 
Far from being a prejuridical condition that is indifferent to the law of the city, 
the Hobbesian state of nature is the exception and the threshold that constitutes 
and dwells within it. It is not so much a war of all against all, as, more precisely, 
a condition in which everyone is bare life and a homo sacer for everyone else. 
(Agamben, 1998, pp. 105-106) 
 
The state of nature is not, in Agamben’s reading, something that precedes the 
commonwealth, but it rather persists at the heart of the commonwealth in the form of 
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the “necessary” state of exception. The legal order is unable to unrelate itself from that 
against which it is constituted: disorder and anomie.  
The state of nature and the state of exception are nothing but two sides of a 
single topological process in which what was presupposed as external (the state 
of nature) now reappears, as in a Möbius strip or a Leyden jar, in the inside (as 
state of exception), and the sovereign power is this very impossibility of 
distinguishing between outside and inside, nature and exception, physis and 
nomos. (Agamben, 1998, p. 37) 
This means, for Agamben, that justifying the sovereign as a “lesser evil” set 
against the “absolute evil” of the dissolution of the social bond is totally without 
justification, as it is the sovereign itself that is the “absolute evil” of the anomos that it 
claims to be fighting against. In Agamben’s reading, as Prozorov notes, “the idea of the 
katechon is an insidious device, by which ‘substantially illegitimate,’ anomic power 
perpetuates its reign, diverting the quest for redemption to the preoccupation with 
protection against the ‘greater evil’ that requires obedience to the ‘lesser’ evil of 
constituted authority” (Prozorov, 2012, p. 488).  
Nihilism here is about law’s being in force without significance, its inability to 
properly function as law with a specific, (relatively) unambiguous content. A law that 
is in force without significance is a purely formal law, a law without content, a law that 
has lost credible consistency and legal security. It is a law that is unable to draw stable 
and credible legal distinctions and to distribute the code legal/illegal in a way capable 
of providing normative expectations that survive their disappointment. It is law that 
is formally in force only in order to provide the fiction that violence is perpetuated on 
the bare life not arbitrarily, but for the sake of the continued existence of the legal-
political collective. Modern biopolitical nihilism is negatively founded on the inclusive 
exclusion of human life that abandons this life to the immediacy of sovereign power. 
This abandonment is concealed by justifying it as a “lesser evil” that wards off the 
lawlessness of the dissolution of the commonwealth altogether, although it is itself the 
evil it claims to fight against. Therefore, “the function of the katechon [can be 
understood] as a double negation or, more precisely, the negation of the originary 
negativity of the human condition” (Prozorov, 2012, p. 492), or indeed as the negation 
of the negativity at the heart of every self-grounding order. The negativity at the heart 
of social order, its lack of ultimate grounds, is understood as an existential threat to 
the order and this threat is then fought against, negated, with means that are 
themselves devoid of grounds. See here how the misfortune of attempts at making the 
paradox invisible (that they are condemned to repeat the problem that they seek to 
solve) manifests again in a different guise.   
We can thus understand this double negation in terms of the logic of 
immunization. In immune protection, life is protected negatively: the very danger 
from which life is to be protected, is introjected within it as the very means by which 
to protect life against that danger. Indeed, to negate the foundational negativity of the 
legal system (lack of legality of its guiding distinction) by re-drawing distinctions that 
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seek to make this negativity invisible follows precisely the logic of immunization. If 
seen against this background, Luhmann’s idea of the invisibilization of the 
foundational paradox by taking recourse to “ideology” that is itself paradoxical, for the 
sake of continued ability to operate and against “explosion,” i.e. entropy and loss of 
order, could be read as a late, non-theological version of the idea of the katechon. The 
apparatuses of invisibilization restrain the apparition of the “Third Question” that 
could destabilize the system, but they only manage to do so by displacing the paradox 
into the new distinction that is supposed to make the old paradox invisible.  
From this perspective, all thinking of dealing with the foundational paradox of 
law, with the lack of positive foundations of the legal order, by reproducing its 
originary gesture, the drawing of a distinction, is nothing but a negation of negation 
that perpetuates the negativity rather than solves the problem it poses. Conceiving 
modern law as nihilistic thus means that the unfounded and unjustifiable legal orders 
preserve themselves in existence by fashioning apparatuses that claim to ward off the 
evil of social disorder by means that themselves capture human beings into conditions 
of sovereign ban and violence. For Agamben, the immunologic of the state of exception 
turns autoimmune, biopolitics turns thanatopolitics, politics of death, at the latest 
when the state of exception becomes normalized, attacking the continued existence of 
law and life that it claimed to be protecting. The lack of ultimate foundation of social 
order has no other consequences for the order than its own re-affirmation in the form 
of yet another distinction that perpetuates “the evil” while claiming to be fighting 
against it. 
4.3.9 Post-juridical politics 
If the state of exception has now become exposed as the new normal, this 
nihilistic situation reveals the katechon for what it is, and its successful legitimation 
as a juridical fiction collapses. For Agamben, “messianic politics,” politics of radical 
transformation, is then about the removal of the katechon, the deactivation of that 
which perpetuates the sovereign ban and withholds radical political change.50 It is the 
gloomy modern nihilism itself that opens the momentum of change, as it not only 
shows the loss of foundations of social order but also exhausts the fictions that help to 
perpetuate the empty and violent operation of the biopolitical apparatus. 
If “[m]an is the living being who removes himself and preserves himself at the 
same time — as unspeakable — in language [and law; HL]; negativity is the human 
means of having language [and law]” (Agamben, 2006, p. 85, emphasis omitted). 
What Agamben calls “sacralization” is rendering this self-removal and separation of 
human life from itself a mystical foundation of both language and rule, within which 
it remains unsayable (Agamben, 2006, p. 106). Negative foundation of language and 
50 For reasons of space, I cannot go into a detailed exploration of Agamben’s “messianism.” For 
example, Jessica Whyte (2009) and Daniel McLoughlin (2016) analyze the relation of Agamben’s 
affirmative politics to the Aristotelian theme of potentiality, to Paul’s messianism and the status of law 
in this “coming politics.” 
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law remained veiled by such sacralization for centuries (it was, in Luhmann’s terms, 
successfully rendered invisible), until modern nihilism. Nihilism is the exposure of the 
ungroundedness of the mystical foundation. The contemporary condition of the real 
state of exception exposes the first and last of the juridical fictions — the katechon, the 
state of exception as what protects the collective from a yet greater evil — for what it 
is. “The condition of modern nihilism,” then, “has thoroughly desacralised every 
mystical version of the unspeakable foundation so that all that remains as the negative 
foundation is simply nothing, not an alluring and tempting Nothing that we could 
marvel at but a mere nullity devoid of any possible significance” (Prozorov, 2014, p. 
73, original emphasis). The only task that remains in nihilism is the empty governing 
of bare life.  
For Agamben, it is precisely the investigation into the relation of law and life, 
the juridical and the political, in conditions of contemporary nihilism that, he wagers, 
allows us to answer the persistent question: “what does it mean to act politically?” 
(Agamben, 2005a, p. 2). It is precisely contemporary nihilism, he suggests, that opens 
the possibility of a new politics of overcoming the biopolitical apparatus and putting it 
to an end (Agamben, 2006, p. 92). Political action capable of breaking with 
contemporary nihilism and life’s capture within its apparatuses cannot take the form 
of seeking to go “back within [law’s] spatially and temporally defined boundaries in 
order to then reaffirm the primacy of a norm and of rights that are themselves 
ultimately grounded in it. From the real state of exception in which we live, it is not 
possible to return to the state of law” (Agamben, 2005a, p. 87). The program of the 
likes of Habermas and neo-republicans who seek to re-ground the political collective 
in law ultimately fails, because they overlook the inconsistency at the heart of that 
collective. Law is incapable of controlling the exception because it is founded on it, 
and, in Agamben’s analysis, the contemporary world lives its ultimate implications. 
For this reason, in the normalized state of exception in which the fictio iuris and its 
coupling of law and life is exposed in its artificiality, political action can only consist 
in making the inoperative, but biopolitics-perpetuating law itself inoperative, that is, 
de-activating the confinement of human impotentiality to the biopolitical apparatus.  
The very inoperativity of law in the state of exception already shows the way for 
the new politics that, for Agamben, can only consist in affirming impotentiality and 
inoperativity beyond their confinement to the sphere of sovereign biopolitics. Political 
action is about re-affirming the potentiality of human life not to be confined as bare 
life within the sovereign, biopolitical apparatus grounded on the “final” (finally 
exposed) juridical fiction of the katechon. It is about “saving” the tasklessness of 
human life from its reduction to biopolitical nihilism:   
 
[I]f it is possible to attempt to halt the machine, this is because between violence 
and law, between life and norm there is no substantial articulation. Alongside 
the movement that seeks to keep them in relation at all cost, there is a 
countermovement that, working in a reverse direction in law and in life, always 
seeks to loosen what has been artificially and violently linked. (Agamben, 
2005a, p. 86, my emphasis.) 
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The articulation between violence and law, life and norm is only a contingent 
juridical fiction that has succeeded in separating life, and its potentiality, from itself, 
confining life within the juridical, prohibitive apparatus and ultimately abandoning it 
to sovereign violence. The fictio iuris of modern law lifts certain acts of political power 
as well as human life into a sphere of the juridical. This is a form of their sacralization, 
Agamben suggests, that divests the founding violence from its contingency and gives 
it an aura of legitimacy. It also separates human life from its potentiality-not-to and 
sends it to a legally enforced destination. As Daniel McLoughlin notes, “[t]he ‘cognitive 
goal’ of the fiction of sovereignty is to conceal the originary inoperativity of the law, 
and thereby to hide the illegitimate foundation of state power and the radical 
groundlessness of human action” (McLoughlin, 2016, p. 524). We return to 
Luhmann’s idea of the legal system’s necessity of making its constitutive inconsistency 
invisible, with the difference that for Agamben, in the normalized state of exception in 
which the paradox, the zone of indistinction between nomos and anomos is exposed, 
even the final attempt at making the inconsistency invisible collapses. From 
Agamben’s perspective, Luhmannian invisibilization is precisely a sacralizing 
instrument that seeks to entrench the separation of contingent acts and life from their 
contingency and their confinement into a juridical sphere where their “true” meaning 
is disclosed — despite the contemporary nihilism that has already exposed the 
invisibilization as a mere fiction without ground.  
Agamben characterizes the contemporary nihilism as “imperfect,” as it both 
exposes the ungroundedness of social order and yet seeks to keep them operating. He 
opposes to it Walter Benjamin’s “messianic” or “active” nihilism that seeks the de-
activation of this empty operation: “Confronted with the imperfect nihilism that would 
let the Nothing subsist indefinitely in the form of a being in force without significance, 
Benjamin proposes a messianic nihilism that nullifies even the Nothing and lets no 
form of law remain in force beyond its own content” (Agamben, 1998, p. 53). The 
normalized state of exception in which we live must be made into, as Benjamin puts 
it, a “real state of exception” in which even the empty operation and subsumption of 
life to the biopolitical apparatus is suspended (Agamben, 1998, p. 55; Benjamin, 1968, 
p. 257). Bringing about the real state of exception means rendering inoperative the
inoperative law that still allows the separation of life from its impotentiality; it is about
bringing nihilistic law to its “fulfillment,” that is, to its end (Agamben, 2005b, p. 107).51
“Only if it is possible to think the Being of abandonment beyond every idea of the law
(even that of the empty form of law’s being in force without significance) will we have
moved out of the paradox of sovereignty towards a politics freed from every ban”
(Agamben, 1998, p. 59, my emphasis). If law operates by separating life from itself and
from its impotentiality, sacralizing impotentiality into a particular sphere, “actively
51 Agamben develops the idea of the inoperativity of the operating law in the conditions 
dominated by the katechon in his discussion of Paul’s messianism (Agamben, 2005b). Paul writes: “the 
messiah is the telos [namely, end or fulfillment; GA] of the law” (Romans 10:4), which, Agamben 
interprets, is the same as deactivating the operation of the law. 
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nihilistic” politics that brings “imperfect nihilism” to an end brings also this empty law 
to its “end,” renders it inoperative. 
Given that a legal fiction is a representation that discloses something as 
something, allows something to be taken within the law that simultaneously remains 
unrepresentable within it, it is unsurprising that Agamben would also emphasize the 
representatives of the sovereign as the ones with whom the struggle over the 
confinement of life within the sovereign ban is fought. In his reading of Kafka’s Before 
the Law and The Castle, Agamben notes that for Kafka’s protagonists that expose key 
features of the structure of law in their struggle with it, “the struggle is not against God 
or supreme sovereignty [...], but against the angels, the messengers and the 
functionaries who appear to represent it. [...] It is not a question [...] of a conflict with 
the divine [the sovereign], but of a conflict with the fabrications of men (or of angels) 
regarding the divine [the sovereign]” (Agamben, 2008, p. 25). For Agamben, the end 
or fulfillment of law is illustrated in Kafka’s “Before the Law,” in which the door of the 
law finally closes at the end of the story, “the man from the country” having waited at 
the doorstep his whole life, without ever crossing it (Agamben, 1998, pp. 49-57).   
Political action is then a struggle with legal representation as a structure of 
separation. It is about deactivating representation that relates life to law by separating 
it from the forms it might otherwise take, exposing the fictional and sacralizing nature 
of representation, and targeting the “as if” by affirming the “as if not” (inoperativity) 
instead. Politics “seeks to deactivate the law by neutralizing the claims to legality made 
by those who present themselves as its guardians” (McLoughlin, 2016, p. 527). Politics 
does not destroy law, its end cannot mean any anarchist destruction of the law, but 
neither does politics posit a new law — it is not what the tradition of political thought 
has called “constituent power” (Agamben, 2016, p. 104). At stake is rather suspending 
the artificial and entrenched (non-)relation between human life and its legal 
articulation, and in our contemporary world, suspending the final fiction of the 
legitimacy of the state of exception, in order to liberate human life to its own 
impotentiality that characterizes it always already, although captured in the sovereign 
ban.  
Thus, Agamben argues that to the withdrawal of law in the state of exception 
that has become the new normal, which implies the blurring of rule and fact, leading 
to the deathly statement “everything is possible,” corresponds the separation of human 
beings from their impotentiality, from their capability not to do what contemporary 
apparatuses (not only of biopolitical government, but also capitalist economy) demand 
of them. “[D]eprived of the experience of what he can not do, today’s man believes 
himself capable of everything,” “freely” choosing between “jobs, vocations, 
professional identities and social roles” that there are on offer. In reality, he has 
become blind to his “consign[ment] in unheard of measure to forces and processes 
over which he has lost all control,” to “this flexibility that is today the primary quality 
that the market demands” from everyone (Agamben, 2011a, pp. 44-45). Politics is then 
about restoring to human beings the experience of their capability not to do what social 
systems expect of them, opening the space for what Agamben calls “new use”: “what is 
in question is the capacity to deactivate something and render it inoperative—a power, 
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a function, a human operation—without simply destroying it but by liberating the 
potentials that have remained inactive in it in order to allow a different use of them” 
(Agamben, 2016, p. 273). Political action in contemporary conditions of nihilism is 
then about seeking to suspend the suspension of the legal order that gives space only 
to biopolitical government, thereby opening life to new forms, to other aims than the 
ones within which it has been captured.  
In what sense, then, is Agamben’s “coming” or “messianic politics” post-
juridical and anti-representative, and what does the “ending” of the law mean for our 
perspective of the legal paradox?52 As we noted above, for Agamben, the task of 
philosophy is to express the very taking place of language: to thematize the medium of 
the glass through which the fly sees the world, which may then help the fly to escape 
from the jar into which it has been confined. In a way exactly analogous to this task of 
philosophy, the task of politics is to thematize the law as the medium that operates by 
separating life from itself. It is to seek to show all legal categories and identities as 
suspended from their operative actuality and thematized as such. Agamben suggests, 
enigmatically, that to bring the law to its end and fulfillment, to a state of inoperativity, 
is to reject the “process of infinite deconstruction that, in maintaining the law in a 
spectral life, can no longer get to the bottom of it” (Agamben, 2005a, p. 64). While the 
paradox works as the deferral and referral of meaning in the operation of law, just like 
we saw in our study of the Luhmannian invisibilization of inconsistency, making 
possible the dynamic evolution of the legal system, Agamben wishes to put this 
evolution to a halt. “The decisive point here is that the law — no longer practiced, but 
studied — is not justice, but only the gate that leads to it” (Agamben, 2005a, p. 64, my 
emphasis).  
Law that is studied, rather than practiced, makes law itself as an inconsistent 
totality thematic, suspending its actualization in particular judgments that represent 
living beings as this or as that, restoring to both the law and the living beings their 
impotentiality that biopolitics abuses (and in this way it may be the gate to justice). 
The intimate relation between law and study is noted by Agamben in his essay “The 
Idea of Study,” where the “exemplary embodiment of study in our culture” is named 
Melville’s Bartleby, the scribe at a Wall Street lawyer’s office, who one day begins to 
“prefer not to” do his duty to copy legal documents (Agamben, 1995, p. 65; see also 
Whyte 2009). Against the law’s self-imposed duty to deliver the decision and thereby 
reproduce itself and suspend its impotentiality, the study of law impersonated by its 
scribe who “prefers not to” copy its documents shows the law’s impotentiality: its 
potentiality not to pass the judgment.      
Agamben suggests, then, that philosophy and politics are both about inhabiting 
the paradox, insisting on the ultimate inability to construct hierarchical oppositions 
and unproblematic representations. As David Kishik notes:  
 
[Agamben’s] conviction is that virtually every important opposition that we can 
think of is today irreparably lost, that it is no longer possible to clearly draw a 
 
52 Catherine Mills (2008) and Jessica Whyte (2009) discuss Agamben’s post-juridical politics 
but do not, however, analyze the status of the paradox in it. 
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separating line, and that our only option is to learn to inhabit the threshold, in 
between whatever division may come our way. [...] On the face of it, Agamben 
asks us to live a paradox, as opposing forces demand to take possession of our 
thoughts and actions, without ever resolving the matter in either direction. It 
seems that we can live, like Humpty Dumpty, only on the narrow wall that 
separates two established realms, though it is important to remember that, at 
least in Lewis Carroll’s version, Humpty Dumpty neither falls nor cracks. 
(Kishik, 2012, p. 68, my emphasis.) 
The scholar, including the scholar of law, is always “stupid,” as Agamben claims 
in his note on the etymological connection between study and stupefying,53 stupefied 
by the explosion of the rule that does not destroy the options of its correct following, 
but rather makes manifest the ultimate groundlessness of each choice among the 
alternatives, of each drawing of a distinction. The study is, in Thomas Carl Wall’s 
words, “for a paralyzed moment, purely exposed to all its possibilities (all its 
predicates), it is undestined to any one or any set of them” (Wall, 1999, p. 152). Against 
the operation of the law Agamben sets its study, which arrests it. In place of the time 
of the operation, it opens another time that is “in effect, [...] per se interminable. [N]ot 
only can a study [not] have a rightful end, [it] does not even desire one” (Agamben, 
1995, p. 64). The study of law is what resists within the law its smooth operation and 
the attempts at making its inconsistency invisible, opening the law as an inconsistent 
totality in all its potentiality, with no single, necessary solutions and destinies to offer.  
Yet, Agamben’s account of the study of law remains rather suggestive. What 
would a political practice be that only and eternally studied law, without ever making 
any impossible decisions in the conditions of undecidability? What is the new use of a 
law that indefinitely only remains in the state of suspension, stupefied by the 
explosion? What Agamben calls “the form-of-life,” “life that cannot be separated from 
its form” (Agamben, 2000, p. 2), seeks to answer this question. It is life that resists its 
capture within the destinies designed for it by the numerous apparatuses, in particular 
the sovereign-legal one, so that it can take whatever form simply in and through living. 
In The Highest Poverty, Agamben argues on the basis of his investigations into the 
Franciscan monastic order, that the Franciscans exemplified such a post-juridical 
form-of-life. By renouncing all forms of ownership, they resisted the capture of their 
life by both canonic and civil law that simply could not understand the affirmation of 
non-ownership. The Franciscans lived in a “real state of exception” insofar as they 
resisted their capture by all forms of authoritative law in order to dedicate their life to 
Christ and to mere use of things that, for Franciscans, did not constitute a form of 
property. The normativity that regulated their life was not imposed on them, but 
rather arose from their life together: “The form [of their life] is not a norm imposed on 
life, but a living that in following the life of Christ gives itself and makes itself a form” 
53 “It goes back to a st- or sp- root indicating a crash, the shock of impact. Studying and 
stupefying are in this sense akin: those who study are in the situation of people who have received a 
shock and are stupefied by what has struck them, unable to grasp it and at the same time powerless to 
leave hold. The scholar, that is, is always ‘stupid’.” (Agamben, 1995, p. 64) 
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(Agamben, 2013b, p. 105). It is not that the Franciscan monastic order lacks 
normativity — it is normative to the smallest detail — but, Agamben argues, the norm 
is not an external one imposed from the outside, thereby separating the life from the 
form that it has, but rather the norm emerges from the very living itself and is 
immanent to it: 
A form of life would thus be the collection of constitutive rules that define it. 
But can one say in this sense that the monk, like the pawn in chess, is defined 
by the sum of the prescriptions according to which he lives? Could one not 
rather say with greater truth exactly the opposite, that it is the monk’s form of 
life that creates his rules? Perhaps both theses are true, on the condition that 
we specify that rules and life enter here into a zone of indifference[.] (Agamben, 
2013b, p. 71) 
On Agamben’s reading, the Rule of St Francis turns the life of Jesus into the 
foundation for a form of “bare life” that manages to escape being captured by every 
form of sovereign power (Vatter, 2018, p. 238). For Agamben, then, “Franciscanism 
can be defined — and in this consists its novelty, even today unthought, and in the 
present conditions of society, totally unthinkable — as the attempt to realize a human 
life and practice absolutely outside the determinations of the law” (Agamben, 2013b, 
p. 110, original emphasis). “The abdicatio omnis iuris,” living beyond the law, is, for
Agamben, the Franciscan legacy “that modernity is unable even to think. (We moderns
are such prisoners of law that we think everything can be legislated without limit)”
(Agamben, 2019, p. 30, my emphasis; see also Agamben, 2013b, p. 110).
To conclude, for Agamben, the paradox of law receives a nihilistic expression in 
the modern biopolitical apparatus the functioning of which must be arrested by 
messianic politics, that is, politics that puts law in its contemporary manifestation to 
an end. The paradoxical relation between life and law cannot find thematization in 
modern law in any other way than as the sovereign exception. Normativity is forced to 
take the form of biopolitical rule. Post-juridical politics seems to be, for Agamben, a 
way to “liberate” the phenomenon of human normativity to its proper impotentiality, 
that is, to let human life take whatever (normative) forms it may take, without being 
destined to actualize the tasks imposed on it by a law from the outside.  
In Chapter 6, we will analyze Hans Lindahl’s theory of law that, by making a 
different diagnosis of modern nihilism, suggests that something like studying the law 
may be possible within modern law, that non-nihilistic politics in this “paradox-
saving” way may be possible within it, and the legal authority might be not simply the 
operator of the law but also the one who is constantly “stupefied” to study it. Before 
going to Lindahl’s account, we will in the next chapter look at another post-juridical 
political theorist, Alain Badiou, and explore the alternative metalogical choice, the 
consistent but incomplete totality, and its implications for law, politics and paradox. 
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5. On the diagonal: Badiou’s generic orientation to paradox
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous three chapters, we have discussed three very different thinkers 
of law (and politics), Kelsen, Luhmann and Agamben, who, despite their substantial 
differences, all recognize, explicitly or implicitly and somewhat reluctantly, that the 
legal system is constitutively inconsistent. All remark, in very different ways, that 
consistency is a very important value for the legal system to seek to realize. For Kelsen, 
the very legality of norms and norm-positing acts depends on the possibility of legal 
cognition to secure their ground in other norms, and in this way seek to show that law 
is consistent and rational. Ultimately, the consistency of the legal system rests on a 
juridical fiction of the basic norm, which is unable to solve the inconsistency in any 
ultimate sense. For Luhmann, the demand for consistency arises from the 
preconditions of communication: for something to count as a communication, it needs 
to link to prior communication and respect its structural requirements (redundancy). 
Confronted with the question concerning the consistency of its code legal/illegal, 
systemic communication will seek to find ways not to confront the inconsistency 
directly by drawing new distinctions, such as externalizing the origin of legal norms to 
the political system or by developing new programs with which to keep applying the 
code in a new manner. For Agamben, the inconsistency of modern law is about its 
being dependent on ultimately political, non-legal or anomic acts of securing a state of 
normalcy in which it can operate, which also implies the constitutive significance for 
law of its own suspension. On the one hand, the inconsistency of the law-sovereign 
apparatus enables the non-mediated governmental power targeted at human life, and, 
on the other, the existence of law despite its suspension allows for the juridical fiction 
of the sovereign as a guardian of the constitution and the commonwealth as a whole. 
This fiction gives the nihilistic apparatus an aura of legal consistency. In all these three 
accounts, legal consistency is something important for law, or for the law-sovereign 
compound, but it is also something “fictive” and, at least for Luhmann, something for 
which the system needs to constantly struggle. Law’s constitutive paradox thus is a 
motor that drives the operation and “evolution” of the system. Modern law is, in all 
these accounts, self-referential, which implies its inconsistency, as self-reference 
necessarily implies the inclosure paradox, that the systemic limit both belongs and 
does not belong to it.  
In this chapter, we will investigate Alan Badiou’s account of politics and how 
the figure of the paradox appears in it. We will see that for Badiou, consistency is a 
concept that characterizes ontology, within which the “world of law” also theoretically 
belongs and which is, according to Badiou, best analyzed by set theoretical 
mathematics. I have no ambitions to present an original reading of Badiou, but I will 
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discuss his work relying on Livingston’s characterization of it as the “generic 
orientation to paradox” that is based on the metalogical choice in favor of consistent, 
but incomplete, totality, instead of inconsistent totality that characterizes grosso 
modo the positions we have discussed until now (although categorization is rather 
complicated, as we have seen).  
It will be my modest suggestion that from the narrow perspective of the legal 
totality, this metalogical choice is also the problem of Badiou’s theory. He 
magisterially presents a theory of politics that transgresses ontology (and law) and 
gives a detailed account of “truth” that breaks with “constructivism” that, as we 
remember, is how Luhmann presents his epistemology. Here it must be noted that 
whereas Luhmann seeks to make the distinction between ontology, which he deems 
obsolete, and epistemology, which is, for him, the modern logos par excellence, Badiou 
equates ontology and constructivism, while seeking to think “the truth” that is 
irreducible to them. But this seems to come at a cost of going back to “old” legal theory, 
in which the legal order does not self-referentially (and inconsistently) decide its own 
limits. For example, in the natural law theory, the system of human, positive law does 
not itself decide its own limits, but is rather ultimately dependent on the metalanguage 
of natural law, which functions as its ground and secures its consistency. As we will 
see, set theory axiomatically forbids self-reference, and if law is situated on the plane 
of ontology the structure of which is analyzed by mathematics, then the self-reference 
and the claim to autonomy of modern law falls out of the theoretical picture. For this 
reason, Badiou’s political theory is, relatively straightforwardly, post-juridical, 
although in a different sense than Agamben’s messianic politics is post-juridical. To 
be sure, it is a metalogical possibility to regard the legal totality as consistent, but it 
arguably is implausible as a description of modern legal systems. Their self-referential 
operation, the claim of modern legal systems to autonomously draw the distinction 
between law and non-law, seems difficult to deny.  
However, for the sake of our chosen heuristics of the metalogical dualism and 
the different orientations to totality it gives rise, we will now enter Badiou’s political 
theory and seek to pinpoint the site of paradox in his theory. For although 
mathematical ontology axiomatically forbids paradox, what Badiou calls “the event” 
brings the paradox into focus. I rely in my presentation of Badiou’s thinking on his 
work Being and Event (1988) with only additional references to his other work. This 
is mostly for reasons of convenience, as Badiou’s thought is extraordinarily complex, 
but also because his recent major work, Logics of Worlds (2006)54 arguably preserves 
the basic structure of his argument with modifications that do not need to concern us 
in the light of the relatively narrow focus of this chapter.  
Following the title of Being and Event, I begin by presenting Badiou’s 
“metaontology” of Being, his philosophy of ontology. For Badiou, ontology, the study 
of “Being as Being,” is the task of mathematics and set theory. Ontology is thus not as 
such philosophy but science. Philosophy of ontology is, then, “metaontology,” the 
observation of mathematical ontology at a meta- or second order level. After the 
54 The third part of the Being and Event series, L’Immanence des vérités. L'Être et l’Événement 
3 was published in 2018. 
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discussion of “Being,” I work my way toward Badiou’s theory of the “Event.” I end by 
drawing some implications to legal theory, making some comparisons to the 
paradoxico-critical orientations and presenting some critical comments from the 
perspective of the alternative metalogical choice.  
5.2 “The one is not”: Badiou’s metaontology 
Let us begin with Badiou’s metaontology. His philosophy of ontology is, as 
mentioned, a philosophical account of contemporary set theory mathematics. 
“[I]nsofar as being, qua being,” he writes, “is nothing other than pure multiplicity, it 
is legitimate to say that ontology, the science of being qua being, is nothing other than 
mathematics itself” (Badiou, 2006a p.xiii). Badiou uses the standard systematized set 
theory, the one based on Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms plus the Axiom of Choice (ZFC). 
Set theory, Badiou argues, gives a formal account of what is, of Being-qua-Being, of 
Being as such of beings, in exclusion to all other qualities (such as being red, round 
and weighing 200 grams) that beings (such as an apple) may have.  
Post-Cantorian ZFC set theory formulates axioms the purpose of which is 
precisely to free set theory from paradoxes such as the Russell paradox (the paradox 
of the set of all non-self-membered sets that both belongs and does not belong to 
itself). Accordingly, for Badiou, ontology is axiomatically consistent. Consistency is, in 
a sense, its highest value. In Livingston’s argument that we have been following, 
Badiou is committed to the metalogical choice in favor of consistency and 
incompleteness over completeness and inconsistency. We will see that this choice has 
profound implications for the Badiouan understanding of the nature of (legal) 
structures that regulate what exists by providing a consistent account of “inconsistent 
multiplicity” as one, and of the nature of genuine politics that presents what “in-
consists,” what breaks incongruently with the ontological unity, supplementing and 
complementing it with a “truth” that remains absolutely indiscernible and unnamable 
within the consistent positive “one.” The “event,” we will see, shows the 
incompleteness of any existing consistent count-as-one of inconsistent multiplicity.  
Let me take this gradually, explaining “inconsistent multiplicity,” “consistent 
one” and the “inconsistent event” all in their turn. First, let us look at the reasons 
behind Badiou’s metalogical choice. His metaontology is based on the impossibility of 
what he calls “the Whole” or “Universe,” the consistent and complete universal set of 
all sets (Badiou, 2009, pp. 109-111; Badiou, 2006a, pp. 40-41). Such a universal set 
cannot exist, because, as we saw in the Introduction (1.3.2), it leads to paradox and 
inconsistency. Furthermore, Cantor’s power set theorem showed that infinities have 
different cardinalities (“sizes”) such that for every infinite set, we can construct its 
infinite power set (re-grouping all its original subsets) the size of which is greater than 
the infinity of the original set. There can thus be no “final” infinity that would englobe 
all other infinities, because for every infinite set, it is possible to construct a still 
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“larger” power set, a yet “bigger” infinity. Sergei Prozorov puts it well when he explains 
that: 
 
[a]s soon as we posit the existence of the world as the whole, it is possible to 
construct a power set of this world, which will be immeasurably greater than it, 
leaving an excess that cannot be incorporated into it. The same procedure can 
then be applied to this power set and so on to infinity. There is thus no such 
thing as “the absolutely infinite Infinity, the infinity of all intrinsically thinkable 
infinities.” The world as the whole is never all there is: there always remains 
an excess that cannot be subsumed under this totality, which is thus forever 
resigned to being limited, partial and particular, irrespective of how it is 
defined. (Prozorov, 2013a, pp. 47-48, citing Badiou, 2006a, p. 277, original 
emphasis.) 
 
For Badiou, then, “there is no Whole” (Badiou, 2009, p. 102). From the 
Badiouan perspective, there cannot be a totality of everything, but every positive world 
there is (such as the world of the French State, the world of a school, the world of a 
legal court, the word of international relations, the world of our home...), is a particular 
and finite world that always leaves an excess that it cannot totalize. Badiou’s starting 
point will thus be the impossibility of the Universe as a single positive, consistent and 
complete world that encompasses everything. “There is no passage from any particular 
world, however diverse and inclusive, towards universality” in the sense of a positively 
existing Universe (Prozorov, 2013a, p. 61). As we will see in the next chapter, Lindahl 
also argues for the impossibility of a Universal World of full inclusion but makes a 
different metalogical choice with different implications. A complete and consistent 
Universe with no outside cannot exist; on this point paradoxico-criticism and generic 
orientation agree. 
Thus, “the one is not” is the famous statement that opens Badiou’s 
metaontology, that is, philosophy that takes set theory as its condition (Badiou, 2006a, 
p. 23). In Badiou’s understanding, as Peter Hallward explains, “if the one is not, only 
what is not one, or multiple, can be” (Hallward, 2003, p. 62). If One consistent World 
is an impossible being, there must always be more than one world; in fact, an infinite 
number of worlds (Badiou, 2009, pp. 114-115). As there cannot be a consistent, 
comprehensive Totality of everything that is, being as such must be both multiple and 
inconsistent. “[B]eing, thought in its very being (the “being-ness” of being, or being 
qua being), is nothing other than inconsistent multiplicity” (Ling, 2010, p. 49). This 
decision to treat being as multiple has the implication that all “presentations” and 
“representations” of being, that is, all positive situations, worlds and systems, can be 
seen as posterior to the being of inconsistent multiplicity as, precisely, its consistent 
presentations and representations.  
So, one is not, but there is an operation of “count-as-one” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 
24). All unity there is, is an effect of the operation of counting the multiple as one. 
Whatever exists, exists as counted-as-one, or as Badiou also puts it, as belonging to a 
situation. For Badiou, “[a]ll thought supposes a situation, a structure, a counting-for-
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one, whereby the presented multiple is consistent, numerable” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 44). 
“A situation” can be understood as a presented set of the members it counts-as-one. A 
set is, as we noted in the Introduction, “any many which can be thought of as one”  
(Cantor, 1980, p. 204, note 1). Burhanuddin Baki offers a more technical definition of 
the set as: 
 
a simple multiple of objects taken as a single entity, or a single entity 
understood as a simple multiplicity of objects. We immediately observe that 
every existent entity is a set, and that every entity exists in the form-multiple of 
a set. Everything is a collection and everything is collected into something else. 
To be is to be a set. (Baki, 2015, pp. 36-37, my emphasis.) 
 
To think in terms of sets, is to think of each being as a member of some set, 
counted in some collection, and as itself also forming a set. For example, the things at 
my table (the computer, the two books, the pile of paper) consist as a set (with four 
members), and each of the thing-members can in turn be thought as a set (the 
computer consists of its parts, the books of their pages, the pile of paper of sheets of 
paper). We can retain from this, on the one hand, multiplicity or “manyness” that is, 
on the other, considered as a unity. Set theory or ontology is the study of how the many 
can be regarded as a unity.  
Badiou’s metaontology decides to theorize, on grounds of axiomatic set theory 
that interdicts inconsistency and works to preserve consistency, Being-qua-Being in 
the formal language of multiples and sets or situations. A situation is any structured 
presentation of multiplicity (Badiou, 2006a, p. 24). As Peter Hallward explains: 
“Structured means to be presented according to a consistent process of one-ification, 
a coherent counting as one” (Hallward, 2003, p. 64). Neither the Universe nor 
inconsistent multiplicity can be presented, because both are, precisely, inconsistent: 
what is presented (or in Badiou’s later terms, “appears”) as belonging to a situation, is 
always multiplicity consistently (without contradictions and paradoxes) counted-as-
one. “Inconsistent multiplicity” thus means here not a paradoxical multiplicity, but 
rather formless or structureless multiplicity that cannot as such be grasped 
(“presented”), because of its lack of structure. Nothing can be, in fact, said of it directly. 
Inconsistent multiplicity is only given form in the operation of count-as-one. 
Situations thus have no “ground in being,” because they are counts-as-one of 
structureless multiplicity: they are only effects of counting this multiplicity as one, 
forming it into consistent multiples, sets with members. Inconsistent multiplicity 
becomes organized membership of a plurality of elements in a situation thanks to the 
operation that counts, gathers, them together.  
“Nothing can be presented that is not presented as one. And conversely, 
whatever is thus presented as one — whatever can thus be counted as one — shows 
itself for that very reason to be not one, that is, multiple. The one is not, precisely 
because ones, unifications, come to be as results” (Hallward, 2003, p. 63). Situations 
contain the multiple they count as their elements or members that then “consist” 
together as one. There are, in other words, no doubts as to what belongs to a set: the 
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count-as-one picks out all and only the members for its domain of operation, all and 
only those elements that satisfy the law of belonging of the set in question. We can 
thus understand consistency here 1. as lack of contradictions and paradoxes and 2. as 
belonging to a set, consisting together of elements as members of a set (see Baki, 2015, 
pp. 55-57). Being is presented, in Badiou’s metaontology, as an infinite multiplicity of 
consistent multiples, “collectives” that consist of their lawful members.  
Here then is the complex core of Badiou’s metaontology. On the one hand, the 
inconsistent multiplicity is what is counted-as-one and made consistent, and it is the 
“formless,” structureless multiple and not the consistent one that exists. On the other 
hand, the multiple can only be ontologically conceived as counted-as-one, as 
consistent instead of inconsistent. “The crucial ontological distinction is then found at 
the level of the situation’s being: the pure being of the situation — the ‘before of the 
count’ — remains beyond the situation itself, inasmuch as its being is uncounted 
multiplicity” (Ling, 2010, p. 50). The situation, the set, can be understood 
(“indexically,” one might say) as “the place of the taking place” of Being as consistent 
(Badiou, 2006a, p. 24). When seen as if through the eyes of an inhabitant of this 
taking-place, from within the immanence of the opening of the situation: 
 
a situation is not such that the thesis ‘the one is not’ can be presented therein. 
On the contrary, because the law is the count-as-one, nothing is presented in a 
situation which is not counted: the situation envelops existence with the one. 
Nothing is presentable in a situation otherwise than under the effect of 
structure, that is, under the form of the one and its composition in consistent 
multiplicities. (Badiou, 2006a, p. 52, my emphasis.) 
 
All that counts within the situation and for its inhabitant is what the law of the 
count-as-one allows one to see. For the inhabitant, the difference between the 
consistent count-as-one and inconsistent multiplicity remains completely in 
obscurity: a situation “necessarily identifies being with what is presentable, thus with 
the possibility of the one” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 52, my emphasis). It is the necessary 
closure that makes a certain opening, a certain horizon of “veridicity” and knowledge 
of beings possible (see Badiou, 2006a, p. 331), but within which the closure itself, and 
thus its difference from inconsistent multiplicity, remains strictly unknowable, beyond 
the situation-immanent discourse of verifiability and falsifiability. Nothing is 
knowable within a situation except what its categories and language, with which the 
count-as-one is established, allow. 
Note how the Badiouan situation resembles Luhmann’s epistemological 
constructivism. Indeed, as we will soon see, it is precisely the mathematical 
constructivism from which Luhmann borrows the name of his own position that 
Badiou critically targets in his political theory. Luhmann’s gesture of abandoning all 
“ontology” (that is, all significance of the reality that remains unknown) in favor of 
system-specific epistemology corresponds to Badiou’s account of the situation in 
which being is identified with what is verifiable according to the rules of belonging to 
that situation. In both, the difference between what appears to the inhabitant of the 
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situation/system and the limited situation/system itself remains in obscurity. For 
Badiou, pure inconsistent multiplicity is, then, from the perspective of the ontology of 
situated Being, inexistent and therefore “nothing.” For Badiou, “ontology [...] is a 
situation,” and “there is nothing apart from situations” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 25).  
And yet, Badiou states that “the one is not.” A situation is a structured 
presentation of the multiple. The multiple is prior to its presentations; it is what is 
being presented as one and thus different from it. Retroactively, Badiou suggests, that 
is, only indirectly, looking back from the situation in which the multiple appears as 
one, i.e. in which multiplicity is already worked over by the operation of count-as-one, 
can we understand inconsistent multiplicity as “subtracting” itself from all figures of 
the one, as the inconsistent that what now appears as consistently presented. “What 
will have been counted as one, on the basis of not having been one, turns out to be 
multiple” (Badiou, 2006a, pp. 24-25). Nothing can be directly known in ontology of 
inconsistent multiplicity, because all that can be known to be is multiplicity made 
consistent in the operation of the count-as-one. 
 
 
5.3 The decision and the name of the void 
 
An indirect approach is, thus, necessary to mark the place of “the nothing” in 
ontology and to formulate the proposition “the one is not.” Badiou uses here a proof 
technique known as “consistency proof” which can establish not “absolute” proof of 
consistency of a proposition but only its “relative” consistency. This is related to 
Badiou’s metalogical choice, so let us try to understand what relative consistency 
means intuitively (for the technical exposition see Baki 2015, p. 55-56, 84-85). If direct 
proof of consistency advances from premises known to be true to a true conclusion, 
relative consistency must do without such direct deduction. It must begin with an 
ungrounded decision instead, a decision to consider the given proposition as not 
leading to a contradiction with its premises, provided that those premises themselves 
are consistent. Only then the proof advances to the “truth procedure” to work through 
the details of showing that, given consistent premises suitably interpreted, the new 
supplementary proposition is consistent with them as well. As Baki explains: 
   
[such] validation of the propositions does not precede but comes after the 
decision. Badiou commits to the “conclusion” [the one is not; mathematics is 
ontology; HL], and then follows through with “justifying” and explicating them. 
This justification-to-come is precisely what he means by fidelity [fidélité] to the 
decision via the faithful sequence of truth procedures. (Baki, 2015, p. 85) 
 
The decision, in a situation of undecidability, to consider a proposition 
consistent opens a task of proving its consistency. Such a task requires what Badiou 
calls “the faithful subject”: the one who carries out the process of constructing the 
proof, who “forces” such a world into being in which the proposition can be shown to 
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be consistent. For Badiou, the subject does not precede the decision, but rather 
emerges as its effect: “decisions (nominations, axioms) suppose no subject, since there 
is no subject other than as the effect of such decisions” (Badiou, 1991, cited in English 
in Hallward, 2003, p. 105). The temporality of the future anterior (“the justification-
to-come”) characterizes the truth procedure: the opening decision will have been 
shown consistent (and the subject faithful) at “the end” of what is an endless, infinite 
process of forcing. We return to this. 
It seems to me that what here is called the consistency proof is precisely what 
is at stake in what we have been calling the temporal paradox, the paradox of 
retroactivity, and that can be extracted from Luhmann’s account of the invisibilization 
of the paradox, and even read into Kelsen’s theory of the basic norm. It also informs 
Lindahl’s paradoxes of representation and authority, as we will see in the next chapter. 
What is common to all these very different expressions of the temporal paradox is the 
non-derivable decision that claims to be consistent/representative/legal in conditions 
in which its consistency/representativity/legality cannot be directly shown. The 
decision is necessary to open the horizon of its own validation as a 
consistent/representative/legal decision within which it already at the moment of 
pronouncing includes itself.  
Badiou thus makes a theory-opening metalogical decision to treat situations as 
consistent and what “subtracts” from them as the inconsistent multiplicity. It is this 
subtracted multiplicity that will later show the incompleteness of situations. As said, 
that being as inconsistent multiplicity cannot be known in ontology means that, from 
the point of view of knowledge, it is indeed nothing. But the count-as-one can be seen 
as a result of an operation that has “targeted” the pure multiplicity existing prior to 
such an operation, excluding it as inconsistent and including it as consistent: 
“although there is never anything other — in a situation — than the result (everything, 
in the situation, is counted), what thereby results marks out, before the operation, a 
must-be-counted” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 53). For this reason, even if what exists is always 
presented and consistent insofar as it is made knowable, the unknowable pure 
multiplicity is not mere non-being. To assert that it is would imply that everything that 
is, is simply consistent multiplicity: being would be equal to structure (see Baki, 2015, 
p. 88). This would lead us to radical structuralism and precisely to the kind of nihilist
constructivism that we discussed in the previous chapter. We will see that Badiou can
be seen to provide a re-appreciation of the nihil, of the reality that in modernity sinks,
according to Luhmann, to nothing and becomes simply the environment of a system.
So, in Badiou’s “realism,” inconsistent multiplicity is a remainder, an excess 
subtracted and withdrawn from all figures of the one. To emphasize this not-mere-
non-being of what within the situation’s horizon of veridicity is always simply nothing, 
Badiou decides that “(the) nothing is” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 36). Part of this decision is 
to give an ontological name to “the nothing” so that it would register within ontology 
(i.e. set theory). This name is the void, or the empty set, marked as ∅ (or { }). For 
Badiou, “every structured presentation unpresents ‘its’ void, in the mode of this non-
one which is merely the subtractive face of the count” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 55). Being-
qua-Being is the subtractive face of every count-as-one, and for this reason it is 
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absolutely a-specific and generic, withdrawing from all its presentations, although 
“situated” in each of them as what is “unpresented” in them, and irreducible to any of 
them. The inconsistent multiplicity “allows, within the retroaction of the count, a kind 
of inert irreducibility of the presented-multiple to appear, an irreducibility of the 
domain of the presented-multiple for which the operation of the count occurs” 
(Badiou, 2006a, p. 28). The empty set is this appearance of the “negative underside” 
of presentation, of its subtractive face, the name that presents, as “the proper name of 
being,” what within ontology can be presented of the unpresentable. The empty set is 
the name of the reality that remains unknown. 
See how Badiou describes this decision of naming the nothing: 
 
Naturally, because the void is indiscernible [unknowable in ontology; HL] as a 
term (because it is not-one), its inaugural appearance is a pure act of 
nomination. This name cannot be specific; it cannot place the void under 
anything that would subsume it — this would be to reestablish the one. The 
name cannot indicate that the void is this or that. The act of nomination, being 
a-specific, consumes itself, indicating nothing other than the unpresent-able as 
such. In ontology, however, the unpresentable occurs within a presentative 
forcing which disposes it as the nothing from which every-thing proceeds. The 
consequence is that the name of the void is a pure proper name, which indicates 
itself, which does not bestow any index of difference within what it refers to, 
and which auto-declares itself in the form of the multiple, despite there being 
nothing which is numbered by it. 
 Ontology commences, ineluctably, once the legislative Ideas of the multiple 
are unfolded, by the pure utterance of the arbitrariness of a proper name. This 
name, this sign, indexed to the void, is, in a sense that will always remain 
enigmatic, the proper name of being. (Badiou, 2006a, p. 59) 
 
What we can retain from this is that to give the name void to Being-qua-Being 
is to posit an ungrounded axiom, the Axiom of the Void, “a pure proper name” of what 
founds presentation. It is the name of that which every presentation presents but in 
the mode of unpresenting. “The set ∅ is not precisely the nothing,” as Baki explains, 
because it is the proper name of the nothing, and the name is not identical to what it 
names. It is “rather the presentative suture to the nothing. The void is the localization, 
with respect to the situation, of nothingness as a multiple” (Baki, 2015, p. 101). The 
void set as the “proper name of being” is the first name that ontology must posit in 
order to be able to constitute itself as the formal language of Being-qua-Being. Because 
inconsistent multiplicity is unnameable as such, the proper name of being must be that 
of a compositionally consistent multiple, that is, a set, but a set that contains, precisely, 
nothing.  
The name void, as Badiou says, simply indicates that what every set is “about”: 
presenting the multiple that subtracts from every presentation of it. It names the 
Being-qua-Being as such within ontology, that bare “there is...” that subtracts itself 
from every presentation and that itself is no particular being. We can thus immediately 
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see that this “auto-declaration,” this “pure utterance of the arbitrariness of a proper 
name” that “commences ontology” is itself ontologically “illegal,” because all self-
reference is axiomatically forbidden within ontology. As Livingston puts it:  
 
[i]n this way the power of auto-nomination to call forth existent sets, though 
explicitly prohibited within ontology by its fundamental axioms, nevertheless 
proves essential in grounding its most basic presupposition, the presupposition 
of a “there is...” of being prior to any determinate set or property. (Livingston, 
2012, p. 48)  
 
Axioms that forbid self-reference and paradox within ontology nevertheless 
themselves require a paradoxical auto-declaration in order to be established. The 
interdiction of self-reference is itself an axiom (the Axiom of Foundation), a non-
derivable decision the consistency of which itself cannot be shown in any direct way. 
The axioms of set theory cannot themselves be proven in the theory, but they are 
decisions that will have been shown consistent when the faithful Subject constructs 
the theory itself as a whole in the infinite truth procedure that is the very development 
of set theory mathematics. The appearance of the laws of ontology (set theory) itself 
is, indeed, an example of what Badiou calls the event: that what breaks with the laws 
of ontology. In direct homology to this truth procedure in science, also politics is, for 
Badiou, precisely a process, inaugurated by “an event” and an ungrounded decision, 
and taken further by the faithful political subject. For Badiou, “truth procedure” 
happens in four, and only four, guises: as science, art, love and politics (see Badiou, 
2008a). The paradox is only characteristic of the emergence of a truth procedure, and 
it does not characterize what the procedure establishes: for example, within the 
science of set theory, the sets themselves. These form the logical structure of all 
ontological totalities, such as the world of law, which are consistent and free of paradox 
and self-reference. 
Being itself is, thus, not mathematical, nor are beings, like apples, buildings and 
humans, mathematical objectivities. Rather, mathematics provides, according to 
Badiou, a language in which to talk about Being in a consistent manner. Furthermore, 
philosophy as metaontology is the locus for thinking about the meaning of 
mathematics as ontology (Meillassoux, 2012, p. 2), and as a meta-perspective, 
philosophy sees what mathematicians cannot see. It can thus see beyond the 
mathematical structures of Being-qua-Being and thereby also that structure does not 
saturate all what is. As Baki puts it: “Badiou’s thesis does not say that Being is 
essentially structure” (Baki, 2015, p. 23). This is the point of anti-constructivism (and 
anti-nihilism), put in the language of The Logics of Worlds: there are only structures, 
“languages,” that regulate how the multiple, “the bodies,” may “appear” within “the 
world” to which they belong — “except that there are truths” (Badiou, 2009, p. 4, my 
emphasis). That set theory is axiomatic, that is, based on “truths,” constitutive 
decisions that cannot be themselves proved within the theory they ground, shows that 
mathematical unities, sets, presentations and worlds, themselves are not but are 
“merely” figures of the operation of one-ification. Such operations are targeted on pure 
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5.4 The metalogical dualism 
 
We can now begin to see Badiou’s metalogical choice that we will continue to 
elaborate: his preference for consistency and incompleteness over inconsistency and 
completeness. By thinking about the count-as-one as both a consistent presentation of 
the multiple and as a mere operation on inconsistent multiplicity, Badiou rejects the 
idea of a completed totality. There is always an excess of inconsistent multiplicity that 
counts as nothing within the lawful situation. This excess accounts for the possibility 
of the Event and the Truth, that is, the apparition of something that the situation 
cannot consistently present and that comes to supplement its consistent depiction of 
being.  
That inconsistent multiplicity is unknowable and unprovable makes of Badiou’s 
decision to treat it as such a pure decision. Furthermore, he wants to have a theory 
that can preserve the primacy of the inconsistent multiple and not to theorize Being-
qua-Being as One. Ontology as a discourse of Being-qua-Being must itself be a 
situation “haunted” by inconsistency. It is a kind of second-order count-as-one that 
can never grasp all there is as a single totality. “If there cannot be a presentation of 
[B]eing because [B]eing occurs in every presentation – and this is why it does not 
present itself – then there is one solution left for us: that the ontological situation be 
the presentation of presentation” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 27). For Badiou, ZFC set theory 
is uniquely capable of providing such a second-order presentation. First, ZFC provides 
an understanding of pure sets that contain nothing but other sets that themselves 
contain nothing but, ultimately, the empty set (set without members); in other words, 
it provides an understanding of pure multiplicity without any particular meaningful 
figure of the one. It does not need to define what exactly sets contain but can work 
with, precisely, the nothing as multiplicity. Moreover, it can do so consistently, by 
providing rules for the manipulation of sets. It will provide a consistent presentation 
of consistent presentation. But this second-order consistency, that of ZFC itself, is 
unprovable by the theory’s own lights. Recall here our discussion on Gödel’s 
Incompleteness Theorems. The choice of this language is a decision, as, due to the 
Second Incompleteness Theorem, ZFC is unable to prove its own consistency. The 
consistency of ZFC is then first a decision, an axiom, before it can become an 
established situation (Baki, 2015, p. 92). The ontological work that is done 
presupposes its own consistency in order to be able to operate:   
 
Badiou has axiomatically decided the paradoxes as resolved, and nothing  
in ontology can argue against this because ZFC cannot prove anything about  
its own consistency or inconsistency. To simply commit that his ontology is  
paradox-free is enough for it to be paradox-free, so long as one follows through  
181 
with the aftermath of the commitment without necessarily justifying or proving 
it. (Baki, 2015, p. 94) 
The perhaps surprising outcome of these observations is that the ontological 
primacy of inconsistent (“one-free”) multiplicity can be maintained when metalogical 
primacy is given to consistency rather than to inconsistency. This is not a paradox, but 
a description of one of the hands of deciding the undecidability that Livingston 
diagnoses, that the Sovereign One can be metalogically split either into consistent 
incompleteness, which leads to ontological primacy of the inconsistent multiple, and 
inconsistent completeness, which leads to the ontological primacy of the inconsistent 
one. That both orientations see inconsistency as ontologically primary, grounds their 
joint rejection of the comprehensive and consistent Universe. 
The paradox and inconsistency are eminently important for Badiou’s theory as 
they expose the limits of ontology and what can consistently be known and open the 
door to what exceeds those limits. The Badiouan subject “moves through” the paradox 
of self-reference, as we will see, because every Truth that an extant situation cannot 
prove must by definition be inconsistent in the situation in which it is asserted. 
Consistency proof will require a faithful subject that commits to showing the 
consistency of a Truth that cannot, for now, be seen to be such. Both the auto-
nomination of the void as the final ground of being and the forcing of “the event” by a 
“faithful subject” in a situation in which it is otherwise indiscernible and unnamable 
are exceptions to the laws of ontology. Both are pure decisions in a situation of 
undecidability, in a situation that is incomplete as it cannot provide proof to a Truth 
that can nevertheless be thought about and can be worked “into” the situation by the 
Subject.    
Livingston argues that Badiou does not, however, explicitly acknowledge the 
existence of the metalogical choice that the impossibility of the consistent and 
complete Whole implies. Badiou takes the choice to rather simply be between the 
classical metaphysical terms: the one and the many. In other words, he does not really 
recognize, or so Livingston claims, the existence of the paradoxico-critical orientation 
to paradox. For Livingston (see also Introduction):  
the effect of Russell’s paradox and related semantic paradoxes is not in fact to 
demand or even suggest such a simple decision between ‘the One’ and ‘the 
Many’ of traditional thought; it is, rather, effectively to disjoin the sovereign 
One into the two aspects of consistency and completeness and demand a 
decision between the two: either consistency with incompleteness (Badiou’s 
decision) or completeness and totality with fundamental contradictions and 
paradoxes attaching to the limits of thought and signification [paradoxico-
critical decision]. (Livingston, 2012, p. 187) 
From this angle, the undecidability is not exactly between the One and the 
Many. Insofar as the Whole is paradoxical, it is not undecidable that consistent and 
complete universal set does not exist. Undecidability emerges rather between 1. the 
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consistent one from which the inconsistent is subtracted as the void that can form the 
site of the event of Truth, which complements the situation that is thereby seen as 
incomplete; and 2. the inconsistent one that is thrown to deal with its paradoxical 
structure of being inside and outside of itself. A decision either way will open a 
theoretical horizon with its distinctive features. 
If the one is consistent and incomplete, as we have now decided to look at it, we 
can formulate, with Badiou, the relation between the one and the many as the 
consistent operation of one-ification targeted at the inconsistent many. This is an 
operation of forming multiplicity into consistent totalities within which knowledge 
and correct (or in Badiou’s terms “veridical”) or incorrect judgments are possible. That 
the many is always subtracted from such results of totalization shows, at least in the 
case of historical totalizations, the contingency and transformability of all figures of 
the one. There are always Truths that remain unknowable within given totalities, and 
the emergence of a new Truth shows the incompleteness of the contingent totality that 
it ruptures.  
 
 
 5.5 The Axiom of Foundation 
 
We can try to further understand the meaning of the void set with the help of 
another law of ontology, that of the Axiom of Foundation. In ZFC set theory in which 
self-referential sets are axiomatically forbidden as a result of the Russell paradox, the 
Axiom of Foundation states that all sets must be founded on other elements already 
there, that is, on other sets than themselves. “As a general rule,” Badiou explains, “the 
being of a multiple is thought on the basis of an operation which indicates how its 
elements originate from another being, whose determination is already effective” 
(Badiou, 2009, pp. 111-112). The Axiom of Foundation forbids the self-foundation of 
sets. Sets ought not be the foundational element of themselves. This Axiom “is the 
ontological proposition which states that every existent multiple — besides the name 
of the void — occurs according to an immanent origin, positioned by the Others which 
belong to it” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 187, my emphasis). The foundational element, “the 
Other” within the situation, “establishes a kind of original finitude” of the situation 
(Badiou, 2006a, p. 186). Hallward gives a “metamathematical,” but illuminative, 
example of the foundational element: a linguistic situation is based on the existence of 
a set of phonemes (Hallward, 2003, p. 88). “Mere sounds” are indiscernible as such 
from the point of view of speaking, because each sound bears meaning according to 
the “laws” of linguistic expression, but they still form the basis of speaking 
meaningfully.55 
 
55 Note, here, the similarity to what Agamben calls “the Voice.” But note also that whereas for 
Badiou, the set is grounded on other sets already there, for Agamben, the Voice is the split within human 
speech itself. This is illustrative of the difference between paradoxico-criticism and the generic 
orientation: whereas sets are founded on a foundational set that does exist as a member of the set it 
founds, but whose own members are external to the founded set, language is founded on an internal 
split of inclusion-exclusion, it is inconsistently self-founding. For Agamben, it is precisely problematic 
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Based on the Axiom of Foundation, set theory may then construct hierarchies 
of sets, each guaranteeing the consistency of others, and the hierarchy is ultimately 
based on the void set alone. There is no “smallest” indecomposable positive element, 
no atom that would halt the structure of foundation, but only the void set. Every count-
as-one is incomplete in that it is based on an element that belongs to it but of the 
content of which (of the elements of which) it cannot know anything with its own 
means of counting. Its operation of the count-as-one is based on a foundational 
element the elements of which remain beyond this operation. There will then be in 
every set, in each count-as-one, an element (a set) that has no elements in common 
with that set it founds. The foundational set belongs to the set it founds, but its own 
members (should it have any; it can namely also be the void set) do not. Ultimately, 
the hierarchy of sets and the regressive investigation into the elements of the elements 
presented in a situation must find a halting point. Given that the one is not, the 
ultimate halting point can then only be the void set. Note that there is no reflexive, 
self-referential drawing of the systemic limit, which always implies a certain 
circularity: determining what belongs to the legal system within that system. For 
Badiou, “the circularity can be undone, and deployed as a hierarchy or stratification. 
This [...] is one of the most profound characteristics of this region of thought: it always 
stratifies successive constructions starting from the point of the void” (Badiou, 2006a, 
p. 376).
Foundational elements are, from the perspective of the situations they found, 
“on the edge of the void”: the inhabitant of the situation cannot discern whether there 
are elements in the foundational set, or whether it is an empty set. Within the founded 
situation, “one cannot think the underside of their [foundational element’s] presented-
Being (Badiou, 2006a, p. 175). Within the situation, the foundational element, which 
has its own elements, and the void set cannot be distinguished. Seen from within the 
immanence of the founded situation, the empty set and the foundational element with 
its own elements “look” the same: opaque. As Baki explains, “[f]or all practical 
purposes, they both mark the event horizon surrounding a black hole. The 
foundational element will be the situation’s own name for the void. Every void must 
be examined with respect to a situation, and every set admits the otherness counted as 
the edge of the void” (Baki, 2015, p. 100). What founds a situation is then anything 
that in the situation in question registers as that what looks “indecomposable” 
(Badiou, 2006a, p. 175), indiscernible and unknowable, and yet as belonging to the 
situation as its “own void.” This highly abstract and technical account of foundation 
will become significant later, when we see that Badiou projects, very imaginatively, 
this set theoretical Axiom onto the field of social orders. In every social order, there is 
an element that “counts as nothing.” The dominant understanding holds such an 
element in no regard. However, it is, crucially, not an empty set but will present itself 
in an act of politics. 
to consider the internal split as consistent, as has been done in the tradition of metaphysics that has 
sought to “mystify” the Voice precisely as something external that grounds language and that can be 
forgotten. 
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The Axiom of Foundation could also be pinpointed as one “site” at which the 
metalogical preference for consistency and incompleteness over inconsistent totality 
appears. The foundational element is precisely the “blind spot” that grounds the 
situation without itself “appearing” in it as what it is. It is the “outer limit” that the 
inhabitant of the situation cannot see, a structural excess that is uncontrollable from 
within the situation. Only from a more encompassing perspective does the 
foundational element come to light, and for Badiou, as we will see in a moment, the 
event is what emerges from the foundational element, by turning it into an “evental 
site.” An event is something that radically breaks with the Axiom of Foundation and 
all other laws of ontology. The cut is clear between the situation in which the 
foundational element counts as nil and the post-evental situation in which it appears 
“maximally.” There emerges a stark opposition between ontology that prohibits 
reflexivity/self-reference and the evental rupture that is reflexive and self-founding.    
5.6 Presentation and representation 
Badiou distinguishes further between presentation and representation. “[A]ll 
situations are structured twice,” he argues (Badiou, 2006a, p. 94). Presentation means 
that an individual element (that, as we remember, is always a set) is counted as an 
element, or member, of another, larger set. Representation, for its part, means that an 
individual element already presented now appears under this or that identity, as 
represented as this or that. Within any set, the elements of that set can be differently 
represented by regrouping, “including,” them into different subsets called “parts.” A 
representation is always “excrescent,” that is, it has more elements than the presented 
situation. “For instance, the set that contains Alain, Bertrand, and Cantor has just 
those three elements, but it has eight subsets or parts. The set containing only Alain 
and Bertrand is one of these parts; another is the set containing only Cantor” 
(Livingston, 2009, p. 314). What Cantor (the person) named the power set “collects 
together all the existing subsets of a particular situation, [...] all the possible ways of 
representing and ‘talking’ about its elements” (Baki, 2015, p. 110).  
Badiou renames the power set, using a deliberately political metaphor, as the 
“state of a situation” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 95). For him, as Norris notes, “there exists a 
close structural homology between, on the one hand, such pressing issues of social 
justice or political representation and, on the other, the sharply distinguished set-
theoretical concepts of part and member, belonging and inclusion, or inconsistent and 
consistent multiplicity” (Norris, 2009, p. 7). The state of the situation, in the context 
of state politics, is “the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, which is not concerned 
with individuals per se as pure elements but only as representatives of groups, be they 
grouped by class, gender, race, professional occupation, sexual preference or what not” 
(Prozorov, 2013a, p. 60). The state of the situation forms a larger situation, a 
metastructure that gives an account of the situation itself, of its count-as-one that is 
the property of membership in it, all the identities and relations that are possible 
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within a situation with certain members. It is a distribution of specific parts to those 
counted into a situation. It targets those who are there, attempting to keep away the 
void, inconsistency and dé-liaision (Badiou, 2006a, p. 109). The unbinding of the 
count-as-one always haunts every presentation, because every situation is incomplete 
and cannot itself secure its own consistency.  
For Badiou, then, “the state is less a result of the consistency of presentation 
than of the danger of inconsistency” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 109): 
The structure of structure is responsible for establishing, in danger of the void, 
that it is universally attested that, in the situation, the one is. Its necessity 
resides entirely in the point that, given that the one is not, it is only on the basis 
of its operational character, exhibited by its double, that the one-effect can 
deploy the guarantee of its own veracity. This veracity is literally the 
fictionalizing of the count via the imaginary being conferred upon it by it 
undergoing, in turn, the operation of a count. (Badiou, 2006a, pp. 94-95, my 
emphasis.) 
The completeness of the initial one-effect is thus definitely, in turn, counted as 
one by the state in the form of its effective whole. 
The state of a situation is the riposte to the void obtained by the count-as-
one of its parts. This riposte is apparently complete, since [...] it generates the 
One-One by numbering structural completeness itself. Thus, for both poles of 
the danger of the void, the in-existent or inconsistent multiple and the 
transparent operationality of the one, the state of the situation proposes a 
clause of closure and security, through which the situation consists according 
to the one. This is certain: the resource of the state alone permits the outright 
affirmation that, in situations, the one is. (Badiou, 2006a, p. 98, my emphasis.) 
To simplify radically: what the state of the situation does is to count-as-one the 
elements of the situation as subsets but also the situation itself (as a subset of itself). 
In this way, it also exhibits the operation of the count-as-one of the prior situation, 
which remains obscure from the point of view of the inhabitant of the situation itself. 
The state of the situation provides, in a sense, a picture of the situation as a count by 
counting its elements (only normal elements, not its foundational element) a second 
time and differently, namely as parts. Representation completes presentation, 
securing it as a one.   
Representation, or “fictionalizing,” is, for Badiou, a consistent set theoretical 
operation of inclusion and thus perfectly “legal” (unlike for Lindahl whose paradox of 
representation we discuss in the next chapter). It is instructive to compare Badiou’s 
state of the situation to Luhmann’s re-entry (the logic of which also applies to Lindahl). 
The latter is a self-reflexive move in which the system observes itself and its own 
distinction from its environment that in mere operation remained a blind spot, 
thereby displacing its own blind spot but not effacing it. The former, by contrast, is a 
construction of a metastructure, a “larger” situation that includes the “smaller” 
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situation and complements it by observing it from an outside position as a consistent 
whole in which every member is at its lawful place and relates to other members in 
lawful ways. Of course, a yet bigger power set can be constructed, ad infinitum, but 
consistency of the “enclosed” set is confirmed by each completing meta-step. The blind 
spot that is the very operation of the count-as-one is, in principle, open to visibility 
from outside.56  
Badiou can then strictly distinguish between pure belonging to the situation 
and being included into the state of the situation; between elements and parts. Making 
these distinctions is not a matter of paradoxical self-identification of a totality. To the 
contrary, for Badiou, representation is a consistent operation of inclusion of a set by 
counting its subsets, by establishing relations between members. It is an operation 
that guarantees for the presentation what it itself cannot: consistent structure of 
presentation. It is from the outside of a situation unable to prove its own consistency 
that this incomplete set itself can be shown consistent. Kelsen’s idea of legal cognition 
could be read to fit this definition of representation, if he is read conventionally, as a 
“constructivist-criteriological” thinker. Scientific legal cognition secures, as a re-count 
of the set of legal norms, the consistency of the system unable to prove it itself, by 
determining the possible lawful relations of the elements (norms) to each other. Legal 
cognition — legal science — exorcizes the ghost of inconsistency (invalidity) from the 
legal system otherwise haunted by it. 
Baki helpfully differentiates between compositional, or semantic, and veridical, 
or syntactic, consistency. Semantic consistency is about consisting together as one of 
the elements of a set. If something is a set, it is a consistent count of its elements; a set 
is defined by its elements. Syntactic consistency is about the logical coherence of an 
axiomatic system (i.e. it does not involve any paradoxes). Gödel’s Completeness 
Theorem (unlike his Incompleteness Theorem, see Introduction)57 states that these 
two forms of consistency coincide. (Baki 2015, pp. 57-58, 121) Baki further explains:   
A presented multiple is consistent not just because it consists together but also 
because its structure is logically and internally coherent, provided that its 
horizon of veracity is articulated by some interpretative formalism that is the 
“fictionalizing” of the first count-as-one [i.e. by a representation, a 
metastructure; HL]. The veridical statements within a situation do not 
contradict each other because the domain of the situation constitutes a set. [...]  
The situation is consistent, but it cannot be verified as such from within its own 
56 Luhmann says, of course, also that “you can see what I cannot see,” that my blind spot is 
visible to an external observer, but nevertheless, for him, this does not prohibit self-reference and 
dynamic reflexivity. 
57 The implication of the Second Incompleteness Theorem is that ZFC set theory as a whole is 
itself incapable of proving its own consistency. It presupposes its own consistency but is incomplete, as 
it cannot prove it. From a Badiouan perspective, this relates to the relative consistency proof that we 
discussed above: ontology is based on axiomatic decisions that open, as events, the space for their 
articulation by a faithful subject in an infinite truth procedure that bit by bit constructs an internally 
coherent mathematical universe. “When coupled with Badiou’s decision that ZFC forms the a priori 
conditions for ontology, the Incompleteness Theorems of Gödel establish the necessity for there to be 
subjects” (Baki, 2015, p. 94). This holds, for Badiou, in strict homology to politics, as well. 
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immanence. The exigency, then, is to step outside of the situation itself into a 
separate situation, the state. The metastructure corresponding to the state 
allows the situation to be represented and statements to be posited. The logical 
consistency of all the veridical statements is equivalent to the compositional 
consistency of the situation. (Baki, 2015, pp. 121-122) 
 
From within the immanence of the situation, it can be seen as consistent 
because its count does not contradict itself. It counts only and all its members, not 
both members and non-members. This is compositional, or semantic, consistency. 
From within the larger, representing situation, the consistency of this very operation 
of counting itself can be guaranteed. This is veridical, or syntactic, consistency. 
 
 
5.7 Extensionalism and constructivism 
 
Furthermore, since, as mentioned, the power set (the state of the situation) is 
always “bigger” than the original set, there is, for Badiou, an excess of representation, 
of re-counting-as-one, over mere presentation. There is an excess of inclusion with 
regard to mere belonging (this is called the “theorem of the point of excess”) (Badiou, 
2006a, p. 98). Also, in Badiou’s account of representation, representation does not 
mirror anything. It is an excess with regard to the presentation of the elements of the 
situation and does not correspond point-to-point with it. As Prozorov explains: 
 
[t]he metastructure does not simply provide representation to the already 
existing subsets of the situation, but rather establishes a certain positive 
distribution of subsets, which it must then secure from the disintegration into 
elements and a possible recomposition into ‘illegal’ subsets, whose existence is 
not validated by the metastructural recount. (Prozorov, 2008, p. 190)  
 
The ways in which, say, a population of a nation can be represented are, for 
Badiou, in principle infinite, although “most” of them would be, of course, completely 
irrelevant, or “illegal,” from the point of view of politics and law, such as combining 
into a set all those who have long hair. Each state of the situation seeks to secure, in 
such a historical situation, a certain, contingent but fixed metastructure that holds the 
present members at their “proper” places (“nature” or “natural situations” are 
somewhat different (see Badiou, 2006a, pp. 130-141)).  
For Badiou, there are thus no natural criteria for creating groups out of 
elements — contrary to what “intesionalist” and “intuitive” positions in set theory 
would argue (see Hallward, 2003, p. 87). Indeed, in contemporary standard set theory, 
sets are understood extensionally, as defined by their elements, rather than 
intensionally, as defined by a prior concept, such as “being an even number,” “being 
French,” or “being a legal norm.” Two sets are simply the same if their members are 
the same. In logic, “intension” is the definition of a concept or a term, its content. For 
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example, “law” can be intensionally defined as “a system of rules that a particular 
community recognizes as binding on its members.” “Extension” is, by contrast, the 
domain of application of the term that encompasses all the objects that fall within it. 
Criminal law, public law, national law, international law, religious law, rules of a game 
etc. constitute the extension of the term (set) “law.” In set theory, extensionalism is 
pushed to its extreme, as its central term, “set,” is not defined at all. It is simply the 
count-as-one of inconsistent multiplicity and not tied to any intuitions about given 
classes of objects that all share some property, like that of being a law. A set is a 
collection of whatever elements, with no presuppositions about how things “naturally” 
fall into classes of objects.  
The preference of extensionalism relates back to Russell’s paradox, as it is 
precisely the intensionally defined set, the set defined by, say, the concept of the legal 
norm, that gives rise to the paradox. The paradox emerges, let us repeat, when we 
notice that such a set does not itself bear the predicate that defines it – the set of legal 
norms is not itself a legal norm – and then ask after the consistency of the set of all 
such sets that are not members of themselves (see Badiou, 2006a, pp. 39-42). 
Contemporary axiomatic and extensional set theory responds to the problem of the 
paradox by stipulating that a set is simply the members it presents, nothing more, not 
pre-defined by any linguistic concept or property that all the members ought to hold. 
Furthermore, due to the Axiom of Foundation, the self-membership of a set cannot 
arise. A set is not defined but merely stated in terms of the belonging relation that can 
be anything at all and does not require any predicates that its elements would share. 
An extensional set is like all the fish, seaweed and trash that the fisher’s net collects, 
with no common denominator except being caught by the net (Hallward, 2003, p. 
333). All predicates like “being an even number” or “being a legal norm” are added to, 
and thus presuppose, the elemental belonging relation (see Baki, 2015, p. 44). 
The intensionalist definition, the Russell paradox and Russell’s proposed 
solution to it are also related to mathematical constructivism. Constructivism, as 
already mentioned, equates language and existence: only what can be named in a well-
formed language, exists. The language and its metalanguage police the limit between 
the sayable and the unsayable, and form the measure of existence (see 1.3.4). 
Constructivism, so understood, pretends to be, Badiou argues, “the master of the 
multiple” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 40). For constructivism, “Being can never be in excess of 
language, or at least any sufficiently well-constructed logical language” (Baki, 2015, p. 
44, my emphasis). What characterizes constructivism, according to Badiou, is “the 
refusal to pursue contradictions to their ultimate (potentially transformative) upshot” 
(Norris, 2013, p. 72). As Christopher Norris notes, for Badiou, the constructivist 
solution to the set theoretical paradox:  
falls short of the rigour required of any adequate set-theoretical or indeed any 
adequate philosophical address to the issues involved. Indeed, [it] always seeks 
to accommodate any problematical instances — anything of an exceptional, 
paradoxical, anomalous, contradictory or logically recalcitrant nature — just so 
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long as its threat can be neutralised or its disruptive potential disarmed by some 
such face-saving move. (Norris, 2013, p. 71) 
 
The constructivist orientation understands truth as strictly internal to a 
conceptual scheme, language or system. Remember that Badiou thinks about sets as 
presenting consistently a prior multiplicity, which is itself inconsistent and unordered 
by any “natural” concepts or language. Against the anti-realist constructivist position 
that prioritizes (as we saw with Luhmann) epistemology and according to which well-
defined languages determine what can intelligibly exist and what can count as true, 
Badiou affirms, with mathematics, the ontological priority of the inconsistent, the 
non-structured multiplicity beyond every possible knowledge. As Norris notes:  
 
it is a chief motivation of Badiou’s whole project to challenge what he sees as 
the strictly preposterous or back-to-front order of priorities that finds no place 
for ontology except as a derivative or secondary field of enquiry subject to the 
scope and limits of human epistemic grasp, and which then looks to language 
— very often conceived in radically holistic or cultural-contextualist terms — as 
the ultimate horizon of knowledge or intelligibility. (Norris, 2012, p. 61)  
 
Badiou then asserts, with extensional set theory, the ontological primacy of the 
multiple without concept, and leaves the notion of the set undefined, only stating that 
it simply corresponds to the belonging relation. What follows from this, for Badiou, is, 
as Livingston notes, that all extant languages and systems are incomplete: they 
presuppose the truth of the prior inconsistent multiplicity radically outside them. This 
constitutes the core of Badiou’s “realism.”  
The critique of constructivism has also an important political register in 
Badiou’s work. His aim is precisely to show that the regimentation of being by well-
formed languages and the representation they provide of the presented being cannot 
be fully policed. For Badiou, the metastructure of a historical situation is strictly 
contingent and has no necessity to it whatsoever. He wants to show formally how the 
structuring by a language of a situation can be demonstrated incomplete, excluding 
what he calls “the truth,” which makes the political rupture of a “state control” of a 
situation possible. Badiou will indeed wager that the gap between presentation and 
representation, situation and its State, cannot ultimately be controlled by any further 
system of measure (Badiou, 2006a, p. 278). There is no ultimate metastructure able 
to guarantee that a historical situation, with its inclusions and exclusions, is fully just. 
If this is the case, the event is thinkable and can take place.  
What Badiou posits as not holding is known in set theory as the Continuum 
Hypothesis, which is (at least for now) an independent and undecidable hypothesis: it 
has neither been proved nor refuted. We will, of course, not enter the complicated 
mathematics behind this Hypothesis, but can understand it here minimally as 
suggesting that the relationship between an infinite set and its infinite power set can 
be regulated by a system of measure. The position in favor of the Hypothesis is, for 
Badiou, is a constructivist position: everything would ultimately be regulated by a 
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system of measure, which would mean the re-introduction of the complete and 
consistent Universe. The immeasurability of the relation of the situation and its 
representation, and the rejection of the Hypothesis, is again a decision in a situation 
of undecidability. It is a wager that, according to Badiou, makes the event thinkable.58 
5.8 Equality and thinking 
We will come back to the general discussion concerning the differences between 
constructivist, generic and paradoxico-critical orientations, as well as the significance 
of these differences for legal theory, at the end of this chapter. Let us now advance to 
look in more detail at Badiou’s theory of the event in a political register.  
Badiou asserts, with set theory, the excess of representation over presentation. 
This implies that there are always some beings in a situation that are not properly 
represented by the state. For this reason, they form a potential “evental site” from 
which the rupture of the authoritative representation may occur — a rupture that the 
state always seeks to prevent. Badiou continues the Marxist tradition that prefers 
presentation over representation, struggles toward “the end of representation and the 
universality of simple presentation” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 108). For Badiou, the Marxist 
analysis of class society and the differential representation of class interests by the 
State exposed “a profound idea”:   
the State is not founded upon the social bond, which it would express, but 
rather upon un-binding, which it prohibits. Or, to be more precise, the 
separation of the State is less a result of the consistency of presentation than of 
the danger of inconsistency. This idea goes back to Hobbes of course (the war 
of all against all necessitates an absolute transcendental authority) and it is 
fundamentally correct in the following form: if, in a situation (historical or not), 
it is necessary that the parts be counted by a metastructure, it is because their 
excess over the terms, escaping the initial count, designates a potential place 
for the fixation of the void. It is thus true that the separation of the State pursues 
the integrality of the one-effect beyond the terms which belong to the situation, 
to the point of the mastery, which it ensures, of included multiples: so that the 
void and the gap between the count and the counted do not become identifiable, 
so that the inconsistency that consistency is does not come to pass. (Badiou, 
2006a, p. 109, original emphasis.) 
58 Baki discusses, understandably for non-mathematicians, the Continuum Hypothesis and 
Badiou’s take on it (Baki, 2015, pp. 130-132, 164-165). He also explains Cohen’s proof according to 
which the negation of the Continuum Hypothesis is consistent with ZFC, which established it as an 
undecidable. This is important for Badiou’s philosophy of “forcing” (Baki, 2015, pp. 169ff.). Livingston 
and Hallward, for example, discuss Badiou’s interpretation critically (Livingston, 2012, pp. 192-197; 
Hallward, 2003). 
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 This resonates with our analysis of the sovereign immunologic and the attempt 
of a system to render inconsistency invisible. The threat is the inconsistency and the 
unbinding of the presentation: the dissolution of social order. This is an always-
present possibility, given that it is precisely inconsistent multiplicity that is the very 
“stuff” of presentation, that what it presents as a consistent one. The State is founded, 
according to Badiou, on the logic of preserving the presentation from its unbinding 
and “return” to the void, and this requires keeping the contingent gap there is between 
presentation and representation as invisible as possible: “the function of the State is 
to number inclusions such that consistent belongings be preserved” (Badiou, 2006a, 
p. 109). As Hallward notes, “[t]he normal regime of a situation is structured in
precisely such a way as to preserve an essential ignorance or ‘unconsciousness’
[inconscience] of its void” (Hallward, 2003, p. 102).
It is this preservation of consistency that the event must break. For Badiou, the 
State, and hence representation, is “precisely non-political, insofar as it cannot change, 
save hands, and it is well known that there is little strategic significance in such a 
change” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 110). The event reveals what the State seeks to hide: the 
inconsistent multiplicity that each situation counts-as-one. For Badiou, politics is 
always about “a politics of emancipation [that] does not have the State as its ultimate 
referent, but instead the particularity of people’s lives, or people as they appear in the 
public space” (Badiou, 2005, pp. 92-93). The political question, for Badiou, “is how 
people are counted by the state. Are they counted equally? Are some counted less than 
others, or hardly counted at all? [...] It is through this kind of question that [...] 
democracy exists as a real and active figure, and not merely as a juridical, 
constitutional mechanism” (Badiou, 2001, p. 102). Badiou thus argues in favor of what 
we in Chapter 4 called “the double inscription of the political”: politics is in no sense 
reducible to the constitutionally entrenched mechanisms of parliamentary politics (as 
it is for Luhmann). It must, rather, be understood in terms of an always particular 
process of a “fidelity to the event” that takes place in a concrete situation. For Badiou, 
the parliamentary democracy is, “when all is said and done, what Marx called an 
‘authorized representative’ of capital” (Badiou, 2001, p. 99). It is Badiou’s conviction 
that today’s quintessential political question — “What kind of politics is really 
heterogenous to what capital demands?” — cannot be posed within such a system 
(Badiou, 2001, p. 106). 
Let us take this gradually. Given the theorem of the point of excess, that is, the 
lack of point-to-point correspondence between presentation and representation, we 
can further see that different combinations of presentation and representation are 
possible. “I will call normal,” Badiou says, “a term which is both presented and 
represented. I will call excrescence a term which is represented but not presented. 
Finally, I will term Singular a term which is presented but not represented” (Badiou, 
2006a, p. 99). We have then the possible combinations of both membership and 
inclusion, inclusion without membership, and membership without inclusion. The 
event has its foundation in the Singular, in the member that is presented but not 
represented. Let us focus, in the following, on the Singular. 
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As said, for Badiou, all historical situations are founded on an element that 
counts as nothing within the situation. It is not a normal element that both belongs to 
the situation and is included in the state of the situation. This element thus escapes 
from representation: “it is that upon which the state’s metastructure has no hold. It is 
a point of subtraction from the state’s re-securing of the count” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 
174). The foundational element cannot be represented because of its invisibility within 
the original situation, and representation can only re-count normal elements. 
Therefore, the foundational element is the weak point in the state’s attempt to keep 
the situation consistent. One of Badiou’s favorite examples are the undocumented 
migrants, les sans papiers, present on the French soil but unrepresented by the French 
State (see Badiou, 2001, pp. 96-105). If one counts the elements of the set “France” 
one by one, at some point one encounters its “foundational element,” an element that 
is there but somehow obscure, as if it was not really there. This element, in the 
situation that is France, is, for Badiou, the sans papiers. They belong to France as 
limit-elements the presence of which is not fully recognized and that the State does 
not represent in its categorizations of the population present on the French soil in any 
other way but negatively, as “social problems” and “economic migrants” that “ought to 
be sent home.” The state of France is built on the constitutive irrepresentability of the 
immigrant worker as an equal citizen. It thrives on his/her dispossession. In his later 
work, Logics of Worlds, Badiou re-names the foundational element that is but does 
not appear (is not represented) in the world as its inexistent (Badiou, 2009, pp. 321-
324). The inexistent, he writes, “is in the world a being whose being is attested but 
whose existence is not. Or a being who happens ‘there’ as nothingness” (Badiou, 2009, 
p. 343). Given an object that appears in a world, such as “being a citizen,” then the
sans papiers are the proper inexistent of that object, beings who do not appear as
citizens, whose appearance as citizens equal to others is of minimal degree.
However, the foundational element can turn into the site of the taking place of 
an event (Badiou, 2006a, p. 176). If the second count seeks to stabilize the consistency 
of the first count, it can nevertheless not abolish inconsistency, which is what Being-
qua-Being ultimately is. Inconsistent multiplicity is, or so Badiou wagers, primary and 
indestructible. The event is about the irruption of primal inconsistency within the 
double count-as-one, making its contingent articulation and unification of multiplicity 
visible. It makes visible that all social wholes exist as results of a contingent operation 
of a distribution of parts. What the foundational-element-turned-into-the-evental-
site, such as sans papiers’ political protests, discloses are the unjust implications of 
such operations and the gap between representation and presentation. It exposes that 
there are beings with no recognized presence and to whom no secure position within 
the social whole is granted; beings who are excluded from law’s protections, left 
without equal rights and legally secured access to the job market, state and its 
institutions; and beings who are included merely as a “social problem” without a 
secure access to the state within which these beings nevertheless are.  
These political protests seek to make visible that the claim of the state to 
guarantee the consistency of the situation by counting all its elements fails, that the 
states’ claim to equal treatment of all members is a false one (Norris, 2009, p. 92). Not 
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everyone who is present is equally recognized as such nor counted in institutionally. 
This constitutes, the protesters claim, an injustice, a violation of the universal truth of 
equality of anyone with everyone. What happens in a political event, is, for Badiou, 
that belonging and inclusion are exposed as contingent articulations of inconsistent 
multiplicity and their unjust effects are challenged in the name of universal equality. 
Indeed, if inconsistent multiplicity is primary, if extensionalism holds and beings 
cannot be categorized by intrinsic properties, challenging contingent unifications as 
unjust is simultaneously about re-affirming one’s primary truth, equality, by 
subtracting oneself from all unequalizing measures. “Finally to count as one that 
which is not even counted is what is at stake in every genuinely political thought, every 
prescription that summons the collective as such” (Badiou, 2005, p. 150). 
Political event (just like other events that, for Badiou, can be scientific, artistic 
or amorous) is about the presentation of the nothing of a situation. Just like the 
determination of the primacy of inconsistent multiplicity over figures of the One is, for 
Badiou, a decision taken in conditions of undecidability, and not a logical deduction 
from true premises, also the political event shares this axiomatic grounding. What 
counts as nothing cannot be directly presented in ontology. Events are always 
localized in particular situations (they are not other-worldly), they always challenge a 
particular situation and its state, although it is precisely that what cannot register 
within it (Badiou, 2006a, p. 178). Insofar as ontology precisely is about unification of 
inconsistent multiplicity, about measuring it, unmeasured equality does not and 
cannot register within it. Badiou’s argument that constructivism is not all there is, that 
not everything can be proved by existing forms of knowledge and expressed in well-
formed languages adds the supplement of “truth” to what can be verified as 
ontologically legitimate in an extant situation. He distinguishes between epistemology 
and the event, between knowledge, “[w]hat transmits, what repeats,” that is always 
ontological and produced by the state of the situation in its organization of the parts, 
and truth which surpasses ontology as something “new.” The problem for thinking 
about truth, or novelty, is its “becoming,” its emergence (Badiou, 2004, p. 61). 
Thinking breaks with repetition and what extant knowledge can prove correct. 
Just like the mathematical breakthrough that was the birth of contemporary axiomatic 
set theory attests to the powers of thought beyond what can be epistemologically 
recognized as correct, also political events attest to the generic, universal human 
capacity of thought. Thinking (or philosophy) and politics are not the same, but they 
both attest to the universal capacity of human beings to discern a truth in conditions 
of its epistemic unrecognizability. Badiou writes: 
Some political orientations, throughout history, have had or will have a 
connection with a truth, a truth of the collective as such. They are rare attempts, 
often brief, but they are the only ones under [the] condition [of which] 
philosophy can think about. These political sequences are singularities, they 
trace no destiny, they construct no monumental history. Philosophy can, 
however, distinguish in them a common feature. This feature is that these 
orientations require of the people they engage only their strict generic 
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humanity. They give no preference, for the principles of action, to the 
particularity of interests. These political orientations induce a representation of 
the collective capacity which refers its agents to the strictest equality.  
What does “equality” mean? Equality means that the political actor is 
represented under the sole sign of his specifically human capacity. Interest is 
not a specifically human capacity. All living beings have as an imperative for 
survival the protection of their interests. The specifically human capacity is 
precisely thought, and thought is nothing other than that by which the path of 
a truth seizes and traverses the human animal.  
Thus a political orientation worthy of being submitted to philosophy under 
the idea of justice is an orientation whose unique general axiom is: people 
think, people are capable of truth. (Badiou, 1999, p. 29, my emphasis.) 
“Equality” here is nothing “objective,” Badiou says, it is not about equality of 
income, status or even rights. “It is a political maxim, a prescription. Political equality 
is not what we want or plan, it is what we declare under fire of the event, here and now, 
as what is, and not what should be” (Badiou, 1999, p. 30). Equality is an axiomatic 
truth that is declared in conditions that do not allow for its recognition. Just like with 
the mathematical axioms, the axiom of equality is not defined, it is not given content 
(or, as we will see, it will be given content later on, in the subjective process of “forcing” 
its truth in a situation). “Thought, on this point, cannot use the scholastic method of 
definitions. It must follow the method of the understanding of an axiom,” Badiou 
argues (Badiou, 1999, p. 30). Defining equality is what the state does, and by doing so, 
it betrays the maxim, turning equality into a management of interests and identity 
groups.  
Badiou affirms, with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, that “equality is politics, such 
that, a contrario, any in-egalitarian statement, whatever it be, is anti political” 
(Badiou, 2006a, p. 347). Equality is extensional: it collects in a generic set all (human) 
beings simply as equal, without any predicates that would introduce differences 
between them. “Generic humanity” is humanity without identity predicates that 
distribute human beings into different, hierarchically organized categories (“men,” 
“women,” “black,” “white,” etc.). The universal community of equals is the political 
homologue to inconsistent multiplicity in ontology. Just like the nothing, such a 
community cannot be a positively existing one. It cannot have a positive form, as we 
now know that the Universal Community of all human beings with no excess, a 
complete and consistent One, is impossible. It is rather what is subtracted from every 
positive figure of community in a political sequence that interrupts the inequalities 
and injustices that such a community produces:  
We have too often wished that justice find the consistency of the social tie, while 
it can only name the most extreme moments of inconsistency. For the effect of 
the equalitarian axiom is to undo the ties, to desocialize thought, to affirm the 
rights of the infinite and the immortal against finitude, against Being-for-death. 
In the subjective dimension of the equality that is declared, nothing else is of 
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interest except the universality of this declaration, and the active consequences 
that it gives rise to. (Badiou, 1999, p. 32) 
The generic humanity and axiomatic equality are affirmed against a finite, 
positive organization of beings and the injustice that a state of the situation implies, 
against its false claim that it represents equally all beings that there are. It is to affirm 
what is infinite, irreducible to any finite collective formation, and universal, shared by 
all as human beings, against the inequalities of the situation. To act politically is to 
think about the truth of equality of anyone with everyone that is unrecognizable within 
the state of the situation and the knowledge it can provide of its members and their 
parts. It is to present the member who counts as nothing as an equal, disidentifying it 
from the place (the void) it is made to hold in the situation. 
5.9 The paradoxical self-nomination of the event 
To break with the nullification of equality within a positive order, the event 
must break so completely (using classical logic that we discuss in a moment) with the 
situation and its metastructure that it is, in fact, initially completely indiscernible and 
unnamable within it. Ontologically, there are no events: an event transgresses 
ontology, is ontologically (set theoretically) formalizable only in an unacceptable 
matrix, namely as an inconsistent, self-belonging set (Badiou, 2006a, pp. 189-190). 
Up until the formulation of the event, Badiou’s ontology is fully in conformity with 
constructivism the insufficiency of which Badiou nevertheless seeks to show with the 
theory of the event. In contrast to the consistent situation, an event is inconsistent: it 
cannot be proved in terms of the situation to have taken place; “ontology declares that 
the event is not” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 190). It can only take place as a supplement to 
being (Badiou, 2006a, p. 17).  
The event cannot be said to happen simply in the now because of its 
unrecognizability within the frame of recognizability offered by the situation. “If it is 
possible to decide, using the rules of established knowledge, whether this statement 
[that an event is taking place] is true or false, then the so-called event is not an event. 
Its occurrence would be calculable within the situation” (Badiou, 2004, p. 62). The 
political sequence that first recognizes the significance of a social movement as a 
political event that affirms the axiom of equality, and then traces its implications, 
begins with a decision to affirm that the event is, in fact, taking place. This requires 
naming the event as an event by those who take part in it. The event lacks a context of 
recognition, so the only way for it to indicate its happening is reflexive: self-
nomination. The event must name itself. Those who recognize themselves as taken by 
it must indicate this and give it a name, like “Paris Commune” or “French revolution.” 
Beginning of a political sequence is the paradoxical self-nomination of the event.  
“I term event of the site X a multiple such that it is composed of on the one 
hand, elements of the site, and on the other hand, itself” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 179). The 
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event is self-founding, and this ejects it outside ontology regulated by the Axion of 
Foundation, which posits that each set is based on “an Other” at the edge of the void. 
Such Otherness is lacking from the event: the event has “no Other in itself, no element 
of [a] such that its intersection with [a] was void” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 190). An event is 
fully self-sustaining vis-à-vis the situation in which it nevertheless takes place, by 
transforming the Other of the situation, its foundational element, into an evental site, 
that is, into a set that counts its elements and itself. No “constituted order” sustains 
such an evental set and regulates its meaning, Badiou argues; the only option left to 
get the event off the ground is self-reference, self-declaration: a self-constitution.  
What exactly took place in March 18
th
, 1871, when the French government 
forces disarmed rebellious workers? “The answer is,” for Badiou, “the appearance of 
worker-being — up until then a social symptom, the brute force of uprisings or a 
theoretical threat — in the space of political and governmental capacity” (Badiou, 
2009, p. 365). March 18
th
, 1871 appears, retroactively, as “the fulminant and entirely 
unpredictable beginning of a break with the very thing that regulates its [worker-
being’s] appearance” (Badiou, 2009, p. 365). It appears as the beginning of the 
political sequence that was the Paris Commune. For Emilios Christodoulidis, “the 
intriguing moment here in Badiou’s thinking is the contrast of the structuring function 
to what ‘in-consists’ and the question over what it means to ‘be’ but not ‘be counted-
for-one’, not situated, but in-consistent” (Christodoulidis, 2011, p. 134, original 
emphasis). In-consistence — the appearance of what cannot be contained within the 
state of the situation — is about breaking the laws of ontology and appearance in a way 
that opens the possibility for a previously invisible and unheard-of articulation of 
reality to suddenly appear.  
Besides the Paris Commune, another paradigmatic example (to which the 
Commune was “faithful”) is the French Revolution: 
 
One could certainly say that the event “the French Revolution” forms a one out 
of everything which makes up its site; that is, France between 1789 and, let’s 
say, 1794. There you’ll find the electors of the General Estates, the peasants of 
the Great Fear, the sans-culottes of the towns, the members of the Convention, 
the Jacobin clubs, the soldiers of the draft, but also, the price of subsistence, the 
guillotine, the effects of the tribunal, the mas-sacres, the English spies, the 
Vendeans, the assignats (banknotes), the theatre, the Marseillaise, etc. The 
historian ends up including in the event “the French Revolution” everything 
delivered by the epoch as traces and facts. This approach, however — which is 
the inventory of all the elements of the site — may well lead to the one of the 
event being undone to the point of being no more than the forever infinite 
numbering of the gestures, things and words that co-existed with it. The halting 
point for this dissemination is the mode in which the Revolution is a central 
term of the Revolution itself; that is, the manner in which the conscience of the 
times — and the retroactive intervention of our own — filters the entire site 
through the one of its evental qualification. (Badiou, 2006a, p. 180, original 
emphasis.) 
197 
What is at stake in revolution is its very taking place itself that the State refuses. 
While all these different elements can be readily recognized as “historical facts” — they 
belong to the motley set that is the situation — what escapes this dissemination and 
cataloguing is the taking place of the French Revolution. No catalogue of events can 
disclose the Event itself; “its belonging to the situation of its site is undecidable from 
the standpoint of the situation itself” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 181, emphasis omitted). The 
mere extensional set of elements presented is not enough to filter out the revolution: 
reflexivity is needed to pinpoint — indicate, name — that a political collective has 
emerged. Only the self-nomination of the event can begin to subtract a truth from the 
mere dissemination of facts. A regress that looks for the foundational element is blind 
to the event that transgresses the Axiom of Foundation. For Badiou, “a truth is always 
that which makes a hole in a knowledge” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 327). That the event is 
actually taking place is undecidable in the situation in which it takes place, and for this 
reason its happening can only be a matter of a wager, a decision, that the event is 
indeed taking place: only a decision to name can begin to mark the gap between the 
consistent ontological situation and the political event (Badiou, 2006a, p. 201).  
An event can only retroactively be seen to have taken place, and such retroactive 
temporality is the time of the subject and fidelity to the event. As Badiou says, “a site 
is only ‘evental’ insofar as it is retroactively qualified as such by the occurrence of an 
event” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 179). The temporality of the event is the difficult time of 
retroaction and future anterior. As Hallward puts it, “evental nomination is the 
creation of terms that, without referents in the situation as it stands, express elements 
that will have been presented in a new situation to come, that is, in the situation 
considered, hypothetically, once it has been transformed by truth” (Hallward, 2003, 
p. 124). Workers’ auto-nomination as the revolutionaries and self-representation as
equals, as political actors and not as a mere social class, bring as a fleeting event into
the present a future that, were it realized, would transform the extant state of the
situation within which the political workers equal to other citizens count as nil. To
keep this presentation of equality alive, the political subject faithful to the trace of the
event must pick up this truth and force it into reality.
5.10 The three negations: the event’s classical logic 
We can then agree with Hallward when he says that for Badiou, 
[w]hatever the circumstances, the struggle for truth takes place on the terrain
first occupied by the state. It involves a way of conceiving and realizing the
excess of parts over elements in a properly revolutionary (or disordered, or
inconsistent) way, a way that will allow the open equality of free association to
prevail over an integration designed to preserve a transcendent unity.




The radicality of the event is about the irruption of inconsistency within a 
consistent situation. It remains strictly unknowable within the epistemological limits 
of this situation. Badiou’s metalogical preference allows him to draw a stark contrast 
— one of classical logic in which both the principle of contradiction and the principle 
of the excluded middle hold — between the context and the novelty. Things are black 
and white, at least in the best of cases when the event of politics resonates to the 
maximum: P against non-P, with no third options. Badiou explains:  
 
In my philosophical vision, in a given world, we have something new only if the 
rational or conventional laws of this world are interrupted, or put out of their 
normal effects, by something which happens, and that I name an Event. Clearly, 
the consequences of this event sustain a negative relationship to the laws of the 
world. [...] So we can say that a truth [...] is a part of the world, because it is a 
set of consequences of the event in the world, and not outside. But [...] we can 
[also] say that a truth is like a negation of the world, because the event itself is 
subtracted from the rational or conventional laws of the world. We can 
summarize all that in one sentence: A truth is a transgression of the law. 
“Transgression” first signifies that a truth depends on the law, and second is 
nevertheless a negation of the law. (Badiou, 2008b, p. 1878) 
 
A truth, such as a declaration of equality, always takes place within a situation 
defined by, among other things, positive legal determinations of equality (such as by 
legal rights to citizenship or vote), but it is about transgressing the possibilities 
recognized by the law, and therefore going beyond the law. In this sense of 
transgression and negation of the law, Badiou’s politics is post-juridical.  
Badiou lists, in an essay titled “The Three Negations,” three different 
combinations of the principles of negation, namely the interdiction of contradiction 
(not both P and non-P) and the excluded middle (either P or non-P). The first is 
classical logic, in which both principles hold, the second intuitionist logic, in which 
only the principle of contradiction holds, and the third paraconsistent logic, in which, 
according to Badiou, only the principle of the excluded middle holds. “[T]he potency 
of negation is weaker and weaker when you go from one to three[, b]ecause the 
destructive power of negation diminishes,” Badiou claims (Badiou, 2008b, p. 1879). 
As it turns out, for Badiou, paraconsistent logic, the one which accepts paradox, gives 
the weakest force to negation.    
Let us see why this is the case. Ontology (set theory), Badiou begins, obeys 
classical logic in which both principles are true. A set is defined, as we saw, 
extensionally, through its members. This implies that “[t]wo multiplicities are 
different if and only if there is some element of one multiplicity which is not an element 
of the other.” The set P and the set of everything that does not belong to P can be clearly 
formulated: “P and non-P have nothing in common” (Badiou, 2008b, p. 1880). The 
principle of non-contradiction holds, because there is nothing that would be both P 
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and non-P. There is also no space, so to speak, between P and non-P, but everything 
falls either to P or to non-P. The principle of the excluded middle holds.   
In his later work Logics of Worlds, Badiou supplements his metaontology of 
Being and Event with a formal theory of appearance and existence, and this brings 
into view other forms of negation than the classical one. Badiou calls this theory 
“objective phenomenology”: it is a theory of appearance, of logic of phenomena, just 
like classical, Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology. “The law of things is to 
be qua pure multiplicities (as things) but, equally, to be there qua appearing (as 
objects)” (Badiou, 2011, p. 49). However, unlike the classical versions of 
phenomenology, Badiou abandons the presupposition of the transcendental subject 
and existing (human) Dasein, the lived dimension of appearance as experienced by 
someone (Badiou, 2009, p. 38; Badiou, 2011, pp. 44-46). He argues for a mathematical 
(based on category theory) and hence “objective” ontology that has no use for the 
transcendental subject of classical phenomenology.  
Badiou will now focus on ontological situations as “worlds,” as the localizations 
of “being-there,” as “places” in which objects come to appear and exist in different 
degrees of intensity. He re-defines metastructure as “the transcendental,” the 
structure that assigns degrees of appearance within a world to those beings that belong 
to it. The transcendental is, for a situation, “the law of its appearing” (Badiou, 2009, 
p. 101), and it is what accounts for the immanent consistency and coherence of the
world in question. Badiou writes: “our operational phenomenology identifies the
condition of possibility for the worldliness of a world, or the logic of the localization
for the being-there of any being whatever” (Badiou, 2009, p. 103). Each world, be it
the Heideggerian workshop, the world of law or “end of an autumn afternoon in the
country” (Badiou, 2009, p. 139), has its own transcendental order that structures
(“indexes”) how beings may come to appear within it, as what they appear and with
which relations to other beings, and what remains inexistent or inapparent within it.
“Consistency” means here “consisting together of beings as a world,” regulated 
by a specific transcendental order or law of appearance. The logic that regulates this 
consisting is not necessarily classical but rather intuitionistic, because appearance 
may take different degrees. Something may appear more or less intensely; beings have 
different degrees of existence. Some beings “appear” as inexistent altogether. One of 
Badiou’s examples of the degrees of appearance is the red of the ivy on the wall at 
sunset: during the time the light fades away, the red of the leaves neither “continues 
to shine forth” nor does it not continue to shine forth: the classical opposition does not 
aptly capture the subtle changes in the intensity of this color relative to the amount of 
light (Badiou, 2009, p. 184). For a “daydreamer reclining between two trees [...] the 
presence of the other trees [is but] a blurred haze behind the leaves s/he is so intently 
gazing at[.] Any one plane tree within this surrounding rippling blur is an inexistent 
of the world” (Badiou, 2011, p. 59).  
Against this background of “objective phenomenology,” Badiou then states: 
if the great field of the law is always a concrete world, or a concrete construction, 
its logic is not classic. [...] If the sentence P is “guilty,” and non-P “innocent,” 
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we have always a great number of intermediate values, like “guilty with 
attenuating circumstances,” or “innocent because certainly guilty, but with 
insufficient proof,” and so on. (Badiou, 2008b, p. 1881)   
With Luhmann we could say that law does, however, retain from classical logic 
its code — things are for it either legal or illegal — but law’s programs “dilute” the 
harshness of the classical affirmation and negation by putting in place conditions for 
the code’s application such that we then have an intuitionist logic as Badiou describes, 
with different degrees of the intensity of existence and appearance of objects such as 
“being guilty.”  
We already noted that for Badiou, “[a] truth is a transgression of the law. 
‘Transgression’ first signifies that a truth depends on the law, and second is 
nevertheless a negation of the law” (Badiou, 2008b, p. 1878). Although a world of law 
might be regulated by a logic that allows for different degrees of appearance, what 
politics is fundamentally about is to bring to maximal appearance a being that exists 
only minimally within a world, its degree of appearance being zero. With the event, 
the classical logic returns: “The equalitarian axiom is present in political statements, 
or it is not present. And by consequence, we are within justice, or we are not. Which 
also means: the political exists, in the sense that philosophy encounters its thought 
within it, or it does not” (Badiou, 1999, p. 30).  
From the perspective of the state or the transcendental of a world, there is no 
such thing as, to use Badiou’s own favorite example, “political proletariat,” but the 
becoming political of the workers is the event that in some way happens in the 
situation/world despite its being strictly impossible to perceive according to the laws 
that regulate appearance in it. Badiou describes the Spring 1871 in France, prior to the 
emergence of the Paris Commune:  
[T]he historical consistency of this world, split and unbound by the
consequences of the war, rests on the prevailing conviction about the
inexistence of a proletarian governmental capacity. For the vast majority of
people, often including the workers themselves, the politicized workers of Paris
are incomprehensible. They are the proper inexistent of the object “political
capacity” in the uncertain world of this Spring 1871. (Badiou, 2009, p. 364)
In the example of the Paris Commune, “from the standpoint of rule-bound 
appearing, the possibility of a proletarian and popular governmental power purely and 
simply does not exist” (Badiou, 2009, p. 366). It is this inexistent that the event 
negates: 
The crucial point is the change of intensity in the existence of something the 
existence of which was minimal. For example, the political existence of poor 
workers in a revolutionary event[.] I name an “inexistent” of a world a 
multiplicity which appears in this world with the minimal degree of intensity, 
something which, in this world, appears as nothing. The question for an event 
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is: what is the destiny, after the event, of an inexistent of the world? What 
becomes of the poor worker after the revolution? (Badiou, 2008b, p. 1882) 
The event may have different implications. In the case of the “true event,” “the 
strength of the change is maximal” (Badiou, 2008b, p. 1882). That what appeared with 
the minimal degree of intensity within a world will now appear with the maximum of 
intensity. The logic is classic: “The whole world, from the point of view of the event 
and of its consequences, is formally reduced to the duality of minimal intensity, or 
inexistence, and maximal intensity” (Badiou, 2008b, p. 1882). P negates the non-P. 
True political event is about “existential absolutization of the inexistent” (Badiou, 
2009, p. 394):  
The proletariat is completely subtracted from the sphere of political 
presentation. The multiplicity it is can be analysed but, according to the rules 
governing the appearance of the political world, it does not appear within this. 
It is there but with the minimal degree of appearance, namely, degree zero. This 
is obviously what the Internationale proclaims: “We are nothing, let us be all!” 
[...] Those proclaiming “we are nothing” are not in the process of affirming their 
nothingness. They are simply affirming that they are nothing in the world as it 
is, as far as appearing politically is involved. [...] Becoming “all” presupposes, 
then, a change of world, which is to say, a change of transcendental. The 
transcendental has to change in order for the assignation to existence and, thus, 
the inexistent as a multiplicity’s point of non-appearing in a world, to change in 
its turn. (Badiou, 2011, pp. 61-62)  
The vector of change obeys classical logic: from being nothing to being 
everything, from minimal to maximal appearance.  
It is also possible that the event’s results are only moderate, and they bring only 
“reform.” In this case, the force of negation is less intense, and logic is intuitionistic. 
Paraconsistent logic, the logic that may (in some of its versions) allow the appearance 
of paradoxes, as we discussed in the Introduction, is something through which the 
event must proceed to the affirmation of the classical logic. All events first take place 
in conditions of undecidability, because the situation and the world in which they 
emerge do not allow a framework for their recognition. From the perspective of the 
state, nothing happens. It is this contradictory simultaneity of event and non-event 
that the event must surpass in order to bring the minimally existent to maximal 
existence within a world. Otherwise it remains minimal and the event “a false event, 
or a simulacrum.” “The lesson is that,” Badiou concludes, “when the world is 
intuitionistic, a true change must be classical, and a false change paraconsistent” 
(Badiou, 2008b, p. 1883).   
Notice here the curious “doubling” of the paradox that we have encountered 
already several times. On the one hand, paradox is an explosion, the impossibility to 
distinguish this from that (here, the event as simulacrum), but on the other, it is also 
a necessary figure of limit-transgression (here, the self-referential event) that makes a 
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new distinction, or truth, possible (here, what appeared minimally, now appears 
maximally). Paradox seems to have, across contemporary political and legal thought, 
both negative and positive value; it is both “good” and “bad.”  
5.11 The faithful subject and the truth procedure: The case against 
constructivism 
Negation is important for Badiou, since in his view “[a]ll the categories by which 
the essence of a truth can be submitted to thought are negative: undecidability, 
indiscernibility, the generic not-all (pas-tout), and the unnameable” (Badiou, 2004, p. 
58). The “positivity” of truth, its “procedure of verification,” is a matter of the 
emergence of the faithful subject: the one who decides, names, discerns the generic set 
and forces transformation in the name of the event (Badiou, 2004, p. 62). 
The political sequence of the decision to affirm the event, name it and trace its 
consequences to the situation in which it takes place (and beyond it) is what gives rise 
to what Badiou calls the faithful, or militant, political subject. The political subject is 
the collective of all those, contemporaries or separated by centuries, who decide to be 
faithful to the event of the declaration of equality and trace its consequences to various 
situations. The wager that affirms that the event takes, and took, place and that it is 
indeed consequential in a situation is an “intervention”: “any procedure by which a 
multiple is recognized as an event” and without which the situation remains in the grip 
of the state and paraconsistent logic that does not allow a clear opposition between the 
situation and the event to arise (Badiou, 2006a, p. 202). As Bruno Bosteels suggests, 
“what matters the most [for Badiou] is not so much the abrupt irruption of a point of 
the impossible, or of a set that paradoxically belongs only to itself, but the implicative 
regime of consequences to which an event will have given way in the aftermath of its 
irruption” (Bosteels, 2011, p. 176). 
To affirm that an event took place is to affirm a truth: that what escapes 
established frameworks of knowledge. The stabilization of the truth of the event 
unfolds as an “examination” of the elements of the situation: the subject evaluates 
these elements and decides, always subjectively, whether they connect to the event 
positively or negatively (Badiou, 2006a, p. 233). Such a process of examination 
constitutes “fidelity” to the event: 
I call fidelity the set of procedures which discern, within a situation, those 
multiples whose existence depends upon the introduction into circulation 
(under the supernumerary name conferred by an intervention) of an evental 
multiple. In sum, a fidelity is the apparatus which separates out, within the set 
of presented multiples, those which depend upon an event. To be faithful is to 
gather together and distinguish the becoming legal of a chance. (Badiou, 
2006a, p. 232, my emphasis.) 
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The subject faithful to the event will constantly need to ask him/herself: “how 
to act, if 1789 is a revolution, and not a disorder?” (Meillassoux, 2012, p. 3). 
Faithfulness takes place as the infinite truth procedure that, on the axiomatic-
decisionist grounds, traces out the implications of the universal axiom of equality that 
the revolution declared to an infinite number of situations and worlds in which 
inequality reigns.  
The truth procedure advances according to the classical logic in the sense that 
it “investigates” whether this or that element of the current situation, say, the suffrage 
limited to propertied male only, affirms or negates the event of equality (and, why not, 
the truth of freedom and fraternity, see Prozorov, 2013a). The compatibility of an 
element with the event and the project of bringing into maximum appearance what 
was only minimally presented depends on the decision of the faithful subject. An 
element must be transformed according to the decision: for example, the decision that 
the suffrage limited to propertied male only is not compatible with the event compels 
its transformation by attributing the equal right to vote also to women and all non-
propertied. Bringing women and the unpropertied to maximal existence in democratic 
institutions is, furthermore, by no means the end of the truth procedure. The tracing 
of the consequences of equality may continue by expanding the scope of the right to 
vote even further, including within it, say, resident aliens. It may also be continued on 
other domains, like that of work and home. “The attainment of maximal existence in 
one region of the world,” as Prozorov explains, “serves as a support for continuous 
affirmation of the axioms in other regions without guaranteeing the success of this 
affirmation” (Prozorov, 2013b, p. 11). The truth procedure that engages the faithful 
subject is necessarily infinite, as there is no shortage of inequality and inexistence in 
any positive situation or world and as the Universe, a positive realization of full 
equality (or full freedom and fraternity) of all beings cannot exist.  
Politics, for Badiou, is an attempt to reduce the complexity of the world to a 
simple, binary code between “yes, this element supports the event” or “no, this element 
does not support the event” (Badiou, 2009, pp. 82, 420, 439; see also Prozorov, 2013b, 
pp. 7-8). The result of this intricate interrogation that advances from one concrete 
situation to the next is a new infinite set. This is the “generic set” that emerges out of 
the gap between the situation and its state, being indiscernible in the pre-evental 
situation (Badiou, 2006a, p. 333). It is a truth that “subtract[s] itself from this or that 
jurisdiction of knowledge” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 328) and is therefore an exception to 
what can be verified within any of them. The “generic multiple” is “the indiscernible, 
the unnameable, and the absolutely indeterminate” from the point of view of ontology 
and the situation. “The being of a truth, proving itself an exception to any 
preconstituted predicate of the situation in which that truth is deployed, is to be called 
‘generic’” (Badiou, 2006a p.xiii). A truth is unknowable, but, Badiou argues, “it can be 
demonstrated that it may be thought” (Badiou, 2006a, p. 16). The infinite truth 
procedure dislocates the metastructure of a situation S by re-counting its elements into 
a new, generic set that is a subset of S totally incongruous to its prevailing 
metastructure. “Little by little,” Badiou writes, “the contour of a subset of the situation 
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is outlined, in which the effects of the evental axiom are verified” (Badiou, 2004, p. 
64). 
For example, re-counting elements in a way faithful to the presupposition of 
equality of anyone with everyone, cuts through, if carried on, all initial subsets, 
nullifying the force of all existing predicates and relations and making them 
indifferent to equality. The generic set thus advances to include not only men, as is 
usual, but also women, not only propertied but also non-propertied, not only the rich 
but also the poor, not only the white but also the black, not only the religious but also 
the non-religious, not only the French but also the non-French... This indexing of 
elements to the generic set suspends the significance of these differences and 
categories, which come to have no determinative power over the formation of the set. 
In comparison to the sets of, say, all men, all the white and all the propertied, the 
generic set contains at least one element that is not in those sets, as it contains women, 
black and non-propertied. Thus, it is indiscernible if observed within those sets. The 
power of the extant state of the situation to categorize beings is rendered inoperative, 
as the generic set collects together beings as equal, whatever identities they (are made 
to) have.  
As Agamben is quick to note, the militant subject (or the truth procedure) has 
the paradoxical structure of the exception:  
 
In Badiou’s scheme, the exception introduces a fourth figure [in addition to 
normality, singularity and excrescence; HL], a threshold of indistinction 
between excrescence (representation without presentation) and singularity 
(presentation without representation), something like a paradoxical inclusion 
of membership itself. The exception is what cannot be included in the whole of 
which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is 
always already included. What emerges in this limit figure is the radical crisis 
of every possibility of clearly distinguishing between membership and 
inclusion, between what is outside and what is inside, between exception and 
rule. (Agamben, 1998, pp. 24-25, emphasis in the original.) 
 
Indeed, the truth procedure, by simply counting beings in the generic set, 
presents them as equal members of this set, beyond their representation in the 
metastructure of the situation that allocates them to unequal positions. In this sense, 
it prefers presentation over representation. But Badiou also says that “[t]here is always 
something institutional in a fidelity, if institution is understood here, in a very general 
manner, as what is found in the space of representation, of the state, of the count-of-
the-count; as what has to do with inclusions rather than belongings” (Badiou, 2006a, 
p. 233). The generic set that presents equal members without any predicates is a 
subset, hence a representation, and just like the state, an excrescence and an excess of 
representation vis-à-vis the extant presentation. It represents to the maximal degree 
what in the extant situation is presented as nothing. The militant subject is the 
exception, “a paradoxical inclusion of membership itself.” That is, to speak with 
Jacques Rancière (who is very close to Badiou and who also makes the metalogical 
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choice in favor of incomplete consistency, although I cannot show it here, setting “the 
police” and “politics” against each other): politics presents “the part of those who have 
no part” (Rancière, 1999, p. 30).  
For the inhabitant of the situation, the generic set is unverifiable, it does not 
exist in the field of knowledge, but, again, as a “hypothesis” or axiom that opens the 
process of verification, that is, the transformation of the metastructure of the situation 
such that it comes to recognize, say, the indifference of gender to equality. The 
temporality of faithfulness is the future anterior: the faithful subject treats the generic 
set and the presentation of equality of men and women as something that will have 
been verified, once the situation is transformed according to the axiom of equality; 
until then it remains affirmed as an axiomatic truth.  
It is thus exactly like with the axiomatic grounding of mathematics itself: the 
proof technique known as “consistency proof,” that we mentioned above, applies also 
to the politics of truth. As Norris notes, for Badiou, “issues of choice and commitment 
in mathematics, logic and the formal sciences find a more than vaguely suggestive 
analogue in the realms of ethics and politics” (Norris, 2009, p. 177). This technique 
cannot establish any “absolute” proof of consistency of a proposition on the spot, so to 
speak, but only its “relative” consistency, beginning from a set of axioms (“human 
being thinks,” “equality is universal”) presupposed as consistent and then advancing 
on their basis to see what fits consistently with them, transforming the world and 
distributions of parts in it bit by bit, such that the world slowly becomes consistent 
with the axioms.  
Such a task can only be infinite, because no world can realize the axiom of 
equality in full and, furthermore, there are an infinite number of worlds. Equality as a 
political maxim always remains a critical supplement to how things stand, and a 
hypothesis that they can be transformed according to this maxim. There is no One, 
Being-qua-Being is nothing but inconsistent multiplicity and each count-as-one is 
contingent. When an event takes place, the inconsistency on which each consistent 
count-as-one is ultimately based is revealed, and this opens the door to the “diagonal,” 
bringing about the presentation of equality of anyone with everyone and the possibility 
of a novel articulation of how things stand. Truth is, for Badiou, not objective but 
strictly subjective, and the subject is the faithful subject of the infinite truth procedure, 
the militant who forces the implications of the axioms into reality. 
The faithful subject who collects the members of the generic set follows the 
technique of diagonalization that we discussed in the Introduction (see Badiou, 
2006a, p. 337). Formulating an indiscernible set in mathematics was the great 
achievement of the American mathematician Paul Cohen, and Badiou uses this 
innovation in his philosophy and metapolitics (philosophy of politics). The truth 
procedure articulates something — an aspecific subset of a situation on the sole 
grounds of universal equality — that cannot figure in the state of the situation as it 
currently stands. The generic set contains elements that are indiscernible from within 
that situation, and yet it belongs to the situation as its subset. The faithful subject 
“diagonalizes” the situation, splits it into two, by discerning both the elements that 
resonate with the event and those that are indifferent to it (Badiou, 2006a, p. 237):  
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It is clear that this [generic] subset is infinite, that it remains indeterminable. 
Yet it is possible to state that, if we suppose its termination, then such a subset 
will ineluctably be one that no predicate can unify — an untotalizable subset, a 
subset that can be neither constructed nor named in the language. [...] 
Indiscernible in its act, or as Subject, a truth is generic in its result, or in its 
being. It is withdrawn from any unification by a single predicate. (Badiou, 
2004, p. 64) 
Cantor used the diagonalization technique to indirectly prove that infinite sets 
come in different cardinalities (see 1.3.2). It operates by picking up one element from 
each subset of the situation defined by a property (from the set of men, women, 
propertied, migrants etc.), thus giving rise to a subset of the situation (the generic set 
of the community of equals) that no extant categorization can discern. This subset 
presents a supplement to the consistent situation, showing its incompleteness. In 
politics, diagonalization is about “a ‘generic’ democracy, a promotion of the 
commonplace, of equality abstracted from any predicate” (Badiou, 2004, p. 68). 
Diagonalization breaks with the constructivist universe, with the direct 
verifiability according to which there are only beings that an existing language can 
name and control. A critique of constructivism requires, for Badiou, the faithful 
subject who deconstructs the state of the situation as the only horizon for intelligibility, 
and discerns, along the diagonal, the indiscernible among the elements of the 
situation: that what carries such names as the Paris Commune and the French 
Revolution. The subject shows that the real as inconsistent multiplicity is never 
reducible to any of its positive presentations, representations and modes of 
appearance. In Logics of Worlds, Badiou contrasts his theory of universal truth to 
constructivism that he calls “democratic materialism.” According to this form of 
constructivism, “there are only bodies and languages” and nothing besides them 
(Badiou, 2009, p. 2). Badiou opposes what he sees as the post-modern and post-
structuralist relativism that reduces everything to local language-games and forms of 
life and is unable to rethink the universal. Against this post-modern nihilism he then 
argues for the axiomatic, exceptional, truths that as universal cut across the infinite 
number of positive worlds thanks to faithful subjects who take up the event of their 
worldly appearance and pursue their local consequences. “There are only bodies and 
languages, except that there are truths” (Badiou, 2009, p. 4) — this expresses what 
could perhaps be called Badiou’s “constructivism+” (I return to this) as well as his 
metalogical preference for consistency and incompleteness. Truth is the exceptional 
supplement to a language and the multiplicities controlled by it (Badiou, 2009, p. 10).  
Badiou’s realism then targets the positions according to which: 
truth cannot possibly exceed the limits of proof, ascertainment or 
demonstrative warrant since to assert otherwise — to claim (in typically realist 
fashion) that we know that there exist unknown or even for us unknowable 
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truths — is to fall in to manifest self-contradiction or plain nonsense. (Norris, 
2009, p. 183) 
Badiou’s theory of militant truth procedure distinguishes truth as transcendent 
to what can be asserted with a warrant, and argues that were we to restrict thinking to 
what can be justified within given languages, nothing radically new — no scientific, 
artistic or political revolutions, nor for that matter falling in love — would ever take 
place. To think about radical novelty and the possibility of transformation requires a 
certain realism: that not everything is confined within given frameworks of language 
and knowledge, that what counts as nothing within them holds the possibility of 
surprising, transformative novelty. “Politics,” then, “can be defined sequentially as 
that which attempts to create the impossibility of non-egalitarian statements relative 
to a situation, and as what can be exposed through philosophy, and by means of the 
word ‘democracy,’ to what I would call a certain eternity” (Badiou, 2005, p. 94, my 
emphasis).  
5.12 Post-juridical politics: The metalogical preference for consistent 
incompleteness and its implications for law  
Let me wrap up this chapter by briefly considering the status of law in Badiou’s 
generic orientation on grounds of this presentation of the main points of his political 
thinking.59 Livingston argues that there is “a profound, deep, and far-reaching 
structural homology between Badiou’s generic orientation and the criteriological 
[constructivist] orientation that he most vehemently argues against, in Being and 
Event and elsewhere” (Livingston, 2012, p. 254). This structural homology is sourced 
in the metalogical preference that both constructivism and the generic orientation 
share: the preference of consistency and incompleteness over inconsistent 
completeness. Classical forms of constructivism, such as Russell’s theory of types or 
Tarski’s theory of metalanguage, seek to secure the consistency of a language by taking 
a leap to the metalevel, and are satisfied with this hierarchy. Badiou, by contrast, and 
crucially for the autonomy of the generic position, seeks to show the thinkability of 
truths unknowable in extant languages. The homology between classical 
constructivism and Badiou’s generic orientation is not surprising, given that both 
accept the interdiction of paradoxical self-reference, although Badiou limits this 
interdiction to the domain of ontology determined by ZFC set theory only. “[B]oth 
orientations are committed to preserving consistency” (Livingston, 2012, p. 255), 
which is why Badiou’s position can be seen as a sort of “constructivism+.”    
Badiou’s extensional count-as-one regards, to take one of his own examples, 
Québec as “motley as this collection may be — Indians, Parti Québecois, blizzards, 
59 Bosteels provides an account of Badiou’s understanding of the political event as “the force of 
nonlaw” that considers texts, in particular The Theory of the Subject and its critique of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, that we have not touched upon here (Bosteels, 2008). 
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Anglophones, sled dogs, hydroelectric plants, maple syrup, Montreal’s universal 
expo...” (Badiou, 2009, p. 307) and attributes consistency to this multiple when one 
can unambiguously say that an element either belongs or does not belong to the set 
“Québec.” The metastructure (or in Badiou’s later terms, “the transcendental”) then 
legislates how these presented beings relate to one another. Commentators have 
argued, however, that it remains entirely obscure from where the objective count-as-
one originates and “who” does the counting (see e.g. Johnston, 2008, pp. 354-355; 
Livingston, 2012, p. 244). Badiou wants to do away with all references to a subject or 
a self as the origin of the counting. This is evident in his later “objective 
phenomenology” in Logics of Worlds. In ontology there are no agents who count. As 
one commentator argues: “mathematics requires no interpreter; the count is 
accessible and true for all according to the logic presented; the count is im-personal” 
(Trott, 2011, p. 84). There is always some law of membership that forms the set as a 
multiple of multiples, but, it seems, no legislator.  
This emphasis on “objective” (mathematically determinable) hierarchical order 
that axiomatically forbids self-reference thus excludes in the very first theoretical step 
the theorization of self-referential totalities, such as the legal system, as the “agents” 
that are “responsible” for social ordering. By taking consistency as the first theoretical 
value thus makes it difficult to appreciate a central feature of modern law: its claim to 
autonomy and, by implication, self-reference. It seems, however, difficult to renounce 
the observation that modern law sovereignly (and inconsistently) claims that it itself 
draws the limit between itself and non-law, between what belongs to its domain of 
operation and what not. It includes itself within the domain of its own operation, 
thereby being both inside and outside itself, giving rise to the inclosure paradox. The 
legal system seems like a perfect example of language seeking to express, in linguistic 
expression, its own limits (see Livingston, 2012, p. 36). Bypassing of this observation 
in fact oddly puts Badiou’s account of law in the company of the traditional theories of 
law, such as the natural law theory, that in different ways share the primacy of 
consistency and endeavor to formulate metalanguages with which to guarantee the 
consistency of positive law from the outside, at a metalevel.     
The claim to autonomy clearly breaks with the interdiction of self-belonging. 
Badiou’s “objective phenomenology,” which precisely excludes all “selves” as centers 
of orders, cannot possibly think of reflexivity — that a legal collective claims that an 
order is its own order — within (social) ontology: reflexivity is, for Badiou, a unique 
mark of “the faithful subject” who breaks with ontology. Reflexivity that set theory 
interdicts returns with Badiou’s desire to show the incompleteness of ontological 
orders and that there are truths that declare themselves against a framework within 
which they cannot be heard. Badiou’s reflexive politics is, thus, in a sense post-
juridical: affirming itself against a domain from which reflexivity is constitutively 
excluded. Reflexivity and paradox are, for Badiou, marks of the truth and the truth 
procedure, which can take place only in science, politics, art and love. 
Furthermore, Livingston argues that Badiou does not represent correctly much 
of the philosophy after the so-called “linguistic turn,” the new focus in philosophy and 
the humanities on language and its structures as mediating our access to reality, 
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exemplified by Wittgenstein and his notions of language games and forms of life. 
According to Livingston, Badiou unfairly subsumes all philosophy of language under 
the heading of constructivism as the thinking of the One (linguistic) structure that 
rules over all reality sovereignly. In Livingston’s argument, Badiou does not see that 
his position rests on the metalogical choice between consistency-incompleteness and 
completeness-inconsistency, and that what he labels as constructivism is, in fact, the 
“common enemy” to both his project and the project of paradoxico-criticism 
represented by late Wittgenstein, Derrida, Agamben, and others. (Livingston, 2012, 
pp. 238-268)  
Norris argues, with Badiou, that: 
[w]here language or the normative appeal to language enjoins us to accept what
is presently sayable, describable, or representable as fixing the ultimate scope
and limits of truth or intelligibility[,] mathematics on the contrary allows —
indeed requires — that we surpass those limits and conceive what may extend
that scope beyond anything yet achieved or remotely envisaged. This it does
through the presence of those various anomalies, conflicts or unresolved
dilemmas that will always exist so long as mathematics remains a live and
intrinsically a problem-solving activity of thought. (Norris, 2009, p. 68, my
emphasis.)
However, as Livingston convincingly argues and as we have seen in our 
discussion of paradox in law and the shortcomings of constructivist-criteriological 
orientation (that seeks to prohibit the paradox) in its dealings with law, such self-
referential totalities are precisely not capable of fixing their limits in any ultimate 
sense: they seek to do so, but always fail. A distinction must be drawn between 
criteriological-constructivist attempts at providing a metalanguage (Russell’s theory 
of types, Tarski’s meta-language, Kelsen’s basic norm traditionally interpreted) that 
precisely seek to construct clear objective and consistent limits of a language, and the 
paradoxico-critical recognition of the inclosure paradox that these attempts cannot 
solve and that requires another approach to the problem of limited orders. In the next 
chapter, we turn to our last theorist, Hans Lindahl, to explore a paradoxico-critical 
position that seeks both to break with constructivism in Badiou’s sense and to present 
a political theory of law that avoids nihilism.  
210 
6. Toward a non-nihilistic notion of the paradoxical legal order:
Lindahl on law as restrained collective self-affirmation
6.1 Introduction 
After Agamben’s and Badiou’s two different but in some sense “post” or “extra-
juridical” accounts of politics, let us now end our investigations into legal totality and 
paradox with an aspiring, non-nihilistic theory of the paradox that seeks to articulate 
the paradoxical limits of the legal totality as a site of politics.  
A strain of thought flows through Hans Lindahl’s theory of law as 
“institutionalized and authoritatively mediated collective action” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 1), 
also called “the IACA-model of law,” and forms its core. This strain consists of different 
formulations of the legal paradox: the paradox of constituent power, the paradox of 
representation, the paradox of recognition and the paradox of authority. In this 
chapter, I follow this thread to interpret Lindahl’s legal theory as a paradoxico-critical 
orientation to the legal paradox. My aim is not to provide a final answer to the 
problems of totality and paradox. I aim merely to show that Lindahl’s theory of the 
legal paradox offers an alternative to Luhmann’s evolutionary constructivism as well 
as to Agamben’s and Badiou’s post-juridical politics, one that makes the metalogical 
choice in favor of the inconsistent totality but also insists on the possibility of a politics 
of law.  
I take my cue from Lindahl’s idea that legal orders always correspond to a 
perspective of a legal collective, of a “we,” and that they are, hence, forms of collective 
self-preservation. Lindahl himself presents his notion of modern self-legislation as 
restrained self-preservation in opposition to Martin Heidegger’s diagnosis of modern 
self-legislation as nihilistic. I seek to show that while Agamben’s and Lindahl’s formal 
analyses of the legal paradox are somewhat similar — they both articulate its logic of 
inclusion and exclusion — the decisive difference is how they conceive of relation of 
the collective self to its Other, and how they thereby come to different accounts of 
modern legal nihilism. 
For Agamben, as we have seen, the paradoxical form of modern law and politics 
is exposed in the state of exception that allows legally unmediated sovereign 
dominance and violence of what is deemed to be “the Other”: feeding on the Other in 
order to preserve oneself. This is the core of the diagnosis of modernity as nihilistic. 
When social orders, legal orders included, lose their transcendent grounds that used 
to justify them and give them meaning beyond their mere functioning, their lack of 
grounds drives them to a certain absolutization of their own perspective. What is Other 
loses all restraining power on the self. While Lindahl recognizes the dominance and 
even the destruction of the Other as a possibility inherent in the notion of self-
preservation, he seeks to show that to conceive of self-preservation merely in these 
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terms is reductive. The notion of restrained self-preservation aims to provide a non-
nihilistic vision of our legal present and show how legal collectives are also capable of 
restraining themselves in order to preserve, not to destroy, the Other. I will also seek 
to show that Agamben’s notion of impotentiality positively resonates with Lindahl’s 
account.  
By rethinking law as a species of collective action, Lindahl provides a notion of 
law that is irreducible to state law. He aims to encompass with his IACA-model of law 
novel forms of so-called “global law” (such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the Accounting Standards Board or the 
Clean Clothes Campaign), but also such social movements as the Zapatistas, the Vía 
Campesina, the Indian Karnataka State Farmers’ Association (KRRS) or Occupy Wall 
Street, as well as indigenous collectives such as the U’wa people and Australian 
aboriginals (Lindahl, 2019c; Lindahl, 2018, pp. 22-28, 40, 165-177; Lindahl, 2013, pp. 
58-64, 258). Lindahl suspends the traditional state-centered concept of law and seeks
to put it to new use, one that would be capable of accounting of our normative present
and conflicts over the normative form of collectivity. In a sense, Lindahl universalizes
the notion of law and legal authority to span across the social field, but emphatically
not in terms of a single universal legal order that would realize justice and freedom for
all. Rather, his paradoxical account of the legal order and the legal collective seeks to
show how each process of legal unification is simultaneously a process of political
pluralization.
6.2 Modern rationality as self-preservation and the reoccupation of the 
question of the nihil  
If it is true, as Agamben says, that “[t]he correct interpretation of a concept or 
a theory depends on the preliminary comprehension of the problem that it is meant to 
confront” (Agamben, 2013a, p. 92), then I wager a preliminary comprehension of 
Lindahl’s theory of law: at the most general level, the problem it confronts is that of 
modern rationality as self-preservation. Lindahl follows the work of the German 
historian of ideas Hans Blumenberg to argue that the predicament of Western 
modernity is how to deal with contingency, namely with “the problem that there is a 
world and what it is as a world”  (Lindahl, 2018, p. 4). When the pre-modern 
theological understanding of the world as created and conserved in existence by God 
loses its plausibility as humanity’s self-interpretation, Western humanity becomes, in 
this new existential loneliness, face to face with itself and understands “the ordering 
of society [...] as a self-ordering.” “Crucially, the problem of the ground of legal orders 
and of their boundaries becomes urgent in light of the contingency of social orders: 
how can a legal order justify that it includes this, while excluding that?” (Lindahl, 2018, 
p. 4, original emphasis.) Lindahl aims to show that although this problem leads to
paradox, it need not lead to nihilistic relativism, to the mere affirmation of the
positivity of contingent, groundless social orders.
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Blumenberg suggests that this modern form of rationality as self-preservation 
is a new answer to a problem that was first articulated in the Middle Ages:  
 
The Middle Ages left behind a question of which antiquity was unaware[.] In 
the face of the entire stock of ideas which it had received from ancient 
metaphysics, the Middle Ages forced itself to conceive of nothing, or the void 
(nihil), almost as the normal metaphysical state of affairs and to think of the 
creation from nothing as a miracle continually effected against this normality. 
(Blumenberg, 1983, p. 218, cited in Lindahl, 2008, p. 331, my emphasis.) 
 
Why is there something rather than nothing? The medieval answer to this 
question of the nihil was, in Blumenberg’s and Lindahl’s interpretation, contingency 
understood as “the dependence of the world on God for both its creation and its 
preservation from nothingness” (Lindahl, 2008, p. 331; Lindahl, 1995, p. 182). The 
human world was understood as created and preserved from nothingness and 
destruction transitively, by the Other conceived of as a transcendent Being beyond our 
world. In modernity, this theorem of transitive or heteronomous conservation “is 
reoccupied by intransitive conservation, that is, self-conservation or self-
preservation” (Lindahl, 2008, p. 331, original emphasis; see also Lindahl, 1995, p. 
182). The old question of the nihil remains, but it receives a new answer. Conservation 
of humanity from nothingness now means that human activity is, first, dependent on 
a pre-given world not of its own making. Second, human activity is also understood as 
a positive force, since it “suppl[ies] the form of what it realizes” (Lindahl, 2008, p. 
331). According to this reoccupation theorem, human activity is dependent on 
existence and a world it did not create, but it is also a productive force that gives form 
to them. Such a conception of the two-foldedness of humanity, its “conditioned 
production or dependent spontaneity” (Lindahl, 2015, p. 165, referring to Kant, 1987, 
B72), reoccupies the medieval thesis of dependence on God of the created being for its 
existence and preservation in existence. The theorem reformulates the answer to the 
problem of the nihil. On the one hand, humanity exists in the world not of its own 
making and thus faces the sheer existence of a world, the fact that there is a world 
rather than nothing. On the other hand, human activity can influence what this world 
is as a world, what kind of an order the existing world takes.  
Thus, for Lindahl, modern philosophical and political thought can be 
understood as a reoccupation of the medieval question of the nihil and supplying an 
answer to this question in terms of a process in which humanity confronts its Other, a 
strange, non-human world and turns it into a familiar, human one. According to 
Lindahl, much of modern political thinking understands political freedom as such a 
double movement of destruction and construction:  
 
If humans are initially given over to a world that appears as binding to them 
and as determining the scope of their possibilities (heteronomy), the initial, 
destructive moment of freedom consists in rendering the extant world order 
non-binding and determinable for human action. In its second, productive 
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moment, human action determines the determinable giving it an order that 
meets the condition of non-contradiction (a universal law). (Lindahl, 2015, p. 
165) 
Karl Marx’s account of the Communist revolution exemplifies this conception 
of destructive-constructive freedom that realizes a universal human order. The 
critique of capitalism deploys the destructive moment that unbinds the seeming 
necessity of the alienating capitalistic world on laboring humanity, and the positive 
moment of the revolution then brings forth a novel human order free from the 
contradictions of the old one (Lindahl, 2015, pp. 165-166). The quintessential modern 
notion of political freedom, that of constituent power, is then understood precisely as 
an activity of bringing forth, on grounds of an unbinding of the political collective from 
what is alien to it, a universal, fully human and contradiction-free order. To self-
legislate and to preserve oneself means becoming autonomous: unbinding oneself 
from the given and initially alien world and re-making it in one’s own image.  
Here begins Lindahl’s critique of this interpretation of modern political 
freedom and constituent power. For Lindahl, modern political philosophy 
presupposes a conception of the political subject that ultimately possesses a “capacity 
to overcome the nihil by integrating the strange — without a remainder — into the 
unity of its own world” (Lindahl, 2008, p. 334). The nihil, that what is non-human and 
resists human endeavors, is put under the sign of provisionality, as something to be 
overcome by constituent power in the gradual realization of universal political 
freedom. The sheer existence of a world and its inappropriability in human terms is 
lost: 
The negative moment of freedom consists in leveling down the strange to the 
factuality of what merely exists, such that, deprived of its binding character, the 
real becomes the point of departure for the positive moment of freedom, 
namely, the enactment of a universal order. Accordingly, the strange or alien 
manifests itself as the ultimate danger that human being could lose itself; that, 
no longer recognizing itself in the made of its making, the subject forfeits its 
primordial ontological productivity and its capacity to assert itself against 
what opposes its continued existence in being. (Lindahl, 2015, p. 171, emphasis 
mine.) 
The understanding of self-preservation provided by modern political thinking 
is then about overcoming negativity: overcoming the strange as what poses a danger 
to the continued existence of the self. Self-preservation is conceived of as a process of 
effacing the subject-binding strangeness of the sheer existence of the world and 
turning it into a fully human world under the sign of the universal law of human 
freedom. So, on the one hand, modernity is marked by the loss of God, the loss of 
transitive conservation of humanity against the threat of nothingness, and this loss 
forces modern society to answer to this threat in a novel way, as intransitive 
conservation or self-preservation. This modern idea of rationality as self-preservation 
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is expressed, Lindahl notes, in Spinoza’s conatus: “Each thing, as far as it can by its 
own power, strives to persevere in its being” (Spinoza, 1988, Part III, Proposition 6, 
cited in Lindahl, 2020; Lindahl, 2008, p. 330). However, this rationality as self-
preservation has been articulated in modern political thought and in the notion of 
constituent power in such a manner that seeks to definitively exclude the fact of the 
world and its mere givenness and strangeness, and make the world fully “our own,” a 
“fully humanized order” (Lindahl, 2015, p. 171).  
In our terms, the reoccupation theorem expresses the main features of the 
constructivist-criteriological orientation to totality and paradox. In Lindahl’s analysis, 
contemporary forms of political universalism, such as that of Jürgen Habermas and 
Seyla Benhabib, are late representatives of this understanding of strangeness as 
waiting to be overcome in a universal legal-political order of full inclusion of all 
humanity. As we already shortly discussed in the Introduction (1.3.4), legal 
universalism is the position that brings “parameterization” into political and legal 
theory, with the aim of developing a metalanguage with which to guarantee the 
consistency of a legal-political totality. The idea is precisely to seek to avoid 
foundational paradoxes, to reject the view that legal and political orders function on 
contingent and not fully rational and justified grounds. Legal universalism postulates 
the ideal of an all-inclusive legal order, like a global order of legal human rights, that 
would offer universal standards that all legal authorities ought to observe. The 
philosophical core of this position is that all legal limits that include some but exclude 
others can be overcome in the process of progressing toward the regulative ideal of an 
all-inclusive order. “Even if its arrival is forever postponed in historical time, 
progression toward a legal order that would include without excluding must be 
postulated as the telos of an authoritative politics of boundaries, holds the legal 
universalist, if globalisations are to be more than arbitrary processes and if relativism 
is to be held at bay” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 283). The authoritativeness of legal authorities, 
their normative legitimacy, is, according to universalism, grounded on including the 
individuals and groups that legal orders have previously excluded.  
Lindahl’s different take on the paradox of legal orders is made visible in his 
critique of legal universalism. He aims to show that even if legal orders premised on 
the state and its territorial borders no longer possess the paradigmatic status they used 
to, no legal order claiming global validity is unlimited. No global legal order, not even 
human rights law, is unlimited and capable of including without excluding at the same 
time. Furthermore, legal universalism does not grasp that, at times, it is inclusion into 
law that is the problem rather than the solution (Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 227-234; Lindahl, 
2018, pp. 207-224, 228-285). For example, the U’wa people in Colombia demand not 
inclusion into the Colombian state and international human rights law, but rather 
exclusion from them (Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 58-64). This suggests, for Lindahl, that the 
authoritativeness of legal authority cannot hinge on the progress of gradually 
eliminating all forms of exclusion. All legal orders, ranging from normative orders of 
Indigenous Peoples to state law, international law and global legal orders, are 
bounded: they both include and exclude, necessarily. Their functioning rests on a 
constitutive closure (or rather, as we will see, a process of opening up and closing 
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down). Therefore, legal theory must look at the logic of boundaries (Lindahl, 2018, 
p.283), and how inclusion and exclusion do their work in making legal orders and legal 
collectives possible. Unlike Luhmann and Agamben, Lindahl devotes a lot of time to 
show that the logic of bounded orders also has normative implications for legal 
authority. To acknowledge the irreducibility of exclusion does not commit one to 
nihilistic relativism that offers no tools to address unjust forms of inclusion and 
exclusion and simply accepts the status quo, or so Lindahl argues.  
This analysis could be read as showing the significance of inventing 
metalanguages for overcoming the paradoxical double-bind at the core of human 
existence: its being undecidably riveted to both passivity and activity, the fact of 
existence and identity, strangeness and ownness. It is against overcoming this 
undecidability by metalanguages and the formulation of constituent power as 
suppressing this passivity, the fact of existence and strangeness that Lindahl proposes 
his paradoxical formulation of constituent power: a paradoxical formulation that seeks 
to show how self-preservation is not about the preservation of the self at the expense 
of the strange, but rather structurally tied to strangeness and incapable of overcoming 
it. But we have some mileage to do before going to the analysis of Lindahl’s paradox of 
constituent power in detail (see 6.6). Let us now investigate how the modern 
conception of freedom as the full humanization of the world has itself been forcefully 
and influentially criticized by Martin Heidegger as an expression of modern nihilism.  
 
 
6.3 Heidegger, Schmitt, the secularization theorem and modern nihilism 
 
Lindahl presents Blumenberg’s analysis of modernity as an alternative to 
Martin Heidegger’s and Carl Schmitt’s respective philosophical and political analyses 
of modern reason as based on secularized theological concepts. With Blumenberg, 
Lindahl opposes the view “that modern subjectivity, as both Heidegger and Schmitt 
suggest, is a transposition of the theological causa sui,” that modern rationality is a 
mere secularization of theological concepts (Lindahl, 2008, p. 330). As Agamben 
explains the secularization theorem: 
 
[secularization] leaves intact the forces it deals with by simply moving them 
from one place to another. Thus, the political secularization of theological 
concepts (the transcendence of God as a paradigm of sovereign power) does 
nothing but displace the heavenly monarchy onto an earthly monarchy, leaving 
its power intact. (Agamben, 2007, p. 77) 
 
The idea that modern political concepts are secularized theological concepts 
has been critically identified, by both Heidegger and Agamben, as exemplifying 
modern nihilism and the loss of collectively binding values and tasks. What Lindahl 
ultimately aims at is a non-nihilistic analysis of modern rationality as self-
preservation, and the critique of the secularization theorem helps to reach this aim. 
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Blumenberg’s reoccupation theorem shows the beginning of the way to this project but 
does not yet achieve to bring it to an end. It only allows articulating the status of the 
nihil in modern political thinking as a negativity to be overcome, and, therefore, also 
ends up in a position described as nihilistic by Heidegger. To counter nihilism, the 
status of the nihil needs to be rethought not as something to be overcome toward a 
fully human humanity but as constitutive of the subject and ultimately inappropriable 
by it. 
For Heidegger, modern nihilism consists of a double negation, of a sort of 
nullification of negation. The first negation is expressed by the Nietzschean argument 
of the death of God and the loss of binding values and goals. The second negation, or 
the nullification of the first negation, takes the loss of God to be a mere absence of 
foundation:  
“God is dead” [...] is to say [that] “Christian God” has lost his power over beings 
and over the determination of man. “Christian God” stands for the 
“transcendent” in general in its various meanings — for “ideals” and “norms,” 
“principles” and “rules,” “ends” and “values,” which are set “above” the being, 
in order to give being as a whole a purpose, an order, and — as it is succinctly 
expressed — “meaning.” Nihilism is that historical process whereby the 
dominance of the “transcendent” becomes null and void, so that all being loses 
its worth and meaning. (Heidegger, 1991b, p. 4, original emphasis.)  
In Lindahl’s interpretation of Heidegger’s account of nihilism, modernity reacts 
to this loss of transcendence, meaning and purpose by secularizing God, elevating 
humanity into the position that was left empty. The loss of the transcendent Being 
means that the now-empty theological causa sui can be secularized, transposed into 
the human subject. The human being who in medieval thought was the created being 
now assumes autonomy and becomes the ultimate self-creating creator, causa sui, the 
self, the ego cogito on whose acts of thinking that what is thought about, the cogitata, 
depends as its foundation (Lindahl, 2008, pp. 325-327, referring to Heidegger, 2002; 
Heidegger, 1991a). As a result, reality appears for such a subject as something to be 
appropriated, as something that is constantly available for the human being and his 
activities and as existing for his sake only:  
Modernity secularizes salvation-certainty because self-legislation posits the 
world as the domain made available for the subject’s unconditioned self-
security. In short, and summing up Heidegger’s argument, the “self” of modern 
self-legislation stands for the claim that human being is not only the self-
positing foundation of all being but also the being for the sake of which all other 
beings ex-sist as available for the self’s purposes, whatever these may be. 
Nihilism has become the destiny of modernity because the subject’s demand of 
autonomy crowds out a transcendent pole, a heteronomy constitutive for 





In Heidegger’s analysis, the loss of the transcendent is not lived in modern 
nihilism as a confrontation with a void, but rather as an absolutizing of the human 
subject, making the subject into a secular god. According to Heidegger, this nihilism 
defines modern thinking, science and technology, but also, as Carl Schmitt’s 
constitutional theory shows, the understanding of politics and law. As Hannah Arendt 
trenchantly puts this Heideggerian critique of modern nihilism: “The modern age [...] 
has led to a situation where man, wherever he goes, encounters only himself” (Arendt, 
1993, p. 89). Or as Agamben puts it, in a passage we cited already above: nihilism 
“interprets the extreme revelation of language in the sense that there is nothing to 
reveal, that the truth of language is that it unveils the Nothing of all things. The 
absence of metalanguage thus appears as the negative form of the presupposition, and 
the Nothing as the final veil, the final name of language” (Agamben, 1999, p. 46, my 
emphasis). When there is nothing to reveal, language recoils onto itself and speaks of 
nothing but itself.  
In Schmitt’s thinking, the secularization theorem is visible in his theory of 
sovereignty and constituent power. In Lindahl’s interpretation, for Schmitt, “the 
people is a subject in the strong metaphysical sense predicated by Heidegger, namely, 
the unconditioned bearer — sub-iectum — of a dependent being — the legal order” 
(Lindahl, 2008, p. 328). The created being – a legal order or a constitution – expresses 
democratic self-determination only to the extent that the people takes the empty place 
of God and becomes the unconditioned foundation of the worldly order, namely law. 
In modern democracy, the people preserves itself in existence by giving itself its own 
law and maintains in its own hands the ultimate power to change this law at will. The 
absolute Being that was conceived in pre-modernity as transcendent to the world, now 
manifests itself in a fully immanent manner, as the democratic identity of the rulers 
and the ruled and as the non-representable, immediate popular will (Lindahl, 2008, 
pp. 327-330; referring to Schmitt, 2005; Schmitt, 2008; Schmitt, 1985). Thus, “[t]he 
passage from transcendence to immanence implies, in Schmitt’s view, that the 
democratic legitimacy of the law ultimately rests on the possibility that the people be 
immediately present to itself as the homogeneous political unity that enacts the law, 
and for the sake of which the law is enacted” (Lindahl, 2008, p. 229, original emphasis; 
see also Lindahl, 2007a; Lindahl, 2015, p. 165). Although Schmitt does recognize the 
necessity of representation of the people for the existence of a state, he does seem to 
understand representation as a sort of mirroring a prior, already extant popular 
identity (Schmitt, 2008, pp. 240-242). “The idea of representation,” he writes:  
 
rests on a people existing as a political unity, as having a type of being that is 
higher, further enhanced, and more intense in comparison to the natural 
existence of some human group living together. If the sense for this peculiarity 
of political existence erodes and people give priority to other types of their 
existence, the understanding of a concept like representation is also displaced. 




As we will see below, it is this immediacy to itself of a collective existing prior 
to its representation that is another important target of Lindahl’s reworking of the 
theory of collective self-preservation as necessarily represented and therefore always 
mediated. 
The secularization of theological transcendence fills the void left by the “death 
of God” with the positive orders that originate in the subject conceived as absolute and 
self-present. According to Heidegger, this prevents the authentic thinking of the void, 
which for him concerns the nothing as the “Being of beings.”60 The formula of nihilism, 
according to Heidegger, is that “there are only positive worlds [of science, of law, of 
politics] and nothing besides them” (Prozorov, 2013a, p. 91). As Lindahl puts it, for 
Heidegger: 
 
the progressive articulation of the principle of autonomy, in modernity’s 
philosophy, science, culture, art, and a fortiori its politics and law, consists in 
the progressive accomplishment of European nihilism. “Secular theology,” in 
its fundamental epochal significance, is nihilism itself: “the essential 
nonthinking of the essence of the nothing.” (Lindahl, 2008, p. 324, citing 
Heidegger, 1991b, p. 22)   
 
It is to counter this assessment of modern self-legislation and self-preservation 
as nihilism, in which what does not fall within a positive world simply counts as 
nothing, that Lindahl seeks to formulate an alternative account of modern law, self 
and its relation to the nihil, to transcendence and the strange. It could be said that at 
play are two different analyses of what the loss of metalanguage means for modern 
social ordering. The loss of God as the metalanguage that held values and norms, aims 
and purposes of society in place leads, in the Heideggerian analysis, to the 
transposition of the function of metalanguage to social immanence. As we discussed 
in the Introduction, the function of a metalanguage is always to seek to offer a stable 
ground for an order that is itself incapable of doing that. The need for a metalanguage 
arises from understanding the lack of grounding as a threat to the preservation of the 
order. A self that has been conceived in the image of an absolute being, seeks to make 
itself consistent by overcoming what is other to it and by positing as its goal the full 
effacement of that other. By embracing a paradoxico-critical orientation to paradox, 
Lindahl seeks to show that metalanguages (both Habermasian universalism of full 
inclusion and Schmittian absolutization of constituent power/the sovereign) cannot 
achieve what they are designed for, and that to see the dependency of a social order on 
what it cannot order as a mere threat to its existence is reductive. “The strange” need 
not necessarily be understood as an enemy to be eliminated.  
Agamben’s critique of the paradox of sovereignty shares important similarities 
with Lindahl’s account. However, its analysis of modern law and sovereignty sees in 
them an absolutization of the government of life, with little space left for a politics of 
law. For Agamben, the task of “messianic politics” is to bring the whole Western legal-
 
60 In Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, Being as such is itself no particular being or thing, it is 
quite literally no-thing, the void in which beings appear as the beings they are (see Heidegger, 1962). 
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political apparatus to an “end.” While Lindahl seeks, beginning with contesting the 
secularization theorem, to build an account of legal authority and collective self-
preservation that does not forfeit the possibility of ethics, for Agamben, sovereignty 
and law in the age of modern nihilism harbors no such possibility. For Agamben, the 
only possibility for overcoming nihilism is to think about politics beyond modern law. 
At stake are ultimately different understandings of the possibility of political change 
in law.      
To set the Blumenbergian theorem of reoccupation against the secularization 
theorem opens, or so Lindahl argues, an alternative angle to modern law and politics, 
namely one that focuses on how any formation and preservation of a “self” is 
dependent on what is “strange” to the self and that remains, ultimately, 
inappropriable by the self. Whereas both Habermas and Agamben see the modern 
collective self as something unbounded and universalizable (for Habermas, 
unbounded because all forms of exclusion can be overcome; for Agamben, unbounded 
because the limiting factor, law, suspends itself permanently to the benefit of mere 
governance of life), for Lindahl, the collective self is finite and bounded. My 
interpretation of the Lindahlian challenge of both Habermasian universalistic 
teleology and Agambenian nihilistic diagnosis of modern legal rationality is based on 
this idea of the inappropriable. In some respects, this comes close to Agamben’s own 
“positive” account of politics, as we will see. 
 
 
6.4 Law as a concrete order 
 
Let us begin with Lindahl’s account of law as a concrete order and see how this 
account of law resists the reduction of law into a mere suspended form.  
At the beginning of the first edition to his Reine Rechtslehre, Kelsen notes that 
legal norms have four “spheres of validity”: spatial, temporal, material and personal. 
Legal norms, he observes, regulate human behavior in these four spheres. They 
determine whose and what kind of behavior is regulated, as well as where and when 
it ought to take place (Kelsen, 2002, pp. 12-13). In Fault Lines of Globalisation, 
Lindahl takes this change of perspective that Kelsen intimated, although never fully 
thought through, as his point of departure for the redefinition of the notion of law 
(Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 13-15). Unlike Kelsen, who does not develop his own insight into 
law as a concrete order of behavior — law as parole, we might say — and goes on to 
define law as a unity of norms — law as langue — Lindahl proposes to turn the 
theoretical lens from norms to the behavior that they regulate. What would it mean to 
think about the unity of law not in terms of (hierarchies of) norms but from the 
perspective of those whose behavior law regulates in the four spheres? (Lindahl, 
2013a, p. 16)  
Lindahl thus attempts to rethink the notion of legal order and law’s unity 
precisely in concrete (“non-suspended”) terms. This theoretical turn requires 
postponing the reductive move that legal theorists have typically made, insofar as they 
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have focused on law as langue, as a system of rules, or norms, and forfeited the 
occasion to analyze law’s concrete, gathering power that is manifest to those whose 
behavior it regulates, that is, to those engaged in joint action under law. This change 
of perspective in legal theory echoes Heidegger’s critique of Western philosophy as 
trying to explain reality single-mindedly as a totality of discreet, context-independent 
and thematically present objects standing vis-à-vis a disinterested subject observing 
the reality theoretically. For Heidegger, philosophy has lost from its sight the fact that 
prior to any theoretical thematization, we “encounter” the world and its things as 
something “available” and “ready-to-hand” (zuhanden) for us, as something that 
“concern” us and with which we are practically engaged (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 91-95). 
Lindahl’s claim is that things are not so different with regard to law: it is also 
“primordially” encountered as something with which we are practically involved. 
Lindahl’s analysis resonates with Heidegger’s on this point: 
[A] legal order is not first and foremost the unity of a manifold of norms and
only derivatively a spatial, temporal, subjective, and material unity. To the
contrary: isolating legal norms as the object of the question about the unity of
legal order comes second, as a historically late doctrinal and theoretical
achievement. (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 7)
Law, in its “primordial” sense, Lindahl argues, lets individuals orientate 
themselves toward each other and the world around them in specific ways (Lindahl, 
2013a, p. 122). Law as a concrete order makes space, time and things available, “ready-
to-hand,” to use Heidegger’s expression with Lindahl’s explicit permission, in 
particular ways to those whose comportment it regulates (Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 124-
125). Importantly, in regulating behavior in temporal, spatial, material and personal 
dimensions, a legal order gives rise to the first-person plural perspective of a “we.” It 
appears (or rather may appear; I come back to this) as “our” order, in the sense that it 
regulates the mutual behavior of those it engages: “our” reciprocal action. A legal order 
that regulates behavior in the four dimensions opens a realm of practical possibilities 
for a manifold of individuals, who can thereby come to orient themselves not only 
toward the world and its things in specific ways, but also toward each other. For 
Lindahl, like for Luhmann, a legal order in place stabilizes expectations of expectations 
of conduct, but unlike Luhmann who conceptualizes the stabilization of expectations 
in terms of communication, Lindahl develops a theory of law as a species of collective 
action in time and space. As Lindahl himself puts it, “whereas systems theory would 
refer to a ‘process of communication,’ a first-person plural account of legal order sees 
an interlocking web of individual acts – participant agency – the unity of which is 
intelligible in terms of the normative point of joint action” (Lindahl, 2013b, p. 710). 
A defining aspect of Lindahl’s theory of law as “institutionalized and 
authoritatively mediated collective action” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 1) is, thus, the 
significance for theory of describing law in its dimension of a concrete practical order 
of behavior. This distinguishes Lindahl’s account from traditional legal positivism. 
Unlike Kelsen who insists on the “purity” of legal methodology and legal knowledge 
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and excludes as sociological investigations into how law concretely shapes practices in 
society, Lindahl seeks to integrate into legal theory an account of how law’s power 
concretely regulates, at the level of embodied experience and spatial and temporal 
conduct, subjects’ orientations in the world, toward its entities and each other.  
In this sense, his approach has affinities with Michel Foucault and Agamben 
who are interested in analyzing how “a set of practices, bodies of knowledge, measures, 
and institutions that aim to manage, govern, control, and orient — in a way that 
purports to be useful — the behaviors, gestures, and thoughts of human beings” 
(Agamben, 2000, p. 12). Foucault famously rejects from his analysis of 
“governmentality” what he thinks is the form of power pertaining to law. Foucault sees 
law as an overwhelmingly negative power, that is, as a power of prohibition, whereas 
what interests him is the positivity of power, its productivity (Foucault, 1980, p. 102, 
footnote 4; Foucault, 1998, p. 85, 90). The Foucauldian distinction negative/positive, 
or prohibitive/productive, is, indeed, quite different from the notion of positivity of 
positive law as something “posited” and in opposition to normativity considered 
“given” or natural. In modern theories of legal positivism since Austin, the defining 
mark of positive law is, of course, its origin not in natural law or other forms of non-
legal normativity but in the legal procedure in which it has been posited. The relevant 
distinction is that between legal and moral norms, or positive and natural law. 
However, in his essay “The Truth in Legal Positivism,” John Finnis scratches 
the surface of the genealogy of the notion of positive law and notes that in his use of 
the term, Thomas Aquinas “asserts and illustrates positive law’s variability and 
relativity to time, place, and polity, its admixture of human error and immorality, its 
radical dependence on human creativity, its concern for what its subjects do rather 
than their motives for doing it” (Finnis, 1999, p. 195). Even if “positivity” means that 
law has been posited in deliberate human action, in distinction to given laws of nature 
and natural rights, the social origin of law is seconded by law’s intimate relation to 
time, place, community and regulation of overt, concrete behavior. Positive law is not 
merely about commands but also about the constitutive rules of a collective praxis. 
Finnis goes on to note that in early Aquinas’ discussion of the religious practice of 
fasting, fasting is conceived as a religious obligation and, thus, pertaining to natural 
law, but it is the task of positive law to determine the times and rations of such 
abstinence (Finnis, 1999, p. 198). The conclusion of Finnis’ reading is that for Aquinas, 
positive law is about determining in concrete, spatial and temporal terms how the 
abstract obligations of religious natural law ought to be realized as a concrete, religious 
practice (Finnis, 1999, p. 199). Explicit positing of a norm is about creating a concrete 
disposition for the addressees so that they can concretely realize their religious and 
moral obligations and virtues.  
In his famous essay “What is an Apparatus?,” Agamben traces, in an 
imaginative genealogy, Foucault’s use of the notion of dispositif back to the writings 
of the latter’s teacher Hippolyte on the young Hegel’s distinction between “natural 
religion” and “positive religion.” According to Agamben, “[w]hile natural religion is,” 
for Hegel, “concerned with the immediate and general relation of human reason with 
the divine, positive or historical religion encompasses the set of beliefs, rules, and rites 
 
 222 
that in a certain society and at a certain historical moment are externally imposed on 
individuals” (Agamben, 2000, p. 4). Positive religion posits norms and imposes them 
on individuals who, furthermore, “internaliz[e them] in the systems of beliefs and 
feelings” (Agamben, 2000, p. 6). What the notion of “positivity,” then, marks for the 
young Hegel and later for Foucault, according to Agamben, is “the relation between 
individuals as living beings and [...] the set of institutions, of processes of 
subjectification, and of rules in which power relations become concrete” (Agamben, 
2000, p. 6, my emphasis).  
The notion of “positivity” can thus be read as both the contingent positing of 
law in acts of law-making and as a concrete productivity. It marks both the separation 
of power to legislate from the Divine, making the law contingent and historical, and 
the concrete arrangements that determine and enable certain practical possibilities for 
individuals, who may thereby become religious, or otherwise intelligible, subjects for 
themselves and others. “Positivity” of positive law can be understood to mean that 
modern law is about the emergence of contingent, posited orders that concretely, in 
time and space, regulate individuals’ behavior by constituting, time and again, certain 
practical possibilities for them that, then, become to an extent “internalized,” lived in 
the flesh, so to speak, and as a certain form of identity or social subjectivity.  
In my reading, the “positivity” of positive law is, for Lindahl, about (re-)setting 
the legal boundaries – positivity as an act of positing – that constitute law as a 
concrete, practical, and limited order – positivity as a concrete order of behavior. 
Accordingly, there are, strictly speaking, no boundaries but rather a fourfold 
(re)bounding process: spacing, timing, subjectifying and materializing as the 
dimensions of a concrete ordering of practical, collective life.  
In Lindahl’s account, law orders space, time, subjectivity and contents of 
behavior. It selects, for instance, certain places as “ought-places,” determining how 
conduct ought to be spatially articulated (Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 18-19). For example, if 
one wishes to cross the external border of the European Union, one ought to cross it 
at a legally appropriate point, like the airport. At the airport, for its part, one ought to 
enter and exit the specific ought-places “nesting” within it, like the security check and 
passport control, in the appropriate manner. Law also articulates behavior into 
temporal sequences, regulating what must be done first and what second (Lindahl, 
2013a, pp. 20-21). If one wishes to enter the EU, one ought first to acquire all required 
documents, such as passports and visas, and only then seek to cross borders, again at 
the appropriate temporal order of, say, first entering the airport, then going through 
the security check, then the passport control, then boarding the airplane... By being in 
possession of all the appropriate documents, one shows that one fulfills the (in one’s 
own case) relevant determinations given by the EU to the subject-positions of the 
border-crosser. Thereby, one is enabled to act as a border-crosser and a passenger, 
and relate to the acts of other legal subjects, like border-control authorities, airline 
personnel and other passengers. A legal order thus regulates subjectivity, as well 
(Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 21-22). Entering the airport, the security check, the airplane etc. 
are, furthermore, all contents of legal acts, different types of legal action that connect 
with each other in specific, legally determined ways.  
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In each dimension, spatial, temporal, subjective and material (i.e. act content), 
a legal order is about differentiating, or selecting, elements (places, times, 
subjectivities, act-contents) and interconnecting, or joining, them into a practical 
order (Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 18-22). To be sure, a legal order does “not simply coordinate 
pre-existent places, times, subjectivities and act-types” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 51), but they 
make sense only as elements of a single whole and in reference to each other. This 
ought-place here refers beyond itself to other ought-places, as well as to a certain 
temporal sequence of how a certain kind of conduct of specific legal subjects ought to 
unfold, which place ought to be entered first and which second. The practical meaning 
of each, such as the meaning of the place for passport control, depends on its being an 
element in the practical context. That a legal order is a concrete order means both that 
it “assigns the appropriate places and times for the appropriate subjects to do the 
appropriate things,” and that all these dimensions refer to each other in such a way 
that only in a gesture of abstraction can they be discussed separately (Lindahl, 2013a, 
pp. 24-25, original emphasis). 
This practical engagement that Lindahl, following Heidegger, calls 
“understanding,” is a mode of legal intentionality: a mode of disclosing something as 
something. When I am moving through the airport to get to my flight, the airport is 
disclosed as a network of ought-places, I am disclosed as a passenger, and others as 
personnel or fellow passengers. Something is disclosed as something in reference to 
the totality of the practical order, in all its dimensions: 
 
in the very move by which a legal act differentiates by picking out something 
(even if it is a class of things or acts, as in the enactment of a statute) and 
disclosing it as something* [i.e. as somewhere, somewhat, somewhen, 
someone], it also interconnects by referring this something beyond itself, to 
other elements with which it belongs in the fourfold referential unity of a legal 
order. (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 128) 
 
Furthermore, what Lindahl calls “the normative point of joint action” is “that 
what our joint action ought to be about,” such as traveling across state and EU borders. 
It is toward a normative point that mutual expectations are geared. Such a point can 
be anything, from interests to values and principles, that is deemed to justify the action 
from the perspective of those involved in it (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 30). All the four 
dimensions play together to enable what it is that the collective is deemed to be doing 
together.  
Indeed, a legal order is concrete not only the sense that it articulates space and 
time, but also in the sense that it forms a practical order from the perspective of those 
whose behavior it regulates (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 24):  
 
Law appears as a four-dimensional order in which, for example, one finds 
oneself in [the supermarket] Lafayette (place), as a prospective client (subject), 
in the course of (time) buying a bag of potatoes and other products (content). 
Only derivatively can a legal order be “objectified,” that is, severed from this 
224 
first-person perspective, with a view to either isolating the “meaning” of legal 
norms as the object of doctrinal analysis and “interpretation,” or establishing 
from a theoretical perspective under what conditions a manifold of norms can 
be viewed as a legal unity. (Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 24-25, my emphasis.) 
Insofar as law really is efficacious and succeeds in regulating behavior, it 
appears as a concrete practical order to those whom it enables to act in specific, 
articulated ways. I am empowered, by law, to act and orient myself in certain ways 
(rather than others) toward the world, its things and others around me. “[F]rom the 
perspective of [law’s] addressees, [...] legal rules are signposts by which to orient 
themselves in space, time, subjectivity and act-types” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 137, my 
emphasis).  
My first-person singular perspective is, furthermore, embedded in a first-
person plural perspective. A legal order allows a manifold of individuals to coordinate 
their actions in definite ways, for example, by occupying the subjectivities of the 
passenger, airline personnel or the security guard, all comporting themselves 
appropriately toward each other and in appropriate space and time. Each of us 
engaged in that praxis expects that our expectations of which others will behave in a 
given situation, and how, where and when they will conduct themselves, will be 
satisfied (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 30). We are, thus, all, within the boundaries of our 
respective legal subjectivity, relating to that of others, and, thereby, together engaged 
in joint action under law. We all share, or rather are deemed to share (I come back to 
this “deeming”), the same expectations of how one ought to behave in the practical 
situation at hand, with regard to its spatial etc. dimensions, and we see (or are deemed 
to see) ourselves “as a group, that is, as a whole or unity the members of which ought 
to coordinate their action appropriately in the process” of the praxis in question 
(Lindahl, 2013a, p. 82). “That legal acts take place in the course of legal practices,” 
Lindahl adds, “means that legal acts are structured as a reiterative anticipation 
(Lindahl, 2013a, p. 131, my emphasis): my act anticipates how it will be responded to 
by others; and it can so anticipate the future, because it reiterates past acts of the same 
type. I can pass through the airport and anticipate how others will respond to my 
gestures, because my behavior repeats what countless others have done before me.  
For Lindahl, group identity can be understood both as sameness (members 
share the same expectations over time) and as selfhood (those who are involved see 
themselves as a group) (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 82). Collective selfhood means that 
normative expectations are not merely the same for each involved individual, but they 
are viewed as “our” expectations of who will act and where, when and how she will act. 
A legal collective can be identified, and identified over time, as the same collective, if 
the way in which it articulates the four dimensions of behavior and the apposite 
normative expectations remain relatively stable over time, and if the behavior of 
relevant parties keeps satisfying those expectations (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 84). By 
contrast, collective identity as selfhood over time requires taking care of reflexivity: of 
the mutual commitment to upholding the normative point and the four-fold legal 
order that is deemed to be the way to realize that point. Finally, the unity of a legal 
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order, the possibility to individuate a concrete legal order, depends on collective 
identity: “[T]he emergence of a legal order hinges on the capacity of the apposite 
collective to stick, by and large, to what are deemed to be its prior commitments about 
the who, what, where, and when of behaviour” (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 99).  
We come back to collective selfhood in a moment but let us complicate the story 
we have been telling so far. For typically the sameness, and in particular the selfhood, 
of a legal collective is only “quietly at work” behind the scenes, so to speak. “The 
orderliness of the legal order shared by [participant agents] remains [normally; my 
addition] hidden from view, as does its subject-relativity” (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 89). For 
Lindahl, the point of departure for legal theory is law as joint action under a concrete 
legal order, but typically such practices as we have been describing are only 
unthematically legal and collective. Law concretely orders the behavior of those 
taking part in legal practice without them explicitly identifying themselves as legal 
subjects undertaking legally ordered actions at a legally appropriate pace and in 
legally appropriate places. Passengers typically simply orient themselves through the 
formalities at the airport, without reflecting on their legal nature, “even if, ex post, 
their behaviour can be shown to be legal and they can interpret it as such” (Lindahl, 
2013a, p. 25). It is indeed remarkable that the very point of departure for legal theory 
is, for Lindahl, this practical engagement that is precisely not thematically legal. Its 
legality is “unobtrusive” for those who are thereby empowered to orient themselves in 
specific ways (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 25). It is this unobtrusive legal order that Lindahl 
calls “the primordial meaning of law as a concrete normative unity.” The 
unthematized practical engagement is, furthermore, “the primordial sense of [legal] 
interpretation” (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 122, my emphasis).  
We will have to take things gradually in order to understand and evaluate 
Lindahl’s claim about “primordiality” of legal behavior that is only “unobtrusively 
legal.” Let us first note that this at least means that law as a concrete order of behavior 
verges on normality and habituality: 
The coordination of behavior in the Galeries Lafayette [...] is habitual, almost 
“second nature” to the participants, such that they do not even think of 
coordinating their acts by reflecting on what one ought to do[.] By the same 
token, as long as behaviour is in accordance with mutual expectations, the first-
person plural reference to a “we” deployed in each joint act whereby a client and 
Lafayette pull off a sales transaction remains more or less implicit; what we 
stand by — our mutual commitments — remains largely taken for granted. 
(Lindahl, 2013a, p. 85) 
What one ought to do and how one habitually behaves are indistinct. There is 
little that a voluntarist description of the situation would grasp: “The closure of space, 
time, subjectivity, and act-content deployed in joint action usually remains a ‘matter 
of course’ for participant agents,” they “uphold extant boundaries, although their 
behavior is not ‘deliberately’ oriented to doing so” (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 201). One simply 




In their involvement with others and with things, individual participants in a 
legal practice orient themselves spatially, temporally, subjectively, and 
materially by actualizing, however implicitly and even anonymously, the first-
person plural perspective of a ‘we’ in joint action. (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 126, my 
emphasis.) 
 
So, interestingly, a theory of law as “collective action” presents as “primordial,” 
as authentically legal and collective, an experience that can be straightforwardly 
described neither as “collective” (but rather “anonymous”), as “action” (but rather 
“behavior”) nor even as explicitly “legal” (but  only unobtrusively so).  
Lindahl calls this “pre- and post-reflexive anonymity of joint action in the mode 
of understanding” (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 136). In other words, explicit drawings of legal 
boundaries by legal authorities “sediment” when their addressees take them as 
premises of their behavior. Behavior is post-reflexive, and post-thematic, “in the sense 
of a normality that has consolidated itself as a result of the reiterated qualification and 
enforcement of behaviour that is deemed legal” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 405). But the 
relation between the habitual and the reflexive is not a one-way street of 
sedimentation. Explicit acts of indication of the legal collective and identification of its 
boundaries do not happen in a vacuum but rather as a response to an interruption of 
a legal normality:  
 
The hold of law qua normative order is at its strongest when it remains 
unnoticed as an order that opens up and closes down normative possibilities by 
differentiating and interconnecting four dimensions of behaviour. Yet more 
pointedly, while participants understand what it is they ought to do, they do not 
immediately describe it in specifically legal terms, even if, ex post, their 
behaviour can be shown to be legal and they can interpret it as such. This is 
important because it suggests that legal orders draw on and come to stand out 
against the background of a more or less anonymous form of normativity, a 
normativity in which interaction precedes the reflexive operation whereby a 
manifold of individuals refer to themselves as a “we” who act together, such that 
paying at the check-out point is simply what “one” does. This is not to say, 
however, that it is a normativity devoid of legality, for law has contributed to 
shaping these patterns of behaviour. (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 25, original emphasis.) 
 
Lindahl speaks of the unobtrusive legal order of praxis as an anonymous social 
normativity (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 25). I want to stress this anonymous, diffuse social 
normativity/normality, because this description of legal normalization suggests, in my 
interpretation, that no such concrete order of behavior can be understood as merely 
legal. Rather, accurately described, law is only one indistinct dimension that 
structures, among other types of normativity and normality, practical engagements. 
Such engagements are not so much about obeying commands as they are about being 
involved in certain kinds of practices — traveling to meet one’s family, shopping for 
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food in order to throw a party — that typically unfold in specific ways. Here law is at 
best only one type of normalization that forms our practical possibilities of orientation 
in the world.  
Lindahl argues that legal possibilities are “first-person [my and our] repertoires 
of involvement with others and with things” (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 131). However, as 
anonymous forms of habit, they are not strictly speaking “mine.” In Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, “anonymity” is an important dimension of 
perception: when I perceive something, perception as such is not my personal project 
aiming toward deliberate goals. Such projects can build upon the perceiving bodily 
engagement with the world, but they do not describe this most “primordial” layer. 
Rather, the subject of perception is my body (my eyes, my hands, my ears, my skin), 
and this subject has a specific passivity and impersonality to it (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 
p. 250). When I perceive, say, a notice board from afar and cannot read what it says, 
the board “calls me” to approach it and find the optimal distance and the perspective 
from which to read what is written on it. I immediately “know,” without reflecting, 
what I “ought” to do in order to see the text that now is too far for me to see. The 
perceptual object itself seems to solicit certain movements and positioning in space 
from me in order to be seen correctly. It is never given completely to my perception 
but always as a Gestalt with a horizon of further possible perception of its other sides. 
A certain normativity of how one “ought to” move around and in relation to that object 
regulates my perception: in order to see the backside of the notice board, I need to 
grab it into my hands and turn it around.  
I can discover how to “best” perceive a Gestalt object because the object itself is 
a sediment of my past perceptions. I have acquired motor, embodied skills through 
learning from past lived experiences, my own but also others, and with these skills, I 
can without effort move about in the world. Perception and embodied intentionality 
are in general about “reiterative anticipation,” to use Lindahl’s apt expression. 
Furthermore, my motor and perceptual skills build up in a world that is given to me 
full of achievements of others’ past intentional orientations. As Sara Heinämaa 
explains: 
 
My perception indicates or refers back, but does not include, a whole history 
and prehistory of sensory-motor agents, living bodies, who have acted on their 
environments and created what I now find in my perceptual field: the 
perspectual thing and my sensing moving body. [T]his picture [of the 
perceptual field also] proposes that our own perception is not an originative or 
creative activity, but a reactivation. At best, we produce modifications or new 
variations of earlier perceptions and add new layers of objectivity to the 
foundation of the perceived world as it is provided for us by our predecessors, 
human and animal. (Heinämaa, 2015, p. 133) 
 
Legal boundaries of behavior are also such achievements that I can take up as 
a dimension of what it is to orient oneself in a certain situation. They offer me certain 
possibilities of orientation that I can use in my own orientation without these 
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possibilities being my achievements in the sense of originating in me. I do not 
“possess” these possibilities, they are not my property in the sense that legal 
philosophy has typically thought about “rights” as one’s possessions. They are rather 
given to me as general — open to an indeterminate number of embodied subjects — 
possibilities of orientation that I can reiterate and use, and with their help, anticipate 
how the practical situation within which I find myself will unfold in the four 
dimensions. As Merleau-Ponty puts it: 
 
My act of perception [...] takes advantage of work already done[.] [M]y body 
and my senses are precisely that familiarity with the world born of habit, that 
implicit or sedimented body of knowledge [savoir habituel]. [...] What we in 
fact have is consciousness of an inexhaustible object, and we are sucked into it 
because, between it and us, there is this latent knowledge which our gaze uses 
— the possibility of its rational development being a mere matter of 
presumption on our part — and which remains forever anterior to our 
perception. If, as we have said, every perception has something anonymous in 
it, this is because it makes use of something which it takes for granted. The one 
who [Celui qui] perceives is not spread out before himself as a consciousness 
must be; he has a historical density, he takes up a perceptual tradition and is 
faced with a present. (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 277, partly my emphasis, 
translation slightly altered.) 
 
Notice here how far we have come from the conception of law as mere external 
imposition of commandment and requirement of obedience. Here law is understood 
much more as something that, precisely, forms experiential life from within. Insofar 
as law concretely articulates our orientations in the world and toward each other and 
ourselves, it withdraws from view as a thematically “legal” and “collective” practice, 
and becomes relatively indistinct from other types of normativities, such as a certain 
normativity regulating mere perception.  
I want to stress this point to which Lindahl does not pay enough attention in 
order to highlight the difference between law as a concrete, effective but unobtrusive 
order and the explicit thematization of behavior in legal terms. Insofar as law forms a 
concrete order of embodied orientation, it is only non-thematically legal and collective, 
and becomes indistinct from normality and habituality, how a “normal person” orients 
oneself in a specific situation, and such normality and habituality is always constituted 
also by other types of normativity than the legal one. I find this state of indistinction 
interesting, because it suggests that no instance of orienting oneself in the world is a 
mere actualization of a set of legal possibilities, but it is always also something more 
and other. Such irreducibility of behavior to the actualization of pregiven possibilities 
is precisely what Agamben’s notion of impotentiality also suggests. We return to 
habituality and Agamben’s notion below. Let us now look at the explicit thematization 
of behavior as legal and collective. Heinämaa notes the following on the thematization 




The functions of my perceptual organs remain non-thematic in ordinary 
experience, but they can be disclosed by reflection, and on the other hand they 
“demand” or “require” our attention in abnormal circumstances, such as 
sickness and fatigue. When I climb up the hill, for example, and get tired, the 
focus of my attention starts to waver: instead of staying fixed on the top of the 
hill and on the path that leads up, it starts to oscillate between my goal (the 
perceived hill top) and my wearied limbs. The movements and sensations which 
at the outset were, as if, transparent or in the margins of my experience, now 
come to the fore. (Heinämaa, 2015, p. 131)     
 
It is this general phenomenon of “estrangement” of experience, the non-
satisfaction of anticipations and the becoming-ruptured of the familiarity and a certain 
“automatism” of the habitual experiential flow that presents the occasion for explicit 
thematic consciousness of that which conditions the familiar unfolding of experience. 
According to Lindahl’s account, things are not so different with law. The indication 
that it is law that structures what we are doing, and the identification of our practice 




6.5 Indication, identification and representation of the legal collective 
 
The very normalization of law into a concrete, habitual order of behavior sets 
the background against which abnormal behavior appears. Remember the 
Kripkenstein paradox, which shows how something that interrupts the typical 
unfolding of a familiar practice – a student interpreting the addition function in a math 
class in a way that strikes everyone else as utterly bizarre – renders that practice itself 
thematic. It challenges the participants to define and explain how exactly the addition 
function is to be used correctly. An interruption of a familiar practice indicates that a 
certain kind of practice is taking place and solicits participants, or better, the 
teacher/authority to explicitly identify the contours of that practice, to explicitly re-
draw its constitutive boundaries. Lindahl describes familiar situations, such as 
shopping, the interruption of which have a legal significance: if somebody leaves a 
supermarket without paying for the produce, and others spot him doing so, the 
practical situation is thrown into legal light. Shopping is suddenly disclosed as a legally 
regulated practice in which we, as participants, have certain obligations and rights 
(Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 26-30).   
As the paradox that we have been discussing extensively suggests, it is the 
interruption of a familiar practice that offers, or even seems to force, the occasion to 
indicate, make explicit, that law is taking place, as well as re-identify what it is that 
“we” are doing together. The explicit indication and identification of a legal order and 
a legal collective whose behavior it regulates — securing the meaning of a conduct as 
legal/illegal — is a problem both for theory and for the legal collective itself. There is 
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no fixed legal order, but, rather, cases of interruption will be investigated by legal 
authorities who will re-identify what the legal boundaries, in fact, are, and whether 
they were breached and with what consequences.  
If Lindahl can be said to rethink law as parole rather than langue, as a concrete 
order rather than a system of norms (without, of course, abandoning the notion of law 
as langue), then the fact that the question of deixis or indication is so important in his 
theory is unsurprising. A classical problem in legal theory has been how to draw a 
distinction between law and morality, and, arguably, this question has been 
approached with the notion of law as langue in mind. The attempts to answer this 
question take the form of finding objective criteria that would allow making a credible 
distinction between these different kinds of normative orders as if from the outside. 
Lindahl’s question is different. With law as parole that indicates its very own taking 
place, what matters are not criteria for identifying different normative orders. What 
matters are, rather, the forms in which a legal order individuates itself by counting a 
certain set of legal possibilities as its own and by representing instances of actual 
behavior as legal or illegal (Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 15-18, 75-81).  
Above we already mentioned collective identity as sameness, the relatively 
stable patterns of behavior that correspond to relatively stable normative expectations 
about who ought to do what, where and when: “[A] legal collective remains the same 
over time to the extent that its members develop and deploy the dispositions that allow 
them and third parties to say that they are living by its law, i.e. that individuals abide 
by who ought to do what, where, and when” (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 85). Collective 
selfhood, for its part, means that individuals can reflexively recognize themselves as 
doing something together with others: they can refer their own behavior and the 
expectation-meeting behavior of others to their collective-in-action. As we just saw, 
legal normativity, insofar as it becomes effective and regulates behavior in the four 
dimensions, tends to become relatively indistinct from other types of normativity and 
normality that articulate experience. For this reason, a crucial function of legal 
authorities is to indicate that law is relevant here, that law is in fact taking place and 
regulating behavior. Although also lay persons do at times indicate, when the need 
arises, that “we” form a legal collective and as members of this collective we ought to 
act accordingly, this monitoring of the permanence of collective action falls upon the 
authorities. 
The function of the use of the indexicals “we” and “ours” is to indicate the very 
taking place of law and legal joint action:  
a more or less anonymous stratum of behavior [is] a form of collective action 
that is not yet action by a “we,” such as in the utterance, “We the people do 
hereby ordain....” Linguistically speaking, the indefinite pronoun, “one,” 
alludes to this anonymous domain of sociality, in contrast to the subjective or 
objective cases of the determinative pronoun: “I/we”, “me/us.” (Lindahl, 2020, 
p. 120)
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Such normative speech acts that speak in the first-person plural (“we have 
decided...,” “a member of our collective ought to act in this way and not in that way”) 
and use other indexicals, in particular the “own,” indicate “an indexical organization”, 
an organization from “our” perspective of space, time, subjectivity and act-contents 
(Lindahl, 2007b, p. 8). Indexicals seek to show, make manifest, that what is happening 
is “our” ordering of reality, including practical possibilities that are of significance to 
“us” and to what it is that we are doing together, excluding other possibilities. 
Remember that also for Luhmann, everything begins not only with a 
distinction, but an indication of which of the sides is the preferred one. This side, and 
not that side, this (in)side and not that (out)side, will be the starting point of all further 
operations. In Lindahl’s account, the need for the explicit indication that “we” are a 
legal collective who ought to act together in specific ways and not in others arises in 
an occasion of interruption:  
if joint action in the mode of legal understanding is pre-reflexive in that the 
actors need not explicitly take up the first-person plural perspective when 
acting, this perspective now [in a case of interruption of the regular flow of 
praxis, like somebody stealing produce in a supermarket; my addition] becomes 
reflexive: who qualifies an act as illegal views him or herself and others, 
including the would-be thief, as part of a group, the members of which ought to 
act in certain ways — and not in others. The pre-reflexive, more or less 
anonymous, “one acts” gives way to the reflexivity of “we ought to act” in this 
way (and not in that way). The group becomes conspicuous as such. Accordingly 
both the illegal act and the collective become conspicuous in the form of their 
discordance. (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 138) 
An interruption of the normal, habitual flow of the intersubjective practice 
throws into relief that practice and the fact that it is a certain kind of practice of a 
certain kind of collective. What does not fit in, an act that the participants cannot 
attribute to the collective, makes the collective, the normativity of its joint action and 
its point (what it is that “we” ought to do together) conspicuous as precisely what was 
interrupted and how things ought to have unfolded. We become aware that we were 
expecting a certain kind of behavior — a type of behavior that we can attribute to “us” 
who are doing something together — when those expectations are disappointed. A 
suspension of the normal attributability of behavior to a structure of iterative 
anticipation makes this structure itself thematic. I would add that suspension of 
attributability of behavior to an order of meaning is by no means specific to law and 
the sovereign in the explicitly political sense, but it seems to characterize all kinds of 
normatively structured experience. All experience that anticipates that certain things 
ought to happen rather than others will be left in a state of suspension of meaning-
attribution when something happens that breaks with those expectations.  
What an interruption makes thematic is that there is a limited “realm of 
practical possibilities as the range of acts available to us, the members of a collective, 
when acting together in the course of joint action: legal com-possibilities. Law opens 
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up practical possibilities by empowering certain actions and empowering 
indeterminately many — but not infinitely many — ways of connecting these actions 
to each other [...]” (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 156). An interruption makes legal closure 
thematic. Up against “our inside” of limited legal possibilities is a “strange outside” of 
other possibilities but our own. “We” have drawn our legal boundaries in specific ways 
and not in others. An interruption breaches these boundaries and brings disorder into 
order. Naming interruptions “illegal behavior” is the typical way for law to deal with 
boundary-breaching. A legal collective, when determining behavior from its 
perspective, can recognize it explicitly either as legal or as illegal. By so representing 
behavior as legal or as illegal, it simultaneously, and implicitly, draws a limit between 
itself and what remains unordered for it. We are already familiar with this logic from 
Luhmann’s account, although Lindahl gives it a new spin, as we will see.  
For now, let us look more closely at the notions of representation and action. 
The interruption gives the occasion to disclose ex post facto past unreflective practice 
as attributable to a jointly acting collective: what before was only (or at best) 
unthematically legal and anonymous is now seen as legal joint action. Note the 
reoccurrence of the by now familiar retroactive temporality: what happened in the past 
can now be seen as what it “truly” and “always” was. Habitually behaving individuals 
appear only now as participants in a joint action, as representatives of a legal 
collective. They are deemed, represented, as representatives of the collective insofar 
as their behavior can be attributed to the collective as action abiding by its boundaries. 
Also, the attribution of illegality to behavior is a way of representing that behavior as 
something of relevance to the collective, namely as being in breach of its boundaries.  
Representational acts make two claims. The first claim is that there is a 
collective that this act represents, on behalf of which it speaks. The second claim 
purports to identify and recognize this collective as this rather than as that kind of a 
collective. The former is an existential claim which is necessary for that 
representational act to refer beyond itself, to something (a collective) in the world that 
precedes this act and on behalf and in the name of which that act is performed. The 
latter is a claim of identification: it spells out what this collective looks like, re-draws 
its contours by determining what its boundaries are and for the sake of what point 
these boundaries have been drawn. At the core of this account of representation is the 
phenomenological notion of intentionality: the appearance of something as something 
to someone. In intentional acts an object is intended (e.g. perceived, judged, cognized, 
recognized, represented) and it is intended as something (e.g. as a tree, as a crime, as 
being true, as being ours, as a legal collective enabling, say, same-sex marriage). As 
Lindahl explains: 
 
All representational acts have two dimensions which follow directly from the 
insight that to represent is to represent something as something. On the one 
hand, representation is the representation of (something); on the other, 
something is represented as (this or that). So also with the representation of 
collectives. (Lindahl, 2019c, p. 265)  
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But, this time, in question is not embodied, pre- and post-representational, only 
ambiguously legal intentionality, but explicit thematization of something as legal and 
pertaining to a legal collective. Representation is a necessary condition for the 
appearance of a legal collective (for any kind of a positively existing collective, really). 
Collectives and orders are not “real entities” simply existing in themselves, beyond all 
representative acts by individuals, but rather meanings or, better, meaningful 
articulations of reality. Reality can only appear as “shared” insofar as it is mediated 
by such articulations. This “non-realness” of collectives and orders implies that their 
emergence and conservation require acts that represent them, that constantly re-
iterate, authoritatively, the existential and identificatory claims. Furthermore, and 
importantly, such meaningful articulations — or forms, we could say — are not mere 
fictive constructions ex nihilo, but precisely articulations of reality. Explicit legal 
representations are articulations, distinctions, that target the relatively indistinct lived 
reality in which legal normativity does not stand out from other types of normativity 
guiding our embodied orientation in the world. This means that representational acts 
that claim that there is a collective and identify a collective as this rather than that kind 
of a collective never give an exhaustive and alternativeless account of such reality. 
Other representations of it remain possible. Giving form to reality through 
representations of legal collectivity thus does not amount to pure productivity, but 
there always remains something a representation/form cannot appropriate. As 
Lindahl notes, “[w]ere what is given in legal intentionality merely a legal construct, it 
would not be possible to distinguish between something which is the object of legal 
intentionality and the object as intended” (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 120). The notion of 
intentionality requires “minimal realism.”  
Representing something as something rather than as something else — A as x 
rather than y — gives us an access to A, lets A appear in a meaningful way. However, 
it never quite catches A, because another representation (A as y, or z or w) was 
possible. A collective does not have natural boundaries, all boundaries are modifiable, 
and no particular determination of the collective is an ultimate one; but also, no 
collective emerges without some representation. Representation thus is productive, 
but also irreducibly reductive and therefore contestable: 
For the one, no collective can emerge absent an act that seizes the initiative to 
speak and act on behalf of a collective, representing us as this or as that. [...] 
For the other, representation ensures that a collective is contingent in a twofold 
sense: it is contingent that we* are a collective and what we* are as a collective. 
Indeed, there is no representation absent more or less forceful inclusion and 
exclusion: we* are represented as this rather than as that group. If intending 
something as this (rather than that) brings about a “significative difference,” I 
would add that representing a collective as this (rather than that) operates a 
representational difference, both cognitive and normative. (Lindahl, 2019c, p. 
265, referring to Waldenfels, 2002, pp. 28-30, original emphasis.)  
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The logic of representative acts is that of inclusion and exclusion: each 
representation of something A as something x rather than y includes the A in the form 
of x, thereby excluding alternative forms, y and z, that A also might have taken. No 
representation simply mirrors a ready-made reality (see Lindahl, 2000). 
Representative acts that claim to speak in the name of a collective, of a “we,” 
characterize this “we” by determining collective possibilities, by drawing legal 
boundaries, specifying how its members ought to orientate themselves in space, time, 
toward each other and the things of the world. Legal collectives expect both behavior 
that abides by its boundaries and behavior that does not, that is, they expect both legal 
and illegal behavior and prepare themselves accordingly (like putting in place forms 
of sanction). Representations, then, have as their effect a cognitive difference: a 
collective is recognized and a state of indistinction distinguished, and the collective is 
recognized as something rather than something else. In addition, they give rise to a 
normative difference: a set of collective possibilities is posited as obligating and 
empowering in distinction to alternative sets. “Recognition is also always 
misrecognition”, because it marginalizes, with no objective justification, alternative 
forms in which individuals, behavior and collectivity could be represented (Lindahl, 
2018, p. 283,  original emphasis). 
All these differences remain contestable and, thereby, also modifiable, at least 
to an extent: 
 
But the surfeit of possible ways of acting together that have been marginalised 
can irrupt into a legal order, challenging its putative unity by transgressing the 
boundaries of what counts as consequential to the collective — as happened 
[when] the KRRS [the Karnataka State Farmers’ Association] forayed into the 
private property of Monsanto to raze its fields of GMOs with a view to 
preserving the traditional way of life of Indian farming communities. (Lindahl, 
2018, p. 295) 
 
If this representation of the “we” as x excludes alternatives, and it lacks any final 
objective license to do so, as we have seen, such representation can become challenged 
and put into question by those who favor an alternative representation y or z of that 
collective. What also can be challenged, and often enough is, as the case of the KRRS 
in the quote above suggests, is one’s being named as a member of a legal collective and 
as obligated to behave in specific ways by it. Evoking the Third Question, which 
challenges the way in which a legal collective attributes space, time, subjects and acts 
to itself in terms of il(legality), can also have as its goal the exclusion from that 
collective to the benefit of the existence and preservation of another one. 
In Lindahl’s illuminating example, the European Union has represented itself 
as a common market, thereby excluding alternative characterizations than the 
economic one of what might bring European peoples together. Challenges to the 
priority of market thinking as what unities Europe draw on meanings of European 
community that economic priority marginalizes in order to represent an alternative 
EU, one in which, say, social justice plays a central role.  
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So, an inclusion of a certain set of collective possibilities excludes other 
possibilities outside the collective’s purview, but only such excluding inclusion gives 
rise to a limited collective perspective. The self-inclusion of a legal collective in a 
representative act is simultaneously a self-exclusion: an exclusion of possibilities of 
articulating our collectivity. The excluded possibilities can, then, become thematized 
in acts of politics of legal boundaries as wrongfully excluded ways of recognizing who 
we “really” are (Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 199-201).  
Alternatively, the direction of critique can also be reverse: challenging that one 
has been rightly recognized by one’s inclusion in a legal collective. In Lindahl’s 
example, by occupying and destroying fields where GMO plants are cultivated, the 
peasant movement KRRS challenges its inclusion into the global legal order of the 
WTO, which regulates the use of genetically manipulated organisms. The KRRS 
thereby seeks to make manifest the strangeness of the traditional Indian peasant form 
of life to this order of global trade and campaigns for the preservation of this form of 
life outside the agriculture represented under the aegis of the WTO (Lindahl, 2018, p. 
24). By “preferring not to” cultivate land in ways recognized as legal and appropriate 
by Monsanto and the WTO, the KRRS makes manifest that the way in which the WTO 
seeks to organize agriculture is a contingent indication and identification of a global 
legal collective that lacks objective justification and literally takes space from an 
incongruous way to cultivate the land. 
To represent a collective is to (re)draw its boundaries in a non-alternativeless, 
contingent way that opens up the possibility a certain kind of a collective, while closing 
down others. Representation is deeply paradoxical:  
 
On the one hand, […] representation effects a self-exclusion, a “self-othering” if 
I can put it that way, in the very move by which it includes a self. On the other 
hand, representation is never only the exclusion of the Other. What I mean is 
that representation cannot exclude the Other without also including it as one of 
us. If self-inclusion goes hand-in-hand with a self-exclusion, so also 
representation ensures that Other-exclusion goes hand-in-hand with Other-
inclusion (and not simply as what has been excluded). Self and Other are more 
and other than what any of their representations can afford. (Lindahl, 2020, p. 
118, original emphasis).  
 
As the legal collective is paradoxical in this way and never simply coincides with 
itself nor is simply different from what is other to it, it can also change: it can come to 
recognize as its own possibilities that it before excluded from itself, and release to the 
domain of the unordered possibilities that it before included in itself.  
To speak about “collective action” is, thus, by no means innocent. For Lindahl, 
collective action can only be a representation of behavior as collective action: behavior 
is deemed or claimed to be “collective action,” and “collectivity,” “legality” and 
“illegality” are attributed to a manifold of individuals and their conduct (Lindahl, 
2019b, p. 438). To speak about “action” is to use a gathering formulation that identifies 
something (behavior) as something (an instance of legally regulated joint action). It is 
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a distinguishing intervention into law’s “primordial” concreteness and state of relative 
indistinction that prefers a certain articulation of a situation over other possible ones. 
But note that this relative indistinction is not the same zone of indistinction between 
law and politics in the state of exception that Agamben talks about: it is not about the 
explosion of the rule, of a growing impossibility to say what the law is because 
judgments of political expediency empty stable legal norms of their contents. Behavior 
can be contingently, and always ambiguously as to its final justification, attributed to 
a collective as being within its boundaries or in breach of them.  
This irreducibility of behavior to its legal interpretation, and the implied 
possibility of plural renderings of it, point, I think, to Lindahl’s post-humanistic stance 
to legal order, if by “humanism” we understand the general conviction that society, 
politics and law have their origins in human rationality and the deliberate decision of 
individuals to act together and agree to a social contract of some sort.61 The acting 
subject is not the sovereign source of the meaning of her action, and joint action is not 
an aggregate of individual actors each intending the same thing in their minds.62 Each 
singular case of “behavior” only counts as legal, and therefore as collective, insofar as 
it can be seen, according to the relevant co-actors and ultimately authorities, as 
pointing beyond itself to a legal order the practical possibilities of which the behavior 
in question is seen more or less to actualize or to breach. To identify behavior as an 
 
61 That collective action ought to be understood as undertaken by deliberate and intentional 
individuals seems to be Alexander Somek’s understanding of it. “At the end of the day,” he writes in his 
critique of Lindahl’s Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion, “the [IACA-]model 
appears to betray an organized vision of collective agency that imputes to individuals participation in 
common action regardless of whether they intend it or not.” Somek implies that one ought to talk about 
collective action only when individuals deliberately act together, which is of course implausible as a 
social ontological account of global legal orders. For Somek, then, Lindahl’s arguments on “collective 
action” are “grossly overstretched” (Somek, 2019, p. 364). For Lindahl’s response (according to which 
Somek gets wrong the notion of representation) see Lindahl, 2019b, pp. 437-446. 
62 This is the problem that also Luhmann has with the traditional notion of action, and the 
reason why he prefers the notion of communication: conceiving of action as originating in the individual 
who controls its meaning and course (how action begins, unfolds and ends). As such arcs of action 
cannot plausibly describe how social systems function, Luhmann rejects the notion of action as basic 
for sociology. For him, society does not consist of individuals and their actions. For Luhmann, the 
human being cannot be seen as the center of society. As King and Thornhill note, “the basis of function 
systems in modern society does not result from the prescriptions of a rational legal subject, but instead 
from each system’s autonomous and contingent self-reproduction” (King & Thornhill, 2003, p. 174). 
Action is not a basic element of society, but, instead, systems’ communicative operations are. 
Furthermore, Luhmann argues that action in itself cannot guarantee connectivity to further action: 
when an individual action has reached its end, it simply ends, without securing a continuity (Luhmann, 
1982, p. 369). If understood in this way, the notion of action is not suitable to explain autopoiesis, the 
system’s recursive reproduction of its own elements with the help of its own elements, as this requires 
explaining precisely the connectivity of operations to operations. Luhmann does not, however, 
completely abandon the notion of action. He rather redetermines its conditions of identification and 
embeds action in the self-reproduction of social systems. Action is not a basic unity of sociality, but 
something more is needed to identify something as a social action. Action can only be identified as such 
by an observing system and thus within it and as its element. “[T]he identification of utterance as 
‘action’,” Luhmann explains, “is the construct of an observer, that is, the construct of a communication 
system observing itself” (Luhmann, 2012, p. 45). Luhmann “reintroduc[es] the concept of action as a 
construct of an observing system, where the system can localize actions as points of imputation in the 
system and in the environment” (Luhmann, 2012, p. 371, footnote 118). Imputation, the attribution of 
communicative operation as somebody’s action, is needed, because “communication cannot be 
observed directly, only inferred. To be observed or to observe itself, a communication system must be 
flagged as an action system” (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 164). 
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instance of collective action is to understand or interpret it ex post facto, and, thus, 
always only putatively, as referring to an order that only can secure its meaning as 
such.   
6.6 The paradox of representation 
To preserve a collective self in existence, then, requires constant “work” or 
“labor” (van Roermund, 2020; Lindahl, 2020, p. 125-128) on the part of participants 
and, specifically, legal authorities. They are called to re-indicate and re-identify their 
legal collective in always novel situations in which the existence and identity of the 
collective becomes a thematic issue and questioned. I suggest drawing a distinction 
between the non-thematic use of legal possibilities of orientation in familiar practices 
and the thematic work done by legal participants and, in particular, legal authorities 
as they seek to re-draw the contours of the collective they claim to represent. Legal 
normativity structures familiar practices but it does not stand out as such: anonymous 
use of ways of orienting oneself in a familiar world intertwine with whatever it is that 
one is doing. One shops for food in order to throw a party and not explicitly in order 
to realize a point of legal joint action. If the need arises, specifically in cases of 
interruption when legal authorities are called to interpret the situation from the 
perspective of the legal collective, one’s behavior can be “worked over” by representing 
it in explicitly legal terms.  
Lindahl describes, as we already saw, the unthematic and unreflexive, 
anonymous form of sociality in Heideggerian terms as being in the world that is “ready 
to hand.” For Heidegger, Dasein’s non-thematic being-in-the-world takes different 
modalities of “concernful” dealing: “having to do with something, producing 
something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, 
giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, 
interrogating, considering, discussing, determining...” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 83). In 
these modalities of using and handling, entities “are not objects for knowing the world 
theoretically, they are rather what gets used [das Gebrauchte], what gets produced, 
and so forth” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 41). Our familiar ways of dealing with the world can 
be understood as representative in the broad sense that they are intentional: they do 
use, treat and grasp something as something, although they do not explicitly objectify 
what is used and predicate something on it. Van Roermund (also drawing from 
Merleau-Ponty) is correct to point out that the difference between habitually orienting 
oneself and explicit legal representation of things resembles that of “grasping” and 
“pointing”: whereas the first is about “developing a grip” — developing a use of 
something or a use of one’s own body, acquiring a habit — on how a certain practice 
appropriately unfolds, the latter, pointing, is precisely an indication in the sense that 
we have been discussing: pointing out to something in order to distinguish it from 
something else, objectifying it (van Roermund, 2020, p. 113-114; see also Lindahl, 
2020, p. 119). The self that has acquired habitual ways of “getting a grip” on the world 
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and orienting in it is not aptly described in terms of a subject relating to an object. 
Rather, it is itself an accomplishment of a certain continuous embodied engagement 
with the world that “anonymity” describes better than merely a proper name. When I 
have learned, say, to get a grip on the flute and acquired the skill to play it, the skill is 
“mine” and a characteristic of my personality, but as we discussed above, the skill does 
not originate in me: I have rather taken up a certain established use of the body and 
the instrument — how one plays the flute — and continued this “tradition of 
embodiment” in my own way.   
Agamben makes the important point that a habit and habitual use must not be 
understood as a mere actualization of a possibility, but rather as a potentiality to do 
something which, as we saw in our previous discussion of this notion, is also always a 
potentiality not to do something:   
A poet is not someone who has the potential or faculty to create that, one fine 
day, by an act of will (the will is, in Western culture, the apparatus that allows 
one to attribute the ownership of actions and techniques to a subject), he 
decides—who knows how and why — like the God of the theologians, to put to 
work [i.e. actualize; HL]. And just like the poet, so also are the carpenter, the 
cobbler, the flute player, and those who, with a term of theological origin, we 
call professionals — and, in the end, every human being — not transcendent 
title holders of a capacity to act or make: rather, they are living beings that, in 
the use and only in the use of their body parts as of the world that surrounds 
them, have self-experience and constitute-themselves as using (themselves 
and the world). (Agamben, 2016, p. 62, my emphasis.) 
Acquiring habits is not about realizing a given human essence but rather 
becoming capable of doing something that one can put to work and actualize but need 
not, and in every actualization of a habitual comportment the potentiality not to 
actualize it remains. Furthermore, no human self is merely, say, a flute player but has 
a range of habitual abilities that intertwine in everyday life such that one’s shopping 
for food requires a range of skills (that have mostly nothing to do with law).  
Why is this important for our account of law? Because when explicitly 
recognized and represented from the perspective of the legal collective, the 
impotentiality inherent in the use of legal possibilities as well as the becoming 
indistinct of legal normativity from other types of normativity easily vanishes from 
view: behavior is now recognized insofar as it is legally relevant and actualizes, or not, 
legal possibilities, it becomes attributed to the legal collective or it is seen as non-
attributable to it and hence illegal. The depth and multidimensionality of the lived 
experience cannot possibly be recognized as such in explicit legal representation of 
behavior (and, hence, Agamben’s attempt at thinking of politics that affirms 
potentiality in terms of the deactivation of the law). Embodied orientation in the world 
is never simply a means to a specific end, but this is how legal representation will 
recognize it: as an instance of joint action geared to “put to work,” realize, its point, or 
failing to realize its point.  
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Lindahl’s account of legal authority will, however, seek also to open an indirect 
way for law to deal with this blindness of the legal representation to the multiple 
dimensions of pre-representational experience. Against what Schmitt and Agamben 
claim, suspending legal measures is not, in Lindahl’s account, only about unhinging 
sovereign violence. It can also be a way of indirectly recognizing that “we” only have 
limited means of recognizing behavior. While Agamben interprets the impotentiality 
of law as a violent state of exception or as a messianic post-juridical condition, Lindahl 
suggests that it has wider use within the law: suspending the actual application of our 
legal norms to a situation, suspending the representation of a situation in legal terms, 
may also count as an ethical gesture that seeks to preserve, rather than destroy, what 
remains strange and inappropriable in “our” terms. Not holding back to dominate and 
destroy, but “holding back to hold out” (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 255), to preserve forms of 
(collective) orienting in the world that “we” cannot include within our legal order. “On 
this reading, exceptional measures are the common root of boundary-setting 
undertaken either to neutralize and destroy, or to preserve and sustain, what radically 
questions the legal collective” (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 251, my emphasis). “[C]ollective 
inaction” (Lindahl, 2020), or put it in an Agambenian language, the impotentiality of 
law, is not to be understood merely as the liberation of sovereign violence and what 
enables the sovereign ban and the biopolitical capture of life. The suspension of the 
application of the rule to the fact is also how another collective may have space to 
preserve itself, its form of life, and not be separated from its form.  
We will need to investigate Lindahl’s account of authority and collective self-
preservation as restrained collective self-assertion more closely in a moment. For now, 
and to finish this section, let us articulate as the paradox of representation the relation 
between the pre-representational, or unthematic, mode of law and legal 
representation. For Lindahl, “the IACA-model of law acknowledges and 
accommodates a certain priority of the pre-representational modes of sociality in 
which boundaries are (re)drawn once and again” (Lindahl, 2020, p. 123). Here, the 
boundaries are (re)drawn in the sense of being (re)used, reiterated, not in the sense of 
being explicitly (re)indicated and (re)identified. The priority of pre-representational 
modes of sociality is not absolute because the use of legal possibilities depends, takes 
up, pre-given possibilities that are traces or achievements of past acts of explicitly 
indicating and identifying a legal collective and its order of boundaries. Pre-
representational social practices enjoy only a certain priority: “if representational 
practices rely on embodied intentionality, so also, and conversely, representational 
practices embody intentionality, where I use the term ‘embody’ in a verbal sense that 
resonates, in some ways, with Foucault’s studies on the disciplining of bodies” 
(Lindahl, 2020, p. 124). Recall here our earlier discussion on Lindahl’s change of point 
of view in legal theory from law as a system of norms to law as a concrete order seen 
as a unity of bounded behavior from the perspective of those whose orientations it 
regulates. Recall also how this resonates with the notion of positivity as a disposition: 
being disposed to behave in certain legally empowered ways rather than others shows 
that “positive law” is not simply about acts of explicit norm-positing but also about 
being concretely disposed to orient oneself in certain ways. Furthermore, this account 
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of the positivity of positive law suggests both that a habitual disposition requires an 
external imposition of legal rules the success of which is dependent on these rules 
becoming internalized by their addressees.  
Let us articulate this two-way dependency — the disposition on the imposition, 
and the imposition on the disposition — in terms of the paradox of representation and 
constituent power. So, on the one hand, there are no legal orders or collectives absent 
explicit representational acts that indicate and identify a collective. Legal collectives 
are contingent formations and require representation: constituent power in the 
general sense of a power to bring a legal order into existence. On the other hand, all 
constituent acts, also the “historically first” ones, must claim to represent a collective 
that already exists: “a purely productive closure is, literally,” Lindahl explains, 
“incredible and unintelligible” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 291). As we have already noted 
several times, law can understand acts only as legal acts. There is then both a non-
legal, or in Lindahl’s terms an a-legal initiative that opens the possibility of a legal 
closure, of a legal collective and its order; and the interpretation of all acts as already 
legal acts. See here yet another formulation of the inclosure paradox: the act that gives 
rise to the collective closure both belongs and does not belong to that closure. What 
gives rise to the possibility to interpret acts as legal or illegal cannot itself be 
consistently shown to be either. 
A constituent act makes an initiative to bring about a novel ordering of reality 
that a plurality of individuals then may (or may not) internalize and even explicitly 
recognize “as their own.” In order to succeed, it needs to present itself as being 
empowered by the collective it seeks to bring into existence. The initiating act, in order 
not to appear as a mere expression of individual will, attributes itself to the collective, 
as being spoken and done on its behalf and in its name. A collective is a necessary 
presupposition — a fiction in Kelsen’s terms — of a constituent act. What is only 
possible through the mediation of representational acts is presupposed by them as 
their empowering ground (Lindahl, 2008, p. 336; Lindahl, 2013a, pp. 150-151; 
Lindahl, 2018, p. 407). “Constituent power,” Lindahl argues, “has the temporal 
structure of an anticipative retrojection: what is said to already have taken place is 
what is yet to come” (Lindahl, 2015, p. 168).  
Constituent power does not produce a collective out of nothing and fully outside 
law and constituted power, unlike how modern political philosophy has traditionally 
understood this notion. “Constituent power can only found by re-founding, claiming 
to uphold the mode of existence of a collective by articulating an original unity that is 
challenged. Paradoxically, constituent power initiates by upholding” (Lindahl, 2018, 
p. 407, my emphasis). Constituent acts re-found because they claim to be responsive: 
they present themselves as responding to what they represent as interruptions of joint 
action and requiring the re-formulation of how “our norms” ought to regulate the 
situation. Constituent power is about re-articulating the collective self vis-à-vis a 
reality that it takes as resisting, even threatening, its existence:  
 
In responding to what challenges them, collectives exist in the mode of exertion, 
of struggle. [...] [H]ow must reality be structured such that the self’s relation to 
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reality is laborious? The answer is that the self’s laboriousness is correlated to 
the resistance of reality. Resistance is the ontological determination of the real, 
of what characterizes reality qua reality in the understanding of collective 
agency accruing to self-preservation. More pointedly: to characterize joint 
action as joint labor is to characterize reality as resistance to the collective self. 
The questionability of the collective self means that the real is what, challenging 
a collective, calls forth the self’s effort to remain in existence. (Lindahl, 2020, 
p. 125, original emphasis.)
Why does the reality resist the collective self? Because even legally normalized 
behavior never simply realizes legal possibilities but is always also more than that, and 
on this non-coincidence builds the possibility to resist inclusion in, or exclusion from, 
a legal collective. The resistant reality can also be understood as another legal 
collective from which constituent acts seek to emancipate. The constant re-indication 
and re-identification of a legal collective and its order is necessary in order to preserve 
that collective self and collective perspective of reality in existence, against the 
background of a resistant reality. 
Constituent power and constituted power thus cannot be opposed to each other 
in the sense that the first is fully outside the law and the latter fully inside. They rather 
cross each other in the form of the inclosure paradox: constituent power is the a-legal 
force that re-opens the framework of constituted power within which the attribution 
of (il)legality to behavior is possible. This opening is not one-off but takes place each 
time the perspective of a legal collective is indicated and identified in a situation that 
is taken to resist the preservation in existence of the collective self.  
Furthermore, as we already saw with Kelsen, a constituent act can only 
retroactively be seen as really/rightly representing a collective. It can appear as an 
empowered, constituted act, if its addressees take the articulation of the collective 
possibilities that the initiative proposes as the premise of their behavior and begin to 
act in ways that these possibilities enable. Paradoxically, if a constituent act succeeds 
in its endeavor — to bring forth a novel legal collective — it will be seen as an instance 
of constituted power: “an act succeeds as the exercise of constituent power only if, 
retrospectively [retroactively], it appears to be the act of a constituted power” 
(Lindahl, 2015, p. 168). There is an intertwinement of constituent and constituted 
powers that deconstructs any facile opposition between inaugurating or unconditional 
and conserving or conditional power.   
On the one hand, then, an act of constituent power is an initiative to bring forth 
something new. This resonates with the modern predicament of the loss of absolute, 
theological and natural foundations of social order and the subsequent need to bring 
one about. Somebody needs to take the initiative and “draw a distinction,” to indicate 
in a preliminary manner a certain limited set of collective practical possibilities that 
the putative members of the collective may/ought to share and assume as their own. 
An initiative is creative, it anticipates what may come. On the other hand, the initiative 
must present itself as an iteration of a collective perspective already in place, namely 
attribute itself to and present itself as being empowered by an already extant collective 
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on behalf of which it speaks. This temporal paradox in which it is impossible to 
separate past and future into neat, self-sufficient moments in a temporal sequence has 
the structure of a reiterative anticipation (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 144).  
Constituent power thus is not fully active but can be said to be passive or 
conditioned in a double sense. There is the passivity/conditionality inscribed in the 
would-be constituent act that needs to present itself as “obeying” a collective already 
there. It is also passive and conditioned in the sense that its constitutive force is 
dependent on its addressees picking up the initiative and stabilizing it into an extant 
order by beginning to use the possibilities it offers for them. For its part, constituted 
power, power conditioned and empowered by legal possibilities and iterating them, is 
not fully passive or conditioned. Already the one who actively “takes the lead” so that 
a collective may have the chance to emerge in the first place must claim to be a 
constituted power (see Lindahl, 2013a, p. 150). At the heart of conditioned power is, 
then, unconditioned power, and vice versa: 
 
The inaugural act which gives rise to the distinction between legality and 
illegality [...] is neither legal* nor illegal*. In other words, and despite the 
possible “success” of an inaugural act, in the sense of its efficacity, the 
conditions governing the emergence of (il)legality* cannot guarantee the 
objectivity of the distinction itself, as drawn in the apposite order, nor the 
objectivity of the order’s boundaries. (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 152)63 
 
Because of the inclosure paradox, a legal order is never free from a-legality, 
from being a use of power to form reality that lacks final justification. The emergence 
of the distinction between legality* and illegality* is itself neither, but rather speaks of 
the a-legal ground of legality. That the inaugural act is neither legal* nor illegal* thus 
means that it operates beyond any legal articulation of space, time, subjectivity or act-
content, even if it must claim representativeness, which can only retroactively be 
(dis)confirmed as a (non)valid claim by the normalization of the initiative into a 
concrete functioning order and the recognition of this order as “ours.”  
But no retroactive recognition and identification of behavior or speech as legal 
can efface the fact that an inaugural act lacks authorization. After all, such later acts of 
recognition and identification are also themselves representations: they represent an 
instance of behavior or speech as something, including this behavior within a legal 
order and excluding alternative possibilities of signifying it. The lack of grounds of the 
initiatory-constituent act is retroactively “forgotten” by representing this act as an act 
of constituted power and therefore valid — but this act itself once more needs to claim 
to speak on behalf of a collective, and the problem is only displaced, not solved for 
good. Each act of explicitly (re-)indicating and (re-)identifying a legal collective claims 
to speak on its behalf, refers itself to it, but the confirmation of this claim is deferred 
to later acts of confirmation that recognize the former act as validly representative. But 
 
63 The asterisk signifies that the attribution of legality or illegality to behavior considers whether 
behavior is or is not within the four dimensions or boundaries of law: the subjective, material, temporal 
and spatial (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 124). 
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such an act of recognition itself calls for further recognition, etc. This referral and 
deferral of legality and collectivity, this paradox at the heart of law with which we are 
already familiar, destabilizes a legal order and makes of the preservation of a legal 
collective self a constant effort. A-legality never leaves a legal collective, because no 
instance of behavior or speech simply “is” legal or collective. Behavior only becomes 
such if it is represented as such, if it is attributed to a collective: through the logic of 
inclusion and exclusion that remains contested. What this means is that a legal 
collective is never present to itself. It is never simply identified as “legal” but rather 
suspended between representative claims that wait for recognition — that are 
themselves representative claims that wait for recognition. See here the similarity to 
what we above called the immunologic: pushing away what destabilizes a legal 
collective (a-legality) with means that themselves preserve that what is being pushed 
away with their help. A legal collective seeks to emerge and stabilize itself against a 
resistant reality through means that bring this resistance with them in altered forms. 
A collective cannot shake off its contingency. 
For this reason, because a legal collective cannot possibly shake off its 
contingency, the possibility for a non-nihilistic law depends on the ways it deals with 
this contingency. As Schmitt and Agamben show, dealing with the resistant reality in 
order to preserve oneself may mean domination and violence. Lindahl’s aim is to show 
that this is not the only possibility: 
the “hermeneutic power” of the subject to make sense of the Other, and [what] 
Van Roermund calls effort or labor, is undercut by a hermeneutic 
powerlessness in the face of what cannot be said and done in a given legal order, 
and where striving – laboring – to render the Other fully intelligible becomes 
an exercise in domination. Self-restraint in the face of a collective’s hermeneutic 
powerlessness seems to be exactly the opposite of effort or laboring: a stance of 
effort-less-ness. Self-restraint as the acknowledgment of a finite responsiveness 
to what challenges a collective speaks to a holding back to hold out what resists 
our collective effort of appropriation through a laborious process of self-
recognition.  Both effort and letting-go resonate in the ontology of restrained 
collective self-assertion: collective action and collective inaction. (Lindahl, 
2020, p. 126-127, original emphasis.) 
The constituent power to re-identify a legal collective is inhabited by a 
“constituent powerlessness” (Lindahl, 2015, p. 172), the inability to open a collective 
perspective in any other but limited, inclusive-exclusive terms. The reality resists a 
legal collective because it cannot possibly “fit” into its limited perspective (although, 
on the other hand, only through limited perspectives may we have access to a 
meaningful reality in the first place). That a legal collective only has a limited, although 
transformable to some extent, range of practical possibilities at its disposal, suggests, 
in Lindahl’s interpretation, that collective self-restraint, the suspension of 
actualization of its limited perspective to a situation, is a way to indirectly recognize 
that there are other collectives, other normative “forms of life” that refuse to be 
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included into “us” and also struggle to preserve themselves. Legal unification — our 
self-inclusion — always comes with political pluralization, alternative articulations of 
collectivity that may refuse to be recognized in “our” terms. To think about a notion of 
a legal collective that is able to deal with its own impotentiality, with its own 
potentiality not to apply itself to a situation in ways that seek to avoid destroying the 
“strange,” is to think about law that does not collapse into nihilism, to empty 
maintenance of itself for no other purpose but that of dominating life that it succeeds 
in capturing within itself. As Lindahl puts it, “everything turns on the question what 
political sense we are to make of the ‘autos’ of autonomy, i.e. of the ‘self’ of collective 
self-legislation” (Lindahl, 2008, p. 239), how to understand the collective self that 
seeks to preserve itself in a way that does not grant absolute powers of self-affirmation 
to this self. What is to be challenged is the understanding of “the [...] core of modernity 
[as nihilistic]: a subject — the people — that poses itself as the uncaused cause of a 
created being — the legal order — in view of securing the latter as the domain for the 





I would like to think that our banal, everyday behavior already makes manifest 
the idea of freedom as pluralization. That no worldly engagement is merely about 
realization of a logic of a particular social system, legal collective or order, suggests the 
potentiality of behavior not to be counted-in by any of them. Trivially, when we travel 
or shop for food, our behavior cannot be contained within the legal order of the airport 
or the supermarket but is always, at least minimally, more and other to it: not simply 
about the passenger showing her passport and the border guard controlling it but also 
about them greeting one another; not simply about the client paying in order to 
participate in economic transactions but also about me welcoming friends to my home 
for dinner. What Lindahl calls a-legal behavior in the political sense, behavior that 
interrupts how the normalized legal practice unfolds by challenging how it makes the 
difference between legal and illegal behavior, and even its right to make this 
distinction in the case at hand, is not a qualitatively different kind of behavior. Rather, 
it uses this ability of human behavior not to be confined into particular legal or 
economic orders, not to simply be the means to specific, legal or otherwise, ends and 
about actualizing established legal or economic possibilities. For Lindahl, the 
individuation of a legal collective — that “we” are a legal collective — arises in response 
to the interruption the anonymous and undifferentiated normativity of sociality. The 
authoritative determination of legal (or moral) norms applicable to the interrupted 
situation at hand — the identification of what “we” are as a collective — is always a 
certain hypostatization, abstraction and separation of the situation from itself.  
I would thus like to connect Lindahl’s articulation of the idea of resistance of 
reality to a legal collective’s self-preservation to Agamben’s insights on human 
impotentiality. What is “primordial” for law, then, is the use of legal possibilities by 
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beings that are also able not to use them and do something else instead. Being capable 
of impotentiality means that an embodied human being is never merely actualizing 
some pregiven possibilities, simply realizing an essence, a genetic code or fulfilling the 
expectations of a social system — not even then when a human being’s behavior can 
be seen as attributable to a collective. Whatever a human being does, as a potential 
being one maintains a relation to one’s potentiality not to do what one is now doing 
and, hence, the possibility also to do something else.  
What this impotentiality of human beings means in our context is that human 
behavior is never reducible to its ex post facto descriptions and identifications as this 
or that kind of behavior, as “joint action,” as legal or illegal, as breaching legal 
boundaries or abiding by them: it cannot be mirrored point by point in representation 
because it is never simply about actualizing a pregiven set of possibilities. Being 
capable of one’s impotentiality means that one’s behavior never simply realizes a 
specific potentiality to do something: it is an ability not to do what one is doing, and 
thereby indicates the non-necessity of what it is one is doing. Human behavior is 
always more and other to any representation seeking to identify what it “really” is 
about. Using legal possibilities is nobody’s vocation; actualizing specific legal 
possibilities is not a measure of one’s humanity. 
Already regular shopping in a supermarket is about something else and 
something more than simply realizing the principle “to each according to their means” 
(namely, shopping for food in order to invite friends and family for a party). One of 
Lindahl’s examples of a-legal activity, a social movement that calls itself the 
Mouvement des chômeurs et précaires en lutte (the “Movement of the unemployed 
and vulnerable engaged in struggle”) that engaged in autoréduction, that is, taking 
food from a supermarket without paying and redistributing it to the unemployed and 
the vulnerable, makes this irreducibility explicit. The chômeurs make such use of the 
produce and the legal space of the supermarket that strikes the legal collective as 
“strange,” as action that they cannot attribute to their collective but that also refuses 
to be merely branded as petty theft. Autoréduction challenges the whole coupling of 
food and its distribution to the legally enforced point of the economic system: to each 
according to their means:  
If a-legal behavior questions the reference to collectivity, so also it questions the 
reference to the normative point of joint action. Such is the stake in chômeurs’ 
action. On the one hand, the autoréduction misses the point of transactions in 
food shops such as Galeries Lafayette; it does not refer to or realize their 
normative point as articulated by the extant legal order. Amongst other things, 
the act is not oriented to realizing the principle “to each according to their 
means”. On the other hand, it points beyond itself to another normative point, 
which, the chômeurs claim, ought to be realized by joint action, e.g. the 
principle “to each according to their needs”. (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 141)  
The occupation and destruction of Monsanto’s fields by the farmers’ 
association, just like the autoréduction, are, for Lindahl, “counter-examples or 
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counter-signs that intimate another world by interrupting the extant legal order” 
(Lindahl, 2019a p. 423). They make manifest and interrupt the legal boundaries that 
articulate space, time, subjectivity and acts into a specific, exclusionary form, thereby 
seeking to indicate and identify — exemplify — another formation of space, time, 
subjectivity and acts: one that the global capitalistic order of things excludes from 
itself. They make manifest that behavior is never simply about executing pregiven 
goals, legal or otherwise, and that its legal representation and attribution to a legal 
collective in the form of (il)legal behavior is a contingent, and potentially 
misrecognizing and dominating, inclusive-exclusive response to a situation. They 
question the point that seeks to justify why behavior ought to remain within certain 
bounds. Thereby, they expose the contingency of the legal collective: its paradoxical 
existence and lack of ultimate grounds. A-legal behavior poses the Third Question: 
with what right does a legal collective draw the distinction between right and wrong, 
legal and illegal behavior? With what right does it organize reality in the way it does? 
Posing these questions seeks to detach land and food, the activities of agriculture and 
eating, from their “destinies” within the global economic legal order, to arrest their 
inclusion into that order and to liberate them, to speak with Agamben, to “another 
use.”  
For Agamben, as we saw, the impotentiality of human beings implies that all 
representations are necessarily structured as dominating inclusive exclusions: a form 
of life is divided, included as something and excluded as what does not fit within this 
specific representational space. Every representation has something it cannot 
represent, something that it must leave unrepresented and repress. Agamben sees 
here the root of all evil: the separation of life from its form and abandonment to 
sovereign violence. But if human beings are potential beings and always, in whatever 
they do, in relation to their impotentiality, this raises the question of the possibility of 
a legal collective that would also remain in relation to its impotentiality. Agamben’s 
politics of impotentiality as detaching it from its colonization by the governmental 
biopolitics and re-affirming it in the mode that he calls “studying the law,” resonates 
with the positive normative value that Lindahl also gives to the exception as the law’s 
suspension in order to preserve the “strange,” the irreducibility of life to “our” law and 
representations. For Lindahl, non-nihilistic legal collective would be one that 
cultivates not only its positive contents and empowerments, but also one that would 
be capable of limiting itself, thereby indirectly recognizing the freedom of human 
beings and other legal collectives not to bind themselves to “our” rules. “We” may 
indirectly recognize “their” potentiality not to follow our rules by making use of our 
impotentiality, that is, our potentiality to suspend the enactment of our rules to them. 
Lindahl’s idea of restrained collective self-assertion resonates with Agamben’s own 
idea of impotentiality as the root of both good and evil, as well as the latter’s 
reformulation of Spinoza’s conatus: there “is a resistance internal to desire [to 
persevere in one’s own being], an inoperativity internal to the operation. But it alone 
confers on conatus its justice and its truth” (Agamben, 2019, p. 28).  
The significance of the phenomenology of embodied experience for legal and 
political theory thus lies precisely in having shown how different logics of inclusion 
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and exclusion of specified legal, economic, educational and other orders and 
collectives intertwine in lived experience, and how this experience cannot be reduced 
to any of those logics, remaining always more and other to them. Therefore, this 
phenomenology also provides us a constant reminder of why these orders that regulate 
our lives are contingent and why none of them is capable of representing the absolute 
value of what it means to be human. 
6.8 Authority, (mis)recognition and restrained collective self-affirmation 
Let me now wrap up this chapter by discussing Lindahl’s take on legal authority 
and restrained collective self-affirmation. In Authority and the Globalisation of 
Inclusion and Exclusion (2018), Lindahl develops a normative account of the 
authoritativeness of legal authority in order to tackle a phenomenon he calls the 
globalization of inclusion and exclusion. Part of this phenomenon is the proliferation 
of legal orders that are either massively inclusive in that they claim globe-wide validity 
for themselves or massively exclusive in that millions of individuals and groups 
struggle to access them. Masses of people world-wide become both bound by legal 
obligations issuing from legal orders like, say, the WTO, and they become un-bound 
by legal orders, like those low-income workers or the unemployed in many European 
countries who have been excluded from welfare or health programs. People are 
increasingly exposed to both inclusive and exclusive acts by global legal authorities. At 
the same time, the existing institutional fora for legitimating legal authority are still 
predominantly the traditional national ones that have less and less purchase on legal 
orders of global scale. What emerging global legal orders lack are the institutional 
stages of legitimating legal authority they nevertheless claim for themselves (Lindahl, 
2018, pp. 40-41). 
This pressing problem is one central reason for re-thinking the 
authoritativeness of legal authority. As we have already seen, Lindahl’s answer to this 
problem rejects a position that readily comes to mind: legal universalism. For Lindahl, 
the normative significance of legal authority cannot hinge on the progress of gradually 
eliminating all forms of exclusion, as all legal orders are bounded and both include and 
exclude, necessarily. Their functioning rests on a constitutive closure, or rather, a 
process of opening up and closing down. Therefore, legal theory must look at the logic 
of boundaries (Lindahl, 2018, p. 283). Lindahl devotes a lot of time to show that the 
logic of bounded orders also has normative implications for legal authority. To 
acknowledge the irreducibility of closure does not commit one to nihilistic relativism, 
he argues. 
So, on the one hand, Lindahl opposes the utopia of universal justice within one 
single, comprehensive legal-political world order, and, on the other, he aims to counter 
the apology of relativistic nihilism. Even if emerging global legal orders lack 
institutional platforms for their democratic legitimation, this does not mean that 
inclusion into and exclusion from these legal orders would go unchallenged. To the 
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contrary, such challenges are ubiquitous, as Lindahl shows in his discussions of anti-
globalization movements such as the Indian Farmers’ Movement KRRS. It is on such 
local sites of challenging the dominating global orders that we should focus in order to 
investigate their ambiguous authority and responsivity to challenges. For Lindahl, the 
question of the normativity of legal authority is not confined to a specific institutional 
domain, such as the parliament. Rather, following the idea of the double inscription of 
the political, politics of legal boundaries is about situational and local challenges to the 
extant authoritative legal orders and how they have drawn the limit between what gets 
included into law and what gets excluded therefrom. Such challenges can take place 
and be staged anywhere, like in the fields in Southern India where the KRRS staged its 
protest against the destruction of the traditional peasant way of life by Monsanto and 
the WTO.  
Such situational and local challenges to legal orders offer the occasion to study 
the dynamic between representation and recognition that Lindahl conceives to be at 
the core of the constitution of legal collectives as well as responsive ethics. Legal 
authorities always claim to speak and rule on behalf and to the benefit of a manifold 
of individuals and groups, but those individuals and groups have not and could have 
not given their explicit consent to be so represented. Those individuals and groups that 
the authorities address as members of the collective they represent may well not 
recognize themselves in that address. Authoritative representations of the legal 
collective always overreach, to a lesser or greater extent. They are always only 
representative claims that never meet with absolute consensus and recognition on the 
part of those they address. Some of those individuals or groups that the representative 
act includes into the legal collective, or excludes therefrom, will not recognize their 
idea of what their collective looks like in that representation. They will claim that 
authorities misrepresent and thereby misrecognize the identity of their collective. 
Hence, they will press claims for recognition: they will claim that their vision of the 
collective ought to be acknowledged (Lindahl, 2018, pp. 232-233). 
Those who dissent and do not agree with the authoritative representations of 
the collective may appear as causing disorder and even as a security threat to the 
collective’s continued existence. The functional task of legal authorities, Lindahl 
argues, is to monitor and enforce the extant boundaries of legal orders in response to 
challenges they face (Lindahl, 2018, p. 59). (It seems to me that Badiou and Agamben 
all understand legal authority only in such functional terms.) Lindahl also argues, 
however, that in the functional task of keeping order, legal authorities are always to a 
greater or lesser extent engaged in the work of redrawing those boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion. In responding to challenges, legal authorities do not simply 
enforce the legal order they represent. Rather, in order to enforce it, they need to re-
identify — re-cognize — what the “default setting” of the legal boundaries, in fact, is in 
the case at hand. Legal authorities are “experts” who produce knowledge of the 
collective, what it is “in truth” and what “really” joins all members together (Lindahl, 
2018, pp. 314-315).  
But what the collective “really” is, is articulated in the response to a challenge. 
Retroactive temporality applies here: what the joint action is “really” about and exactly 
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what kind of order has been ruptured and calls for enforcement “is the outcome of a 
décalage whereby what is yet to come is retrojected into the past as what, having 
already come to pass, only needs continuation [and enforcement]” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 
324). The paradox of representation exposes that the articulation of the order to be 
enforced is dependent on and follows from what is interpreted as its rupture, although 
in its articulation, it is presented as an order already in place prior to the rupture. 
There is what Lindahl calls “the double asymmetry of question and response” (Lindahl, 
2018, p. 278). On the one hand, a surprising rupture, a challenging question addressed 
to the collective concerning the way it draws its boundaries and recognizes itself and 
its other, is possible, because the collective perspective is limited and the collective 
only anticipates certain things to happen rather than others, and reality never quite 
satisfies these expectations (“asymmetry 1”). On the other hand, however, what the 
surprise and rupture is about, how exactly the expectations of the collective self were 
disappointed and what those expectations, in fact, were, becomes articulated in the 
authoritative response only (“asymmetry 2”) (Lindahl, 2018, pp. 276, 281).  
Unlike the constructivism that, according to Badiou, simply identifies 
knowledge and existence and can only re-cognize that for which it has an already 
existing name – thus leaving it to the supplement of politics to articulate the truth to 
which knowledge is blind – Lindahl’s constructivism is paradoxical. There is no 
representation, identification nor recognition of the collective a as x without a 
challenge that forces the production of an authoritative self-recognition as a response 
to this challenge. The challenge ruptures the smooth unfolding of the joint action, 
“deactivates” it, renders it inoperative and creates disorientation. But the meaning of 
this challenge, what the question, in fact, asks, only becomes heard in the response. By 
responding, the collective recognizes both itself and its other as something. The 
relation of question and response is, thus, not linear. “Boundary-setting is retroactive 
in that the question to which it responds only becomes manifest in the response itself” 
(Lindahl, 2018, p. 298). What the question asks, and what the rupture is about, 
appears retroactively, through the response given to it by the authorities. This is one 
way of expressing the completeness of a legal totality: it will give a legal answer to every 
question posed to it, and hence it will also hear the question in such a way that it can 
answer it.  
Furthermore, there is no necessary reason why a collective ought to respond to 
a challenge in a specific way. There is no fixed collective identity that would determine 
a response. This implies the contingency of every response and recognition of the self 
and the other as something. Alternative responses are always possible. This means 1. 
that those who pose the question may not recognize the response as a satisfying, 
proper response to their question, but rather as its misrecognition, and 2. that all 
“expert knowledge” concerning what the collective represented in the response “truly 
is,” is simultaneously its misrecognition, a collective self-misrecognition. Because of 
this contingency, the recognition of the self/other is always also a misrecognition of 
the self/other. Recognition is paired with misrecognition of what it recognizes.  
Remember that, for Lindahl, representing something, like the collective a, as 
something x is a pluralizing gesture to the same extent as it is a gesture of 
250 
identification, because it “introduces a non-identity ([the collective a as x] rather than 
y) into identity” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 326, my emphasis). Self-inclusion, or self-
recognition, as x is paired with self-exclusion, or self-misrecognition, as y. It is
“alienating to those who would range themselves under the pennon of y” (Lindahl,
2018, p. 326). For such members, to represent the collective a as x counts as an
exclusion from a collective they could recognize as their own, and hence as its
misrecognition. This is what Lindahl calls “untoward ‘othering’” (Lindahl, 2018, p.
322). It is contested in claims to transform the terms of inclusion and exclusion in such
a way that what before was excluded and thereby misrecognized, may now be included
as “one of us.” Furthermore, distinguishing the collective a from other collectives
through its representation as x, may also be met with claims that it is inclusion to the
collective a by means of representing it as x that misrecognizes the political identity of
those included and who would rather recognize themselves as members of a collective
b, irreducible to the law of the collective a. This counts as an “untoward ‘selving’,” and
may be contested in claims to transform the terms of inclusion and exclusion in such
a way that what before was included, and thereby misrecognized as “one of us,” is now
excluded and released to its strangeness, to what is other to “us.” “The dynamic of
representation,” Lindahl concludes, “ensures that collective self-recognition involves
not only collective self-misrecognition but also misrecognition of the other, giving rise
to demands for inclusion in and exclusion from the collective” (Lindahl, 2018, pp. 322,
326).
Unlike in Badiou’s understanding of constructivism, in which, within ontology, 
a collective (like the French state) simply is what it can already name and order, for 
Lindahl, “[a] collective is never simply itself and never simply different from the other; 
entwinement is the primordial condition that governs the encounter between 
collective self and other” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 322). “Entwinement” is a name for the 
paradoxical totality of the legal collective that cannot coincide with itself, but is rather 
inhabited by, to borrow Agamben’s term, “indistinction” between self and other. For 
Lindahl, this indistinction does not give rise only to the possibility of the state of 
exception in Agamben’s sense. Rather, it is the possibility of the transformative politics 
of boundaries: to include what was excluded and to exclude what was included.  
Lindahl insists on the fundamental ambiguity and contestability of recognition 
as a cognitive-epistemic activity that seeks to authoritatively establish the identity of 
the represented collective: “collective recognition is always, to a lesser or greater 
extent, collective misrecognition” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 327). Hence, it will be seen as 
dominating, violent and something to challenge. Contingently articulated legal 
totalities cannot be internally consistent, but they are always split: the authoritatively 
represented and recognized collective is inhabited by internal resistance and 
otherness.  
Lindahl endeavors to articulate this otherness as politically and ethically rich. 
His attempt contrasts with both the Luhmannian evolutionary account and the 
Agambenian nihilism that see the internal otherness as fuel either for the system’s 
functional perpetuation or for the operation of the governmental apparatus with no 
other task than targeting this otherness as bare life beyond legal protection. At stake 
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is how contingent and inconsistent collectives can deal with their limits that they seek 
to draw between themselves and otherness in such a way that would not signify their 
absolutization with no regard to the irreducibility (impotentiality) of life and reality to 
their limited perspective.    
A situation of rupture and inoperativity amounts to what Lindahl calls “the 
summons to collective self-assertion,” to authoritative indication and identification of 
the existence and identity of the collective (Lindahl, 2018, p. 331). It is a situation in 
which the indistinction between the self and the other becomes exposed. This leads to 
disorientation of joint action, to its “deactivation” and thus, Lindahl argues, calls for a 
response on the part of those claiming to be the collective’s authoritative 
representatives. Their response re-articulates legal boundaries in such a way that will 
have allowed the collective to overcome the challenge to its existence. This means, as 
we saw above in the discussion of the temporal paradox of representation, that each 
response to a rupture is a wager the success of which — and, ultimately, the 
authoritativeness of which — hinges on whether it can be said “on hindsight and for 
the time being [to have gained] wide allegiance among its addressees and motivate[d] 
them to act as a group that can deal with challenges to its contingent existence” 
(Lindahl, 2018, p. 329, emphasis omitted). Authority is, then, for Lindahl, above all 
about deciding, in a situation of collective disorientation, what the collective response 
to it is and how the collective will overcome it and go on, without being able to resort 
to any objective, pregiven criteria of collective identity. Such an initiative opens the 
possibility of the collective perspective to continue.  
The initiating decision, and, therefore, authority itself, is not absolute. It is 
dependent on its “success”: on its ability to respond to collective disorientation in such 
a way that the necessary self- and other-misrecognition involved in it will not 
immediately again prevent the continuation of collective action under the 
reformulated default setting. Only if the response is taken up by (sufficiently many of) 
its addressees and recognized by them as an authoritative representation of “who we 
really are,” taken by them as the premise of their joint action, will the decision gain 
some security in its meaning as authoritative, rather than mere arbitrary command. 
Authority is, thus, not only about “leading the way” and “commanding,” Lindahl 
insists, but it is also about becoming seen as “obedient to the collective identity, 
seeking to articulate, retroactively, what is truly important to us” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 
334). Lack of such recognition would indeed mean that law exists only in a state of 
virtuality, without actual effectivity to concretely orient individuals. Lindahl insists 
that a distinction is to be drawn between mere arbitrariness of commands and 
contingent acts of authoritative decision-making. The “as if,” the representation of acts 
as “our” acts are retroactive achievements that will have allowed a particular, positive 
collective perspective to open up. However, the fiction remains necessarily 
contestable. There are no guarantees that all those addressed will, in fact, recognize 
themselves as “rightly” represented by it.  
The core of responsive ethics of legal authority is thus this: in response to a 
challenge, rupture or conflict in the practical context of the legal collective, legal 
authorities may re-draw those temporal, spatial, subjective and material boundaries 
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that determine a range of practical possibilities of behavior for the legal collective in 
question. In other words, they answer again and differently, on behalf of the legal 
collective, to the practical question who ought to do what, where, and when. An 
important task of legal authorities thus is to specify, over and over again in response 
to always particular situations, that there is a collective and what kind of a collective 
this collective actually is. The legal collective gets continuously re-identified and re-
presented by its authorities as a response to always particular situations and 
challenges and as always under at least somewhat different light: as now including a 
practical possibility it previously excluded, or vice versa. 
When legal authorities confront situations where they must determine what the 
law is and how it responds to the situation at hand and the practical question it poses, 
they do two things, one directly and the other indirectly. Directly, they determine what 
is legal or illegal behavior in the situation at hand. By so doing, they also indirectly 
exclude what is irrelevant from the law’s perspective, what counts as a-legal. In 
Lindahl’s terms, the four-fold boundaries of law can manifest themselves as limits 
between the inside and outside, as limits that can be expanded or contracted. What 
before was illegal, can become legal, and vice versa, but also what before was irrelevant 
from a legal collective’s perspective, like, say, forms of domestic violence, can become 
relevant to it, and vice versa (Lindahl, 2013a, p. 174; Lindahl, 2018, pp. 295-296). But 
second, transformability also means that a collective identity is irreducibly finite. No 
matter how the distinction between what is relevant for the legal collective, and thus 
legal or illegal, and what is irrelevant for it is drawn, this limit itself cannot be effaced. 
This means that a collective identity is transformable but never unlimited. It can only 
transform the limit between itself and what remains other to itself in a manner that it 
can recognize as its own; that is, a collective can only include and exclude practical 
possibilities in a way that its representing authorities judge as not undermining its 
own existence.  
As we already saw with Luhmann and in our discussion of law as the immune 
system of society, law’s transformability is tied to its self-preservation. Self-
transformation cannot be about self-destruction. “[C]ollectives are finite in that their 
authorities frame the questions to which they respond in such a way that their 
response is consistent with the continuation of joint action” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 298, 
my emphasis). In other words, they seek to respond to challenges in such a way that 
the response will have been seen as consistent with, obedient to what the collective 
“really” is, by sufficiently many of its addressees – although it never simply is 
consistent, as collective self-recognition is constitutively tied to self-misrecognition. 
The task of authorities is thus to uphold and modulate the distinction between 
inside and outside, self and other, all the while preferring the first term. Lindahl’s 
account reaffirms the significance of creating an appearance of consistency for the 
legal collective’s self-preservation. Unlike Luhmann, Lindahl insists that self-
preservation has also a political and ethical dimension to it, because it always concerns 
a contingent representation of what is claimed to be common and joint to a selection 
of individuals and groups. The consistency of authoritative decisions with the 
collective identity remains, in principle, always contestable. Only an 
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acknowledgement of this contestability keeps contingent legal orders from collapsing 
into sheer nihilistic relativism and constructivism, or so Lindahl argues. Furthermore, 
what Lindahl calls a fault line “signals a non plus ultra for joint action” (Lindahl, 2018, 
p. 282). A fault line signals the excess of practical possibilities that remain strange to
a legal collective that it cannot, at least for the time being, recognize as its own. The
collective can re-identify itself in what was other to it, but the cleavage per se between
self and other cannot be overcome. Self-restraint, or self-suspension, may be a mode,
Lindahl suggests, with which the legal collective can indirectly recognize its own
contingent finitude. Self-restraint may be a way to deal with the fact that transforming
the legal possibilities by including what was excluded may not correctly recognize —
do justice — to claims to the “right” to a form of life.
What Lindahl calls a-legality can only be indirectly acknowledged by the legal 
collective. Nothing is a-legal as such; it is what in a claim x remains untranslated into 
the legal idiom (Lindahl, 2018, p. 296). A challenge appears as a “weak a-legality,” if it 
is responded to by transforming the extant legal boundaries, by recognizing the other 
as one of us and by including what previously was excluded. “Strong a-legality” is, by 
contrast, only indirectly indicated by the transformed default-setting as what still 
remains in excess of our collective possibilities, as being beyond the legal collective’s 
transformed range of practical possibilities (Lindahl, 2018, pp. 298-299). The degree 
of the radicality of the question thus depends on the response the authorities give to 
it. It depends on how much they deem necessary to transform the default setting of 
joint action and how much of the challenge the legal order can recognize as a legally 
valid challenge implying changes to its default setting:  
the challenge of the KRRS could be responded to by, perhaps, transforming the 
WTO’s default setting of environmental protection and sustainable 
development. [...] [N]ew default settings of free global trade would evince 
behaviour that, although initially unordered, is to a certain extent orderable for 
the WTO. The outcome of the new default setting of joint action would be that 
the WTO shifts, perhaps in ways that were unexpected for the protagonists, the 
limits of what counts as free global trade. [...] [However,] there is also a “strong” 
dimension of a-legality, namely, challenges insofar as they are unorderable for 
the respective collective. The KRRS’ aim to create Village Republics organised 
on the basis of the principle of food sovereignty is inimical to the principle of 
free global trade. [...] The surd domain of what is unorderable, ungovernable, 
for a collective is also the privileged domain of constituent power, the fount 
whence another collective can emerge. It is the domain of innovation, at times 
of radical innovation: not the tapping of a range of extant possibilities but rather 
the emergence of a new range of possibilities for joint action. (Lindahl, 2018, 
pp. 298-299) 
Food sovereignty claimed by the KRRS is irreducibly at odds with the collective 
perspective offered by the WTO and its limited possibilities of transformation. A fault 
line, rather than an expanding and retracting limit, separates these two collectives. 
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How, then, might the WTO respond to the claim for food sovereignty? The notion of 
collective self-restraint names a situation in which a collective re-affirms itself by 
indirectly recognizing the other as other to itself, as incongruent with its perspective, 
and does not seek to bring it within itself through boundary-transformation. For 
example, “[a] collective declares that a domain of behaviour is off bounds for it; it 
recognises that this domain ought to remain unordered from [its] first-person plural 
perspective [...]” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 358). As a response to the claim that the KRRS’s 
Village Republics ought to remain outside global trade, the WTO could, for instance, 
release peasant communities from directed obligations related to the global trade of 
seeds (Lindahl, 2018, p. 343). Legal authority would thus work toward creating the 
conditions for the opening and preservation of another collective. 
Furthermore, instead of (only) including novel possibilities to itself, the 
collective may postpone its acts of boundary-setting, deferring them in time and 
thereby giving space to struggles for representation over how the collective ought to 
be represented and which collectives call for representation. Suspending its operation, 
the legal collective gives space to other collectives to indicate their presence and 
articulate their identity irreducible to “our” tasks and points of action. “Staying 
collective self-assertion amounts to allowing both dimensions [that we are a collective 
and what we are as a collective] of struggles for recognition and representation to 
come out into the open” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 342). Furthermore, as struggles for 
representation and recognition are also struggles for authority, for who gets to speak 
on behalf of a collective, and which are the collectives in need of authoritative 
representation, suspending the operation of decision-making and boundary-drawing 
also gives space for the staging of the contingency of authority-claiming 
representations and exhibiting the conflict between non-institutionalized and 
institutionalized forms of authority (Lindahl, 2018, p. 243). 
Self-restraint may also be formally similar to the Schmittian exception, namely, 
the non-application of rules that ought in principle to be applied to the situation at 
hand. Lindahl insists, however, that, here, the exception has an inverted sense to 
Schmitt’s and Agamben’s notions of the exception. For Schmitt, the exception to the 
rule allows for legally non-mediated political governing of the situation. For Agamben, 
such suspension of the rule has gradually become the normal situation in which the 
legal order is in force only in an inoperative mode. This empties the significance of, for 
instance, fundamental rights, and leads to the governance of living beings exposed to 
sovereign violence. For Lindahl, the exceptional, requiring exceptional measures, can 
only reductively be understood as simply the enemy (Schmitt) or the bare life 
(Agamben):  
 
The strange, in its strong dimension, speaks to a fault line of collective action, 
not to a variable limit thereof: to something that resists inclusion as one of us 
because it is the other (in ourselves) of us. In a word, the exception speaks to 
singularity, to that which eludes a dialectic between the general and the 
particular. [...] Instead of being an act of direct recognition – we can include 
the other (in ourselves) as one of us – it is an indirect form of recognition, one 
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that holds back to hold out insofar as we* cannot include the other (in 
ourselves) as one of us without destroying the other’s identity/difference. 
(Lindahl, 2018, pp. 344-345, original emphasis.) 
 
When facing something singular that resists being recognized and represented 
in our terms, we* can make an exception to the application of our law. Here, the 
contingency of legal authority is exposed in its impotentiality, as we* can not apply 
our law. Thereby, we* resist the absolutization of our own perspective and take care 
not to destroy that what remains strange to us. Self-restraint is “the opposite of 
universalization,” as it is about self-limitation to counter “the danger of imperialism,” 
latent in attempts at constructing all-encompassing positive legal orders, and an 
attempt at preserving “the strange as strange,” as irreducibly different, 
unrepresentable and yet not an enemy to be destroyed.  
As we saw above, within the immune paradigm, the anomos is conceived an 
existential threat to the collective to which the sovereign needs to respond by 
introducing anomy within the commonwealth, thus itself becoming the threat against 
which it seeks to protect the collective, turning everyone into bare life. Self-restraint 
as the ethical gesture does actualize anomy within the collective. It does so, however, 
not in order to destroy or control bare life but, rather, in order to preserve the singular, 
anomic other in its strangeness and potentiality not to be reduced to our law. Self-
restraint is a way to deal with the inconsistent completeness of the legal totality, with 
the fact that its ability to hear and respond to challenges is limited, and, therefore, 
never without alternatives. By restraining its operation and leaving some questions 
legally unanswered, the legal collective gives space for such formulations of the 
problem at hand that remain beyond its capacities of understanding. Thereby, it also 
indirectly recognizes that there are forms of rationality that are incongruent with it. 
Self-restraint is a way for a legal collective to obliquely acknowledge that there is a 
reality that remains inappropriable for it.   
Self-restraint maintains the collective in a state of indistinction of the self and 
other not in order to “make everything possible” in the sense of legally non-mediated 
political domination, but rather in order to exhibit the political pluralization that 
always takes place when the boundaries of a legal totality are drawn. Clearly such an 
ethics is risky. It remains a political question whether self-suspension constitutes an 
act of self-betrayal or even self-destruction (Lindahl, 2018, p. 345). Legal authority as 
indirect recognition of the other (in ourselves) as other than us that resists inclusion 
also needs to preserve the collective that it claims to represent. Self-restraint is also 
about self-assertion. For Lindahl, then:  
 
[t]he responsive ethics at work in asymmetrical recognition suggests that the 
authoritativeness of an authoritative politics of boundaries turns on asserting 
ourselves as a collective by including the other (in ourselves) as one of us in a 
way that also makes room for preserving the other (in ourselves) as other than 




Limited autonomy regimes, Lindahl argues, such as regimes that grant a 
minority political control over a certain territory, are instances of the restrained 
collective self-affirmation. They are examples of the state legal collective’s self-
affirmation because, first of all, the political other is (mis)recognized as a “minority,” 
which means that the other is included within the collective as “one of us.” A collective 
can only count as a “minority,” when it is included in a larger collective featuring a 
“majority” collective. The autonomy regime is thus limited by “[t]he constraints [that] 
delineate the scope within which the [state] collective is prepared to recognize a 
minority as other than us, while also including it as one of us: plurality within unity” 
(Lindahl, 2018, p. 357). Members of the minority group are treated also as members 
of the state legal collective, although in some respects the state withdraws from 
imposing its legislation on them, thereby indirectly recognizing its inability to 
accommodate political-legal alterity:  
 
The collective restrains itself in the double sense of a deferral of self-assertion, 
such that a struggle for recognition and representation [of the “minority” 
group] can be staged, and deferral to a group that demands recognition by 
ceding to it the representation of what counts as its unity, qua minority. In this 
way, a collective indirectly recognizes the other (in ourselves) as other than us, 
where “us” adverts to the authoritatively mediated first-person plural 
perspective of the broader collective. In brief, limited autonomy regimes are 
institutional instantiations of restrained collective self-assertion: we* can 
include the other (in ourselves) as one of us and exclude the other (in ourselves) 
as other than us. (Lindahl, 2018, p. 358, emphasis in the original.) 
 
In Lindahl’s interpretation, restrained collective self-assertion is also what the 
European Court of Human Rights does, when it gives leeway to the Member States 
through the mechanism of the national margin of appreciation to answer a legal 
question concerning the interpretation and application of human rights in a particular 
situation (Lindahl, 2018, pp. 351-352). By leaving it to a Member State to decide 
whether it allows a certain kind of behavior, like in the Lautsi case64 the display of 
crucifixes at public schools, the Court restrains its legal powers it could have used but 
did not. The Court could have opined that the mandatory display of crucifixes in Italian 
public schools violates the rights to education and the freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion of the applicant under the European Convention on Human Rights, but it 
did not. Instead, it gave space for the Italian authorities to decide on that matter. As 
the legal authority of the legal collective that is the Council of Europe, the Court 
recognized Italy both directly and indirectly: directly insofar as it recognized Italy as a 
Member State bound by its human rights obligations and the Court’s authority, but 
also indirectly insofar as it exercised self-restraint and refrained from using its own 
powers to give space to the powers of Italy. In this way it indirectly recognized that 
Italy is another legal order that the Council of Europe cannot fully assimilate into itself 
(Lindahl, 2018, pp. 352-354). 
 
64 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Lautsi and Others v. Italy, 18 March 2011. 
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The possible intimate relation of the indirect recognition of alterity by self-
withdrawal to prudential (and immunitary) considerations of the ability of the self to 
continue operating is clear in this example. Given that membership in the European 
Council and the European Convention on Human Rights is voluntary, the Court needs 
to prudentially seek to secure its continuing existence by not simply imposing its 
commands on every possible occasion. “A prudential dimension is,” Lindahl argues, 
“an ingredient feature of politics” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 308, emphasis omitted). The 
politics of legal boundaries, self-restraint included, is intertwined with the authority’s 
need not simply “to articulat[e], monitor[...] and uphold[...] a valid order [but also to] 
secur[e] the conditions for order” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 308, original emphasis). To make 
an exception in order to preserve the strange as strange, as other to us, comes hand in 
hand with self-preservation and the creation of conditions suitable for it. There is no 
overcoming of this ambiguity insofar as politics is thought as a dimension of positive, 
extant normative orders.  
The act of self-restraint is irreducibly an act of power that can also be contested 
as a misrepresentation and misrecognition of “our” collective. The Lautsi case is a 
poignant example of the ambiguous success of restrained collective self-affirmation. It 
is not difficult to oppose the Court’s representation of Europe on grounds that it, as 
Lindahl himself says by quoting Daniel Augenstein, “perpetuates ‘national 
majoritarian traditions at the expense of protecting religious minorities’” (Lindahl, 
2018, p. 352; Augenstein, 2013, pp. 470-471) and, thereby, misrecognizes a Europe 
that prefers religious freedom and plurality to social cohesion advanced by 
suppressing minorities. The responsive ethical act that was the Court’s use of the 
margin of appreciation that indirectly recognizes a Member State as another legal 
order that it cannot fully include within itself, may well look like an act of symbolic 
violence and hostility to plurality that completely misrecognizes what the Council of 
Europe ought  “really” to be about.  
By implication, there is no way to guarantee that the indirect recognition of the 
other as other than us is not a misrecognition of ourselves or of the other. After all, our 
fault lines do not necessarily lie precisely there where the legal authorities have drawn 
them. There are no guarantees that the legal translation of a question addressed to it 
appears as a just translation, and the answer as a just answer, to those who have posed 
the question. There is an inevitable failure even in the law’s success. “This success is,” 
as Lindahl writes:  
irreducibly ambiguous: authority, to be such, must hearken to summons; but 
an ineradicable positivity animates its response[.] The congruence and 
incongruence of question and response, of other and self, goes to the heart of 
what authority is about[.] (Lindahl, 2018, pp. 330-331)  
Responsive authority is never simply ethical, simply for “the good.” It always 
risks being seen as someone who does not understand the situation, the claim 
addressed to it nor what “we” “really” are. Therefore, it verges on “the evil.” No 
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positively existing order is fully free of violence and imposing itself from the outside 
on beings who would “prefer not to.”  
6.9 Conclusion 
From the perspective of messianic politics, Lindahl’s account is probably not 
radical enough. Unlike Agamben who seeks to formulate the coming to an end of the 
law and post-juridical forms-of-life as a response to sovereign violence, Lindahl sees 
in the paradoxical structure of authority political promise that cannot, however, be a 
promise of the end of violence tout court. What Lindahl calls “the in-between” is the 
paradoxical “zone of indistinction” between the self and the other: “a relation and non-
relation between self and other” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 284, emphasis omitted). The 
boundary between the self and the other does not belong to either side, but resists 
appropriation by either of them. Although drawing boundaries does give rise to the 
difference between the self and the other, it is irreducibly also the always-present 
possibility of disorientation and inoperativity internal to all joint action. Lindahl will 
insist that for every representation, there is an irreducible non-representation, for 
every recognition, a misrecognition, for every identification of something as 
something, a pluralization of this something that haunts all authoritative claims to re-
cognize what the collective “truly” is. According to Lindahl, it is, thus, an important 
normative task of legal authorities to seek to respond to claims of misrecognition and 
misrepresentation. They can do so by probing the possibilities of transforming the 
default setting of legal boundaries in order to include those who claim to be 
unjustifiably excluded, or by restraining the application of the legal solution in order 
to exclude those who claim to be unjustifiably included. Each new act of authoritative 
boundary-drawing or boundary-suspension remains, however, questionable. 
Collectives are “irreducibl[y] contingen[t] because there can be [...] no inclusion, no 
unification, no identification, without [...] exclusion, pluralization and differentiation” 
(Lindahl, 2018, p. 337).   
Lindahl’s account thus is interestingly close to, and far away from, Agamben’s. 
Remember that for Agamben, the problem is the “negative foundation”: putting two 
separate terms (like voice and meaning, bare life and law) into a relation with each 
other in such a manner that the first term functions as the foundation for the second, 
but only as excluded. Bare life is excluded from law, and thereby captured in the state 
of exception in which its biopolitical dominance is rendered possible. Voice and bare 
life are presupposed as different from meaning and law, other to and excluded from 
them, although both terms of both pairs are constituted only through their relation. A 
relation is both “attractive and repulsive” (Agamben, 2016, p. 272) – or as Lindahl puts 
it, it “joins and separates.” Deactivation of such constituting relations does not destroy 
the elements, but rather exhibits them in a lack of relation. Following Giorgio Colli’s 
reading of Aristotle’s characterization of the activity of thought as thigein, “touching,” 
in which Colli defines this “contact” as “the indication of a representative nothing,” 
 
 259 
Agamben gives the name “contact” to this absence of relation that lets two points be in 
contact although “between them there is nothing” (Agamben, 2016, p. 237, citing Colli, 
La ragione errabonda). 
For Agamben: 
 
it is this thigein, this contact that the juridical order and politics seek by all 
means to capture and represent in a relation. Western politics is, in this sense, 
constitutively “representative,” because it always already has to reformulate 
contact into the form of a relation. It will therefore be necessary to think politics 
as an intimacy unmediated by any articulation or representation: human 
beings, forms-of-life are in contact, but this is unrepresentable because it 
consists precisely in a representative void, that is, in the deactivation and 
inoperativity of every representation. To the ontology of non-relation and use 
there must correspond a non-representative politics. (Agamben, 2016, p. 237) 
 
Lindahl’s response to this would be, I think, that Agamben’s account of legal 
representation is one-sided. From a Lindahlian perspective, although legal orders are 
representative, them being paradoxical implies that this representation is always 
inhabited by non-representation that the legal collective can indirectly indicate in self-
restraint. Both Agamben and Lindahl seek to express the contingency, non-necessity 
and a certain artificiality of all forms of order and positive forms of community, and to 
save the dimension of potentiality from its being hidden away by entrenched forms of 
representation. Lindahl’s “in-between” as a “hiatus between question and response” 
(Lindahl, 2018, p. 339) is not too far from Agamben’s “contact” that is “an absence of 
representation, [...] a cesura” (Agamben, 2016, p. 272). It also seeks to express the 
“underside” of all representation and bringing-into-relation: that no representation is 
necessary and without alternatives, that every relation lacks a “ground in Being” and 
that every order is an effect of an operation of unification of what lacks a pregiven 
order.  
Whereas Agamben’s emphasis falls on “the end,” on the deactivation of extant 
legal identities without positing new ones, Lindahl’s account keeps identity and its 
inoperativity together. For Lindahl, politics of legal boundaries operates “in” the 
paradox, both undoing and reformulating collective representations and identities. It 
falls beyond the possibilities of this work to evaluate in further detail Agamben’s 
proposal for “non-representative politics” and in what way, if any, the notion of the 
“form-of-life” would be able to avoid representation per se, given that it still denotes a 
positive collective way of life (like that of the Franciscans).65 For Lindahl, inoperativity 
 
65 In addition, the Franciscan monastery order would undoubtedly also fall within Lindahl’s 
rather expansive notion of a “legal collective.” This notion is independent of substantive identificatory 
criteria and instead emphasizes, as we have seen, self-individuation: that a collective identifies itself 
through representative acts (the meaning of which as representative always remain a wager and thus 
contestable). Alexander Ferrara argues, quite straightforwardly, that Lindahl’s account of the 
irreducibility of representation and inclusion/exclusion challenges Agamben (and such figures of post-
deconstructive thought as Jean-Luc Nancy and Esposito) to explain how a community without 
representation and point would be conceivable at all and distinguishable as a political community from 
mere humanity (Ferrara, 2019, pp. 373-374). My hunch is that when Agamben wishes to give a positive 
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is a moment immanent to the operation of law, a moment of the exposure of the 
indistinction between law and non-law, that makes possible both the transformation 
of the “default setting” of the legal order and its suspension in a way that seeks to 
respond to a claim to recognition. It can include what was excluded or exclude what 
was included, but it is constitutively unable of achieving justice in any absolute sense. 
For Lindahl, politics cannot only be conceived as being about bringing to an end. By 
contrast, it ought to obey “the imperative of politics, namely, the commitment of a 
responsive ethics to holding open the in-between that governs the encounter between 
collective self and other” (Lindahl, 2018, p. 347). Politics of legal boundaries ought not 
be brought to an end (Lindahl, 2018, p. 204), although bringing to an end is certainly 
a central element of such politics that seeks to hold open the threshold between the 
self and the other. Not to blindly enforce the self’s perspective as if the other simply 
counted as nothing may require self-suspension. In a way, responsive ethics is about 
politicizing the immunologic geared to self-preservation, as it is about exhibiting the 
contingency and inconsistency of the legal collective and about giving space to the 
conflict over the existence of forms of collectivity and their identity, rather than simply 
seeking to make political plurality invisible. For paradoxical legal totalities, restrained 
collective self-assertion may well be a way to seek to take responsibility for their 
existence that they can never fully justify in neutral terms.    
  
 
formulation to the inoperative community as a form-of-life (like the Franciscans), it becomes indeed 
impossible to detach the community from representation per se. 
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7. Conclusion: Orientations in legal formalism and the implications of
paradox for legal and political thought
The aim of this work has been to analyze different accounts of law as a totality, 
as one kind of “form” and “formalization” of norms, communications, behaviors and 
life, and to pinpoint various orientations to the problem of the limits of such a totality 
by analyzing the work of Hans Kelsen, Niklas Luhmann, Giorgio Agamben, Alain 
Badiou and Hans Lindahl.  
I have used as a methodological, heuristic tool Paul M. Livingston’s notion of 
the metalogical choice, or dualism, and his mapping of the three orientations of formal 
thought to totality: the constructivist-criteriological, the paradoxico-critical and the 
generic orientation. As we have seen, the categorization of the theorists analyzed is not 
straightforward, but I have modified the mapping when necessary. Kelsen may 
arguably be read as oscillating between the first two orientations, and, thus, also 
between metalogical choices. Luhmann’s categorization also presents some 
difficulties, as he explicitly recognizes the irreducibility of the inclosure paradox for 
law (and thereby prefers the inconsistent totality), and yet he argues that when 
sociologically observed, the legal system operates on grounds of what could be called 
a “pre-Cantorian ignorance” of its foundational inconsistency, always seeking to 
appear consistent by making its paradox invisible. I have, thus, labeled Luhmann a 
“paradoxico-constructivist” and “paradoxico-evolutionary” thinker who prefers to 
observe the conditions for the continuous operation of the system to thinking about 
the political implications of its inoperativity. Agamben’s and Badiou’s classifications 
in this work follows Livingston’s: the first is a paradoxico-critical and the second a 
generic thinker. What brings Agamben and Badiou together substantively, however, is 
a certain rejection of law as a site of politics, and the emphasis on politics beyond the 
boundaries of law. Lindahl is a representative of the paradoxico-critical approach who, 
by contrast, sees law as a site of politics.  
I have argued that we encounter an inclosure paradox, if we seek to draw the 
limits of law within the law itself and by its means. This is, at least, the position held, 
in different ways, by those theorists who make the metalogical choice in favor of 
inconsistent and complete totality, rather than consistent, but incomplete totality. I 
have argued that for a legal theory that takes seriously the autonomy of modern 
positive law, the recourse to the metalogical choice in favor of the consistent, but 
incomplete totality is not a viable option. Resorting, as the so-called “constructivist-
criteriological” positions do, to metalanguages, such as moral human rights or 
objective legal science, that would complete the positive legal form by securing the 
consistency of its limits from a neutral outside position, is impossible if the legal 
system is understood as autonomous. Also, Badiou’s generic orientation, although 
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otherwise harshly critical of constructivist positions, shares with them the preference 
for consistency, and for this reason, his position is problematic from the perspective 
of legal theory that sees in modern positive law an autonomously (self-referentially 
and hence inconsistently) operating system. It must, however, be remembered that 
seeing in the legal system a self-referentially operating totality is based on a 
metalogical decision taken in a situation of undecidability (and thus non-deductively), 
which implies that seeing in it a consistent, but incomplete, totality remains an option 
with different implications, some of which I have sought to pinpoint in the chapters 
on Kelsen and Badiou.   
From the perspective of formal legal thought that prefers to see in the legal 
totality the inclosure paradox, the legal system operates autonomously, on grounds of 
its closure, which implies that it will understand every question posed to it in legal 
terms and give a legal answer to each question. It is complete in this sense. Kelsen (if 
read against the received interpretation as making the metalogical choice in favor of 
the complete, but inconsistent totality), Luhmann, Agamben and Lindahl all share this 
basic insight, although they interpret its significance very differently and draw 
different implications from it. Kelsen (conventionally interpreted, as preferring 
consistent and incomplete legal totality) and Badiou form an odd pair, insofar as they, 
regardless of their enormous differences, both make the metalogical choice in favor of 
the consistent, but incomplete totality. Kelsen’s intentions (in particular when 
conventionally read) are epistemological (constructivist-criteriological), Badiou’s 
political, but their common point is to view the legal form as consistent, although 
completable by an external truth (the legal scientific basic norm and the political truth 
of generic equality, respectively).  
I have, thus, also sought to show that when the limits of the legal totality are 
taken into focus, the relationship between law and non-law, in particular law and 
politics, comes into view. When the legal totality is taken to be at the focus of post-
metaphysical (or post-onto-theological) thinking, the nature of this totality as 
contingent becomes visible, and therefore also the problems that the contingency 
implies: the legal system or collective is unable to legitimate its existence and identity 
in response to challenges in any other way than by drawing from its own resources – 
which precisely is the problem in the first place. To observe the legal system as a 
paradoxical, self-referential totality implies that no fully satisfying neutral 
metalanguage that could solve this problem is forthcoming. This poses a challenge to 
theory to think about the ways in which the problem of nihilistic relativism, the mere 
perpetuation of self-referential social systems, can be avoided and how the normativity 
of the finite legal totality can be rethought. 
I have argued that Luhmann’s evolutionary account of the legal system 
downplays the political significance of the drawing of the limits of the legal totality, 
because it does not consider “the double inscription of the political,” but reduces 
politics to what the institutional political system can recognize. For Agamben, the 
paradoxical articulation of law and politics is exposed in the state of exception, which, 
in his analysis, has become the new normal, requiring “messianic” politics that 
deactivates the whole nihilistic sovereign-legal apparatus. For Badiou, what can be 
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said within a language, and by implication a legal system, is pre-determined by that 
language, and politics, the desire to say the unsayable, is thrown fully outside 
language, and the legal system, to a position from which law’s incompleteness, its 
incapacity to offer space for justice and politics, can only be disclosed. Politics is, then, 
the operation of seeking to carve that place of the self-determination of the political 
subject that is “nothing” within the legal system, incongruent to it, and therefore 
wholly outside it. Furthermore, it must be noted that as for Luhmann, the legal system 
needs to make its foundational paradox invisible and seek to appear consistent, his 
theory of law as a process of deparadoxification, with its emphasis on the need for 
consistency, may quite logically be completed by Badiou’s theory of politics, as Emilios 
Christodoulidis has suggested (and to whose work I have shortly referred in my 
discussions on Luhmann and Badiou). It would require further research to show if and 
how Badiou can account for legal change after the law’s political transgression in and 
by the event and in the post-evental truth procedure. After all, he seems to reject the 
view of the legal system as inconsistent, which is, for paradoxico-criticism, precisely 
the condition of legal transformation. For Lindahl, politics is about the dynamism of 
the inconsistent boundaries of a legal collective and its legal order, about their 
authoritative transformation that can take the form of including what was previously 
excluded or excluding what was previously included. The very inconsistency and 
paradox at the heart of the legal order is, for Lindahl’s paradoxico-criticism, also the 
site of the politics of its limits: how the order deals, always ambiguously and with no 
un-contestable outcome, with claims that challenge how it draws the limit between 
itself and its others.  
We have seen that although the access to objective morality from which to 
evaluate law is impossible, if modern positive law is understood as autonomous, this 
does not necessarily imply a straightforward reduction of law to a nihilistic relativism 
in which nothing counts except the functional operation of the legal system and its 
self-perpetuation. Through the discussion of the “immunologic,” nihilism and the 
possibility of politics, my aim has been both to show the danger of nihilistic relativism 
and map responses to it. Here the core problem has been how contingent legal orders 
may deal with their limits in such a way that does not render their perspective of reality 
absolute and imperialistic. With Lindahl and Agamben, I have sketched a politics of 
legal boundaries that both directly and indirectly seeks to attenuate the violence 
implied by the emergence of particular legal perspectives. However, the possibility of 
a legal order counting as political dominance cannot be finally excluded — at least 
insofar as we are not ready to renounce legal ordering of reality and life altogether.  
From a paradoxico-critical perspective, legal order is only ever capable of giving 
a legal answer to a challenge that questions the way it deals justice (we can name this 
the “reflexivity problem of justice”), but such an answer is nevertheless capable of 
transforming the limit between law and non-law, although in a way that remains 
contestable. That the identity of a legal order is inconsistent, that a legal order at any 
given moment both includes and excludes itself and its other in a way that cannot be 
justified in any ultimate sense, allows for an open set of situational re-adjustments of 
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its limits, generalizations that never become a consistent and complete universal set 
of full inclusion.  
Here a notable difference between Lindahl’s paradoxico-criticism and Badiou’s 
generic orientation arises. While for the latter, the vector of political transformation is 
from counting as nothing in a social situation to counting as everything within it, from 
a zero-degree appearance to a maximal appearance, and hence from exclusion to 
inclusion, for the former the vector may head in both directions. The important point 
that Lindahl makes is that inclusion is not the only possible positive normative move 
to make, but exclusion from a contingent positive order and the clearing of space for 
another, incongruous collective may also be what is claimed in the politics of 
boundaries. (Although it must be added that both Agamben and Badiou do argue for 
exclusion in the sense of the necessary dis-identification of the political subject from 
its extant social identity.) For Badiou, the political imperative reads: What was nothing 
in this world must become everything! According to Agamben, the imperative is: Bring 
the sovereign legal apparatus to its end! For Lindahl, instead, it says: Set collective 
boundaries in such a way that politics of legal boundaries is not brought to an end!  
All these formulations can be seen, although to show this would require some 
further research, as ways of both countering relativistic nihilism and re-thinking 
universalism for post-Cantorian (paradox-conscious) formal legal-political thought: 
rethinking universalism after the Universe, after the complete and consistent, 
comprehensive legal-political totality has been shown impossible. It seems to me that 
for both Agamben and Badiou, the new universalism consists in bringing to thought 
what Badiou calls the “generic set” and Agamben the “form-of-life.” These 
formulations are about a non-positive universal collectivity that is, in a somewhat 
bizarre way, singular because strictly unrecognizable by extant, authoritative 
articulations of collective identity and what subtracts from all of them. Such 
subtraction gives rise to a generic or aspecific collectivity of strictly equal beings, with 
no predicates that would represent them and thus produce inequalities between them. 
While both Agamben and Badiou seem to, accordingly, argue for a notion of politics 
as anti-representational, Lindahl argues for the irreducibility of the paradox of 
representation and, hence, also for a politics of the boundaries of positive orders. For 
Agamben and Badiou, the new universality is about an aspecific collectivity of singular 
“whatever beings,” as Agamben puts it (Agamben, 1993, p. 1). Such a collectivity is not 
a single positive order, but only unfolds in the mode of subtracting from and dis-
identifying with extant, inequality- and violence-producing collective identities, legal 
ones included (which only allows, for Badiou, the maximal positive appearance of what 
before counted as nothing). By contrast, Lindahl’s universalism is about keeping open 
the political space for staging the paradoxical limits of all extant, positive orders and 
collectives.     
Finally, and in conclusion, I want to suggest that the investigation into the 
paradoxico-criticism in legal theory has pinpointed a position in formal legal theory 
that abandons legal formalism as naive legal positivism, the view of the legal system 
as both consistent and complete, as a system that would be able to complete itself 
consistently, without any resistance from reality to which it applies itself. It also 
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abandons naive legal realism, the view that legal norms are ultimately reducible to 
mere social facts. What we have instead is a sort of “chiasma” between positivism and 
realism in law. We could call it “positivist realism” or “realist positivism” that 
recognizes the limit between law and reality as inconsistent and as the place where the 
authority of law to form itself into a unity encounters the resistance of non-law that it 
can neither fully ignore (positivism) nor fully embrace (realism).  
That legal orders and collectives are not fully positivist means that they are not 
in absolute control of their own emergence and operation — they are not autonomous 
in any absolute sense — but require “decisions” always in some way in excess of law’s 
posited structure. That legal orders and collectives are not fully realist means that 
these decisions are not merely empirical acts, but these acts must always claim to be 
representative and point beyond themselves to a “form” that could secure their 
meaning, beyond their mere taking place. “The decision” here marks the limit of legal 
formalization, something that the legal form needs and yet cannot fully grasp. It is the 
point at which the law as a formal structure is taken beyond itself (as it cannot fully 
control it) and yet also given to itself (as it needs it for its emergence).  
The realism here is not, as should be clear by now, naive realism that holds that 
entities exist in themselves as what they are regardless of any structure of 
representation, recognition, meaning or knowledge which mediate access to them. The 
point is not a romantic return to the “state of nature.” (As we saw with Agamben, the 
figure of the state of nature is itself a product of a structure.) The realism I have in 
mind refers rather to what we discussed, with Lindahl, as the “resistance of reality” to 
the attempts of the collective self to persevere, to preserve itself in existence. If, on the 
one hand, the only access to reality is mediated by structure, which sets the conditions 
for meaningful appearance of beings as this or that, every structure still, on the other 
hand, leaves a remainder, an excess that is beyond its powers of signification and that 
cannot be brought to appearance by its means. Whereas constructivism only 
recognizes that something either is because namable by the structure, or is not because 
unnamable, the paradox announces a site where nameability and un-nameability, 
structure and reality, cross. When there is both closure and transcendence, merely 
constructivist position becomes impossible. The post-metaphysical position behind 
paradoxico-criticism in legal theory could, thus, also be characterized as “constructive 
realism.”  
It is with this excess of the real that remains inappropriable that the legal 
collective needs to constantly deal with. The Sovereign, or authority, both inside and 
outside the structure, is the name for the shifting limit between structure and reality. 
Critique of authority is first and foremost self-criticism: the ability of the collective self 
to indirectly recognize the excess of reality within itself, as well as the contingency and 
ultimate unjustifiability of its limits. The task of critique is to keep making manifest, 
“faithfully,” we might say with Badiou, the limits of the legal order and the zone of 
indistinction in which the order and reality cross. Law’s “impotentiality,” its non-
operation or inoperativity is the moment for staging as an open question that there is 
a legal collective and where exactly its limits lie, how exactly “our” law ought to be 
distinguished from non-law, as a question to which no single right answer can be 
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found. Such moments of inoperativity resist the undeniable need of the system to again 
find closure and render the constitutive inconsistency invisible. The political is what 
appears as the “para-site” of each established social system (as a site at the limits of 
each of them) that sutures the systemic, “consistent” interiority to its inappropriable 
outside, ruining it as pure constructivism. 
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